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GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES 

IN CONTINENTAL 

EUROPE 



BY 



A. LAWRENCE LOWELL 



IN TWO VOLUMES 
VOL. I 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

®fc ffittoer#be pre$& Camfcriboe 

1900 



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4 nn 



Copyright, 1896, 
By ABBOTT LAWRENCE LOWELL. 

All rights reserved. 



FIFTH IMPRESSION. 



The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A. 
Electrotyped and Printed by H. 0. Houghton and Company. 



To the memory of 

EDWARD JACKSON LOWELL 

whose sympathy and wise counsel 

were an invaluable help in the 

preparation of these pages 



PREFACE. 



The State has been represented at sundry times 
under different figures. In the frontispiece to Hobbes' 
Leviathan, in the edition of 1651, it is given the form 
of a gigantic prince whose body is composed of minute 
human beings of every kind. A more common symbol 
is that of a ship sailing the trackless ocean, with a 
venerable pilot at the helm, steering by the light of the 
everlasting stars. To the writer the State sometimes 
presents itself under the figure oi a stage-coach with 
the horses running away. On the front a number of 
eager men are urging the most contrary advice on the 
driver, whose chief object is to keep his seat; while 
at the back a couple of old gentlemen with spy-glasses 
are carefully surveying the road already traversed. 
Now, useful as all these persons undoubtedly are, there 
ought to be room also for the quiet observers, who 
watch the movements of the horses, and note the strain 
on the wheels, axles, and bolts ; who listen to the hub- 
bub on the front seat, and the grave conversation at 
the rear. To drop the simile and speak directly, there 
is a real need to-day of a thorough examination into 
the actual working of modern governments, and in one 



vi PREFACE. 

direction at least that need is still imperfectly satisfied. 
I refer to the activity of the parties, which furnish the 
main motive power in public life. 

A great deal of discussion has taken place of late 
over the question whether political parties are a good or 
an evil, but from a scientific point of view this seems 
very like making the same inquiry about the winds and 
the tides. In reality parties are a fact, and as such 
their manifestations ought to be studied. Moreover, it 
is impossible to say that parties in the abstract are a 
good or an evil, because the result depends on the circum- 
stances under which they act. In Venice, for example, 
the absence of parties, or factions, prevented the State 
from falling into anarchy and despotism like the other 
Italian republics. In England the existence of two 
strong parties enabled the people to control the crown, 
and made parliamentary government possible. In 
France the subdivision of parties has prevented the 
parliamentary system from being a success, and both 
there and in Germany it has been a constant obstacle 
to popular government ; while in Switzerland the sub- 
division and low development of parties has enabled 
the people to maintain one of the most perfect democra- 
cies the world has ever seen. 

The phenomena of parties considered as a fact have 
been examined much less than they deserve. Perhaps 
the best work in this line is that of Dupriez, whose 
book, " Les Ministres dans les Principaux Pays 
d' Europe et d'Amerique," appeared while the following 



PEEFACE. vii 

pages were in preparation, and with whose conclusions 
the writer agrees in the main. Dupriez approaches the 
subject, however, from a somewhat different direction, 
for he deals primarily with the minister and treats of 
the parties so far as they affect his authority ; while the 
writer was interested first in the parties themselves, and 
considered the position of the cabinet from its bearing 
on their condition. 

The present work deals only with a very small part 
of the great subject of political parties. It is simply an 
attempt to study the relation between the development 
of parties and the mechanism of modern government, 
and other questions are referred to only so far as they 
have a bearing on the main theme. In carrying out 
this object, a systematic order of arrangement has been 
followed so far as practicable. The treatment of each 
country begins with a description of its chief institu- 
tions, or political organization ; this is followed by a 
sketch of its recent history, in order to show how the 
parties actually work ; and, finally, an attempt is made 
to find the causes of the condition of party life. The 
investigation is limited to the principal countries where 
a division into two great parties does not prevail, and 
where there usually exists in its place a division into a 
number of more or less sharply defined political groups. 
This department of the subject seemed to separate itself 
naturally from the rest, and was selected mainly because 
it had been far less studied than the growth and in- 
fluence of the bi-party system that prevails generally 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. 



viii PREFACE. 

For the convenience of students, the constitutions of 
all the nations dealt with that have written constitutions 
have been added in an appendix ; and they have been 
given in their original languages, because they are 
more valuable in this form than in a translation. In 
the case of Switzerland, where the constitution is 
officially printed in German, French, and Italian, the 
French text has been selected. 
Boston, September 4, 1896. 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 

FRANCE : INSTITUTIONS. 

PAGE 

Origin and nature of parliamentary government in England . . 2 

The system imperfectly copied on the Continent ... 6 

The French constitutional laws ....... 7 

History of their creation ....... 8 

The method of amendment ....... 12 

Their legal and moral effect 13 

The Chamber of Deputies 14 

The method of election, scrutin de liste and scrutin d'arrondisse- 

ment 15 

The Chamber a tumultuous body 18 

The Senate 19 

Its functions and actual influence . . . ... .21 

The ministers as a rule not responsible to it . . . . 22 

The National Assembly 26 

The President of the Republic ....... 26 

~ His functions . . . . . . . . . .27 

-His powers really exercised by responsible ministers . . 28 

The Council of State 30 

The ministers .......... 32 

Their responsibility to the Chamber of Deputies . . .33 
Their enormous power (which is due to the four following mat- 
ters) 33 

The paternal nature of the government 34 

The centralization of local government ...... 36 

The department, with its prefect and general council . . 36 

The arrondissement and the canton 40 

The commune, with its mayor and communal council . . 40 

Paris and Lyons 42 

' The legislative powers of the executive 43 

Ordinances and appropriations ...... 44 



x CONTENTS. 

The judicial powers of the executive 47 

Difference between English and French history ... 47 
In England the royal power grew early and took a judicial 

form 48 

In France it developed late and took an administrative 

form .......... 51 

Effect of the doctrine of the separation of powers . . .54 
Questions of the legality of official acts withdrawn from the 

ordinary courts 55 

The administrative courts and the court of conflicts . . 57 

The state of siege 63 

Effect of the French system on the position of the ministers . . 64 

Note on Gneist's views on English and French history ... 65 



CHAPTER II. 

FRANCE : PARTIES. 

The influence of parties in popular government . . . .69 

The parliamentary system normally produces two parties . . 70 

It cannot work well otherwise ....... 72 

In France there are many parties or groups 74 

History of parties under the Third Republic 75 

The presidency of Thiers 76 

The presidency of MacMahon . 77 

His struggle with the Republicans 79 

The progress towards the Left . 80 

The growth of personal politics 83 

The career of Boulanger ........ 85 

Its effect on the Right 87 

The Church accepts the Republic 89 

The policy of Republican concentration and its failure . . 91 

The cabinet of Casimir-Perier 94 

His presidency 95 

The breaking up of the Conservative majority .... 96 

Bourgeois' Radical cabinet 98 

The Conservative cabinet of Meline . . . . • .99 

Causes of the subdivision of parties ...... 101 

Lack of a political consensus 101 

Theoretical character of French political opinions . • . 105 

Lack of the habit of political organization 106 

The election of the deputies by majority vote . . . 108 



CONTENTS. xi 

The system of committees in the Chambers . . . . Ill 
This undermines the authority of the cabinet and its ability 

to hold the majority together 114 

The use of interpellations 117 

This has a similar effect 118 

It is due to jealousy of the ministers 124 

Results of the subdivision of parties 127 

A change of ministry does not mean change of party . .127 

The cabinets short lived 128 

As a rule they are coalitions and therefore weak . . . 129 

They must confer favors on the deputies to win votes . . 130 
The deputies in turn must curry favor with the local nominating 

committees and the constituents ...... 132 

Prospects of the Republic 137 

Since the Revolution there has been no change of the party in 

power without a revolution 138 

Financial dangers 142 

Possible organic changes 144 



CHAPTER.aiI. 

ITALY : INSTITUTIONS. 

The formation of the kingdom 146 

The Statuto 150 

The King 152 

The ministers 153 

The Senate 154 

The Chamber of Deputies 156 

The franchise, the method of election, etc 157 

The administrative system 161 

The ordinance power 165 

The civil service . „ , 166 

Local government 168 

The judicial system 170 

The courts and the officials 171 

Administrative law and the administrative courts . . .173 

Weakness of the judicial system 176 

The church 178 

The doctrine of a free church in a free state .... 179 

The monastic orders , 181 

The Pope, and the law of the Papal Guarantees . . . 182 
Embarrassing situation of the Vatican 186 



xii CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER IV. 

ITALY : PARTIES. 

History of parties 189 

Cavour's relation to parties 189 

Government by the Right 190 

Effect of the advent to power of the Left in 1876 . . .191 

The Depretis-Nicotera cabinet 193 

The Cairoli-Zanardelli cabinet . 195 

The Cairoli-Depretis coalition 197 

Successive cabinets of Depretis, and the Transformismo . . 198 

The cabinets of Crispi and his fall 200 

The bank scandals, the Sicilian insurrection, the restoration of 

Crispi and his defeat 201 

Causes of the condition of parties 204 

The attitude of the Clericals ....... 205 

The system of committees ....... 206 

Interpellations 210 

The political character of the people as shown in the lack of 

unity in the cabinets • 212 

The prominence of the personal element ..... 214 
The social disorganization in the south ..... 215 

The political cliques 216 

And their relation to the deputies 218 

The connection between national and local parties in France and 

Italy 220 

Autocratic power inconsistent with a parliamentary system . . 226 

The need of a stronger judiciary 228 

Outlook for the future 230 



CHAPTER V. 

GERMANY : THE STRUCTURE OF THE EMPIRE. 

The Holy Roman Empire . . '232 

The growth of Prussia 233 

The Germanic Confederation and the Diet ..... 234 
The failure of the Liberal attempt at union in 1848-49 . . 236 

Bismarck and the war of 1866 237 

The North German Confederation and the Empire . • . 240 

The constitution . 241 

Nature of the federal union 243 

Legislative centralization and executive decentralization . . 243 



CONTENTS. xiii 

Inequality of rights among the members .... 246 

The privileges of Prussia 246 

The privileges of the other states 249 

The Reichstag : its composition 252 

Its powers 256 

The Bundesrath : its composition 259 

Its character and the position of the members . . . 262 

Its internal organization 265 

Its powers and privileges ....... 267 

Its actual influence 272 

The Emperor 273 

Interlacing of his powers as Emperor and as King of Prussia . 274 

The Chancellor 276 

He is not responsible to the Reichstag ..... 278 
His functions and substitutes 279 

The judicial system: The Reichsgericht ...... 281 

Power of the courts to hold statutes unconstitutional . . 282 

General character of the federal system 284 



CHAPTER VI. 

GERMANY : PRUSSIA AND THE SMALLER STATES. 

Prussia : The constitution 286 

The King 288 

The ministers responsible only to him ..... 288 
Their independence of each other ..... 290 

The bureaucracy 293 

Administrative justice, and the administrative courts . . 294 

The Landtag : its powers and procedure .... 297 

The House of Peers 301 

The House of Representatives 303 

The three-class system of election, and its effects . . 303 
The new local government ....... 308 

The objects of the reform 310 

The principles of the system 311 

The province and its organs 314 

Berlin 318 

The Regierungsbezirk • 318 

TheKreis 321 

The rural commune, and the manor 325 

The city 327 

Actual working of the system ...... 331 



xiv CONTENTS. 

Saxony . 334 

Bavaria : Institutions 337 

Parties 338 

Wurtemberg : Institutions 340 

Parties 343 

Baden : Institutions 344 

Parties 345 

Hesse 347 

Oldenburg 348 

Brunswick 350 

Anhalt 351 

Waldeck 353 

Lippe-Detmold . 354 

Schaumburg-Lippe 355 

Saxe- Weimar 356 

Saxe-Meiningen 357 

Saxe-Coburg-Gotha > • . . 358 

Saxe-Altenburg 359 

Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt 361 

Schwarzburg-Sondershausen 361 

Reuss-Schleiz 362 

Reuss-Greiz 363 

The two Mecklenburgs 364 

Hamburg, Bremen, and LUbeck ^. .368 

Alsace-Lorraine 372 

The vitality of monarchy in Germany 376 



GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES IN 
CONTINENTAL EUROPE. 



CHAPTER I. 



FRANCE: INSTITUTIONS. 



In order to understand the government of a country 
it is not enough to know the bare structure of its insti- 
tutions. It is necessary to follow the course of politics ; 
to inquire how far the various public bodies exercise the 
authority legally vested in them ; and to try to discover 
the real sources of power. It is necessary, in short, to 
study the actual working of the system ; and although 
this depends chiefly upon the character, the habits, and 
the traditions of the people, it is also influenced in no 
small measure by details, like the method of voting, the 
procedure in the legislative chambers, and other mat- 
ters, that are too often overlooked on account of their 
apparent insignificance. Now in several of the states 
on the Continent of Europe the main features of repre- 
sentative government have been copied directly or indi- 
rectly from English models, while the details have grown 
up of themselves, or are a survival from earlier tradi- 
tion. It is not surprising, therefore, that the two are 



2 FRANCE. 

more or less inconsistent with each other, and that this 
want of harmony has had a pronounced effect on public 
life. 

Although most people to-day are familiar with the 
Parliament- parliamentary system of government as it has 
rnlnt°m ern " developed in England, it may not be out of 
England. pl ace to give a brief description of it here on 
account of the profound influence it has had in other 
countries. 

The Middle Ages gave birth to two political ideas. 
The first of these was a division of the people into 
separate classes or estates, each of which had independ- 
ent political functions of its own. The second was 
representative government, or the election — by those 
estates whose members were too numerous to assemble 
in a body — of deputies authorized to meet together 
and act for the whole estate. The number of these 
estates, and the number of separate chambers in which 
their representatives sat, varied in the different coun- 
tries of Europe ; 1 but it so happened that in England 
all the political power of the estates became in time 
vested in two chambers. 2 One of them, the House of 
Lords, contained the whole body of peers, who were the 

1 Thus in France, and in most continental countries, there were three, 
while in Sweden there were four : the clergy, the nobles, the cities, and 
the peasants. The existence of only two Houses in England might almost 
be called an accident. (Cf . Freeman, Growth of the English Constitution, 
p. 93.) 

2 In 1664 Convocation, which was the ecclesiastical chamber, discon- 
tinued the practice of voting separate taxes on the clergy, and thus the 
clergy definitely ceased to be an estate of the realm. (See Hallam, 
Const. Hist, of England, chap, xvi.) 



ORIGIN OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 3 

successors of the great feudal vassals of the Crown ; 
while the other, the House of Commons, was composed 
of the deputies from the towns and counties, who had 
gradually consolidated into a single house, and might 
he said to represent all the people who were not peers. 

By degrees the House of Commons acquired the 
right of originating all bills for raising or spending 
money, and hence its support became essential to the 
Crown. But its members were independent, and on 
the whole less open to court influence than the peers. 
They felt under no obligation to support the policy of 
the government, or to vote an appropriation unless they 
understood and approved the purpose for which it was 
to be used; and King William III., during his wars 
with France, found them by no means as easy to man- 
age as he could wish. Hitherto his ministers had been 
selected from both political parties, and hence were not 
in harmony with each other, and were unable to exert 
an effective influence in Parliament ; but between 1693 
and 1696 he dismissed the Tories, and confided all the 
great offices of state to the Whigs, who had a majority 
in the Commons. The result was that the House which 
had been turbulent became docile; and the ministers 
by winning its confidence were able to guide it, and 
obtain the appropriations that were required. This was 
the origin of the practice of selecting the ministers from 
the leaders of the majority in Parliament, — a practice 
which at a later time crystallized into a principle of the 
British Constitution. 1 But of course men who held 
the most important offices, and at the same time led the 

1 Macaulay, History of England, chap. xx. 



4 FRANCE. 

House of Commons, were certain not to be mere tools 
in the hands of the King. They were sure to try to 
carry out their own policy, and when the sceptre of 
William had passed into the hands of the first two 
Georges, who were foreigners and took little interest in 
English politics, the ministers exercised the royal power 
as they pleased, and became in fact the custodians of 
the prerogatives of the Crown. The subordination of 
the King to his ministers is, indeed, the inevitable re- 
sult of the system ; for so long as the latter retain their 
influence over the House, and can direct its votes, they 
can hold their offices and administer them according to 
their own views. If the King attempts to dismiss them 
they can block the wheels of government, by inducing 
Parliament to withhold supplies ; and if, on the other 
hand, they cease to be the leaders of the House, and 
a different party with new leaders gets a majority, the 
King finds himself obliged to send for these and intrust 
the government to them. The system which had been 
devised in order that the King might control the House 
of Commons became, therefore, the means by which the 
House of Commons, through its leaders, controlled the 
King, and thus all the power of the House of Commons 
and of the Crown became vested in the same men, who 
guided legislation and took charge of the administration 
at the same time. 

The House of Lords, meanwhile, was losing ground. 
It had no right to initiate or amend money bills, and, 
what was far more important, it had no influence on the 
formation or the policy of the cabinet. The ministers 
were, indeed, often peers, but they were not selected 



NATURE OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 5 

because they belonged to the majority in the House of 
Lords, nor did they resign when that body voted against 
them. Like their colleagues from the other House, they 
represented the majority in the Commons, and were 
solidly in accord with it. The House of Lords, there- 
fore, found itself confronted by the combined power of 
the Crown and the House of Commons, and this it was 
unable to resist. In fact the power to create new peers 
furnished the Crown, or rather the ministers acting in 
its name, with a weapon always ready to break an 
obstinate resistance, and at the time of the Reform Bill 
of 1832 a threat of this kind was enough to compel 
submission. The Upper House has thus gradually lost 
authority, until now it does not venture to reject any 
measure on which the cabinet is really in earnest, — 
unless perchance, as in the case of the recent Home 
Rule bill, it is convinced that the House of Commons 
does not fairly represent the people, and that a new 
election would result in a victory for the party in oppo- 
sition. In such a case the refusal to pass the measure 
is tantamount to a demand for a Referendum. 1 

The ministers remain in office only so long as they 
continue to be the leaders of the Lower House and are 
able to control the majority. When this condition has 
changed, a vote is sometimes passed to the effect that 
the ministers have ceased to possess the confidence of 
the House ; but such an express declaration is rarely used 

1 It is a curious fact that the Premier of New South Wales has recently 
proposed to prevent deadlocks between the Houses by providing that 
after a bill has been rejected once by the Legislative Council and again 
passed by the Assembly, the Council shall not have power to reject it a 
second time, but may require it to be submitted to popular vote. A sim- 
ilar proposal has been discussed in Belgium. 



6 FRANCE. 

at the present day, and a hostile vote on any matter of 
considerable importance is treated as a proof that the 
government has no longer the support of a majority. 
After such a vote, therefore, the ministers resign, and 
if there is a normal division into two parties the Crown 
sends for the leader of the opposition, and intrusts him 
with the formation of a cabinet. The defeated minis- 
ters have, however, one other alternative. If they think 
that the House of Commons has ceased to be in har- 
mony with the opinion of the nation, they can dissolve 
Parliament in the name of the Crown, and try the 
chance of a new election. Thus in the English parlia- 
mentary system the direction of the legislature, and the 
control of the executive, is in the hands of the leaders 
of the majority in the House of Commons. For their 
exercise of power these leaders are directly responsi- 
ble to the House of Commons, which can call them to 
account at any time ; while the House itself is responsi- 
ble to the people, which gives its verdict whenever the 
end of the term of Parliament or a dissolution brings 
about a general election. 

Turning now from the consideration of English forms 
Parliament- °^ government to those in use on the Con- 
ment°ra the tinent, we find that the main features of the 
British Constitution have been very generally 
imitated. In fact, the plan of two chambers, one of 
which issues from an extended suffrage and has the 
primary control of the purse, and of a cabinet whose 
members appear in the chambers and are jointly respon- 
sible to the more popular one, so that all the ministers 
resign on an adverse vote of that chamber, is of Eng- 



ENGLISH SYSTEM IMPERFECTLY COPIED. 7 

lish origin, and has spread widely over Europe. These 
features of the parliamentary system are striking, and 
have become famous, while the procedure in the House 
of Commons, which enables the system to work smoothly, 
has attracted far less attention, and has been followed 
very little. This is peculiarly true of France, where the 
principle of cabinet responsibility has been adopted to 
the fullest extent, but where there exist at the same 
time several practices that help to twist parliamentary 
government out of the normal form. More curious still 
is the fact that these very practices have been blindly 
copied by other countries which intended to imitate the 
English system. 

A description of the French government must begin 
with its structure, with the legal composition Outline or 
and powers of the different political bodies, seeonfch^ 
This will occupy the present chapter. In the terSe 
next, the actual working of the system will be consid- 
ered, especially in regard to the character of political 
parties ; and an attempt will be made to explain the 
peculiarities that are found by a reference to the condi- 
tion of the people, and to those parts of the political 
machinery that seem to have a marked effect. In other 
words, we shall begin with the skeleton, and then take 
up the muscles and nerves. 

The first thing one looks for in a modern government 
is the constitution ; but although the French 
Republic has a constitution, it differs in two Constitu- 
very important respects from those to which 
we are accustomed. It is not comprised in any one 
document, but in a series of distinct laws, and it 



8 FKANCE. 

contains few provisions limiting the functions of the 
different bodies, or prescribing fundamental rights 
which the state is enjoined to respect. This is a depart- 
ure not only from American, but also from the earlier 
French usage, for previous constitutions in France have 
been long documents and have contained elaborate 
bills of rights ; although the absence of practical guar- 
antees has made their effectiveness depend upon the 
good pleasure of the government. The present consti- 
tution is very different, and barely provides for the 
organization of the powers of the state, without even 
speaking of such important matters as a yearly budget 
or the tenure of office of the judges. It does little 
more than establish the main framework of the govern- 
ment by declaring what the chief organs of public life 
shall be, leaving them almost entirely free to exercise 
their authority as they see fit. The reason for such a 
departure from French traditions is to be found in the 
circumstances of the case. The earlier constitutions in 
France were attempts to frame an ideal system, but the 
present one resulted from an immediate need of pro- 
viding a regular government of some sort that could 
rule the country for the time, and was drawn up by 
men who had no belief in its inherent perfection. To 
understand this it is necessary to glance at the history 
of the period. 

The rapid series of defeats suffered by the French 
History of armies at the hands of the Germans, in 1870, 
its creation. a estrove( j t k e tottering authority of the 
empire, and as soon as the news of the surrender of 
Napoleon III. at Sedan reached Paris an insurrection 



THE CONSTITUTION. 9 

broke out on the fourth of September. The republic 
was at once proclaimed, but this was no time to debate 
plans for a constitution, and so long as the war lasted 
the country was ruled by the self -elected Government 
of the National Defense. When the war was over, a 
National Assembly with indefinite powers was chosen 
by universal suffrage. The member of this body who 
commanded the most general public confidence was 
Thiers, the historian, and former minister of Louis 
Philippe. To him the Assembly intrusted the execu- 
tive power, and in August, 1871, it gave him the title 
of President, without, however, fixing any term for the 
duration of the office. Thiers was constantly urged 
to introduce the parliamentary system by allowing his 
ministers to assume the responsibility for his acts, but 
this he refused to do, saying that the position in which 
it would place him, although perfectly consistent with 
the dignity of an hereditary king, was for him, a little 
bourgeois, entirely out of the question. 1 He held him- 
self, however, personally responsible to the Assembly 
for the conduct of his government, took part in the 
debates on the measures he proposed, and declared that 
he was ready to resign at any time, if the majority 
wanted him to do so. 2 This state of things continued 

1 The law of Aug. 31, 1871, declared that the President as well as the 
ministers should be responsible to the Assembly. See Dupriez, Les Mi- 
nistres dans les Principaux Pays d' Europe et a" Amerique, vol. ii. p. 320. 

2 The law of March 13, 1873, abolished the right of the President to 
take part in debate, and while allowing him to address the Assembly, 
ordered the sitting to be suspended immediately after his speech. This 
was, of course, an attempt to reduce the personal influence of Thiers. 
(Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 321-22.) 



10 FRANCE. 

for nearly two years, when a hostile vote forced Thiers 
to retire. His successor. Marshal MacMahon, was 
elected for a term of seven years, and as the new 
President was not a member of the Assembly, his cabi- 
net became responsible in the parliamentary sense. 
But although the chief magistrate now held office for 
a fixed period, and was freed from the caprices of an 
uncertain majority, still there was no constitution and 
no permanent organization of the government. The 
situation was, in fact, a provisional one, prolonged ab- 
normally by the strange condition of politics. The 
monarchists formed a majority of the Assembly, but 
they were hopelessly divided into two sections, — the 
Legitimists, whose candidate was the Comte d£ Cham- 
bord, and the Orleanists, who followed the Comte de 
Paris. At one moment it seemed not impossible that 
the Comte de Chambord might become king, and some 
of his supporters opened negotiations for the purpose ; 
but these were brought to nothing by obstinacy of the 
Prince himself, who was a true scion of his race, and 
would not yield one jot of his pretensions. He even 
refused to accept the tricolor flag that means so much 
to Frenchmen, and clung doggedly to the ancient white 
standard of his house. Under such circumstances, a 
monarchy was out of the question, and so this assembly 
The Constitu- °^ m( >narchists at last set to work to organize 
tionai Laws. a republic ; or rather a sufficient number of 
monarchists, feeling that a republic was, for the time 
at least, inevitable, joined with the minority to estab- 
lish a government on the only basis possible. 1 But 

1 Very good brief descriptions of the formation of the Constitution 



THE CONSTITUTION. 11 

although the republican form was adopted, the institu- 
tions that were set up departed essentially from the 
ideas which the French had been accustomed to asso- 
ciate with that term. The present government, like 
all political systems that have been created suddenly 
and have proved lasting, was essentially a compromise. 
From the French republican principles there was bor- 
rowed, besides the name, little more than the election of 
the chief magistrate, while from the traditions of con- 
stitutional monarchy were taken the irresponsibility of 
the head of the state, and the existence of a second 
legislative chamber. 1 Now it was natural that no one 
should feel inclined to construct an ideal system on a 
hybrid foundation of this kind. Moreover none of the 
parties regarded the work of the Assembly as final, for 
the monarchists looked forward to a future restoration 
of the throne, while their adversaries hoped to place 
the republic before long on a more secure and perma- 
nent footing. Hence the Assembly did no more than 
provide for the immediate organization of the govern- 
ment in as brief and practical a manner as possible. It 
passed three constitutional laws, as they are called, 
which are in the form of ordinary statutes, and very 

may be found in Boze*rian's Etude sur la Revision de ^Constitution, and 
in Professor Currier's Constitutional and Organic Laws of France. The 
latter, published as a supplement to the Annals of the American Academy 
of Political Science (March, 1893), gives a translation into English of all 
these laws. See also an article by Saleilles on the " Development of the 
Present Constitution of France." {Ann. Amer. Acad, of Pol. Sci., July, 
1895.) 

1 Lebon, Frankreich (in Marquardsen's Handbuch des Oeffentlichen 
Rechts), p. 19. 



12 FRANCE. 

short and concise. One of them, that of February 25, 
1875, provides for the organization of the powers of 
the state. Another, that of February 24, 1875, deals in 
greater detail with the organization of the Senate. And 
the third, dated July 16, 1875, fixes the relations of 
the powers of the state among themselves. 

The provisional character of the constitution is clearly 
Amend- seen m ^ ne me ^hod of amendment. It has 
ments. been the habit in France to make a sharp dis- 

tinction between the constituent and legislative powers, 
the former being withdrawn to a greater or less extent 
from the control of the Parliament. But in this in- 
stance both of the great parties wanted to facilitate 
changes in the fundamental laws, in order to be able to 
carry out their own plans whenever a favorable occasion 
might present itself. 1 A departure from tradition was 
therefore made, and it was provided that the constitu- 
tional laws could be amended by a National Assembly, 
or Congress, composed of the two branches of Parlia- 
ment sitting together, which should meet for this pur- 
pose whenever both chambers on their own motion, or 
on that of the President of the Republic, declared the 
need of revision. 2 The constitutional laws have been 



1 Cf . Borgeaud, Etablissement et Revision des Constitutions, pt. iii. liv. ii. 
ch. viii. 

2 Const. Law of Feb. 25, 1875, Art. 8. It is not provided whether the 
Chambers shall declare in general terms that there is a need of revision, 
or whether they shall specify the revision to be made, and this point has 
given rise to lively debates ; bnt on the two occasions when a revision was 
actually undertaken, the Chambers passed identical resolutions specifying 
the articles to be amended. (Lebon, Frankreich, pp. 74, 75 ; Saleilles, op. 
cit. pp. 6, 7, 9.) 



THE CONSTITUTION. 13 

twice amended in this way. On the first occasion 
(June 21, 1879), the provision making Versailles the 
capital was repealed, and thereupon a statute was 
passed transferring the seat of government to Paris. 1 
On the second occasion (August 14, 1884), several 
amendments were made. Among these one of the 
most notable changed the provisions relating to the 
mode of electing senators, and another declared that 
the republican form of government cannot be made the 
subject of proposal for revision, — the object of the 
latter being to prevent the destruction of the Republic 
by constitutional means. The device of providing that 
a law shall never be repealed is an old one, but I am 
not aware that it has ever been of any avail. 

This method of amendment has virtually rendered 
the Parliament omnipotent, for excepting the provision 
about changing the republican form of government, 
there is no restriction on its authority. The Chambers 
cannot, it is true, pass an amendment to the consti- 
tutional laws in the form of an ordinary statute, but 
if they are agreed they can pass it by meeting as a 
National Assembly. The power of the Chambers is 
therefore nearly as absolute as that of the British Par- 
liament. 2 The principle, moreover, that the funda- 
mental law cannot be changed by ordinary statute is 
devoid of legal sanction, for if the Chambers should 
choose to pass an act of this kind, no court or official 
could legally prevent its application. 3 But while the 

1 Law of July 22, 1879. This act provides, however, that the National 
Assembly shall meet at Versailles. 

2 Cf. Saleilles, op. cit., p. 11. 

3 Cf. Laferriere, Traite de la Jurisdiction Administrative, vol. ii. p. 5. 



14 FRANCE. 

constitution imposes no legal restraint on the Parlia- 
ment, it would be a great mistake to suppose that it 
had no effect. On the contrary, it has such moral force 
that any attempt to pass a statute that clearly violated 
its terms would awake a strong repugnance ; and indeed 
a suggestion by the president of one or other of the 
Chambers that a bill would be unconstitutional has more 
than once sufficed to prevent its introduction. 1 On the 
other hand, the fact that formal amendments can be 
made only in joint session, and only after both Chambers 
have resolved that there is a need of revision, has some 
influence in preventing changes in the text of the 
constitutional laws, because the Senate, being the more 
conservative body, and only half as large as the other 
House, is timid about going into joint session, not 
knowing what radical amendments may be proposed 
there, and fearing to be swamped by the votes of the 
deputies. 

Let us now examine the organs of the state in 
succession, taking up first the Parliament with its two 
branches, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies ; 
then turning to the President as the chief magistrate of 
the Republic, and finally passing to the ministers as the 
connecting link between the Parliament and the Presi- 
dent, and the controlling factor in the machinery of the 
state. 

The composition of the Chamber of Deputies is left to 
ordinary legislation, except that the constitu- 

TheCham- . _ J & _ _ ' /, _ r . 

berof Depu- tional law oi February 25, 1875, Art. 1, pro- 
vides for its election by universal suffrage. By 

1 Lebon, Frankreich f p. 23. 



THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. 15 

statute the ballot is secret, and the franchise extends to 
all men over twenty-one years of age who have not been 
deprived of the right to vote in consequence of a con- 
viction for crime, and who are not bankrupts, under 
guardianship, or in active military or naval service. 1 To 
be eligible a candidate must be twenty-five years old 
and not disqualified from being a voter. 2 Members of 
families that have ever reigned in France are, however, 
excluded; 3 and in order to prevent as far as possible 
the use of pressure the law forbids almost every state 
official to be a candidate in a district where his position 
might enable him to influence the election. 4 As a fur- 
ther safeguard against the power of the administration, 
which is justly dreaded by the French Liberals, it is 
provided that all public servants who receive salaries, 
except a few of the highest in rank, shall lose their 
offices if they accept an election to Parliament, and that 
a deputy who is appointed even to one of these highest 
offices, unless it be that of minister or under-secretary, 
shall lose his seat. 5 

The Chamber of Deputies is elected for four years, 
and consists at present of five hundred and The method 
seventy-six members ; ten of the seats being of electlon - 
distributed among the various colonies, and six allotted 
to Algiers, while the remaining deputies are chosen in 

1 Arts. 1, 2, and 5 of the Law of Nov. 30, 1875. Poudra et Pierre, 
Droit Parlementaire, sects. 482-84, 498-514. 

2 Law of Nov. 30, 1875, Arts. 6, 7. 

3 Law of June 16, 1885, Art. 4. 

4 Law of Nov. 30, 1875, Art. 12. 

6 Id., Arts. 8, 9, and 11. A deputy appointed to one of these offices 
may, however, be reelected (Art. 11). 



16 FRANCE. 

France. The method of election has varied from time 
to time between that of single electoral dis- 
fhte^l 6 tricts, a system called the scrutin d'arronr 
d'arron- dissement, and that of the scrutin de liste, 
which consists in the choice of all the deputies 
from each department on a general ticket, the difference 
being the same that exists between our method of elect- 
ing congressmen each in a separate district, and our 
method of choosing presidential electors on a single ticket 
for the whole State. The scrutin cfarrondissement or 
single district system prevailed from 1876 to 1885, when 
the scrutin de liste was revived; 1 partly, no doubt, in 
order to swamp the reactionary minority, but also with 
the hope of withdrawing the deputies from the pressure 
of petty local interests, which had become lamentably 
strong, of getting a Chamber of broader and more 
national views, and of forming a Republican majority 
that would be more truly a great and united party. 
The experiment did not last long enough to produce 
any sensible effect of this kind ; and indeed the change 
seems, on the whole, to have resulted in an increase of 
the power of the local politicians, who formed themselves 
into nominating and electoral committees for the depart- 
ment. At the general elections of 1885 the Reaction- 
aries gained rather than lost seats in spite of the scrutin 
de liste; and the disgust of the Republicans with the 
device from which they had hoped so much was brought 
to its height two or three years later, by General Bou- 
langer. This singular man, who, after enjoying a mar- 
velous popularity, became in a short time an object of 

1 Law of June 16, 1885. 



THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. 17 

contempt, if not of ridicule, had been minister of war in 
one of the recent Republican cabinets. He was forced 
to resign on account of his enormous expenditure on 
the army, and the fear that he would plunge the nation 
into a war with Germany. He then posed as the saviour 
of the country, and being at the height of his reputa- 
tion he made use of the scrutin cle liste to hold a 
plebiscite or popular vote of France piecemeal. When- 
ever a seat became vacant in a department he stood as 
a candidate, and if elected he held the seat only until 
a vacancy occurred in another department, when he 
resigned to appear as a candidate again. After doing 
this in several large departments he was able to declare 
that a considerable part of the French people had pro- 
nounced themselves on his side — a proceeding which 
would have been impossible if the deputies had been 
elected in five hundred and seventy-six separate dis- 
tricts. He threatened to carry the plan out completely 
at the general elections, by standing as a candidate 
in all the departments at once, hoping in this way to 
get a popular vote of the whole country in his favor ; 
but his success at the by-elections had so frightened 
the Republicans that they restored the scrutin d'arron- 
dissement or single electoral districts before the general 
election of 1889 took place. 1 

Every large body of men, not under strict military 
discipline, has larking in it the traits of a mob, and 

1 Law of Feb. 13, 1889. In order to frustrate more effectually Bon- 
langer's scheme, a law of July 17, 1889, provided that no one should be 
candidate in more than one district. The meaning and effects of these 
laws is discussed by Saleilles {Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.. Sci. r July, 1895, pp. 
19-37). 

VOL. I. 



18 FRANCE. 

is liable to occasional outbreaks when the spirit of dis- 
The Cham- or der becomes epidemic ; but the French 
muituous Chamber of Deputies is especially tumultuous, 
body ' and, in times of great excitement, sometimes 

breaks into a veritable uproar. Even the method of 
preserving order lacks the decorum and dignity that 
one expects in a legislative assembly. The President 
has power to call a refractory member to order and 
impose a penalty in case he persists; but instead of 
relying on this alone, he often tries to enforce silence 
by caustic remarks. The writer remembers being in 
the Chamber a few years ago when M. Floquet was 
presiding, — the same man who fought a duel with 
General Boulanger and wounded him in the throat. 
A deputy who had just been speaking kept interrupt- 
ing the member who was addressing the Chamber, and 
when called to order made some remark about parlia- 
mentary practice. The President cried out, " It is not 
according to parliamentary practice for one man to 
speak all the time." " I am not speaking all the time," 
said the deputy. " At this moment you are overbear- 
ing everybody," answered the President. This incident 
is related, not as being unusual or humorous, but as 
a fair sample of what is constantly occurring in the 
Chamber. Even real sarcasm does not seem to be 
thought improper. Thus in a recent debate a deputy, 
in the midst of an unusually long speech, was con- 
tinually interrupted, when the President, Floquet, ex- 
claimed, "Pray be silent, gentlemen. The member 
who is speaking has never before approached so near 
to the question." 1 These sallies from the chair are an 

1 Journal Officiel of Nov. 18, 1892. 



THE SENATE. 19 

old tradition in France, although, of course, their use 
depends on the personal character of the President. 
One does not, for example, find them at all in the 
reports of debates during the time Casimir-Perier was 
presiding over the Chamber. When the confusion gets 
beyond all control, and the President is at his wits' 
end, he puts on his hat, and if this does not quell the 
disturbance, he suspends the sitting for an hour in 
order to give time for the excitement to subside. 

The French Senate consists of three hundred mem- 
bers, and by the constitutional law of Feb- 
ruary 24, 1875, two hundred and twenty-five 
of these were to be elected for nine years by the depart- 
ments, while seventy-five were appointed for life by the 
same National Assembly that framed that law. The 
life senators were intended to be a permanent feature of 
the Senate, and it was provided that when any of them 
died his successor should be elected for life by the Sen- 
ate itself. A few years later, however, the Republi- 
cans, thinking such an institution inconsistent with 
democracy, passed the amendment to the constitutional 
laws, to which a reference has already been made. 1 
This, while leaving untouched the provisions relating 
to the existence and powers of the Senate, took away the 
constitutional character from those regulating the elec- 
tion of senators, which thus became subject to change 
by ordinary legislation. A statute was then passed 
(December 9, 1884) providing that as fast as the life 
senators died their seats should be distributed among 
the departments, and thus eventually all the senators 
1 Const. Law of Aug. 14, 1884. 



20 FRANCE. 

alike will be elected in the same way. There are eighty- 
six departments in France, and the senators are appor- 
tioned by the act among them according to population, 
so that when the life senators have disappeared the 
number of seats belonging to a department will vary 
from two up to ten, while the territory of Belfort, each 
of the three departments of Algiers, and several of the 
colonies are represented by one senator apiece. 1 The 
senators so elected hold office for nine years, one third 
retiring every three years. 2 They are chosen in each 
department of France by an electoral college composed 
of the deputies, of the members of the general council, 
of the members of the councils of the arrondissements, 
and of delegates chosen by the municipal councils of 
the communes of towns. 3 Before 1884 each commune 
elected only one delegate, 4 but by the law of that year 
the number of delegates increases with the size of the 
communes, though much less than in proportion to the 
population. These communal delegates form a large 
majority of the electoral college, and hence the Senate 
was called by Gambetta the Great Council of the Com- 
munes of France. 5 

A senator must be forty years old ; and since the law 
of 1884 the disqualifications for this office have been 
the same as for that of member of the Chamber of 
Deputies. 6 

1 Law of Dec. 9, 1884, Art. 2. 

2 Id., Art. 7. 

3 Id., Art. 6. 

4 Const. Law of Feb. 24, 1875, Art. 4. 

5 Saleilles, op. cit., p. 41. 

8 Law of Dec. 9, 1884, Arts. 4, 5, and Provisions Temporaires. Law 
of Dec. 26, 1887. Lebon, Frankreich, pp. 63, 64, 67. 



THE SENATE. 21 

The legislative power of the Senate and the Chamber 
of Deputies is the same, except that financial i tsfunc _ 
bills must originate in the latter; 1 but while tlons * 
it is admitted that the Senate may reduce proposals for 
taxes and appropriations, there is a dispute whether it 
can increase them or not, and debates on this point are 
constantly recurring. In practice the Chamber has some- 
times accepted augmentations thus introduced, but more 
frequently the Senate has abandoned them. 2 The Senate 
has two peculiar functions. First, its consent is neces- 
sary for a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, 3 a 
provision designed as a safeguard against the President, 
who might otherwise dissolve the Chamber in order to 
attempt a coup d'etat during its absence ; and, second, 
the President is authorized, with the approval of the 
Council of Ministers, to constitute the Senate a high 
court to try any one for an attempt on the safety of the 
state. 4 This power was used in the case of General 
Boulanger, who failed to appear for trial, and was con- 
demned in his absence. 

With such an organization and powers, an American 
might suppose that the Senate would be a Its actual 
more influential body than the Chamber of ^™* CQ - 

i Const. Law of Feb. 24, 1875, Art. 8. 

2 Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 430-32. 

3 Const. Law of Feb. 25, 1875, Art. 5. 

4 Lebon, Frankreich, p. 73, Const. Laws of Feb. 24, 1875, Art. 9, and 
July 16, 1875, Art. 12. The procedure was regulated by a law of Aug. 
10, 1889. By the Const. Law of July 16, 1875, Art. 12, the Chamber of 
Deputies can impeach the ministers, and in case of high treason the 
President of the Republic. The impeachments are tried by the Senate. 
For the interpretation put upon this clause, see Lebon, Frankreich 
pp. 55-58. 



22 FKANCE. 

Deputies ; but in reality it is by far the weaker body 
of the two, although it contains at least as much po- 
litical ability and experience as the other House, and, 
indeed, has as much dignity, and is composed of as 
impressive a body of men as can be found in any 
legislative chamber the world over. The fact is that 
according to the traditions of the parliamentary system 
the cabinet is responsible only to the more popular 
branch of the legislature, and in all but one of the 
instances where a cabinet in France has resigned on an 
adverse vote of the Senate, the vote was rather an 
excuse for the withdrawal of a discredited ministry than 
the cause of its resignation. 1 The remaining case, 
which occurred during the present year, is the only one 
where the responsibility of the ministers to the Senate 
was fairly raised, and where anything like a real contest 
took place between the chambers. On this occasion the 
Senate did certainly force a united and vigorous cabinet 
to resign, but it was enabled to do so only because the 

1 Dupriez (vol. ii. pp. 453-54) mentions two such cases. One in 1876, 
when the cabinet, disliking a bill for an amnesty passed by the Chamber 
of Deputies, proposed in the Senate a compromise, which the latter, 
averse to any amnesty, rejected. The ministers thereupon resigned, but 
they had really been beaten in the Chamber of Deputies, and their only 
hope of restoring their prestige lay in forcing through the compromise. 
The other case was in 1890, when the Senate by a vote condemning the 
economic policy of the government, brought about a cabinet crisis. But 
the ministry was already divided within itself, and had almost broken in 
pieces a few days before. There appears to have been a third instance of 
the same kind in 1883. In that case the Fallieres ministry resigned 
because the Senate rejected a bill on the expulsion of members of families 
that had reigned in France, but here again the cabinet was disunited and 
in a feeble condition before the vote in the Senate took place. (Journal 
Officiel, Feb. 18 and 19, 1883.) 



THE SENATE. 23 

majority in the Chamber of Deputies was highly pre- 
carious, for there can be no doubt that if the cabinet 
could have relied on the hearty support of the Chamber 
it would have defied the Senate as it had already done 
two months before. 1 It has been only in very excep- 

1 The history of this case is as follows : The present Chamber of 
Deputies when elected contained a decided majority of Conservative 
Republicans, and for two years the successive cabinets represented their 
views, but by degrees the party became disintegrated, and in October, 
1895, a Radical cabinet was formed, which succeeded in obtaining the 
support of a majority. Early in the new year the Minister of Justice, 
not being satisfied that the Juge oV Instruction, who was holding the inquest 
on the southern railroad frauds, was sufficiently zealous in discovering 
the offenders, took the case out of his hands and intrusted it to another 
magistrate. On February 11, the Senate, which was strongly conserva- 
tive, passed a vote censuring this act as an interference with the course 
of justice. Two days later, the Chamber of Deputies expressed its con- 
fidence in the government ; whereupon the Senate, on February 15, 
repeated its former vote. On the 20th, the matter was again brought up 
in the Chamber of Deputies, and M. Bourgeois, the head of the cabinet, 
declared that he should not resign so long as he was upheld by the 
Chamber, which proceeded to reaffirm its vote of the week before. A 
number of the senators who had been opposed to the cabinet, finding 
that it would not yield, read in the Senate next day a declaration protest- 
ing against the refusal of the ministers to hold themselves responsible to 
the Senate as a violation of the Constitution, but saying that while as 
senators they reserved their constitutional right, they did not wish to 
suspend the legislative life of the country. The Senate thereupon adopted 
an order of the day approving this declaration, and thus virtually gave 
up for a time the attempt to make the ministers responsible to itself. 
(Journal Officiel, Feb. 12, 14, 16, 21, and 22, 1896.) 

A little later the cabinet brought forward a bill for a progressive in- 
come tax, and succeeded on March 26 in getting the Chamber to adopt an 
order of the day approving of the general principal involved. The order, 
however, which was somewhat equivocal, was only carried by sixteen 
votes, and more than half of the deputies were believed to be opposed in 
their hearts to the tax. The Senate thought its opportunity had come, 
and again passed a vote of lack of confidence in the ministry, this time 
on the subject of foreign affairs. (Journal Officiel, April 4.) The result 



24 FRANCE. 

tional cases, therefore, when the Chamber was not 
firmly opposed, that the Upper House has upset the 
ministry. Moreover the question at issue in the recent 
struggle was not whether the cabinet is responsible to 
the Senate to the same extent that it is to the Chamber, 
but simply whether the Senate can insist on the removal 
of a ministry to which it is peculiarly hostile, and which 
it is absolutely unwilling to trust. No one has ever 
doubted that under ordinary circumstances the minis- 
ters are responsible only to the Chamber. The majority 
in that body alone is considered in the formation of a 
cabinet, and an unfavorable vote there on any current 
matter of importance is followed by a change of min- 
isters, while a similar vote in the Senate is not regarded 
as a reason for resignation. 

was no better than before, but the Senate felt the strength of its position, 
and was not to be ignored. On April 21, therefore, it took a bolder step 
by a resolution to postpone the vote on the credits asked for Madagascar 
"until it had before it a constitutional ministry having the confidence of 
the two Chambers." Instead of trying to continue the fight Bourgeois 
resigned, declaring to the Chamber of Deputies that as the representa- 
tive of universal suffrage it ought to be supreme, but that, owing to the 
impossibility of insuring proper military service in Madagascar after the 
vote of the Senate, patriotism obliged him to withdraw. The Radicals 
in the Chamber succeeded in carrying a vote affirming once more the 
preponderance of the elect of universal suffrage, and urging the need of 
democratic reforms ; but a few days later a purely Conservative cabinet 
presented itself to the Chamber, and obtained a vote of confidence by a 
majority of forty-three. (Journal Officiel, April 22, 24, and May 1.) 

The outcome of the affair justified the belief that the Chamber would 
not engage in a prolonged struggle to support the cabinet ; that while 
unwilling to turn the ministers out itself, it would not be sorry to 
have the Senate do so. Had the deputies been so thoroughly in 
earnest as to force a deadlock between the Chambers, the Senate could 
not have refused its consent to a dissolution, and would certainly have 
been obliged to give way if the elections had resulted in a victory for the 
cabinet. 



THE SENATE. 25 

As a rule the Senate does not decide the fate of the 
ministries, and hence cannot control their policy. The 
result is that without sinking to the helplessness of the 
English House of Lords, it has become a body of sec- 
ondary importance. 1 At one time it stood very low 
in public esteem, on account of its origin ; for it was 
created by the Reactionaries in the National Assembly, 
and was regarded as a monarchical institution ; and even 
after the greater part of its seats were occupied by Re- 
publicans, it was suspected of being only half-heartedly 
in favor of the republican form of government. Its 
condemnation of Boulanger increased its popularity by 
making it appear a real bulwark of the Republic against 
the would-be dictator ; but the prejudice against it has 
by no means disappeared, and the extreme Radicals have 
never ceased to demand its abolition, although conser- 
vative feeling in France will doubtless remain strong 
enough to prevent such a step. How great the in- 
fluence of the Senate will be in the future is not easy 
to foretell. Some people are of opinion that when the 
life members are gone, many of whom have been dis- 
tinguished in letters, in science, or in war, it will lose 
a good deal of the prestige that it retains to-day. 2 But, 
on the other hand, men of mark are still elected, and 
now that the Senate is not afraid of being thought 
lukewarm or hostile to the Republic, and does not feel 

1 In his Essays on Government (chap, i.) the writer has tried to prove 
that this must necessarily be the condition of one of two chambers wher- 
ever the cabinet is responsible to the other ; and that the cabinet cannot 
iu the long run be responsible to both. 

2 About half of them have already died. Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 374, 
note. 



26 FRANCE. 

its existence seriously threatened, it has acquired more 
boldness and energy. 1 It is highly improbable, more- 
over, that it will become utterly powerless, so long as 
the deputies are divided into a number of political 
groups, and the ministers are not able to speak with 
authority as the leaders of a great and united party. 

Although the Senate has little or no share in directing 
the policy of the cabinet, it must not be supposed that 
it is a useless body. On the contrary, it does very valua- 
ble work in correcting the over-hasty legislation of the 
other Chamber, and in case of disagreement often has 
its own way or effects a compromise. 2 

The two Chambers meeting in joint session form 
what is called the National Assembly, which, 

The Na- , 

tionai as we have seen, has power to revise the con- 

Assembly. . 

stitutional laws. It has one other function, 

that of electing the President of the Republic . This 

officer is chosen for seven years, and is re- 

The Presi- . . ... 

dent of the eligible; 3 the only limit on the choice of a 
candidate being found in the constitutional 
law of August 14, 1884, which excludes all members 
of families that have ever reigned in France, — a pro- 
vision dictated by the fear that, like Napoleon III., a 
prince might use the presidency as a step to the throne. 
The President is at the head of the Republic, but he 
lives and travels in a style that is almost regal, for the 
conception of a republic as severe, simple, and econom- 

1 Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 382-83. The present position and the probable 
future of the Senate are discussed by Saleilles, op. cit., pp. 37-52. 

2 Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 413-15. 

8 Const. Law of Feb. 25, 1875, Art. 2. 



THE PRESIDENT. 27 

ical has changed very much in France since the second 
Empire taught the nation extravagance. 1 

The duties of the President, like those of every chief 
magistrate, are manifold. He is the executive His func . 
head of the nation, and as such executes the tlons# 
laws, issues ordinances, 2 and appoints all the officers of 
the government. 3 He has also certain functions of a 
legislative character, but, except for the right of initi- 
ative in legislation, these are not in fact very exten- 
sive. He has no veto upon the laws, and although 
he may require the Chambers to reconsider a bill, the 
right has never been exercised. 4 With the consent of 
the Senate he can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, 5 
but this power has also fallen into disuse, because the 
members of his cabinet are very much under the control 
of the deputies, who dread the risk and expense of an 
election ; and, in fact, a dissolution has not taken place 
since President MacMahon's unsuccessful attempt to use 
it in 1877 as a means of getting a Chamber in sym- 
pathy with his views. The President has power to make 
treaties ; but treaties of peace, of commerce, those which 
burden the finances, affect the persons or property of 
French citizens in foreign countries, or which change 
the territory of France (in other words, all the more im- 

L Cf. Gr. Channes, Nos Fautes, Letter of Jan., 1885 ; Theodore Stan- 
ton in the Arena, Oct., 1891. 

2 For the nature of this power, see pp. 42-44, infra. 

8 Const. Law of Feb. 25, 1875, Art. 3. 

4 Const. Law of July 16, 1875, Art. 7 ; Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 369. It 
is not likely to he used unless after the bill has passed the cabinet that 
favored it has resigned, and another hostile to it has come in. 

6 Const. Law of Feb. 25, 1875, Art. 5. 



28 FRANCE. 

portant ones), require the ratification of the Chambers. 1 
A declaration of war also requires their consent ; 2 but 
as a matter of fact the government managed to wage 
war in Tunis and Tonquin without any such consent, 
alleging at first that the affair was not a war, and 
afterwards defending itself on the ground that the Par- 
liament by voting credits had virtually sanctioned its 
course. 3 

Unlike the President of the United States, the French 
President is not free to use his powers accord- 

His Powers , . . n , o • i i 

are really nig to his own judgment, lor in order to 
the ministers make him independent of the fate of cabi- 

in his name. 

nets, and at the same time to prevent his 
personal power from becoming too great, the constitu- 
tional laws declare that he shall not be responsible for 
his official conduct, except in case of high treason, and 
that all his acts of every kind, to be valid, must be 
countersigned by one of the ministers ; and thus, like 
the British monarch, he has been put under guardian- 
ship and can do no wrong. 4 When, therefore, we speak 
of the powers of the President, it must be remembered 
that these are really exercised by the ministers, who are 
responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. The Presi- 
dent, indeed, is not usually present at the cabinet con- 
sultations (conseils de cabinet) in which the real policy 
of the government is discussed, and as a rule he pre- 
sides only over the formal meetings (conseils des mi- 

1 Const. Law of July 16, 1875, Art. 8. 

2 Id., Art. 9. 

8 See Lebon, Frankreich, pp. 46, 47. 

* Const. Law of Feb. 25, 1875, Arts. 3 and 6. 



THE PRESIDENT. 29 

nistres) held for certain purposes specified by law. 1 He 
has power, it is true, to select the ministers, and in this 
matter he can use his own discretion to some extent, but 
in fact he generally intrusts some one with the forma- 
tion of a cabinet, and appoints the ministers this man 
suggests. 2 His duty in these cases is not, however, as 
simple as that of the English Queen, because, for reasons 
that will be discussed in the next chapter, there is usually 
on the fall of a cabinet no leader of a victorious oppo- 
sition to whom he can turn. A good deal of tact and 
skill is sometimes required at cabinet crises, and it is said 
that on a recent occasion the formation of a ministry 
was due to the personal influence of President Carnot. 3 

Sir Henry Maine makes merry over the exalted office 
and lack of power of the President. " There is," he 
says, " no living functionary who occupies a more pitia- 
ble position than a French President. The old kings 
of France reigned and governed. The Constitutional 
King, according to M. Thiers, reigns, but does not 
govern. The President of the United States gov- 
erns, but he does not reign. It has been reserved for 
the President of the French Republic neither to reign 
nor yet to govern." 4 

At first sight the situation does, indeed, appear some- 
what irrational. When the head of the state is desig- 

1 Lebon, Frankreich, p. 53 ; Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 350-51 and 367- 
68, states that the President is often present when important matters are 
discussed, but cannot influence the decision. 

2 Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 340. 

8 See "France under M. Constans," in Murray's Magazine for May, 
1890. 
4 Popular Government, p. 250. 



30 FRANCE. 

nated by the accident of birth it is not unnatural to 
make of him an idol, and appoint a high priest to 
speak in his name ; but when he is carefully selected 
as the man most fit for the place, it seems a trifle illo- 
gical to intrust the duties of the office to some one else. 
By the constitution of Sieyes an ornamental post of a 
similar character was prepared for the First Consul, but 
Napoleon said he had no mind to play the part of a 
pig kept to fatten. In government, however, the most 
logical system is not always the best, and the anoma- 
lous position of the President has saved France from 
the danger of his trying to make himself a dictator, 
while the fact that he is independent of the changing 
moods of the Chambers has given to the Republic a 
dignity and stability it had never enjoyed before. It 
is a curious commentary on the nature of human am- 
bition, that in spite of the small power actually wielded 
by the President in France, the presidential fever seems 
to have nearly as strong a hold on public men as in this 
country. 

Before proceeding to consider the ministers, there is 

The Conseii one other institution which claims attention 

on account of its past rather than its present 

position. This is the Conseii d'Etat or Council of 

State, 1 a body whose importance has varied a great deal 

i Aucoc, Conferences sur le Droit Adm., liv. ii. ch. i. § 3 ; Ducrocq, 
Cours de Droit Adm., tit. i. cb. i. sec. i. § iii. ; Bceuf, Resume sur le Droit 
Adm., ed. of 1895, p. 32 et seq. ; cf. Lebon, Frankreich, pp. 96-98; Du- 
priez, vol. ii. pp. 285-316, passim, and pp. 481-92 ; Goodnow, Comparative 
Administrative Law, vol. i. pp. 107-13. See also articles entitled "Le 
Conseii d'Etat et les Projets de Re'forme," by Varagnac, Revue des Deux 
Mondes, Aug. 15 and Sept. 15, 1892. 



THE COUNCIL OF STATE. 31 

at different times. Under Napoleon I., and again dur- 
ing the second Empire, in addition to the possession of 
executive functions, it was a real source of legislation ; 
while at the time of the Restoration and the Monarchy 
of July it became what it is to-day, a council with high 
attributes, but very little authority. Except as a court 
of administrative justice, 1 it has now lost most of its 
influence ; for although it must be consulted before 
certain classes of ordinances can be issued, and may be 
consulted on other administrative matters, its advice 
need never be followed ; and in fact the habit of con- 
sulting it is said to have become little more than a mere 
form. 2 The legislative functions of the Council have 
faded even more completely to a shadow, as is proved 
by the fact that while the Government or either of the 
Chambers may seek its aid in the framing of statutes, 
the privilege is rarely exercised by the ministers, scarcely 
at all by the Senate, and never by the Chamber of 
Deputies. 

The members of the Council are divided into several 
classes, but those belonging to the most important class, 
and the only ones who can vote when the Council sits 
as a court, are appointed and dismissed at will by the 
President of the Republic. 3 

1 For its functions of this nature, see pp. 55-61, infra. 

2 "La Rdforme Administrative — La Justice," by Vicomte d'Avenel, 
Revue des Deux Mondes, June 1, 1889, pp. 597-98. 

3 The other members are also appointed by the President subject to 
certain conditions, but as he can dismiss any of them, their tenure of office 
depends on the pleasure of the cabinet, and in fact by means of resigna- 
tions or removals, most of the councilors were changed in 1879 in order 
to make the council Republican. — " Le Conseil d'Etat," Varagnac, 
Revue des Deux Mondes, Sept. 15, 1892, p. 295. 



32 FRANCE. 

In a parliamentary system the ministers have two 
t^ „,,•„« distinct functions. One of these is the same 

lne minis- 

ters * as that of the members of the President's 

Cabinet in the United States, and consists of the man- 
agement of the departments of the administration. 
The other is the duty of representing the government in 
the Chambers, urging the adoption of its measures, and 
defending its policy against the attacks of its adversa- 
ries. These two functions are not necessarily united, 
and in fact it has been a common habit in some coun- 
tries to appoint ministers without portfolios, as it is 
called, that is, without any executive duties at all, in 
order that they may devote their whole energy to the 
battles in Parliament. 1 Although there is nothing to 
prevent such a practice in France, it is not followed 
to-day, each minister being at the head of a particular 
branch of the administration. The number of depart- 
ments, however, and the distribution of the public busi- 
ness among them is not fixed by law, but is regulated 
from time to time by decree of the President of the 
Republic. The number of ministers is, therefore, con- 
stantly liable to change according to the immediate 
needs of the public service. At present there are eleven 
departments or ministries : those of the Interior and 
Religion ; of Justice ; of Foreign Affairs ; of Finance ; 
of War ; of the Navy ; of Education and the Fine 
Arts ; of Public Works ; of Commerce, Industry, and 

1 This practice virtually exists in England, because some of the offices 
held by the ministers, such as that of First Lord of the Treasury, and 
that of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, involve few or no adminis- 
trative duties. 



THE MINISTERS. 33 

Posts and Telegraphs ; of Agriculture ; and of the 
Colonies. 1 

The constitutional law of February 25, 1875 (Art. 
6), declares that the ministers are collectively Their re- 
responsible to the Chambers for the general g°thf mty 
policy of the government, and individually for hambers - 
their personal acts. The object of this clause was, of 
course, to establish the parliamentary system, and in 
fact the French ministry is responsible to the Chamber 
of Deputies, as the English is to the House of Com- 
mons, and resigns on a hostile vote on any matter of 
importance. Except, indeed, for the Ministers of War 
and of the Navy, who are usually military men, the 
cabinet officers are almost always selected from among 
the members of Parliament, 2 although the reason for 
this practice in England does not apply in France, 
because the ministers have a right to be present and 
speak in either Chamber, whether members of it or not. 3 

But in order to understand fully the position of the 
French ministers, and their relation to the ™ . 

lheir enor- 

Parliament, it is necessary to realize their ^Jits ^ 
enormous power, and this is due largely to causes - 
three causes, — the paternal nature of the government, 
the centralization of the state, and the possession by 
the executive of authority that in an Anglo-Saxon 

1 B(Euf, Resume, ed. of 1895, pp. 22, 23. The last ministry, that of 
the Colonies, was, however, created by statute in 1894, and as Bceuf 
remarks, the Chambers can always prevent the creation of a ministry by 
refusing to make the necessary appropriations. 

2 Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 336. 

3 Const. Law of July 16, 1875, Art. 6. In practice this privilege is also 
accorded to their under-secretaries. Lebon, Frankreich, p. 52. 

VOL. I. 



34 FRANCE. 

country would be lodged with the legislature or the 
courts of law. 

On the first of these matters, the paternal nature of 
the government, there is no need to dwell 

Paternal na- , ,, k -,-, , 

tnre of the at length. All governments are growing 
more paternal at the present day, for a re- 
action has set in against the extreme laissez-faire 
doctrines preached by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mu% 
and the English political economists of the earlier 
school. There is a general tendency to restrain the 
liberty of the individual and subject him to govern- 
mental supervision and control. Such control and 
supervision are traditional in France, and far exceed 
anything to which we are accustomed in this country. 
All trades and occupations are there subject to a great 
deal more police inspection than with us. They require 
more generally to be licensed, and are regulated and 
prohibited by the administrative officials with a much 
freer hand. And although the liberty of the press and 
the right of holding public meetings are now sub- 
stantially realized, the right of association is still very 
limited, for no society of more than twenty persons, 
except business companies, and associations of persons 
pursuing the same profession or trade, can be formed 
without the permission of the Minister of the Interior 
or the prefect of the department. 1 It is easy to see 
how much power all this paternalism places in the 
hands of the administration. 

An explanation of the centralization of the state 
entails a brief survey of local government; and here 

1 Lebon, Frankreich, pp. 32-39 ; Ducrocq, tit. ii. ch. iii. ; ch. iv. sec. iii. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 35 

we meet with a deeply rooted French tradition, for cen- 
tralization was already great under the old re- Centraliza . 
gime, and although the first effect of the Rev- tlon# 
olution was to place the administration of local affairs 
under the control of independent elected bodies, the 
pressure of foreign war, and the necessity of maintain- 
ing order at home, soon threw despotic power into the 
hands of the national government. Under Napoleon 
this power became crystallized in a permanent form, and 
an administrative system was established, more perfect, 
more effective, and at the same time more centralized 
than that which had existed under the monarchy. 1 
The outward form of the Napoleonic system has been 
continuously preserved with surprisingly little change, 
but since 1830 its spirit has been modified in two dis- 
tinct ways : first, by means of what the French call 
deconcentration, that is, by giving to the local agents 
of the central government a greater right of independ- 
ent action, so that they are more free from the direct 
tutelage of the ministers ; second, by a process of true 
decentralization, or the introduction of the elective 
principle into local government, and the extension of 
the powers of the local representative bodies. But 
although the successive rulers of France have pursued 
this policy pretty steadily, the progress of local self- 
government has been far from rapid. 2 One reason for 

1 For a short but vigorous comment on Napoleon's system, see G. L. 
Dickinson, Revolution and Reaction in Modern France, ch. ii. 

2 On the subject of local government, I have used Aucoc, Conferences, 
3d ed. ; Bceuf , Resume, ed. of 1895 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, A dm. Locale en 
France et en Angleterre ; Lebon's two works on France ; Goodnow, Comp. 
Adm. Law. There is a popular account in Block, Entretiens familiers 
sur VAdm. de notre pays. 



36 FRANCE. 

this is the habit of looking to the central authorities for 
guidance in all matters. Another is a fear on the part 
of the government of furnishing its enemies with 
rallying-points which might be used to organize an op- 
position, — a fear that takes shape to-day in provisions 
forbidding the local elected councils to express any 
opinions on general politics, or to communicate with 
each other except about certain matters specified by 
law. A third cause of the feeble state of local self- 
government is to be found in the fact that the Involu- 
tion of 1789 destroyed all the existing local divisions 
except the commune, and replaced them by artificial 
districts which have never developed any real vitality, 
so that the commune is the only true centre of local life 
in the republic. 1 A fourth, and perhaps the most 
potent cause of all, is the dread of disorder which is 
constantly present in the minds of Frenchmen, and 
makes them crave a master strong enough to cope with 
any outbreak. 

France is divided into eighty-six departments, at the 
Local gov- head of each of which is a prefect, appointed 
The depart- and removed at pleasure by the President of 

ment and i-r> ivi • 

the prefect, the Republic, but in reality nominated by the 
Minister of the Interior. The office is, indeed, regarded 
as distinctly political, and the incumbent is often re- 
placed when the minister changes. The prefect, who 
is by far the most important of the local officials, occu- 
pies a double position, for he is the agent of the 
central government in regard to those matters of 
general administration which are thought to concern 
1 Most of the existing communes were in fact created in 1789. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 37 

the whole country, and at the same time he is the 
executive officer of the department for local affairs. 
In the former capacity he is in theory the immediate 
subordinate of the Minister of the Interior, but since 
his duties extend to all branches of the administration, 
he corresponds in practice directly with any minister in 
whose sphere of action the matter with which he is 
called upon to deal may lie. His authority as the 
agent of the central government is not, however, the 
same in all cases. Sometimes he is absolutely subject 
to the orders of the ministers. This is true when he 
executes general laws and ordinances ; but when, for 
example, he directs the police of the department, or 
supervises the subordinate local bodies, he proceeds 
on his own responsibility, and his acts can be overruled 
by the central government only in case they are con- 
trary to law, or give rise to complaints on the part of 
the persons affected by them. In pursuance of the 
policy of deconcentration, the prefect has been given 
an independent authority of this kind over a large 
number of subjects, and he was intended to exercise his 
own judgment in regard to them, but the influence 
and pressure of the deputies has, it is said, induced 
him to shirk responsibility as much as possible by refer- 
ring doubtful questions to the ministers, and hence the 
centralization has not been diminished as much as was 
expected. 1 In matters of general administration, the 
prefect is assisted by a prefectoral council of three or 
four members appointed by the President of the Re- 
public ; but, except when it sits as an administrative 

1 Channes, Letter of October 1, 1884. 



38 FRANCE. 

court, the functions of this body are almost altogether 
advisory, and their use has become scarcely more than 
a form. 1 

As the executive officer for local affairs, the prefect 
The General carries out the resolutions of the General 
Council. Council. This is the representative assembly 
of the department, and is elected by universal suffrage, 
one of the members being chosen in each canton for 
six years, and half of them being renewed every three 
years. The authority of the body is jealously limited. 
Its competence is almost entirely confined to affairs 
that are deemed to have a strictly local interest, 2 and 
even in regard to these its powers are not absolute, for 
its votes on certain matters can be annulled by the 
President of the Republic, and its budget, that is the 
annual tax levy and list of appropriations, is not valid 
without his approval. Although the Council has the 
right of final decision in a considerable class of sub- 
jects, its actual power over them is curtailed in a variety 
of ways. In the first place it does not carry out its 
own votes, but their execution is intrusted to an agent 
of the central government, the prefect, who appoints 
all the officials, manages the public institutions, and 
signs the orders for all payments of money ; the direct 
control of the council over his performance of these 
duties extending only to the election of a standing 
commission which has little more than a right of inspec- 

1 Vicomte d'Avenel, "La Re'forme Administrative," Revue des Deux 
Mondes, June 1, 1889, p. 596. 

2 Its functions in relation to the general administration consist in ap- 
portioning certain direct taxes, in giving its advice when asked, and in 
expressing its wishes on matters not connected with general politics. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 39 

tion. 1 In the second place, the prefect has an opportu- 
nity to exert a great deal of influence over the action 
of the Council, for not only has he a right to address 
it, but he prepares the budget and all other business, 
and in fact it is not allowed to act on any matter until 
it has heard his report. 2 Moreover the Council is only 
permitted to sit a very short time. It has two regular 
sessions a year, whose duration is limited one to a 
month, the other to a fortnight, and although extra 
sessions can be held they must not exceed one week 
apiece. Finally its very existence is insecure, for it can 
be dissolved by the chief of the state. In general it 
may be said that in matters falling within its province 
the General Council cannot do everything it wants, but 
can prevent almost anything it does not want. Its 
financial resources are not large, 3 and its attention is 
confined for the most part to the construction of roads, 
subventions to railroads, and the care of schools, insane 
asylums, and other institutions of a similar character. 

At one time a hope was entertained that politics 
might be kept out of the general councils, but it has 
not been fulfilled, the departmental elections being 
regularly conducted on party lines. 4 It has therefore 



1 The Council can delegate to the commission a somewhat indefinite 
class of functions, but it is not in fact a body of much importance. Bu- 
priez, vol. ii. pp. 467-68. 

2 Aucoc, p. 282. 

8 Almost its only source of revenue is the addition of a limited sum to 
the direct state taxes. 

4 Boze'rian, in his Etude sur la Revision de la Constitution (pp. 89-90), 
attributes this to the fact that the local assemblies take part in the elec- 
tion of senators. 



40 FRANCE. 



been thought best to intrust the supervision of the 
communes largely to the central government and its 
representative the prefect, rather than to the councils 
with their partisan bias, and this, of course, deprives 
the latter of a part of the importance they would other- 
wise possess. 1 

The next local division is the arrondissement. This 
rm. is a mere administrative district without cor- 

Ine arron- 
dissement. p 0ra te personality, with no property, revenues, 

or expenses of its own, and although it has a sub-pre- 
fect and an elected council, neither of them has much 
power. In fact it has been proposed to abolish the 
arrondissement altogether. 

The canton, which is the next subdivision, is really a 
The can- judicial and military rather than an admin- 
ton * istrative district, and therefore does not con- 

cern us here. 

We now come to the communes, which are the small- 

Thecom- es ^ l° ca l entities, but differ enormously in 

area and population. They vary in size from 

twenty acres to over a quarter of a million, and they 

run all the way from a hamlet with a dozen inhabitants 

to large cities ; yet with the exception of Paris and 

Lyons they are all governed on one plan. The officer 

in the commune whose position corresponds 

to that of the prefect in the department is 



the mayor. He acts in the same way both as agent of 
the central government, and as the executive head of the 

1 By the law of 1884 on municipalities, part of the supervision over these 
bodies, which had previously been in the hands of the general councils, 
was withdrawn and given to the prefect. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 41 

district, but whereas in the prefect the former character 
predominates, the mayor is chiefly occupied with local 
matters. It is largely for this reason that, unlike the 
prefect, he is not appointed by the President, but of 
late years has been elected by and from the communal 
council for the length of its own term. 1 The mayor is, 
however, by no means free from control. So far as he 
acts as agent of the central government, he is abso- 
lutely under the orders of the prefect. Nor is this all. 
The subject of communal police, which includes the 
public health and other matters of a kindred nature, is 
considered a part of the local administration, but the 
acts of the mayor in regard to it can be annulled by 
the prefect, who has also power in many cases to issue 
direct orders of his own. Moreover the police officials 
require to be confirmed by the prefect, 2 and can be 
removed only by him. 3 But even these extensive pow- 
ers of control are not deemed enough, and it is provided 
that the mayor can be suspended from office for a 
month by the prefect, or for three months by the Min- 
ister of the Interior, and can be removed altogether by 
the President of the Republic. 

The deliberative organ of the commune is the com- 
munal council, which varies in size from ten to thirty- 
six members, and is elected by universal suffrage for 
four years. Its authority extends to all communal 

1 The office is an honorary one, as the mayor receives no salary. 

2 Or sub-prefect. 

3 The mayor is not free from control in regard to other matters of 
local interest, for his accounts must be submitted for approval to the pre- 
fect, who can order the payment of any expense properly authorized if 
the mayor neglects to make it. 



42 FRANCE. 

affairs, except that it has nothing to do with the broad 
subject of police, although that is regarded for other 
purposes as a local matter. The recent statute on 
municipal government lays down the general princi- 
ple that the decisions of the council on local affairs, 
when legally made, are conclusive without the approval 
of any superior administrative official, but in a subse- 
quent section all the most important matters are spe- 
cially excepted from the rule. The list of exceptions 
includes almost every financial measure, the construction 
of roads and buildings, and the sale of communal prop- 
erty. 1 The council has, therefore, very much less power 
than might at first sight be supposed ; and in order to 
guard against any attempt on its part to exceed these 
slender privileges, the prefect is given a discretionary 
authority to suspend it for a month, while the President 
of the Kepublic can dissolve it entirely, and appoint a 
commission with limited powers to rule the commune 
for two months, when a new election must take place. 
The general laws of local government already de- 
scribed do not, however, cover the whole 

Paris. _ 

field, because a dread of the explosive char- 
acter and communistic tendencies of the democracy of 
Paris has prevented the capital from enjoying even the 
measure of liberty granted to other towns. The city 
has, indeed, a municipal council composed of eighty 
elected members and endowed with most of the usual 
powers, and a general council for the department with 
limited powers, composed of these same eighty rein- 

1 The official who has power to approve the budget can also inscribe 
therein certain obligatory expenses. 



PARIS. 43 

forced by eight suburban members ; but the executive 
authority is entirely in the hands of the central govern- 
ment. It is lodged in part with the mayors of the 
twenty arrondissements, who are appointed directly by 
the President of the Republic ; but chiefly with two 
prefects appointed in the same way. One of these, 
the Prefect of the Seine, has most of the functions of 
the ordinary prefect, together with those of a central 
mayor; while the other, the Prefect of Police, has 
charge of the police, and is directly responsible to the 
Minister of the Interior. 1 

This sketch of local government in France shows 
how centralized the state still remains, what extensive 
supervision and control the administration keeps in its 
own hands, and how slight is the measure of real local 
autonomy if measured by an Anglo-Saxon standard. 
In fact, the central government still makes itself contin- 
ually and actively felt in local affairs, and this is for 
the ministers a great source of power, but also, as we 
shall see later, a cause of weakness. 

A third source of the enormous power of the minis- 
ters in France is the possession by the execu- 
tive of authority that in an Anglo-Saxon and judicial 
country would be lodged with the legislature the execu- 
or the courts of law. This requires an expla- 
nation, for it involves some of the most strange and 

1 Until 1881, the city of Lyons was governed in the same way, and the 
control of the police is still intrusted to the Prefect of the Rhone. In all 
cities of over 40,000 people the organization of the police is fixed by 
decree of the chief of the state, although the members of the force are 
appointed as in other communes. 



44 FRANCE. 

interesting peculiarities of French, and, indeed, of con- 
tinental political ideas. 

Let us take first the legislative authority of the execu- 
tive in France. When an English or an Ameri- 
deerees and can legislator drafts a statute he tries to cover 

ordinances. . , ., , Tx 

all questions that can possibly arise. He goes 
into details and describes minutely the operation of 
the act, in order that every conceivable case may be 
expressly and distinctly provided for. He does this 
because there is no one who has power to remedy 
defects that may subsequently appear. If the law is 
vague or obscure, it can receive an authoritative inter- 
pretation only from the courts by the slow process of 
litigation. If it is incomplete, it must remain so until 
amended by a subsequent enactment. In some cases, it 
is true, an officer or board is given by statute power 
to make regulations. The Local Government Board 
and our boards of health furnish examples of this; 
but such cases are exceptional, and most Anglo-Saxons 
feel that the power is in its nature arbitrary, and ought 
not to be extended farther than is necessary. And here 
it is important to distinguish between rules issued by the 
head of a department for the guidance of his subordi- 
nates and the regulations of which we are speaking. 
The former are merely directions given to the officials 
for the purpose of instructing them in their duties, and 
are binding on no one else. The right to issue them 
must belong, to some extent, to every one who has other 
persons under his orders, although they are used much 
more systematically in France than in the United States. 
The regulations with which we are concerned here are 



THE ORDINANCE POWER. 45 

of quite a different kind, for they are binding on all 
citizens who may be affected by them, and have, in fact, 
the character of laws. 

In England and America the authority to make them 
is delegated by the legislature cautiously, and apart 
from such an express delegation no officer of the gov- 
ernment has power to issue any ordinances with the 
force of law. But in France all this is very different. 
Statutes that do not concern the rights of a man against 
his neighbor, that do not, in other words, form a part 
of the Civil Code, are often couched in general terms, 
and enunciate a principle which the Executive is to 
carry out in detail. 1 Sometimes the President of the 
Republic is expressly given power to make regulations, 
but even without any special authority he has a general 
power to make them for the purpose of completing the 
statutes, by virtue of his general duty to execute the 
laws. 2 Such regulations in France are called acts of 
secondary legislation, and the ordinances o£ the Presi- 
dent in which they are contained are termed decrets. 
The power to make them is not, however, confined to 
the chief of the state. For matters of inferior grav- 
ity the laws often confer a similar authority on the min- 
isters, the prefects, and even the mayors, and in this 

1 Dupriez (vol. ii. p. 377), after remarking this difference between 
English and French legislation, expresses a regret that the French Parlia- 
ment has shown a tendency of late years to go more into details. 

2 On the power to issue ordinances in France, see Aucoc, Conferences, 
§§ 52-57, 66, 91, 170 ; Ducrocq, Cours, §§ 61-66, 72-73, 109-10, 210-14 ; 
Goodnow, vol. i. pp. 85-87. 

Before issuing certain classes of ordinances the President must consult 
the Council of State, but he is not obliged to follow its advice. 



46 FRANCE. 

case the edicts are termed arretes, to distinguish them 
from the more solemn ordinances of the President. 1 
The regulations cannot, of course, be contrary to law, 
or in excess of the authority of the official who issues 
them. If they are so and infringe private rights, a 
process to have them annulled may be instituted before 
the administrative courts, and in certain limited cases 
the ordinary courts can also refuse to apply them. 2 

So much for the power of the executive to make law, 
Appropria- but this ^oes not exnail st its encroachments 
tions. on w ] ia t we have learned to regard as the 

province of the legislature, for it is less strictly held to 
the appropriations voted by the Chambers than is the 
case with us. The virements (that is to say, the use for 
one purpose of appropriations voted for another), which 
were an abuse under the Empire, have, indeed, been 
abolished, except as between different items in the same 
chapter of the annual budget ; but certain chapters 
are designated each year to which additions can be 
made by decree of the President issued with the con- 
sent of the council of ministers. Moreover, in urgent 
and unforeseen cases arising when Parliament is not in 
session, the government has power by means of such a 
decree, not only to incur the expenses called for by the 
emergency, but also to open an extraordinary credit on 
its own authority and borrow the money that it needs. 3 

1 Lebon, FranJcreich, p. 23 ; Aucoc, Ducrocq, ubi cit. 

2 Laferriere, Traite de la Jur. Adm., liv. iii. ch. i. sec. n. ; liv. vi. ; liv. 
vii. ch. i. sec. iv. 

8 In both cases notice of the decree must be laid before the Chambers 
within fourteen days from their next meeting. (Lebon, FranJcreich, p. 
162.) It is worth while, moreover, to note in passing that there is 



ENGLISH AND FRENCH HISTORY. 47 

One may, perhaps, be pardoned for dwelling at some- 
what greater length on the judicial powers of Judicial 
the executive in France, both because they g^execu- 
are so little understood by English-speaking tlve * 
people, and because their origin may be traced to a 
tradition which has its roots far back in the past. 

The characteristic difference between the political 
history of England and that of France is to Character _ 
be found in the fact that the English, though ^ c e £ ei 
influenced by each new spirit of the age, frShhS- 
have never yielded entirely to its guidance, tory# 
while the French have always thrown themselves into 
the current, and, adopting completely the dominant 
ideas, of the time, have carried them to their logical 
results. Thus, in the Middle Ages, the feudal system 
never became fully developed in England as it did in 
France. Again, when absolute monarchy came into 
vogue, the British sovereign was not able to acquire 
the arbitrary power of the Bourbons. And, lastly, 
democracy made its way neither so rapidly nor so 
thoroughly on the north as on the south of the Chan- 
nel. The result is that in France the institutions of 
any period have been adapted almost exclusively to 
the wants of the time in which they were produced, 
and in the succeeding age it has been thought necessary 
to destroy them and devise new ones more in harmony 

no effective process for bringing to account a minister who exceeds the 
appropriations. He can, indeed, be impeached, but except in times of 
great excitement this would not be done if the money had been expended 
for public purposes ; and as regards civil liability, there is no court that 
has power to compel him to refund the sums which he has spent illegally. 



48 FRANCE. 

with the new conditions ; 1 whereas in England there 
has been no need of such sweeping changes, and it has 
been possible to preserve in a modified form many of 
the most important features of the government. Hence 
the permanence and continuity of the political system. 2 
Let us inquire how these facts have affected the devel- 
opment of judicial and administrative institutions in 
the two countries. 

The Norman kings of England strove deliberately to 
check the growth of the feudal system, and 
veiopment their successors constantly followed the same 
power in policy. Now the essence of the feudal sys- 
tem consisted in the blending of public and 
private law by making all political relations depend on 
the tenure of land ; and, in fact, according to the strict 
feudal theory, no man had direct relations with any 
superior except his immediate overlord. Every great 
vassal of the crown, therefore, had jurisdiction over all 
the tenants on his estate, which he exercised by holding 
a court of his own for the administration of justice 
among them. The English kings resisted this principle, 
and tried to bring their power to bear directly on all 
The judicial tne P e °pl e of the realm. For this purpose 
system. sheriffs were appointed to represent the crown 
in the counties, and what was of more permanent im- 
portance, the gravest crimes, actions for the possession 

1 This is the more striking because the French are in some ways more 
conservative than the English, as, for example, in their retention to the 
present day of public executions. M. Lebon truly remarks (France as 
It Is, p. 86) : "People have no idea of the spirit of routine and conser- 
vatism which prevails in France." 

a Cf. Freeman, Growth of the English Constitution, pp. 63-66. 



ENGLISH CENTRALIZATION JUDICIAL. 49 

of land, and subsequently other matters, were brought 
within the jurisdiction of the Curia Regis} As early 
as the reign of Henry I., moreover, royal officers were 
commissioned to travel about the country holding court, 
a practice which was renewed in a more systematic 
form by Henry II., and has continued with short in- 
terruptions to the present day. 2 The chief object of 
the early kings in sending out the itinerant justices, as 
they were called, was no doubt financial; for their 
duties consisted in assessing taxes, collecting fines for 
violation of the law, and administering justice, which 
was in itself a source of no small profit in the Middle 
Ages. 3 The functions of the justices in the collection 
of revenue grew, however, less and less prominent, but 
their administration of justice became of permanent 
importance, and in regard to this two tendencies were 
at work. In the first place, the royal judges adopted 
new methods of procedure and gradually developed the- 
trial by jury, while the baronial courts clung to the 
ordeal and other barbaric forms of trial. 4 " The glad- 
some light of jurisprudence," as Coke called it, came? 

1 See Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, vol. i. pp. 85-87 anct 
chs. v. and vi. 

2 The institution of traveling judges was not new. It had been used 
by Charlemagne (Hallam, Middle Ages, ch. ii. part ii. 5), and a similar 
practice was employed by Alfred, Edgar, and Canute (Stubbs, History 
of England, xi. §§ 127, 134). On the itinerant justices, see Stubbs, lb. 
xi. 127 ; xii. 141, 145, 150 ; xiii. 163 ; xv. 235 ; Gneist, Englische Ver- 
fassungsgeschichte, pp. 148, 224-28, 305 (note), 318-19, 447. Pollock & 
Maitland, vol. i. pp. 134, 149, 179 ; Franqueville, Le Systems Jindiciaire 
de la Grande Bretagne, vol. i. pp. 149 et seq. The royal duty of sending 
the justices in eyre is one of those insisted upon in Magna Charta, § 18* 

3 Stubbs, lb. xi. 127. 

* Cf . Stubbs, lb. xiii. 164 ; Gneist, lb. p. 142. 

VOL. 7. 



50 FRANCE. 

with the king's courts, and hence it is not surprising 
that they supplanted the baronial courts, and in time 
drew before themselves all the important lawsuits. In 
the second place, the commissions which had at first 
been issued to high officials, barons, and knights, be- 
came confined to regular judges, and about the time of 
Edward I. were given only to the members of the royal 
courts at Westminster. 1 The same body of judges, 
therefore, expounded the law in all parts of the realm, 
and hence England, alone among the countries of 
Europe, developed a uniform national justice called the 
common law. 2 The people naturally became attached 
to this law and boasted of the rights of Englishmen, 
while the courts that were the creators and guardians 
of the law became strong and respected. 

The very fact that the judicial branch of the govern- 
ment became so highly developed made the 
istrative centralization of the administration unneces- 

system. at* i i • • • 

sary. At the time when the itinerant justices 
first went on circuit, administration in the modern 
sense was of course unknown, and such local affairs as 
needed attention were regulated by the shire moots 
and other local meetings. 3 The sheriff, indeed, repre- 
sented the crown, but his powers were curtailed more 
and more, until, apart from his command of the mili- 
tary forces of the county, he became little more than 
an officer of the courts. 4 When the local administra- 

1 Gneist, Englische Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 318 ; Stubbs, History of 
England, xv. 235. 

3 Cf. Hallam, Middle Ages, ch. viii. part ii. 3. 
8 Stubbs, lb. xv. 205. 

4 On the powers of the sheriff, see Stubbs, lb. xiii. 163, xv. 204-7 ; 
Gneist, lb. pp. 115-20, 297. 



FRANCE CENTRALIZED LATER. 51 

tion grew more important, it was confided not to him, 
but to justices of the peace, who, though nominally 
selected by the king, were never strictly under his 
orders, and in time became almost completely inde- 
pendent, except for the purely judicial control exercised 
by the Court of King's Bench. 1 

In England, therefore, the royal power came early 
into contact with the people all over the 
kingdom by means of the courts of law, mentofthe 
and the judicial system became highly cen- power in 
tralized; while the local administrative insti- 
tutions developed slowly, and through them the king's 
authority was little felt. In France, on the other hand, 
the course of events was very different, for the royal 
power came into direct contact with the people at a much 
later date, and therefore in quite another form. When 
the feudal system became established, the The judicial 
great vassals set up their own courts and sue- system * 
ceeded in excluding the royal judges from their fiefs, 
so that the direct jurisdiction of the crown became 
confined to the comparatively small part of the country 
which was included in the royal domain. Gradually, 
indeed, as the feudal system began to lose its strength, 
the king's jurisdiction encroached upon that of the 
vassals, — a process which was carried on both by 
insisting on the right of appeal to the royal tribu- 
nals, and by reserving for the exclusive cognizance of 
the king's courts a somewhat indefinite class of cases 

1 Gneist, Englische Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 298 et seq., 468 et seq.; 
and see the note at the end of this chapter. 



52 FRANCE. 

known by the name of cas royaux} But this process 
aroused serious resistance on the part of the territorial 
lords, and it was not until the sixteenth century that 
the crown judges possessed the universal authority they 
had obtained in England more than three hundred 
years earlier. So strong, in fact, did the local jealousy 
of the Parliament of Paris (the king's high court of 
justice) remain, that after the great fiefs fell into the 
hands of the crown, they were not placed under the 
jurisdiction of that tribunal, but were given independ- 
ent parliaments of their own. 2 At the outbreak of the 
Revolution there were thirteen separate parliaments, so 
that every considerable province had a distinct body 
of magistrates. 3 Under these circumstances, the courts 
could not create a uniform national justice like the 
English common law, and although since the revolution 
such a uniform system has been provided by the Code, 
this does not strengthen the hands of the judges, but 
has rather the opposite tendency. In the first place, it 
is not their work, and hence does not redound to their 
glory; and secondly, by weakening the force of prece- 
dent, it diminishes the importance of judicial decisions. 
This review of the history of the courts of law shows 

1 Aubert, Le Parlement de Paris de PUllippe le Bel a Charles VIL, 
ch. L sec. i. ; Hist, du Pari, de Paris, 1250-1515, liv. ii. ch. i.; Du Bois, 
Hist, du Droit Criminel de la France, part i. ch. i. ; Esmein, Hist, du Droit 
Francais, part i. tit. ii. ch. i.; Hist, de la Proc. Crim., part i. tit. i. ch. i. 
sec. Ii.; ch. ii. sec. i.; Hallam, Middle Ages, ch. ii. part ii. 5. 

2 Du Bois, part i. ch. ii. § 2 ; Bastard d'Estang, Les Parlements de France, 
vol. i. pp. 36-38 ; Esmein, Hist, du Droit Francais, tit. ii. ch. i. sec. I. § 2, v. 

8 For the dates of the creation of the provincial parliaments, which 
run from 1444 to 1775, see Bastard d'Estang, vol. i. p. 189, note, and 
Esmein, ubi supra. 



HER CENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE. 53 

clearly why they have not attained in France the same 
power and authority as in Anglo-Saxon countries. 1 

The French courts of law were weak because the 
royal authority did not come into direct con- 

• 11 i i i i • The admin- 

tact with the people at the time when public istrative 

and private law were everywhere blended, 
when the tone of thought was peculiarly legal, and 
when political power was chiefly exercised in a judicial 
or semi- judicial form. 2 It made itself felt at a later 
date, and especially as the restorer of order after the 
anarchy caused by the hundred years' war. Its presence 
brought peace and prosperity, and naturally enough 
the organs which it employed acquired a high degree 
of vigor. Now, at this period, administration, in the 
modern sense, was becoming important, and as the 
royal authority came to be exercised by commissioners 
or intendants who had, indeed, certain judicial powers, 
but whose functions were chiefly administrative, 3 the 
administration developed an influence and a strength 
which the courts have never attained. The administra- 
tive system became centralized, and grew to be the most 
important factor in the government. 4 All classes of 
the people looked to it for protection ; 5 in fact, it took, 

1 Since the Revolution, the courts have, of course, been reorganized on 
3, centralized basis. 

2 On the relative importance attributed to law in the Middle Ages, and 
in later times, see Stubbs's chapters on the Characteristic Differences 
between Mediaeval and Modern History, in his Lectures on Med. and 
Mod. Hist. 

8 Che'ruel, Die. des Inst, de la France, " Intendants des Provinces ; " 
Esmein, Hist, du Droit Francais, tit. ii. ch. v. § 2. 

4 Cf. De Tocqueville, An. Reg. et la Rev., liv. ii. chs. ii. iii. 

6 De Tocqueville speaks of all classes as looking on the government as 
a special providence. Id., ch. vi. (7th ed. pp. 100-103) . 



54 FRANCE. 

to a great extent, the place which the judiciary filled in 
England, and in those countries which had inherited 
the English principles. 

This difference in the relative authority of the courts 

and the administration was intensified, so far as 
doctrine of the United States and France were concerned, 
tion of ' by the political philosophy of the last century. 

Montesquieu, in his " Spirit of the Laws," pro- 
claimed the importance of separating the executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers, and the maxim was 
eagerly accepted on both sides of the Atlantic, though 
in very different senses. Our ancestors, anxious to 
maintain the independence of the courts and the sacred- 
ness of private rights, took the principle to signify the 
necessity of so protecting the courts from the control or 
influence of the other branches of the government that 
they might be free to administer justice without regard 
to the official position of the litigants or the nature of 
the questions involved. They meant to preserve the 
English tradition that there is only one law of the land 
to which every one is subject, from the humblest citizen 
to the highest officer. The French, on the other hand, 
had acquired no great passion for law, or for the rights 
of the individual, and did not admit a claim on the part 
of any one to delay or overturn the public interests in 
order to get his own grievances redressed. Moreover, 
they had seen the Parliament of Paris interfere with 
the government by refusing to register the edicts of the 
King ; for although this tribunal had failed to acquire 
judicial supremacy, it had retained a good deal of politi- 
cal power, which it used during the years preceding the 



THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. 55 

Revolution to resist innovations. 1 Such a power might 
not be disliked as a means of opposing an unpopular 
court party, but it could not be tolerated for a moment 
when the reins of government were seized by men who 
believed themselves commissioned to reform the world. 
The French statesmen, therefore, took Montesquieu's 
doctrine in the sense that the administration ought to 
be free to act for the public weal without let or hin- 
drance from the courts of law. The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man proclaimed in 1789 that a community in 
which the separation of powers was not established had 
no constitution ; and a statute of the next year, on the 
organization of the tribunals, gave effect to the maxim 
as it was understood in France by providing that the 
judges should not interfere in any way with the work 
of administrative authorities, or proceed against the 
officers of the government on account of their official 
acts. 2 The American and French applications of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers are both per- 
fectly logical, but are based on different conceptions of 
the nature of law. The Anglo-Saxon draws no distinc- 
tion between public and private law. To him all legal 
rights and duties of every kind form part of one univer- 
sal system of positive law, and so far as the functions 
of public officials are not regulated by that law, they are 
purely matters of discretion. It follows that every legal 
question, whether it involves the power of j/l public 
officer or the construction of a private contract, comes 

1 Cf . Edward J. Lowell, The Eve of the French Revolution, p. 105. 

2 Aucoc, Conferences, part i. liv. i. ch. i. ; Bceuf, Resume, part iv. 
sec. ii. 



56 FRANCE. 

before the ordinary courts. 1 In France, on the other 
hand, private law, or the regulation of the rights and 
duties of individuals among themselves, is treated as 
only one branch of jurisprudence; while public law, 
which deals with the principles of government and the 
relations of individuals to the state, is regarded as 
something of an entirely different kind. Of course 
every civilized government must strive to treat all its 
subjects fairly, and hence, in the course of administra- 
tion, questions of justice must arise ; but as these do 
not concern the rights of a man against his neighbor, 
they are not classed in France with private law. It is 
felt that, unlike questions of private law, they ought 
not to be decided solely by the application of abstract 
principles of justice between man and man, but must be 
considered from the broad standpoint of public policy. 
Now the domain of the ordinary French courts is pri- 
vate law alone, and it is quite logical to regard any 
attempt on their part to judge administrative acts and 
thus pass on questions of public policy, as an attempt 
to go beyond their proper sphere of action and invade 
the province of the executive. 2 

The principle of withdrawing questions of public law 
from the ordinary courts was not new. It existed in 

1 This principle, like all others in Anglo-Saxon countries, is not carried 
out with absolute consistency. Thus the various commissions in America 
on railroads, interstate commerce, etc., partake of the nature of the 
French administrative tribunals. 

2 The French, like the Americans, have not applied their principles 
quite strictly, for Criminal Law ought to be a branch of Public Law 
(Aucoc, Introd. § 1), but it has been put into the charge of the ordinary 
courts. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS. 57 

practice under the old regime, 1 but was extended and 
systematized after the Kevolution. The protection of 
officials from suit or prosecution was formally incorpo- 
rated into the Constitution of the year VIII. (1799), 
and remained in force until after the fall of Napo- 
leon HI., when it was repealed by a decree of the 
Government of the National Defense. 2 This decree 
was intended to remove all hindrances in the way 
of bringing government officials before the ordinary 
courts, but it had very little effect, because the Tri- 
bunal of Conflicts held that it applied only to the 
personal protection of officials, and did not affect the 
principle of the separation of powers, which, as un- 
derstood in France, forbids the ordinary judges to 
pass upon the legality of official acts. 3 Ques- 
tions of this kind, therefore, are still reserved istrative 
exclusively for the administrative courts, — 
tribunals created especially for this purpose, and com- 
posed of officials in the service of the government. 
Criminal cases are, indeed, an exception to the rule, 4 but 
this is of no great practical importance, because as force 
is pretty sure to be on the side of the police, it is no 
real protection to the individual to know that he can- 

1 See Laferriere, Traite, liv. i. ; De Tocqueville, An. Reg. et la Rev., 
book ii. ch. iv. ; Varagnac, " Le Conseil d'Etat," Revue des Deux Mondes, 
Aug. 15, 1892. 

2 Decree of Sept. 19, 1870. 

3 Arret, 30 Juillet, 1873, « Affaire Pe'le'tier," Dalloz, Jur. Gen., 1874, 
part iii. p. 5 ; Leferriere, Traite, liv. iii. ch. vii. ; Aucoc, Con/., liv. v. ch. 
ii. ; Goodnow, Comp. Adm. Law, vol. ii. pp. 172-76. 

4 Laferriere, Traite, liv. iii. ch. vi. But eveu this exception is not 
absolute. See, also, a discussion of the subject in Dalloz, 1881, part iii 
p. 17, note. 



58 FRANCE. 

not be condemned for resistance ; and on the other hand 
the officials concerned run no risk of punishment for 
illegal acts committed in obedience to orders, because 
the government can easily manage to prevent their 
being brought to trial, and can pardon them if con- 
victed. In France, therefore, there is one law for the 
citizen and another for the public official, and thus 
the executive is really independent of the judiciary, 
for the government has always a free hand, and can 
violate the law if it wants to do so without having any- 
thing to fear from the ordinary courts. Nor is the 
danger of interference on the part of the administrative 
tribunals as great as it would be in the case of the 
ordinary judges, because the former can be controlled 
absolutely in case of necessity ; and, in fact, they are 
so much a part of the administration itself that they 
fall into the province of the Interior and not that of 
Justice. 1 The independence of the ordinary judges is 
secured by a provision which prevents their removal or 
transfer to another court, without the approval of the 
Court of Cassation, the final court of error. 2 But the 

1 It would be absurd to suppose that the government always extorts 
a favorable judgment. This was clearly shown about a year ago in a 
famous case, which illustrates at the same time the degree of respect 
entertained for the decisions of the administrative courts. The Minister 
of the Interior and the railroads disagreed about the interpretation of a 
statute relating to the state guarantee of interest on the securities of the 
roads. The matter was brought before the Council of State, which 
decided in favor of the railroad. Thereupon the Minister of the Interior 
resigned, but the rest of the cabinet felt bound to abide by the decision. 
A discussion was, however, raised in the Chamber of Deputies, which in 
effect censured the ministers for submitting the matter to the Council of 
State, and thereby caused the cabinet to resign. 

2 This provision was suspended by statute for three months in 1883, 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUETS. 59 

judges of the administrative courts enjoy no such pro- 
tection, and can be removed by the President at any 
time. 1 The result is that, although a great mass of 
administrative law has slowly grown up from the deci- 
sions of these courts, 2 and personal liberty is much 
more respected than under t^e Empire, yet the courts 
themselves cannot be considered entirely judicial bodies, 
and are far from providing the rights of the citizen with 
a complete guarantee, at least where political questions 
are involved. 3 

on the ground — which seems to have had at least some justification — 
that the existing judges were partisan and influenced by anti-republican 
opinions. The suspension and the removals made in pursuance of it 
struck a severe blow at the independence of the judiciary, for the judges 
learned that their function was to render service rather than to administer 
justice, and it was some time before the bench began to recover its judicial 
tone. (For the causes and effects of this action, see J. Reinach, La Poli- 
tique Opportuniste, pp. 269-70 ; Vicomte d'Avenel, " La Rdf orrae Adminis- 
trative — La Justice," Revue des Deux Mondes, June 1, 1889, pp. 582-83; 
Jules Simon, "The Stability of the French Republic," Forum, 10, p. 383; 
Comte de Chaudordy, La France en 1889, p. 36, and a somewhat violent 
article by Hurlbert on " The Outlook in France," Fortnightly Review, 55, p. 
347.) Saleilles (Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Sci., July, 1895, p. 16, note) remarks 
that the consequences of this law still weigh heavily on the country. 

1 Aucoc, Con/., vol. i. pp. 156-57 ; Bceuf, Resume, pp. 39-40. The mem- 
bers of the Council of State who are qualified to sit as administrative 
judges are said to be always selected from the political friends of the 
government (Dupriez, Les Ministres, vol. ii. pp. 482-83). 

2 Unlike the civil law, the administrative law has never been codified, 
and indeed it could not be without destroying the element of discretion 
which is the reason for its existence. So far as it is not contained in 
statutes and ordinances, it has developed, like the English Common Law, 
by decision and precedent, and hence the sources for studying it are the 
reported cases and the writings of jurists such as those heretofore cited. 

8 Lebon, France as It Is, pp. 101-2 ; Goodnow (Comp. Administrative 
Law, vol. ii. pp. 220-21, 231) remarks that the administrative courts have 
shown themselves more favorable to private rights than the ordinary 



60 FRANCE. 

It is evident that with two sets of courts, neither of 
The Court which is superior to the other, disputes about 
of Conflicts. j ur i S( Ji c tion must constantly arise. Such is in 

courts, and he cites a celebrated instance where the former set aside an 
obnoxious ordinance of a prefect which the latter had held valid. But in 
the first place, this proves rather the timidity of the ordinary courts as at 
present organized, than the eagerness of the administrative courts to 
guard personal rights ; and in the second place, to set aside an ordinance 
which has no political significance is a very different thing from protect- 
ing an individual against a deliberate attack on the part of the govern- 
ment. Mr. Goodnow himself points out (vol. ii. pp. 226-27) that the 
administrative courts have decided that they will not interfere with acts 
of a political character, and have held that the illegal destruction of a 
newspaper in a time of public disturbance was an act of this kind. The 
cases referred to occurred, it is true, during the second Empire, but it 
is not improbable that these precedents would be followed to-day in any 
period of popular excitement. The practice of arbitrary arrest and the 
impossibility of getting redress has often been a grievance in France ; 
and it may be noticed that the guarantees of personal liberty and private 
right are in general the same to-day that they were at the time of 
Napoleon III. 

In regard to the relative merits of the English and French methods 
of dealing with public officials, the former gives to the citizen a better 
protection against oppression, but there can be no doubt that the latter 
has certain advantages from the point of view of administrative efficiency. 
Mr. Goodnow discusses the various aspects of the question in his Compara- 
tive Administrative Law, a book which is not only an admirable treatise, 
but has a peculiar value for Americans, because the author is completely 
imbued with continental ideas. He has, indeed, so little sympathy with 
Anglo-Saxon legal principles that he thinks the ordinary courts ought 
not to be allowed to decide questions of public law, because they have 
a tendency to apply to them the principles of private law (vol. i. 
p. 13). 

It is somewhat curious in this connection to observe that French 
writers often assert the inability of an ordinary court to protect the pub- 
lic against illegal ordinances, because it can only decide the case at bar, 
whereas an administrative court has power to annul the ordinance alto- 
gether ; a remark which shows an entire failure to comprehend the force 
of precedent in a judicial system like that of England. (See, for example, 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS. 61 

fact the case, and a special tribunal has been appointed 
to determine these disputes, or conflicts as they are 
called. 1 It is composed of the Minister of Justice, of 
three members of the highest court of law, the Court of 
Cassation, of three members of the highest administra- 
tive court, the Council of State (each of these sets being 
selected by their own court), and of two other persons 
elected by the foregoing seven. All the members are 
chosen for three years, except the Minister of Interior. 
This officer has the right to preside, and thus his pres- 
ence gives to the administration a majority in the tri- 
bunal. A striking example of the working of the sys- 
tem was presented in 1880, when the government issued 
decrees for the suppression of all monastic orders not 
authorized by law. There seems to have been grave 
doubt about the legality of the decrees, and the victims 
brought suits in the ordinary courts in several parts of 
France. Most of these courts held that they were 
authorized to entertain the suits, and in some cases they 
went so far as to order the persons who had been ex- 
pelled from their establishments to be restored to pos- 
session pending the trial ; 2 but the government raised 
the question of jurisdiction, and the Tribunal of Con- 

Varagnac, " Le Conseil d'Etat," Revue des Deux Mondes, Sept. 15, 1892, 
pp. 290-91.) 

An admirable comparison of the English and French systems may be 
found in Professor Dicey's Law of the Constitution, and especially in 
chapter xii. 

1 Aucoc, Con/., vol. i. § 406; Bceuf, Resume, 15th ed. pp. 542^3. 

2 Some of the decisions to this effect may be found in Dalloz, Jurispru- 
dence Generate, 1880, part iii. pp. 57-62, and 80. In the note to page 57 
there is a list of some of the other similar decisions and a discussion of 
the law. 



62 FRANCE. 

flicts decided that the ordinary courts were not compe- 
tent to deal with the matter. 1 It is a significant fact, 
which seems to show a lack of confidence in the impar- 
tiality of the administrative courts, that the persons 
injured did not bring the question of the legality of 
the decrees before the Council of State. 2 

When an ordinary court has assumed jurisdiction of 
a case, the question of competence can be raised only 
by the prefect, and not by a party, for the principle 
that the ordinary courts cannot determine the legality 
of official acts is intended solely as a protection to the 
administration. 3 

It is not quite accurate to say that the ordinary 
jurisdiction courts can consider the validity of no official 
act, and, indeed, the line between the juris- 
diction of the ordinary and the administrative 
courts does not follow any strictly logical principle. 4 
Questions of indirect taxes, for example, and those 
relating to the lesser highways [petite voirie), come 
before the ordinary courts, while those arising under 
the direct taxes, or relating to the greater highways 
(grande voirie), come before the administrative tribu- 
nals. The competence of the various administrative 

1 Arrets de Nov. 4, 5, 13, 17, and 20 ; Dalloz, 1880, part iii. pp. 121- 
32. These cases are reported with unusual fullness. 

2 At least I can find no decision on the subject by the Council of State 
reported in Dalloz. For criticisms on the conduct of the government, 
see Jules Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberte, ch. vi. ; and Channes, Nos Fautes, 
letters of July 12 and Oct. 27, 1880. 

8 Aucoc, Con/., vol. i. § 404; Bceuf, Resume, 15th ed. p. 547. 
4 On this subject, see Laferriere's great work, Traite de la Jurisdiction 
Administrative. 



of the ad- 
ministrative 
courts. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS. 63 

courts is no less complicated. The prefect and the 
mayor have each a very limited jurisdiction. That of 
the pref ectorial councils, on the other hand, is very con- 
siderable, although as a matter of fact these councils 
are occupied almost altogether with questions of taxes, 
and in these, as a rule, they follow the advice of the 
assessors. 1 But by far the most important administra- 
tive court is the Council of State, which has a special 
section or committee to attend to the contentieux, as 
this class of litigation is called. The Council not only 
hears appeals from the lower administrative tribunals, 
but has also original jurisdiction in many important 
cases, and in fact recent practice is tending to establish 
the principle that the Council of State is the judge of 
all administrative matters in the absence of special pro- 
visions of law. The number of cases brought before 
it is very large, and has increased so rapidly that the 
section for the contentieux is badly in arrears, and it 
has been proposed to create a second section to relieve 
the pressure. 2 

Such is the legal position of the administration in 
ordinary times, but in case of war or insurrec- The state of 
tion it can be given far greater powers, by a 8iege ' 
proclamation of the state of siege. This can be made 
by statute, or if Parliament is not in session, it can be 
made by the President ; but in that case, in order to 
meet the danger of a coup d'etat, which is ever present 

1 Vicomte d'Avenel, " La Rdforme Administrative — La Justice," Revue 
des Deux Mondes, June 1, 1889, p. 596. 

2 For the number of cases decided by the administrative courts, see 
the tables (through 1886) in Laferriere, liv. i. ch. v. 



64 FRANCE. 

to the eyes of Frenchmen, it is provided that the Cham- 
bers shall meet as of right in two days. 1 Within the 
district covered by the state of siege, the military courts 
can be given criminal jurisdiction, and can punish any 
offenses against the safety of the Republic or the general 
peace. They can search houses by day or night, expel 
from the district any non-residents, seize all arms, and 
forbid any publications or meetings which are liable to 
disturb the public order. 2 

I have dwelt at some length on what, from an 
Effect of the Anglo-Saxon point of view, may well be called 
S^on the ^ ne legislative and judicial powers of the 
thTexSju- executive in France, because these things are 
entirely foreign to our own political ideas and 
experience, and because they exist in some form in 
almost every country on the continent of Europe. 

When we consider the paternal character of the 
government, the centralization of the state, and the 
large share of authority vested in the executive depart- 
ment, we cannot fail to see that the ministers in whose 
hands this vast power is lodged must be either very 
strong or very weak. If they are able to wield it as 
they please, and are really free to carry out their own 
policy, they must be far stronger than any officer or 
body in Great Britain, and immeasurably stronger than 
any in our federal republic. But, on the other hand, 
the very immensity and pervasiveness of their power, 
the fact that it touches closely every interest in the 
country, renders them liable to pressure from all sides. 

1 Law of April 3, 1878, Poudra et Pierre, § 79. 

2 Poudra et Pierre, § 76, gives the text of the law. 



EFFECT OF THE FRENCH SYSTEM. 65 

It becomes important for every one to influence their 
action, provided he can get a standpoint from which 
to bring a pressure to bear. This standpoint is fur- 
nished by the Chamber of Deputies, for the existence 
of the ministry depends on the votes of that body. 
The greater, therefore, the power of the minister, and 
the more numerous the favors he is able to bestow, the 
fiercer will be the struggle for them, and the less will 
he be free to pursue his own policy, untrammeled by 
deputies, whose votes he must win if he would remain 
in office. A Frenchman, who is eminent as a student 
of political philosophy, and has at the same time great 
practical experience in politics, once remarked to the 
author, " We have the organization of an empire with 
the forms of a republic." * The French administrative 
system is, indeed, designed for an empire, and would 
work admirably in the hands of a wise and benevolent 
autocrat who had no motive but the common weal ; but 
when arbitrary power falls under the control of popular 
leaders, it can hardly fail to be used for personal and 
party ends ; for, as a keen observer has truly said, the 
defect of democracy lies in the fact that it is nobody's 
business to look after the interests of the public. 2 

1 Gneist expresses the same idea : " Es entsteht der unvermittelte Gegen- 
satz einer republikanisch gedachten Verfassung wit einer absolutistlsch orga- 
nisirten Verwaltung." (Die Preussische Kreisordnung, p. 7.) 

2 The late Professor Gneist, perhaps the most profound student of the 
comparative history of England and the continent, from the point of 
view of the working of parliamentary government, demonstrated that the 
success of the system in England has been due to certain underlying 
institutions which have made that country a commonwealth based upon 
law (Rechtsstaat). His chief works on the subject are his Englische 
Verwaltungsrecht ; Self-government, etc., in England; Der Rechtsstaat, and 

VOL. I. 



66 FRANCE. 

Verwaltung, Justiz, Rechtsweg. In the opening words of the preface to 
the last of these, the keynote of the whole theory is struck when he says, 
" Die parlamentarische Regierung Englands ist eine Regierung nach Gesetzen 
und durch Gesetze" 

His views may be briefly summarized as follows : In England alone, 
among the countries of Europe, the royal power became consolidated 
early, for the Norman kings broke down the resistance of the great 
vassals and made their authority effective over the whole realm, drawing 
military, judicial, and police matters into their own hands. By this 
process, the antagonism and jealousy of the different classes was crushed ; 
while the land-owning nobility found their only chance of political activity 
in exerting a restraint upon the crown by means of judicial action and 
statutes. Their first great achievement was Magna Charta, with which the 
parliamentary era begins. The struggle was continued in the Barons' 
war, and resulted in the evolution of the House of Commons. 

From time to time Parliament enacted statutes which supplemented 
the customary law, and furnished a solid basis for the decisions of the 
courts. The existence of permanent statutes, as distinguished from royal 
edicts in their nature changeable, is one of the chief foundations of the 
reign of law in England, for the statutes in ever increasing quantity regu- 
lated the administration rigorously and uniformly throughout the land. 

Another factor that contributed to the same result was the method in 
which the statutes were executed, and this in turn may be traced to the 
early extension of the royal power. The administrative laws were 
carried out by means of a large number of officers, of whom the most 
important were the justices of the peace. These were appointed by the 
king, and hence acted in behalf of the state instead of local or class 
interests ; but, on the other hand, they were in fact the greater land- 
owners of the county, not professional officials bound to do the bidding of 
the court. They conducted the local administration according to judicial 
forms, subject on purely legal questions to the control of the King's 
Bench by means of writs of Certiorari, Mandamus, etc., the effect being to 
prevent arbitrary abuse of power, and to insure legality in the execution 
of the law. In short, as Gneist expresses it, the English developed an 
elaborate and effective system of administrative justice. 

The method of administration also produced self-government, by which 
Gneist means not the control of local matters by bodies elected to repre- 
sent local hjterests, but an organization of the whole community for the 
service of the state, so arranged that the classes most capable by their 
wealth and position for government bore the burdens and administered 
the affairs of their neighborhood. The result was brought about in 



NOTE OF THE VIEWS OF GNEIST. 67 

England chiefly by means of the office of justice of the peace, which 
gradually became both an honor and a duty attached to the ownership of 
land. Thus the gentry carried on the local government ; but this was 
no mere privilege which they enjoyed for their own benefit, because they 
also paid the taxes and ruled, not for the profit of their own class, but as 
officers of the state for the common good and in strict accordance with 
fixed laws. Hence, instead of the hostility of classes that existed all over 
the continent, there developed harmonious local communities with true 
public opinions on political questions. Moreover, the habit of sitting as 
justices gave to the gentry a sense of public duty and a love for law. 
Now the House of Commons was virtually composed of the representa- 
tives of the gentry, who carried into it their sentiments. The members 
of Parliament, therefore, understood law, and had a deep sense of its 
importance, while their training caused them to act for the good of the 
whole state rather than the benefit of their own class. This rendered 
possible the formation of real national parties, based on differences of 
opinion, not on class interests ; parties whose action in Parliament was 
restricted by a respect for law. 

Gneist points out how different has been the history of France. 
Feudalism there was at first too strong for the royal power to overcome, 
and hence the community, instead of being consolidated, split into hostile 
classes. The king found himself at the head of a state whose organiza- 
tion was so loose and inefficient as to be incapable of natural develop- 
ment. As soon as he was able, he began to create in the royal domains 
better military, financial, police, and judicial systems. The old institutions 
having gained no strength in the mean while were unable to stand against 
the new and more effective ones, which gradually spread over the whole 
of France. The new ones, however, were not combined with the old, but 
substituted for them ; and thus the power both of the vassals and of the 
estates was crushed by the royal supremacy. In fact, the political and 
social organization of the country became entirely unlike. Socially, 
the nation was still divided into the classes whose selfish antagonism had 
made possible the triumph of the crown. Politically, absolute power 
had become vested in the king, who ruled by means of a paid corps of 
officials without ties with the local communities, unrestrained by perma- 
nent statutes, and dependent solely on his pleasure. The French Revolu- 
tion did not essentially change this state of things. It did not create a 
new organic political structure of the community, but merely transferred 
the royal power to the people, or rather to those particular interests 
among the people that were able to acquire ascendency for the moment, 
and these were no more inclined to place restraints on their own omnipo- 



68 FRANCE. 

tence than the king had been before. While, therefore, private law was 
just and strong, public law was weak and unstable ; and as public law is 
the foundation of political society, Gneist regards France as the very- 
negation of a commonwealth based upon law. 

German history followed very much the same course during the 
Middle Ages, but at their close the central power was not strong enough 
to enforce obedience and consolidate the empire. Hence the supremacy 
of the crown developed at a still later time, after the centrifugal forces 
had grown so powerful that the principalities had become well-nigh 
independent. Then the princes overcame within their territories the 
resistance of the estates as the king had done in France. In Germany, 
however, and especially in Prussia, the bureaucracy was so ordered as to 
furnish a better protection to individual rights and a firmer maintenance 
of law. But this broke down with the spread of French ideas after 1848, 
when the antagonistic interests in the state, taking advantage of the 
parliamentary system, abused the administrative power and introduced 
a veritable party tyranny. 

Gneist considered the subsidiary framework of the English institutions, 
and especially the justices of the peace, as the foundation of the legal 
character of the government, and hence of the success of the parlia- 
mentary system. But he did not realize that the keystone of the whole 
structure is the ultimate decision by the courts at Westminster of all 
questions of law that arise in the course of the administration. He did 
not see that the legal spirit pervading the system is the result of giving 
to public law the sacredness and inflexibility that pertains to private law, 
and that this end is reached by fusing the two together, and confiding 
them both in the last resort to the same courts. On the contrary, he 
believed that public and private law ought to be kept distinct, and he 
approved of the practice of placing the former in the hands of special 
administrative tribunals. The germs of such a system appeared for a 
moment in England when the Star Chamber began to act as a supreme 
administrative court ; but one cannot help feeling that if this procedure 
had become permanent, public law would have been much less rigidly 
interpreted than it was by the King's Bench, that the administration 
would have become more discretionary, and that the strict, rigorous, 
legal spirit of the system would have been lost. 

It may be added that Gneist considered the English government at 
its highest perfection under George III. In his opinion, the reform bill 
of 1832, the extension of the franchise in 1867, and still more the recent 
changes in local government, have been a departure from historic prin- 
ciples, and have tended by disorganizing the state to bring about a strife 
of parties and reduce England to the condition of other nations. 



CHAPTER H. 

FRANCE: PARTIES. 

For more than a hundred years it has been the habit 
to talk of government by the people, and the 
expression is, perhaps, more freely used to-day ence of par- 
than ever before, yet a superficial glance at largovem- 
the history of democracy ought to be enough 
to convince us that in a great nation the people as a 
whole do not and cannot really govern. The fact is 
that we are ruled by parties, whose action is more or 
less modified, but never completely directed, by public 
opinion. Eousseau, indeed, shadowed forth a great 
truth, when he declared that no community could be 
capable of a general will — or as we should express it, 
of a true public opinion — where parties or sects pre- 
vailed; 1 and our own experience of popular government 
will quite justify us in saying that public opinion is 
always more or less warped by the existence of party 
ties. A study of the nature and development of parties 
is, therefore, the most important one that can occupy 
the student of political philosophy to-day. Asa rule 
Among Anglo-Saxon peoples, who have had onfy e two e 
a far longer experience in self-government a^Io-" 1 

• i i it ±i ii j Saxon coun- 

tnan most other races, there are usually two tries, but 
great parties which dispute for mastery in the where. 

1 Contrat Social, liv. ii. ch. iii. 



70 FRANCE. 

state. But in the countries on the continent of Europe 
this is not usually true. We there find a number of 
parties or groups which are independent of each other 
to a greater or less extent, and form coalitions, some- 
times of a most unnatural kind, to support or oppose 
the government of the hour. Now the existence of 
several distinct political groups has a decisive influence 
on the working of the parliamentary system. Let us 
consider this question a moment. 

When a country with a parliamentary form of gov- 
ernment is divided into two hostile parties, 
parliament- the ministers who lead the majority of the 
there are popular chamber must of course belong all to 

normally > ,' "i • n i i i 

only two one oi those parties, or all to the other, and 

parties. 

they are forced by circumstances to work in 
harmony. But even when party strife is less bitter, 
and parties have begun to break up, experience has 
proved that the best policy for the ministers is to sup- 
port each other and stand or fall together. Lord Mel- 
bourne is reported to have exclaimed at a cabinet meet- 
ing, after a discussion on the question of changing the 
duty on corn, " Now is it to lower the price of corn, or 
is n't it ? It is not much matter which we say, but 
mind, we must all say the same." 1 The statesmanship 
implied by this remark may not have been of the high- 
est kind, but the politics were sound, and showed a 
knowledge of the great secret of success. It is, indeed, 
an axiom in politics that, except under very peculiar 
circumstances, coalition ministries are short-lived com- 
pared with homogeneous ones, whose members are in 

1 Bagehot, English Constitution f p. 16, note. 



PARTIES IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM. 71 

cordial sympathy with each other. Now so long as the 
ministers cling together, every member of the House 
must consider the cabinet and its policy as a whole, and 
make up his mind whether he will support it, or help 
to turn it out and put in an entirely different set of 
ministers with another policy. He cannot support the 
cabinet on certain questions and oppose it on others. 
He must sacrifice details to the general question. The 
result is that the members either group themselves 
about the ministers, and vote with them through thick 
and thin, or else they attach themselves to an opposi- 
tion party, whose object is to turn out the cabinet, and 
then take office itself and carry on a different policy. 
The normal condition of the parliamentary system, 
therefore, among a people sufficiently free from preju- 
dices to group themselves naturally, and possessing 
enough experience to know that the practical and 
attainable, and not the ideal, is the true aim in politics, 
is a division into two parties, each of which is ready to 
take office whenever the other loses its majority. This 
has been true in England in ordinary times, and 
although of late years it has been frequently asserted 
that the two great parties in the House of Commons 
are destined to come to an end, and be replaced by a 
number of independent groups, the prophecy does not 
accord with experience. It is based on the state of the 
Parliament of 1892, and seems to arise from mistaking 
a temporary political condition for a permanent one. The 
sudden interjection of the question of Home Rule into 
English politics caused a new party division on fresh 
lines, which necessarily broke up the traditional associ- 



72 FRANCE. 

ations of public life, and threw both parties into a state 
of confusion that has not yet disappeared. On one 
side, the opponents of the measure we,re composed of 
men whose habits of thought had been most diverse ; 
while the followers of Mr. Gladstone, on the other side, 
included many Liberals who were forced, against their 
will, to subordinate to Home Eule other matters which 
they deemed more important. In short, the introduc- 
tion of a new issue shattered the old basis of cleavage, 
and it is not surprising that new, solidified parties were 
not formed in an instant. Moreover it may be noticed 
that although the Liberal groups in the late House of 
Commons talked freely of their dissensions, they acted 
as a single party, and supported the cabinet by their 
votes with astonishing fidelity. 

A division into two parties is not only the normal 
result of the parliamentary system, but also 
work well an essential condition of its success. Sup- 
pose, for example, that a third party, like that 
of the Irish Home Rulers under Parnell, is formed, and 
places some one specific issue above all others, with the 
determination of voting against any cabinet that does 
not yield to its demands on that point ; and suppose 
this body becomes large enough to hold the balance 
of power. If, in such a case, the two old parties do 
not make a coalition, or one of them does not absorb 
the new group by making concessions, no ministry will 
be able to secure a majority. Every cabinet will be 
overthrown as soon as it is formed, and parliamentary 
government will be an impossibility. Now suppose that 
the third party, instead of being implacably hostile to 



TWO PARTIES ESSENTIAL. 73 

both the others, is willing for a time to tolerate a cabi- 
net from one of them, — is willing, in short, to allow the 
ministers to retain office provided they give no offense. 
Under these circumstances parliamentary government 
is not impossible, but it is extremely difficult. The 
ministers are compelled to ride two horses at once. 
They must try to conciliate two inharmonious bodies of 
men, on pain of defeat if either of them becomes hos- 
tile ; and hence their tenure is unstable and their course 
necessarily timid. Now the larger the number of dis- 
cordant groups that form the majority, the harder the 
task of pleasing them all, and the more feeble and 
unstable the position of the cabinet. . Nor is the diffi- 
culty removed «by giving portf olios to the members of 
the several groups ; for even if this reduces the labor of 
satisfying the parties, it adds that of maintaining an 
accord among the ministers themselves, and entails the 
proverbial weakness of coalition governments. A cab- 
inet which depends for its existence on the votes of 
the Chamber can pursue a consistent policy with firm- 
ness and effect only when it can rely for support on a 
compact and faithful majority; and therefore the par- 
liamentary system will give the country a strong and 
efficient government only in case the majority consists 
of a single party. But this is not all. The opposition 
must also be united. So long as the ministry stands, 
the composition of the minority is, indeed, of little con- 
sequence ; but when that minority becomes a majority, 
it must in turn be a single party, or the weakness of a 
coalition ministry cannot be avoided. It follows that a 
division of the Chamber into two parties, and two par- 



74 FRANCE. 

ties only, is necessary in order that the parliamentary 
form of government should permanently produce good 
results. 

In France the parliamentary system has not worked 

well, because this condition has not been ful- 

tionhasnot filled. 1 The various groups of Monarchists 

filled in and Bonapartists have together formed in the 

France. 

Chambers the party of the Keactionaries, or 
as it is more commonly called, the Eight. 2 The rest of 

1 This is recognized by many French writers, e. g. f Lamy, La Re'pub- 
lique en 1883 ; Paul Laffitte, Le Suffrage Universel et la Regime Parlementaire, 
pt. i. ch. iii. ; Saleilles, in the Annals of the American Academy of Political 
Science, July, 1895, pp. 57, 64, 65. But the reason for the existence of a 
number of groups in France seems to be only partially understood. The 
most clear-sighted writer on this subject is Dupriez. (See Les Ministres f 
vol. ii. pp. 363-65, 370-71, and 386-95.) 

2 For readers unfamiliar with European politics it may perhaps be 
necessary to explain the meaning of the terms Right and Left, as they 
are used all over the Continent. In England a broad aisle runs from the 
Speaker's desk through the middle of the House of Commons to the main 
entrance opposite, and the benches of the members are arranged parallel 
to this aisle and facing it. The Ministry sit on the front bench at the 
right of the Speaker (the so-called Treasury Bench), their supporters 
taking seats behind and alongside of them, while the opposition sit on the 
left side of the House. The Liberals and Conservatives, therefore, are 
each to be found sometimes on one side of the House and sometimes on 
the other, according as their party is in power or not. But on the Conti- 
nent the seats are arranged, as a rule, like those of a theatre, as in our 
legislative bodies, the ministers usually sitting immediately in front of 
the Speaker or President, on a bench which sometimes faces him and 
sometimes looks the other way, while the conservative members sit on 
the President's right, the more liberal next to these, and the radical on 
his left. As this arrangement is permanent, the words Right and Left 
have come to be generally used for Conservative and Liberal ; and the 
different groups are often designated by their position in the Chamber, 
as the Right, the Centre, and the Left Centre, the Left, or the Extreme 
Left. 



MANY GROUPS IN FRANCE. 75 

the members have been supporters of the Republic, and 
have formed nominally a single party, but they have 
really been held together only by a desire to maintain 
the existing form of government, and have seldom 
acted in concert except when they thought that threat- 
ened. They have always comprised men of every shade 
of opinion, from conservatives to radicals and even 
socialists, and would speedily have broken up into com- 
pletely hostile parties, if it had not been for the fear 
of the Reactionaries. Even under the pressure of this 
fear their cohesion has been very slight, for they have 
been divided into a number of groups with organiza- 
tions which, though never either complete or durable, 
have been quite separate ; and again, these groups have 
often been subdivided into still smaller groups, whose 
members were loosely held together by similarity of 
opinions or desire for advancement, usually under the 
standard of some chief, who held, or hoped to win, a 
place in the cabinet. In fact, the parties in the Cham- 
ber of Deputies have presented such a series of dissolv- 
ing views that it is very difficult to draw an intelligible 
picture of them. 

A short history of the parties under the Third 
Republic will help to make their nature and 
position clear. 1 In the National Assembly, parties 
elected at the close of the war with Germany, Third Re- 

public. 

the Right, consisting of Monarchists and a 

few Bonapartists, had at first a majority, although the 

1 A list of the cabinets, with the causes of their fall, may be found in 
Muel, Gouvernements, Ministeres et Constitutions de la France, and Hau- 
cour, Gouvernements et Ministeres de la III mt Republique Francaise. 



76 FRANCE. 

subsequent course of events proved that it had no 
chance of carrying out its own opinions. The members 
openly in favor of a Eepublic were in the minority, 
and were, moreover, divided into three groups : the 
Extreme Left, with few seats in the Assembly, but 
many active and enthusiastic partisans outside; the 
Left proper, at first the largest of the three groups; 
and the Left Centre, which was not strong at the out- 
set, but grew rapidly by the adhesion of many former 
Monarchists. A regular government of some 
deney of kind had to be established at once, and the 

Thiers 

Feb., 1871- first act of the Assembly was to elect as Chief 

May, 1873. . J 

of the Executive, 1 by an almost unanimous 
vote, the former minister of Louis Philippe, Adolphe 
Thiers, whose personal inclinations were in favor of 
constitutional monarchy, but who saw that in the exist- 
ing condition of things a Republic was the only form 
of government possible in France. Under these cir- 
cumstances Thiers selected his ministers among the 
moderate elements in the Assembly, chiefly from the 
Left Centre, and although his views were by no means 
in entire accord with those of the Right, he was sup- 
ported by the great majority of the Assembly until the 
treaty of peace had been made and the country almost 
entirely evacuated by the German troops. The intense 
dread of radicalism on the part of the Right, and the 
decided stand of the President in favor of the Repub- 
lic, had already begun, however, to make a breach 
between them, and a conflict was soon precipitated. In 

1 This title was changed on Aug. 31, 1871, to that of President of the 
French Republic. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 77 

the spring of 1873 a number of Radicals won seats at 
by-elections, and this was followed by the resignation 
of the most conservative of the ministers, and a partial 
reconstruction of the cabinet. Thiers himself was a 
strong Conservative, but he did not believe in the pol- 
icy of active resistance to the Radicals urged by the 
Right, and hence the latter, on May 24, carried an 
order of the day censuring the recent changes in the 
ministry. Thiers at once resigned, and the Right elected 
Marshal MacMahon in his stead. 

The new President appointed a cabinet of a more 
strictly conservative character, and placed at Thepresi- 
its head the Due de Broglie, who had led the MacMahon. 
attack against Thiers. But this ministrv also Theremain- 

,., • ! . derofthe 

did not represent any united party, and, m- term of the 

jS tit 1 OUR 1 

deed, it would not have been possible for it Assembly. 
to do so, because the parties had become so broken up 
that no single group controlled a majority of the Assem- 
bly. In fact, a year had hardly passed when the cabinet 
was defeated by the votes of the Extreme Right, the 
Left Centre, and the Left, on a question of the order 
in which the Constitutional Laws should be considered. 
Before those laws were completed two more ministries 
had come in, each a trifle more liberal in composition 
than the last, but neither of them able to command the 
allegiance of a compact majority. 

At last the constitution was adopted, and early in 
1876 the first Senate and Chamber of Depu- Thefirst 
ties were elected; 1 the former being still ^wconsd- 9 
controlled by the Right, while in the latter 

1 The seventy-five life senators had been chosen in December, 1875. 



78 FRANCE. 



the majority was Eepublican by more than two to one. 
The strength and character of the various Eepublican 
groups in the Chamber of Deputies was, however, very 
different from what it had been in the Assembly, for 
the Extreme Left, which had controlled only a few seats 
there, had grown very much in size, and took the name 
of " Eepublican Union " to distinguish it from a new 
group that had been formed still farther to the Left. 
Gambetta, indeed, the hero of the final struggle against 
Germany, and the leading spirit of the Union, had 
formerly passed for an extremist, but was now accused 
by the theoretical Eadicals of adapting his policy to 
circumstances, and striving for what was attainable 
rather than for the ideal principles of the Eepublic. 
For this reason they styled him an " Opportunist," a 
name that was soon applied to the party of which he 
was the chief. During the period that now began, 
the most important of the Eepublican groups in the 
Chamber of Deputies were the Left Centre, the Eepub- 
lican Left, the Eepublican Union, the Eadical Left, 
and the Extreme Left; and each of these, like the 
fractions into which the Eight was split, was organized 
with a president, secretary, and executive committee of 
its own ; although it is hardly necessary to remark 
that no one of them comprised by itself a majority of 
the members of the Chamber. In the Senate the Ee- 
publicans were similarly divided into the Left Centre, 
the Eepublican Left, and the Eepublican Union. 

President MacMahon, as the head of a parliamentary 
government, felt obliged to select his ministers from 
the Eepublican majority in the Chamber, and shortly 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 79 

after the election he appointed a new cabinet drawn 
entirely from the Left Centre. This ministry was cer- 
tainly homogeneous, but as its immediate followers in 
the Left Centre were a small fraction of the Deputies, 
it could not count on the support of a majority; and 
finding itself beaten by the Left in the Chamber and 
by the Eight in the Senate, it resigned in less than a 
year. The cabinet was reconstructed on the same lines 
under Jules Simon, who might have stood a better 
chance had not MacMahon himself become alarmed at 
the spread of radical opinions. The President re- 
proached his minister with lack of firmness about the 
proposed laws on the press, and on his resignation 
appointed a new cabinet, composed largely of Monarch- 
ists, with the Due de Broglie at their head. 

This was clearly a violation of the parliamentary 
principle, and the members of the Republi- 

. . . t . i , i • i MacMahon's 

can groups at once joined in a protest, which strife with 
was answered in June, 1877, by a dissolution cans, and his 

. . fall. 

of the Chamber. By his course the Presi- 
dent had opened a wide gulf between the Monarchists 
and the Republicans. He had made it impossible for 
the men of moderate views in the two parties to unite, 
and had precipitated a struggle between the extreme 
elements in the state. The conflict was passionate on 
both sides, for the Republicans were firmly convinced 
that the President intended to restore the monarchy, 
and he on his part believed equally strongly that the 
success of his opponents meant the triumph of radical- 
ism and the ruin of the country. Nor were any efforts 
spared to carry the elections. The cabinet replaced 



80 FKANCE. 

most of the prefects, and many other officials, by its 
own friends, and brought to bear the immense power 
of the administration. The Marshal himself threw 
his personal influence into the scale, and the bishops 
helped him by ordering a supplication for a favorable 
vote. But in spite of every exertion, the elections 
in October resulted in a victory for the Kepublicans. 
MacMahon, however, was not yet willing to submit, 
and when the ministers resigned, he appointed others 
who were not in active politics and had no seats 
in Parliament. The Chamber, regarding this as an 
attempt to defeat the will of the nation, refused to 
enter into any relations with the cabinet, and at last 
the President found himself obliged to give way. In 
December he constructed a purely Republican ministry, 
most of who;3£ members were taken from the Left 
Centre ; but it was now impossible for him to keep the 
Moderates in power. He had brought about precisely 
the result he meant to avoid, for he had thrown the 
Republican party into the hands of its less conservative 
wing. Gambetta had been the leader in the late cam- 
paign. The victory had been his victory, and had 
made him for the moment almost omnipotent in the 
Chamber. The only obstacle in his way was presented 
by the Senate, and when the elections of January 5, 
1879, gave a majority in that body also to the Repub- 
licans, they assumed a more aggressive tone. They 
began by demanding the removal of several Bonapartist 
generals ; and Marshal MacMahon, who felt that su'ch 
a policy would injure the army, and who could not bear 
to dismiss his old companions in arms, saw no course 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 81 

open to him but resignation. He therefore withdrew 
from public life, and on January 30, 1879, was re- 
placed by Grevy, a Republican of Gambetta's school. 

After the fall of MacMahon, the Opportunists re- 
mained for many years the dominant fraction 
in the Republican party, but as they did not ress towards 
comprise a majority of the Chamber, the min- 
isters were drawn from more than one group. The 
combinations were, of course, constantly changing, and 
as a matter of fact, the successive cabinets became less 
and less conservative, and yielded more and more to the, 
demands of the Extreme Left. First the communists 
were pardoned, then religious teaching was abolished in 
the public schools, and this was followed by the forci- 
ble breaking up of the so-called unautljorized religious 
orders. Meanwhile a host of officials were discharged^ 
and replaced by men of more advanced views; and 
finally even the law protecting judges from removal was 
suspended, in order, as it was said, to purify the bench 
from the enemies of the Republic. In short, the policy 
of the government was dictated more and more com- 
pletely by the Radicals. 1 The reason for such a state 
of things is simple. A body of men that has the 
enthusiasm and energy of fanaticism always possesses a 
greater momentum than its mere numbers would give 
it, 2 and in France by far the most determined and 
energetic parties are the Clericals, or ardent supporters 

1 G. Channes, Nos Fautes, passim • Jules Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, 
ch. vii. sec. I. 

2 The Comte de Chaudordy keenly remarks : " Beaucoup d'audace, un 
peu de savoir-faire, et on parvient a gouverner la France." (La France 
en 1889, p. 75.) 

VOL. I. 



82 FRANCE. 

of the church, on the Eight, and the Eadicals on the 
Left ; the people of less extreme views not having the 
same passionate convictions. 1 The Eadicals were, in 
fact, far more tenacious than the other Eepublicans. 
The latter preferred to sacrifice their opinions rather 
than precipitate any crisis which might endanger the 
Eepublic, and, believing that they could not resist the 
Eight and secure the necessary majority in the Chamber 
without the help of the Eadicals, tried to conciliate 
them. 2 The result was that the Eadicals, through 
their influence in the cabinet, wielded great power, 
without feeling the restraint that comes from a sense 
of responsibility. 3 

During the struggle with MacMahon, the Eepubli- 
cans had been solidly united, but the danger had not 
passed very long before the Eadicals began to show 
themselves independent. They soon became quite 
ready to upset any ministry that offended them, and 
in fact cabinet after cabinet was overthrown by the 
votes of the Eight and the Extreme Left. Even 
Gambetta, who had striven to keep the Eepublicans 
together, did not escape this fate, in spite of his im- 
mense popularity both in the country and in the Parlia- 
ment. He did not consent to form a ministry until 
November, 1881 ; and after holding office only two 
months and a half, he was forced to resign by the 
refusal of the Chamber to introduce the scrutin de liste 
for the election of deputies. He lived only till the 

1 Channes, Letter of Sept. 5, 1885. 

2 Cf. Channes, pp. 334r-35. 

8 Cf. Pressense', La France, les Partis et les Elections, p. 51. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES, 83 

end of the year, and his death deprived France of her 
only great popular leader. After his fall, politics fol- 
lowed the old course, and there passed across the stage 
a series of short-lived ministries, none of which lasted 
more than a year, except one formed by Ferry in 
February, 1883. Ferry had formerly been very active 
in suppressing the religious orders, but he now declared 
himself opposed to the Radicals ; and in spite of their 
hostility and his own lack of popularity, he succeeded 
by his personal force and ability in so managing the 
deputies as to keep himself in office for more than two 
years. He was even able to secure the adoption of the 
scrutin de liste which had wrecked Gambetta. But 
his long tenure of power awoke jealousy and resent- 
ment, and when his expedition to Tonquin met with 
reverses, the Chamber turned against him. A credit 
he asked for was rejected by a vote of more than two 
to one, and he resigned, never to hold a portfolio again. 
His is not, indeed, the only case in which the Republic 
has discarded a politician because he was too strong. 

About this time a change began to come over the 
condition of the parties. 1 Their discipline 
had never been strict, for although the of personal 

i -I -i • p i i t polities. 

various groups were in the habit oi holding 
caucuses to decide upon their attitude in regard to 
questions pending in the Chambers, such determina- 
tions had not been absolutely binding, and the members 
of a group rarely voted as a unit. But of late years 
the lack of discipline had been increasing. Moreover, 
the groups themselves had been subdividing and mul- 

1 Cf. Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 386-95. 



84 \ FRANCE. 

tiplying until they ceased so thoroughly to represent 
intelligible principles that personal interest became the 
real basis of union. At the same time a feeling began 
to arise that the groups were responsible for the bad 
working of parliamentary government, and after the 
elections of 1885 many deputies refused to join any 
organization at all. The breaking up of the groups 
was followed, not by the formation of great parties, but 
by the growth of innumerable personal cliques whose 
political opinions were often ill-defined. The result 
was that the cabinets had no policy, and were drawn 
now a little more from the Left and now a little more 
from the Centre, according to the opportunity of 
making a workable combination. The deputies were 
naturally in a state of political anarchy, while the 
Chamber, without the guidance of responsible leaders, 
did not know its own mind. In March, 1888, it over- 
threw one set of ministers because they refused to 
consider the revision of the constitution, and within a 
year it upset the next because they wanted to consider 
it. Politics were truly in what a friend of the writer 
described as a condition of permanent instability. To 
how great an extent this is true may be judged from 
the fact that in the ten years following the resignation 
of President MacMahon there were fourteen different 
cabinets. 1 

Meanwhile, the most conservative class of Repub- 

1 It was during this period, on Dec. 2, 1887, that President Grdvy was 
forced to resign on account of the scandal arising from his son-in-law 
Wilson's traffic in decorations. On the next day Carnot was elected in 
his stead. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 85 

licans, finding their opinions disregarded, had become 
discouraged, and abstained to a great extent 

_L lift moa f)f 

from going to the polls. 1 Thus it happened General 
that at the election of 1881 the Left Centre 
almost disappeared from the Chamber. But while the 
Parliament and the cabinets became continually more 
radical, the people at large were really getting more 
conservative. 2 The government failed, therefore, to 
represent the true sentiments of the country, which 
grew weary, moreover, of the incessant change of min- 
istries, and of the intriguing and wrangling in the 
Chamber. It felt that the best men were not at the 
head of the state, and it conceived a profound disgust 
for parliamentary government, and a good deal of 
contempt for politicians, 3 — a feeling justified by the 
fact that one of the greatest merits of the parlia- 
mentary system, that of sifting the public men and 
bringing the greatest to the top, had certainly not 
been realized in France. The people showed their dis- 
content at the general election of 1885 by returning an 
increased number of Monarchists ; but the Republicans 
did not take warning, and pursued their old tactics. 
At this time General Boulanger came forward and 
promised reform. He had become prominent as Min- 

1 Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberie, pp. 330, 374 ; Nos Hommes oVFtat, p. 
116 ; Souviens-toi du Deux-Decembre, pp. 90, 349, et seq. ; Laffitte, op. 
cit., p. 75. 

2 Channes, Nos Fautes, passim ; Simon, Souviens-toi, p. 146. 

3 Channes, Letter of Aug. 22, 1885 ; Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberie, pp. 
374-75 ; Souviens-toi, p. 140. For recent popular expressions of disgust 
for the parliamentary system and the intrigues of politicians, see, for 
example, the Petit Journal, Dec. 7, 1892, Feb. 18, 1893 ; Le Figaro, 
Dec. 22, 1892 ; Le Matin, Feb. 15, 1893. 



86 FRANCE. 

ister of War from January, 1886, to May, 1887, when 
his heavy expenditures on the army, and his aggressive 
hostility towards Germany, had caused the fall of the 
last cabinet to which he belonged. Always classed as 
a Eadical, he now proposed revision of the constitu- 
tion, although precisely what that revision was to be he 
refused to say. The Bonapartists, who hoped for the 
overthrow of the Republic and cared little what the 
name of the next Emperor might be, trooped after him 
almost to a man. A considerable part of the Monarch- 
ists, also, were glad to fish in troubled waters, and 
followed him; 1 and he secured, besides, the support 
of a good many Radicals, because in spite of their 
success they were dissatisfied. They had failed to 
attain their ideal, 2 for the ideal of the extreme French 
Radicals is so far removed from actuality as to be unat- 
tainable, and hence they are never satisfied with any- 
thing that exists, their constant desire being for change, 
not to say destruction. For a moment the 
danger was great, and, indeed, had a war 
broken out, or had Boulanger himself been a man of 
real capacity, it is not impossible that the Republic 
might have been brought to an untimely end. But the 
Republicans who remained faithful realized the gravity 
of the crisis. They drew together, and Boulanger was 
heavily beaten at the general election of 1889. 3 

1 See the Comte de Chaudordy, La France en 1889, p. 73 ; Jules Simon, 
Souviens-toi, pp. 153-59 ; " The Stability of the French Republic," Forum, 
vol. 10, p. 383. 

2 Channes, Letter of Oct. 1, 1883. 

8 For a discussion of Boulanger's defeat and its effect on parties, see 
articles by G. Monod, Contemp. Rev., vol. 58, p. 19, and vol. 60, p. 911. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 87 

The storm had passed, but it left a marked, perhaps 
a permanent, change in the political atmos- 
phere of France. One of its most important on the 
effects was on the attitude of the Eight. By 
following Boulanger, the Bonapartists and many of the 
Monarchists put themselves in a totally false position, 
and learned their own weakness and the vitality of the 
Republic. Their situation, indeed, had been none too 
strong before, because they never had anything in 
common but their hatred of the existing government, 
so that their triumph at any moment would have been 
a signal for their quarrel. Each of these two groups, 
moreover, had long been hopelessly divided within 
itself. 1 Their real bond of union, or perhaps it would 
be better to say their real basis of strength, was the 
Catholic church, of which they tried to be the support 
and the shield ; 2 for it must be remembered that in 
France, church and state are not separated, the rela- 
tions between the two still resting, so far as the 
Catholics are concerned, on the Concordat between 
Napoleon I. and the Pope. The bishops are nominated 
by the government, and the appointments to all the 
higher ecclesiastical offices require its approval. No 
papal bull can be published in France, nor can a Nuntio 
exercise any functions there without its consent ; and 
the existence of most of the monastic and other re- 
ligious communities is dependent upon its permission. 
On the other hand, the clergy receive then salaries 

1 Comte de Chaudordy, La France en 1889, p. 74. 

2 Cf . Channes, Letters of Sept. 17, 1883, and Oct. 27, 1884 ; G. Monod, 
* French Affairs," Contemp. Rev., vol. 60, p. 911. 



88 FRANCE. 

from the state. 1 Under these circumstances, it is 
inevitable that religious matters should be constantly 
prominent in politics, to say nothing of the question 
of the connection of the church with education, which 
has been a fruitful source of strife. 2 Gambetta early 
saw that the strength of the Reactionaries was based 
upon their alliance with the church, and sought to cut 
the ground from under their feet by breaking down 
the power of the priests. Hence his cry, " Le clerical- 
ism voila Vennemi" and hence the series of measures 
directed at the influence of the clergy and even at 
religion. 3 In justification of his course, it must be said 
that the political activity of the French priesthood is 
commonly believed to prevent a free expression of 
public opinion, and that the church by its alliance with 
Napoleon IIL, and afterwards with MacMahon in 1877, 
took up a position of real hostility to the Republic. 4 
But Gambetta did not realize the magnitude of the power 

1 See Lebon, France as It Is, ch. vi. The Protestant churches (Calvin- 
ist and Lutheran), the Jewish, and in Algiers the Mohammedan, are also 
supported by the state. In France, religion, strictly speaking, is not 
free, for except in the case of the forms of worship which are recognized 
and supported by the state, all meetings and associations for religious 
purposes are subject to the ordinary rules of law, by which no meeting can 
be held without giving the authorities notice twenty-four hours before- 
hand, and no association of more than twenty persons can be formed 
without a permission from the government which may be revoked at any 
time ; Lebon, lb., pp. 87, 127. 

2 See Lebon, lb., p. 142 et seq. 

3 For a description of some of these measures, see Simon, Dieu, Patrie, 
Liberie. 

4 See Vicomte d'Avenel, " La Re'forme Administrative — Les Cultes," 
Revue des Deux Mondes, May 15, 1890, pp. 352-53 ; Channes, Letter of 
Oct. 27, 1884 ; Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberie, p. 193 et seq. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 89 

he attacked. He did not see that love and reverence 
for the church cannot be stamped out in France, and 
that any attempt at persecution only intensifies them. 1 
So long as the church was hostile to the Republic, the 
men who defended her were sure to have a considerable 
following ; but the Boulanger episode led her to doubt 
the wisdom of allying herself with a discredited party 
against a powerful republic. In November, change in 
1890, Cardinal Lavigerie, one of the most S^^ 6 
influential of the French prelates, declared ^d?thT 
that the church was not necessarily opposed epuo c ' 
to the republican form of government in France, and 
several of the other bishops immediately followed his 
example. In the spring of 1892 the Pope himself 
issued an encyclical letter to the same effect, — a 
policy which he had the courage and wisdom to re- 
iterate in the midst of the Panama scandals, in the 
following winter, in spite of the discredit those scandals 
threw upon a number of leading Republican politicians, 
and incidentally upon the Republic itself. The change 
in the attitude of the church naturally shook a good 
deal the position of the Reactionaries, many of whom, 
under the name of Rallies, now prepared to accept 
the Republic. 2 In fact, before Cardinal Lavigerie had 
spoken, party lines had become softened and blurred, 
and a group calling itself the Constitutional Right, 
with conservatism under the Republic as a programme, 
had already been formed, and had tried to ally itself 

1 On the unpopularity of the crusade against the church, see Channes, 
Nos Fautes, passim. 

2 G. Monod, "French Affairs," Contemp. Rev., vol. 60, p. 911. 



90 FKANCE. 

with the Moderate Republicans. Whether the Right 
will definitely abandon all hostility to the form of 
government or not depends very much on the action of 
the Republicans themselves. That every true Repub- 
lican in France ought to wish to make the acceptance 
of the Republic as universal as possible would hardly 
seem to admit of a doubt, but to the Radicals such a 
prospect is by no tneans wholly agreeable. The chief 
weakness in the position of the Reactionaries has lain 
in the fact that they have stood for revolution, which 
France has learned to abhor ; x and if they were to 
abandon all idea of changing the form of government, 
their strength would no doubt increase. Moreover, on 
the practical questions of the day, those Republicans 
who are by nature conservative are really closer to 
the Right than to the Radicals; 2 and although the 
men of conservative views have hitherto been unable 
to unite, because some of them were Republicans and 
some were not, and hence have failed to exert their 
full influence in politics, yet it is probable that to- 
gether they form a decided majority of the people. 3 
If, therefore, the Right, as a whole, were to accept the 
Republic without reserve, thereby freeing the Mod- 
erates from their dependence on the Radicals, the con- 
servative elements in France would be likely to draw 
together and get control of the state. 4 Now, much as 
the Radicals are attached to the Republic, they have 

1 See an article on "Provincial France," Quart. Rev., Oct., 1890. 

2 Cf. Le Figaro, Feb. 9, 1893. 
8 Channes, p. 335. 

4 Comte de Chaudordy, La France en 1889, p. 73 ; G. Monod, " French 
Affairs," Contemp. Rev., vol. 58, p. 19. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 91 

no desire to have it conservative, or to see their own 
influence curtailed; and they cannot fail to perceive 
that their interests and opinions would suffer a severe 
check if the Eight were to become Kepublican. 1 It is 
not unnatural, therefore, that they should have tried to 
keep the Right and the conservative Republicans apart, 
by urging the government into a renewal of the anti- 
clerical policy. 2 - 

Another result of the contest with Boulanger, though 
a less permanent one, was a closer union of Stpn le 
all the Republicans, caused by the impend- jjj^jjjj. 
ing danger and the need of united action to pSicyof 6 
which it gave rise. Thus was developed the ^, e n P ceS n 
policy of the Republican concentration, as it tlon ' 
is called; that is, the attempt to hold all the vary- 
ing shades of Republicans together as a single party. 
This had always been the practice of the Opportunists, 
but now it grew more systematic. The different organ- 
ized groups dissolved, or became less prominent and 
less active ; 3 but the happy family so created could not 
possibly live in peace very long. For a time, indeed, 
everything went smoothly. Neither the Right nor the 
Radicals were at first in a condition for battle, because 
the Right had been disorganized and beaten, and the 
Radicals had lost power by the defection of some of 
their members, and by the fact that the revision of the 

1 G. Monod, Contemp. Rev., vol. 58, p. 19. 

2 " La pacification religieuse," George Picot, Revue des Deux Mondes, 
July 1, 1892. This has always been the Radical device for keeping the 
Republicans together. Cf. Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 348 ; Simon, Nos Hommes 
d'Etat, p. 146. 

3 Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 392. 



92 FRANCE. 

constitution, which had long been a cardinal point in 
their programme, had been discredited by Boulanger's 
adoption of it. Party strife was, therefore, thrown 
temporarily into the background by economic ques- 
tions which divided the deputies on new lines; the 
protective tariff, for example, drawing its supporters 
from all parts of the Chamber. The result was that the 
colorless cabinet of Freycinet, formed in March, 1890, 
was able to prolong its existence more than two years. 
The views of the different Republican elements were, 
however, too far apart to allow them to work together 
in real harmony, and after the suicide of Boulanger had 
taken away the chief motive for union the old antago- 
nism revived, and the efforts of the successive cabinets 
to treat the Republicans as a single party only con- 
cealed the differences they were unable to suppress. 
Such a policy could be assumed with success only by 
ministers of great personal force and influence, who 
could govern their followers and compel obedience ; but 
as the French cabinets were not strong, their object 
was to avoid offending any of the groups of the Left, 
and their course was weak and vacillating. While the 
ministers were thus trying to keep the Republicans 
together, 1 the conservative and radical wings each 
strove to exclude the other from the control of the 
party, and force the adoption of its own views. 2 It was 

1 See Ribot's declaration of his policy on this point on Jan. 12, 1893, 
Journal Officiel, Jan. 13. 

2 See, for example, the debate in the Chamber on an interpellation on 
Feb. 16, 1893, Le Matin, Feb. 17, and the Report in the Journal Officiel 
of the same day. The Radicals, being weak, urged at this time the 
policy of concentration, which the Conservative Republicans did not want. 
See Le Matin, Feb. 9 and 12, 1893, and Le Figaro, Feb. 18. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 93 

clear, therefore, that the policy of the concentration was 
a failure/ and, indeed, it had so enfeebled the govern- 
ment, and deprived it of the power to follow any steady 
policy, that some of the Eepublicans proposed to restore 
the habit of holding caucuses of the groups, in order 
that these might discuss and settle all questions as they 
arose, and thus supply the lack of guidance on the part 
of the cabinet. 2 

The elections of 1893 made a great change in the 
political situation, for in spite of the Panama 
scandals of the preceding winter, which the mentofthat 
Eight had tried to use as a means of dis- 
crediting the Republic, and the Radicals as a means 
of discrediting their more conservative alhes, these last 
gained a large majority of seats. The people either 
did not believe the stories of wholesale corruption, or 
else thought all politicians equally bad. At all events 
they disappointed the hopes of the extremists. The 
Radicals and the Extreme Left gained, indeed, a few 
members, but several of their chiefs failed to be elected, 
and among them Clemenceau, who had upset more 
ministries than any other man in France. The Right, 
moreover, both in the part that accepted the Republic 
and in that which opposed it, lost so heavily in favor 
of the Conservative Republicans that the latter, who 
were henceforth known as the Moderates or Republi- 
cans of Government, had an absolute majority in the 

1 See Le Temps, Jan. 8 ; Le Figaro, Feb. 9, 1893 ; and a letter of the 
former date from M. Piou to Le Figaro. On the evils of the policy, see 
Lamy, La Republique en 1898 ; Pressensd, Les Partis et les Elections. 

2 Le Matin, Dec. 14, 1892. 



94 FRANCE. 

Chamber. 1 At last it was plain that the policy of the 
concentration must be given up, and on December 3, 
shortly after the opening of the session, a min- 
of cSmir- istry of Moderates was appointed with Casimir- 
Perier at its head. For the first time in the 
history of the Republic a homogeneous cabinet was 
supported by a homogeneous majority. The system 
of groups, however, was by no means abandoned, for 
besides the Republicans of Government, who formed 
a single body, the Republican part of the Chamber con- 
tained a number of factions, of which the most impor- 
tant were that of the Radicals, surnamed at this time 
the Progressive Left, and that of the Socialists, who 
organized under the name of the Extreme Left, but 
were divided into several subordinate groups. 2 The 
new cabinet pursued a thoroughly conservative policy, 
maintaining the authority of the government against 
socialistic agitation, and adopting a conciliatory tone 
towards the church; but in spite of the fact that a 
decided majority of the Chamber was heartily in sym- 
pathy with its general course, it was upset 
in May, 1894, by one of those unexpected 
crises that often occur in France. The ministers were 
suddenly asked in the Chamber whether they intended 

1 Daniel, V Annie Politique for 1893, p. 281, gives the results of the 
election as follows : — 

Republicans of Government 311 

Radicals 122 

Right 58 

Socialists 49 

Rallies 35 

2 Daniel, L'Annee Politique, 1893, p. 331. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 95 

to allow the employees of the state roads to attend 
a national congress of railroad men ; and when they 
replied in the negative a motion expressing disapproval 
was made. To the surprise of everybody it was carried, 
and the ministers resigned. The Eadical and Socialist 
groups were elated, and each of them passed a resolution 
to the effect that the next cabinet ought to lean more 
to the Left. The Republicans of Government, on the 
other hand, voted that they would not support any 
ministry that did not adopt the same principles as 
Casimir-Perier, 1 and in fact it was evident that no other 
course could be pursued ; but the former ministers hav- 
ing agreed to stand or fall together, 2 a cabinet of new 
men was appointed, who carried on the old policy. 3 
The whole occurrence illustrates the irrational working 
of the parliamentary system in France. 

A month later President Carnot was murdered by an 
anarchist at Lyons. Such a terrible event The murder 
naturally strengthened the party that upheld of Carnot - 
the authority of the government ; and the Conservatives 
had no difficulty in electing Casimir-Perier to the vacant 
post, and in passing a law concerning the offense of 
inciting to crime, which increased the penalty, took 
away the right of trial by jury, and forbade publication 
of the proceedings. The Extreme Left, however, was 
neither awed nor silenced. Not only did it continue to 
attack the cabinet, but it kept up in the newspapers a 

1 VAnnee Politique, 1894, pp. 142, 143. 

2 Muel, Gouv. Min. et Const. Supp., p. 73. Only one of the old minis- 
ters sat in the new cabinet. 

8 UAnnee Politique, 1894, p. 145 et seq. 



96 FRANCE. 

constant stream of personal abuse against the new Pres- 
ident. With the Conservatives, moreover, the impulse 
to rally round the government was of such short dura- 
tion, that in less than seven months the cabinet was 
overthrown. It happened in this way. A difference 
of opinion arose between the Minister of Public Works 
and certain railroad companies over the interpretation 
of a statute guaranteeing interest on the securities of 
the roads. The matter was brought before the Council 
of State, and when it decided against the government 
the minister threw up his position. His colleagues 
felt bound by the decision of the tribunal, but the 
Chamber censured their course and thus forced them to 

resign. The President suddenly announced 
of Casimir- that he should follow their example. He had 

passed seven unhappy months in office, a con- 
stant target for slander and insult, with a feeling that 
the cabinet did not support and protect him as it 
should, and he could bear it no longer. The provoca- 
tion was no doubt great, but one cannot help thinking 
that if Dante had lived at the present day he would 
have placed Casimir-Perier with Celestine V., — 

" Che fece per viltate il gran refiuto." 

Felix Faure, the new President, appointed another 
cabinet of Moderates, who followed nominally 

The break- . 

ingupofthe the old policy, but were really more compli- 
ant towards the Kadicals than their predeces- 
sors had been. They passed an amnesty for political 
offenses, and imposed a tax on the religious orders; 
and in fact the rigidly conservative principles adopted 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 97 

by the ministry of Casimir-Perier had been maintained 
with less and less firmness ever since its fall in May, 
1894. Meanwhile, under the lack of parliamentary dis- 
cipline, the majority in the Chamber was slowly going 
to pieces. Instead of being a compact party that could 
be relied upon, it became a feebler and feebler support, 
until at the meeting of the Chambers in the autumn of 
1895 it had ceased to be a real majority at all. The 
cabinet had a heavy burden to carry, and would proba- 
bly not have survived a debate on the expedition to 
Madagascar, for although the campaign against the 
Hovas had ended in victory, some serious mismanage- 
ment had no doubt taken place. The final struggle 
turned, however, on the chronic charge of corruption. 
There had been bribery in connection with one of 
the railroads, and the ministers, while known to be per- 
fectly innocent themselves, were accused of trying to 
shield guilty politicians. They refused to interfere 
with the inquest of the magistrates, which in France is 
considered the province of the courts, but the Chamber, 
on October 28, voted by a large majority that all the 
persons implicated ought to be brought to trial and the 
documents laid on the table of the House. The min- 
isters, regarding this as a censure, resigned; and so 
impotent had the Moderates become, that a Eadical 
cabinet was formed, and declared its intention of pursu- 
ing a truly Eadical policy. Thus the Chamber, which, 
for the first time in the history of the Republic, had 
begun its career with a homogeneous ministry supported 
by a homogeneous majority, had degenerated in two 
years into a state of political confusion, and found itself 

VOL. I. 



98 FRANCE. 

led by a homogeneous cabinet of an entirely different 
party. 

An English premier placed in the position of Bour- 
geois, the head of the new ministry, would 
Radical have insisted on a dissolution, and refused to 
accept office on any other terms; but the 
condition of the French Chamber is so fluid, and the 
subdivision into groups gives such an opportunity for 
political combinations, that he was able to accept office 
with the existing Parliament. Out of the unpropitious 
elements of the Chamber he contrived by dexterity and 
determination to manufacture for himself a tolerably 
efficient majority. The use of patronage doubtless pro- 
cured some adherents, while a vigorous pursuit of the 
charges of corruption brought over to his side a certain 
number of men who were afraid of the suspicion of 
trying to smother investigation. After consolidating 
his followers, he brought forward, to the delight of 
the Eadicals, a proposal for a progressive income tax. 
It is probable that far more than half of the deputies 
disliked the measure, and the committee on the budget 
was decidedly hostile to it; but the influence of the 
cabinet had become so great that, on March 26, 1896, 
the Chamber adopted an order of the day approving 
the general principle involved. The order, it is true, 
was only carried by sixteen votes, and left undecided 
some of the most important points in dispute, but the 
fact that Bourgeois was able to maintain himself at all, 
and to wring a sanction of a Badical policy from a 
Chamber composed chiefly of men elected as Conserva- 
tives, shows how little the French groups furnish a basis 
for a true party life. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 99 

The Conservatives looked upon the proposed income 
tax as an exceedingly dangerous measure, and 
were determined to exhaust every means in thrown by 
their power to prevent its enactment. It was 
quite probable that when it came to an actual vote the 
Chamber would not pass the bill, but the Conservatives 
preferred not to run the risk. They controlled the 
Senate, and made up their minds to use that body as a 
lever to pry the cabinet out of office. Twice the Senate 
passed a vote of want of confidence in the ministry, 
and twice the ministers refused to consider this a 
ground for resignation, declaring that they would re- 
main so long as they had the support of the Chamber. 
A mere expression of opinion being ineffectual, the 
Senate adopted, on April 21, a proposal to refuse the 
credits demanded for Madagascar until a change of 
ministry took place, thereby proclaiming that it was 
ready to stop the wheels of government rather than 
tolerate the cabinet. Bourgeois was thus put in a 
position in which he could only remain in power at the 
cost of a prolonged struggle between the two Chambers, 
with a strong chance of losing at any time his majority 
in the Chamber of Deputies. Under these circum- 
stances he thought it better to withdraw. 1 

His successor, Meline, professed a desire to return 
to the policy of concentration, and tried to TheConser- 
induce some of the Radicals to come into his Sry of mm 
cabinet on the basis of eliminating all ques- 
tions that divided the Republicans. As this meant in 

1 For a description of the struggle between the cabinet and the Senate, 
see p. 23, note 1, supra. 

L«fC. 



100 FRANCE. 

reality a surrender of their programme, the Eadicals 
not unnaturally declined. Meline, therefore, selected 
his colleagues entirely from the Conservatives, and in 
the statement of his policy read before the Chamber of 
Deputies on April 30, the income tax was definitely 
abandoned. 

Here was a most excellent chance for the majority in 
the Chamber to show how much it was in earnest in 
supporting Bourgeois, and how much it cared for the 
Eadical programme. On the very day of his fall, and 
after his resignation had been announced, the Radicals 
had succeeded in carrying the resolutions they proposed, 
in spite of the opposition of the Conservatives ; but 
when Meline read his declaration of policy two days 
later, the Chamber adopted an order of the day express- 
ing its approval by a majority of forty-three, so weak 
was party discipline, or rather so weak was the tie that 
bound the various groups together. 

The policy of Republican concentration has been 
replaced by the practice of selecting the ministers 
only from one wing of the Republican party, but the 
Chamber has shown itself incapable of furnishing a 
stable majority for either wing. 

During the last three years there has indeed been 
a nearer approach to a division of the deputies into 
two great parties — one Conservative and the other 
Radical — than at any other time since the birth of the 
Republic ; and yet the history of the successive min- 
istries during the life of the present Chamber makes 
it clear with how little sharpness the lines are drawn, 
and how little the members of the various groups that 



CAUSES OF THE STATE OF PAETIES. 101 

compose the majority can be relied upon to be faithful 
to the cabinet. In short, there has been an approach 
to the system of two parties, but as yet not a very 
near approach, and the numerous detached groups still 
remain the basis of parliamentary life. 

So much for the actual state of parties in France. 
Let us now consider the reasons for the sub- CaTlses of 
divisions of the Chamber into a number of eice 6 ^*" 
groups. And first we must look at a source SeTm 1 ^ 
of political dissensions with which we are not France * 
familiar at home, but which is to be found in almost 
every nation in Europe. 

Few persons ever ask themselves why the bodies of 
men who assemble every year at the State 

The lack of 

House or the Capitol have power to make apolitical 

_ . , . consensus. 

laws. It is not because they have more per- 
sonal force or wisdom or virtue than any one else. A 
congress of scientific men may contain all these quali- 
ties in greater abundance, but it cannot change a single 
line in the statute-book. Is it because they represent 
the people? But we all know that they occasionally 
pass laws which the people do not want, and yet we 
obey those laws without hesitation. Moreover, this 
answer only pushes the question one step further back, 
for why should we obey the people ? A few centuries 
ago nobody recognized any right on the part of the 
people to govern or misgovern themselves as they chose, 
or rather on the part of the majority to impose their 
will on the minority ; and in many countries of the 
world no such right is recognized to-day. How does it 
happen that there is not a class of men among us who 



102 FRANCE. 

think that the legislature does not fairly represent the 
people, or who think that the right to vote ought to be 
limited by a certain educational or property qualifica- 
tion, or by the profession of a certain creed ; and why 
does not some such class of men get up a rival legisla- 
ture ? The fact is that, while we may differ in regard 
to the ideal form of government, we are all of one mind 
on the question of what government is entitled to our 
actual allegiance, and we are all determined to yield to 
that government our obedience and support. In short, 
a common understanding or consensus in regard to the 
basis and form of the government is so universal here 
that we feel as if it were natural and inevitable; but 
in all countries this is not so. Such a consensus is the 
foundation of all political authority, of all law and 
order ; and it is easy to see that if it were seriously 
questioned, the position of the government would be 
shaken, that if it were destroyed, the country would 
be plunged into a state of anarchy. Now persons who 
do not accept the consensus on which the political 
authority of the day is based are termed in France 
Irreconcilables. Men of this sort do not admit the 
rightfulness of the existing government, and although 
they may submit to it for the moment, their object 
is to effect a revolution by peaceful if not by violent 
means. Hence their position is essentially different 
from that of all other parties, for these aim only at 
directing the policy of the government within constitu- 
tional limits, and can be intrusted with power without 
danger to the fundamental institutions of the nation, 
while the Irreconcilables, on the contrary, would use 



LACK OF A CONSENSUS. 103 

their power to upset those institutions, and therefore 
cannot be suffered to get control of the state. They 
form an opposition that is incapable of taking office, 
and so present a disturbing element, which in a parlia- 
mentary form of government throws the whole system 
out of gear. 1 

Another thing to be noticed about a consensus is 
that it cannot be created artificially, but must A consensus 
be the result of a slow growth and long tra- %£$££" 
ditions. Its essence lies in the fact that it is rapidly * 
unconscious. The people of the United States, for 
example, could not, by agreement, give to a dictator the 
power the Czar wields in Russia, for except in the pres- 
ence of imminent danger he would have no authority 
unless the people believed in his inherent right to rule, 
and the people cannot make themselves believe in any 
such right simply by agreeing to do so. The The French 
foundation of government is faith, not rea- ditriye! 11 
son, and the faith of a people is not vital elfeon^en?" 
unless they have been born with it. 2 Now, sus " 

1 It is impossible to draw a sharp line between what is revolutionary 
and what is not; or to define exactly an Irreconcilable. The matter 
depends in fact upon the opinion of the community. Thus, before 1886, 
Home Rule might fairly be said to have been revolutionary, and the 
Irish Home Rulers to have been Irreconcilables ; but after Mr. Gladstone 
made Home Rule a practical question in English politics, it would have 
been absurd to call Parnell's followers Irreconcilables. 

2 Curiously enough an exception to this principle, and almost a solitary 
one, is to be found in the history of the United States. The generation 
that framed the Constitution looked upon that document as very imper- 
fect, but they clung to it tenaciously as the only defense against national 
dismemberment, and in order to make it popular, they praised it beyond 
their own belief in its merits. This effort to force themselves to ad- 
mire the Constitution was marvelously successful, and resulted, in the 



104 FRANCE. 

in France, the Kevolution of 1789 destroyed all faith in 
the political institutions of the past, and was unable to 
substitute anything else. It did, indeed, give birth to 
a code of law, and to an administrative system, both of 
which have taken a strong hold on the nation, and have 
survived every change in the government. These are 
the permanent elements in France, and the only ones 
that have acquired the blind force of tradition. They 
supply a machinery that is unshaken by political up- 
heavals, and it is this that has made it possible for the 
country to pass through so many revolutions without 
falling into a state of anarchy. 1 But in regard to in- 
stitutions of a purely political character, the nation 
has not been so fortunate, for the governments that 
followed the Revolution were not sufficiently durable 
to lay even a foundation for a general consensus, and 
the lack of continuity has so thoroughly prevented the 
steady growth of opinion that the people have not 
succeeded in acquiring a political creed. The 
of this on result is that every form of government that 

parties. . J ,° 

has existed m France has its partisans, who 
are irreconcilable under every other ; while the great 
mass of the middle classes and the peasants have no 
strong political convictions, and are ready to support 
any government that maintains order. Thus the two 
Empires bequeathed to the Republic the group of Bona- 
partists, while the Monarchists are a legacy from the 
old regime and the reign of Louis Philippe. At pres- 

next generation, in a worship of the Constitution, of which its framers 
never dreamed. 

1 Cf. Laffitte, pp. 208, 209. 



POLITICAL OPINIONS THEORETICAL. 105 

ent it seems altogether probable that, if no great 
European crisis occurs, the Eight will end by accept- 
ing the Kepublic, and if so the irreconcilable elements 
will disappear or become insignificant, and one of 
the chief obstacles to the formation of two great 
parties, one Conservative and the other Eadical, will be 
removed. 

But this is only one of several obstacles, and the 
others are so great that it will probably be a other causes 
long time before the system of groups breaks ^^of 
down in France, or is replaced by that of two parties - 
political parties. 

In the first place, the Frenchman is theoretical rather 
than practical in politics. He is inclined to 

. t -, . . . . , . ■. . Theoretical 

pursue an ideal, striving to realize his concep- character of 
tion of a perfect form of society, and is re- political 

t . p • » opinions. 

luctant to give up any part of it for the sake 
of attaining so much as lies within his reach. Such 
a tendency naturally gives rise to a number of groups, 
each with a separate ideal, and each unwilling to make 
the sacrifice that is necessary for a fusion into a great 
party. In short, the intensity of political sentiment 
prevents the development of real political issues. To 
the Frenchman, public questions have an absolute 
rather than a relative or practical bearing, and there- 
fore he cares more for principles and opinions than 
for facts. This tendency is shown in the programmes 
of the candidates, which are apt to be philosophic docu- 
ments instead of statements of concrete policy, and, 
although published at great length, often give a com- 
paratively small idea of the position of the author on 



106 FRANCE. 

the immediate questions of the day. 1 It is shown also 
in the newspapers, and the use that is made of them. 
An Anglo-Saxon reads the newspapers chiefly for infor- 
mation about current events, and as all the papers 
contain very much the same news, he habitually reads 
only one. But the French papers contain far less 
news, and as the Frenchman reads them largely for the 
sake of the editorials, he commonly reads several in 
order to compare the opinions they express. 

It is partly on account of this mental attitude, and 

partlv owing: to the absence of the habit of 
do not 1 self-government, and the lack of sympathy 
readily in between different parts of the country, that 

the French do not organize readily in politics. 
This is the more curious because in military matters 
they organize more easily than any other people in the 
world ; and it is no doubt the military instinct, as well 
as the want of confidence in their own power of po- 
litical organization, that disposes them to seek a leader 
and follow him blindly after he has won their confi- 

1 Lebon, France as It Is, p. 85. 

Abstracts of all the electoral programmes issued by the successful 
candidates for the Chamber of Deputies at the elections of 1889 and 
1893, together with the results of the ballots, have been published 
by Duguet, under the title Les Deputes et les Cahiers Electoraux. These 
volumes are very instructive ; and a perusal of them shows that the 
programmes of the Radicals are much longer and less vague than 
the others, but often demand measures which lie out of the domain 
of practical politics, such as revision of the Constitution, abolition of 
the Senate, abolition of state aid to the churches, confiscation of all 
ecclesiastical property, elective judiciary, etc. The programmes give a 
very good idea of the candidate's general turn of mind ; and those of 
the Radicals may be said to contain their conception of the ideal state 
of politics or of society. The Radicals are, indeed, the only group among 



PARTIES LITTLE ORGANIZED. 107 

dence. 1 The inability to organize readily in politics 
has this striking result, that vehement as some of the 
groups are, and passionate as is their attachment to 
their creeds, they make little effort to realize their aims, 
by associating together their supporters in all parts of 
the country for concerted action. In fact, there may 
be said to be no national party organizations in France. 2 
The various groups into which the deputies are divided 
have, as a rule, no existence whatever outside of Par- 
liament, the candidates for seats merely calling them- 
selves in general terms, Moderates, Eadicals, Socialists, 
or simply Republicans without further qualification, and 
attaching themselves to a particular group after the 
Chamber has met. Moreover, the programmes, which 
are drawn up by each candidate for himself, are only 
individual confessions of faith, and are all different, so 
that there is no policy which any party as a whole is 
pledged to support. Before the opening of the cam- 
paign, indeed, party gatherings or banquets take place, 
and speeches are made, but at the last general election, 
for example, no common platform of principles was 
issued except by the Socialists. 3 It is after the cam- 
paign has begun, however, that the absence of party 
organization is most clearly seen. Then the struggle 

the Republicans that can be said to have anything like a positive pro- 
gramme, and this is the source both of their strength and their weakness. 

1 Cf. Channes, Letter of Aug. 22, 1885. 

2 Cf . Lebon, France as It Is, p. 75 ; Theodore Stanton in the North 
American Rev., vol. 155, p. 471. This contrasts strangely with the United 
States, where the machinery of a party has sometimes shown more 
vitality than its principles. 

8 Daniel, UAnne'e Politique, 1893, pp. 254-80. 



108 FRANCE. 

is conducted in each electoral district with very little 
regard to the rest of the country, and in fact each 
district appears like a separate nation engaged in a 
distinct contest of its own. 1 Political effort becomes 
localized, and except for the candidates themselves, who 
confine their labors to their constituencies, scarcely a 
man of prominence opens his mouth. 2 

One might suppose that, under a parliamentary 

form of government, party organization would 

French hardly be required, and that, as in England, 

mechanism the need of political cohesion would be to a 

in splitting A 

up J? e great extent supplied by a strong ministry 



that really led Parliament and the nation. 
But here we meet with some of the other causes that 
tend to produce a multiplicity of groups, — causes 
that spring from certain of the minor French institu- 
tions which were referred to in the beginning of the 
first chapter as inconsistent with the parliamentary 
system. Three of these are especially important, — the 
method of electing deputies, the system of committees 
in the Chambers, and the practice of interpellations. 
In France the scrutin de liste, or the election of all 

the deputies from a department on one ticket, 
of electing and the scrutin d'arrondissement, or the use 

of single electoral districts, have prevailed 
alternately, the latter being in force at the present day. 
But under both systems an absolute majority of all the 
votes cast is required for election. If there are more 
than two candidates in the field, and no one of them 

1 Comte de Chaudordy, La France en 1889, p. 89. 

2 Theodore Stanton, North Am. Rev., vol. 155, p. 473. 



METHOD OF CHOOSING DEPUTIES. 109 

gets such a majority, a second vote, called the ballotage, 
is taken two weeks later, and at this a plurality is 
enough to elect. 1 Now it is clear that such a procedure 
encourages each political group to nominate a separate 
candidate for the first ballot. Suppose, for example, 
that there are Reactionary and Moderate Republican 
candidates in the field, and that the Radicals prefer the 
Republican to the Reactionary, still they have nothing 
to lose by running a candidate of their own on the first 
ballot, for if the Reactionary can poll more votes than 
both his rivals combined, he will be elected in any 
event ; if he cannot, he will not be elected whether the 
Radicals put up a candidate of their own or not. In 
this last case, the first ballot will have counted for 
nothing, and the Radicals will be able to vote for the 
Moderate Republican at the hallotage, and elect him 
then. They are likely, indeed, to gain a positive advan- 
tage by nominating a separate candidate, for if they 
succeed in polling a large vote on the first ballot, they 
are in an excellent position to wring concessions from 
the Moderates as a price of their support. 

1 Law of June 16, 1885, Art. 5. (This article was not repealed by the 
Law of Feb. 13, 1889.) By the same article a quarter as many votes as 
there are voters registered is required for election on the first ballot. 

According to strict parliamentary usage, the term ballotage is applied 
only to cases where, at the final trial, the voting is confined by law to the 
two names highest on the poll at the preceding ballot, but the word is 
popularly used for any final ballot where a plurality is decisive. 

For the choice of a senator by the electoral college of a department, 
the votes of a quarter of the college, and a majority of all the votes 
actually cast, are required on the first two ballots, while on the third a 
plurality is enough. Law of August 2, 1875, Art. 15. The election of 
delegates to the college by the municipal councils is conducted in the 
same manner. Law of Dec. 9, 1884, Art. 8. 



110 FRANCE. 

Cumbrous as it is, this system of voting dates back 
to the election of the States General in 1789, and, 
with a couple of short breaks, has been maintained in 
France ever since. 1 The idea that a representative 
ought to be the choice of a majority of the people 
seems, indeed, to be natural in democracies, for we 
find it put in practice elsewhere. Thus, in the United 
States, a majority vote was formerly very commonly 
required for election, but it is instructive to notice that 
it was found to hinder the smooth working of two 
political parties, and has been generally though not 
quite universally abandoned. 2 The fact that election by 
majority did not give rise to a multiplicity of parties in 
America shows that by itself it does not produce that 
result, where the other influences favor the development 
of two parties ; but it is nevertheless clear that where 
a number of groups exist, it tends to foster them, and 
prevent their fusing into larger bodies. 3 The French 
system has been praised on the ground that it saves 
the people from the yoke of huge party machines, and 

1 Poudra et Pierre, liv. ii. ch. vii. 

2 Stimson, Am. Statute Law, § 232. In Massachusetts, election by plu- 
rality was introduced in 1855. Const, of Mass., Amendments, Art. xiv. 
For the previous law, see Const, pt. ii. ch. i. sec. n. Art. iv. ; ch. ii. sec. I. 
Art. iii. ; sec. n. Art. i. ; Rev. Stats, ch. iv. sec. xm. 

8 At the elections of 1885, which were held under the system of 
jcrutin de liste, there were two Republican lists of candidates in almost all 
the departments. G. Channes, Letter of Oct. 30, 1885. At the elections 
of 1889 and 1893, held under the scrutin d' 'arrondissement, there were two 
Republican candidates in a large proportion of the districts, the total 
number of candidates for a single seat running as high as ten. Duguet, 
Les Deputes et les Colliers Electoraux en 1889 ; Id., 1893. And see Tableau 
des Elections a la Chambre des Deputes, dresse aux Archives de la Chambre* 



THE SYSTEM OF COMMITTEES. Ill 

enables them to select their candidates more freely. 1 
This is true, and it is a great advantage. But the 
converse is also true ; the system tends to prevent the 
formation of great consolidated parties, and that is 
the evil from which parliamentary government suffers 
in France to-day. 2 

The system of committees in the Chambers is a still 
more important matter. Each of the French The system 
chambers is divided into sections called Bu- tles°S^ie" 
reaux, of which there are nine in the Senate Chambers - 
and eleven in the Chamber of Deputies. 3 The Bureaux 
are of equal size, and every member of the Chamber 
belongs to one and only one of them, the division being 
made afresh every month by lot. This is a very old 
institution in France, a relic of a time before parliament- 
ary government had been thought of ; for not only do 
we find it in the Assembly of Notables and the States 
General that met on the eve of the Eevolution, 4 but it 

1 Alfred Naquet, "The French Electoral System," in the North Am. 
Rev., vol. 155, pp. 467-68. 

2 It is not a little curious that just at this time, when the English system 
of two parties is thought by many people to be in danger of breaking up, 
a motion should be made in the House of Commons to introduce election 
by majority vote and second ballot. Such a motion was made by Mr. 
Dalziel on April 5, 1895. 

3 For the constitution of the Bureaux and the election of the commit- 
tees, see Poudra et Pierre, liv. v. chs. ii. and iii. ; Reginald Dickinson, 
Summary of the Constitution and Procedure of Foreign Parliaments, 2d 
ed. pp. 363-66. 

These Bureaux must not be confounded with the Bureau of the Cham- 
ber, which consists of the President, the Vice-Presidents, and the Sec- 
retaries. The habit in France of using the same word with different 
meanings is liable to be the source of no little confusion to the students 
of her institutions. 

4 Poudra et Pierre, § 976. 



112 FRANCE. 

existed in the ecclesiastical assemblies, and to some 
extent in the States General, at a mnch earlier date. 1 
The use of the lot is, indeed, a survival from the Mid- 
dle Ages, when it was a common method of selecting 
officials. 2 The Bureaux meet separately and have three 
functions. The first is that of making a preliminary 
examination of the credentials of members of the Cham- 
ber, which are divided among them for the purpose. 
The second is that of holding a preliminary discussion 
on bills brought into the Chamber, before they are 
referred to a committee ; but as a matter of fact this 
discussion is perfunctory, and is limited to finding out 
in a general way what members of the Bureau favor 
or oppose the bill. 3 The third and most important 
function of the Bureaux is the election of committees, 
for with rare exceptions all the committees of both 
Chambers are selected in the same way. Each of the 
Bureaux chooses one of its own members, and the per- 
sons so elected together constitute the committee. In 
the case of the more important committees it is some- 
times desirable to have a larger number of members, 
and if so the Bureaux choose in like manner two or 
even three members apiece, — the Chamber in each case 

1 Sciout, Histoire de la Constitution Civile du Clerge, p. 36. While 
writing, a friend has pointed out to me that the States General which met 
at Tours in 1484 was divided into six sections by provinces. See a jour- 
nal of this body by Jehan Masselin, in the Collection de Documents inedits 
sur F Histoire de France publies par ordre du Roi, Paris, 1835, pp. 66-73. 

2 The chief relic of the lot left in Anglo-Saxon institutions is, of course, 
its use in the selection of the jury, — a survival which is due to the fact 
already pointed out, that the English royal justice developed at an early 
period. 

3 Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 404. 



THE SYSTEM OF COMMITTEES. 113 

directing, by its rules or by special vote, the number of 
members to be elected. Thus the committee on the 
budget, which is the most important one of the year, 
consists of three members chosen by each of the 
Bureaux in the Chamber of Deputies, and contains, 
therefore, thirty-three members ; while the correspond- 
ing committee in the Senate contains eighteen members, 
or two from each Bureau. 

The committee on the budget and the one appointed 
to audit the accounts of the government are permanent, 
and remain unchanged for a year. A few of the others 
(those on local affairs, on petitions, on leave of absence, 
and on granting permission to members of parliament 
to introduce bills) serve for a month and then are 
chosen afresh. With these exceptions every measure 
is in theory referred to a special committee elected by 
the Bureaux for the purpose ; but as there are certain 
to be in every session a number of bills that cover 
very much the same ground, a rigid application of this 
principle would result in inconsistent reports on the 
same matter by different committees, and would throw 
the work of the Chamber into utter confusion. A prac- 
tice has, therefore, grown up of treating certain com- 
mittees — such as those on the army, on labor, and on 
railroads — as virtually permanent, and referring to 
them all bills on their respective subjects. 1 

We have seen that with rare exceptions all committees, 
whether permanent, temporary, or special, are elected by 
the Bureaux, but these last, being created anew every 
month, acquire no corporate feeling, and hence have 

1 Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 385-86. 

VOL. I. 



114 FRANCE. 

no real leaders. Owing partly to this fact they do not 
choose freely, and the chief of the parliamentary groups 
meet and barter away the places on the important com- 
mittees, which are thus cut and dried beforehand. 1 But 
whether the choice of committee-men is really made by 
the Bureaux or dictated by the chiefs of the groups, 
the main point to notice is that the system is entirely 
inconsistent with the parliamentary form of government. 
The cabinet cannot exert the same influence over an 
election conducted in this way that it could over one 
made by the Chamber in open session. In the latter 
case it might insist on the choice of a majority of the 
committee from among its own friends, and make of 
the matter a cabinet question; but it cannot treat the 
failure of several irresponsible sections of the Chamber 
to act in accordance with its wishes as an expression of 
want of confidence by the Chamber as a whole. The 
result is that the committees are not nominated by the 
cabinet, or necessarily in sympathy with it ; and yet all 
measures, including those proposed by the government, 
are referred to them to revise as they think best. Now 
if the ministers are to be responsible for directing the 
work of the Chamber, they ought to have a policy of 
their own and stand or fall on that. They ought to be 
at liberty to determine their own course of action, and 
to present their measures to Parliament in a form that 
they entirely approve. But if a committee has power 
to amend government bills, the ministers must either 
assume the burden of trying to persuade the Chamber 
to reverse the amendments, with all the influence of the 

1 Cf. Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, pp. 41, 241. 



THE SYSTEM OF COMMITTEES. 115 

committee against them; or they must take the risk 
of opposing the bill as reported, although they still 
approve of many of its features ; or finally they must 
accept the bill as it stands, and become responsible for 
a measure with which they are not themselves fully 
satisfied. The committees in fact use their power with- 
out shrinking, and the annual budget, for example, has 
been compared to a tennis-ball sent backward and 
forward between the minister and the committee until 
a compromise can be reached. 1 

M. Dupriez, in his excellent work on the ministers 
in the principal countries of Europe and America, 
paints in very strong colors the evils of the French 
committee system. He points out how little influence 
the ministers have with the committees, who often 
regard them almost as the representatives of a hos- 
tile power in the state. 2 He shows that while the 
ministers have no right to be present at committee 
meetings, and are invited to attend only when they 
wish to express their views, the committees claim a 
right to examine the administrative offices, insist on 
seeing books and papers, and volunteer advice. 3 So 
little respect, indeed, do the committees pay to the 
opinions of the cabinet, and so freely do they amend 
its bills, that, as M. Dupriez sarcastically remarks, the 
government and the committee are never in perfect 
accord except when the former submits to the latter. 4 
He says, moreover, that when a bill comes up for 

1 Simon, Souviens toi du Deux Decembre, p. 314. 

2 Vol. ii. pp. 406-7. 8 Id., pp. 395, 405, 423-24, 438-39. 
4 Id., pp. 405-6, 412. 



116 FRANCE. 

debate the reporter of the committee is a rival who 
has great influence with the Chamber, while the depu- 
ties are inclined to regard the ministers with jealousy 
and defiance. 1 Nor do the woes of the cabinet end 
here, for its authority is reduced to so low a point that 
its bills are quite freely amended during the debate on 
the motion of individual deputies. 2 

Of all the committees, the most domineering and vex- 
atious is that on the budget. This committee seems to 
take pride in criticising the estimates and making them 
over, both as regards income and expenditures, while 
each member exerts himself to add appropriations for 
the benefit of his own constituents, so that when the 
report is finally made the government can hardly recog- 
nize its own work. 3 In strong contrast with all this 
is Dupriez's description of the procedure on the budget 
in England. 4 There the authority of the ministers is 
expressly protected by a standing order of the House of 
Commons to the effect that no petition or motion for 
the expenditure of the public revenue shall be enter- 
tained except on the recommendation of the Crown; 
and in accordance with a firmly established practice 
proposals for national taxes originate only with the 
government. In regard to amendments of the budget, 
members of the House may move to diminish, but 
not to increase an appropriation, and as a matter of 
fact the budget is rarely amended by the House at all. 
The comparison of the English and French methods of 
dealing with the budget goes far to explain the differ- 

1 Dupriez, vol. ii., p. 411. 8 Id., pp. 425-26. 

2 Id., p. 412. 4 Id., vol. i. pp. 110-12. 



INTEEPELLATIONS. 117 

ence in the position of the two cabinets. Such a state 
of things as exists in France cannot fail to lessen the 
authority and dignity of the ministers, and place them 
at the mercy of the committees. It prevents them 
from framing their own programme, and insisting that 
the deputies shall accept or reject it as it stands; 
and thus, instead of compelling the majority to act 
solidly together under the leadership of the cabinet, it 
allows any deputy to use his place on a committee as a 
means of urging his own personal views. Hence it 
tends to dislocate the majority and break it into sec- 
tions, with policies more or less out of harmony with 
each other. While, therefore, the French scheme of com- 
mittees has good points, and some features that might 
be very valuable under another form of government, it 
is clearly incompatible with the parliamentary system. 1 

The habit of addressing interpellations to the min- 
isters has a direct bearing on the stability of i nterpella . 
the cabinet and the subdivision of parties ; tlons - 
for it cannot be repeated too often that these things 
are inseparable. The existence of the ministry depends 
on the support of the majority, and if that is compact 
and harmonious, the ministry will be strong and 
durable ; if not, it will be feeble and short-lived. The 
converse is also true. The cohesive force that unites 
the majority is loyalty to the cabinet and submission 
to its guidance, but if the cabinets are weak, or are 
constantly overthrown at short intervals, they cannot 

1 Lebon, L'Allemagne, p. 88, remarks that the Bureaux in the French 
Chamber were intended to subdivide the factions, and accomplish this 
only too well. 



118 FRANCE. 

acquire the authority that is necessary to lead the 
majority and weld it into a single party. This is 
especially the case when the crises occur over matters 
which are not of vital consequence to the bulk of the 
followers of the government, and yet that is precisely 
the state of things that interpellations tend to create. 

It is of the essence of parliamentary government 
that the majority should support the ministers so long, 
and only so long, as it approves of their course, and this 
means their course as a whole, in administration as well 
as in legislation ; for parliament, having the fate of the 
ministers in its hands, holds them responsible for all 
their acts, and has gradually extended its supervision 
over the whole field of government. Now a parliament 
can judge of the legislative policy of the cabinet by 
the bills it introduces, but it is not so easy to get 
the information necessary for a sound opinion on the 
efficiency of the administration. It is largely to satisfy 
this need that a practice has grown up in the House of 
Commons of asking the ministers questions, which 
may relate to any conceivable subject, and afford a 
means of putting the cabinet through a very searching 
examination. Of course the privilege is freely used to 
harass the government, but the answer is not followed 
by a general debate, or by a vote, except in the un- 
usual case where a motion to adjourn is made for the 
purpose of bringing the matter under discussion. 1 

1 The motion to adjourn is the only one that is in order, and since 
1882 its use has been carefully limited. May, Pari. Practice, 10th ed. 
p. 240 et seq. In this form or some other a vote is occasionally taken 
on a single detail of administration. The most famous instances of late 
years have been the affair of Miss Cass in 1887, where the House of 



INTERPELLATIONS. 119 

A similar practice has been adopted in France, and 
questions are addressed to the ministers by members 
who really want information. But another kind of 
question has also developed, which is used not to get 
information, but to call the cabinet to account, and 
force the Chamber to pass judgment upon its con- 
duct. This is the interpellation. 1 In form it is similar 
to the question, but the procedure in the two cases 
is quite different. A question can be addressed to a 
minister only with his consent, whereas the interpel- 
lation is a matter of right, which any deputy may 
exercise, without regard to the wishes of the cabinet. 
The time, moreover, when it shall be made is fixed by 
the Chamber itself, and except in matters relating to 
foreign affairs, the date cannot be set more than a 
month ahead. But by far the most important differ- 
ence consists in the fact that the author of the question 
can alone reply to the minister, no further discussion 
being permitted, and no motion being in order ; while 
the interpellation is followed both by a general debate 
and by motions. These are in the form of motions to 

Commons expressed its disapproval of the government's refusal to make 
an inquiry by voting to adjourn, but where no member of the cabinet felt 
obliged to resign ; and the recent defeat of Lord Rosebery's ministry. 
In the last case a motion was made to reduce the salary of the Secretary 
of State for War, in order to draw attention to the lack of a sufficient 
supply of ammunition, and the motion was carried ; but there can be no 
doubt that the cabinet would not have resigned if its position had not 
already been hopeless. 

In the House of Lords questions can always be debated. May, p. 206. 

1 For the rules and practice in the case of questions, see Poudra et Pierre, 
liv. vii. ch. iii., and Supp. 1879-80, § 1539. In the case of interpellations, 
7c?., liv. vii. ch. iv. 



120 FRANCE. 

pass to the order of the day, and may be orders of the 
day pure and simple, as they are called, which contain 
no expression of opinion, or they may be what are 
termed orders of the day with a motive, such as " the 
Chamber, approving the declarations of the Govern- 
ment, passes to the order of the day." Several orders 
of this kind are often moved, and they are put to the 
vote in succession. The ministers select one of them 
(usually one proposed by their friends for the purpose), 
and declare that they will accept that. If it is rejected 
by the Chamber, or if a hostile order of the day is 
adopted, and the matter is thought to be of sufficient im- 
portance, the cabinet resigns. This is a very common 
way of upsetting a ministry, but it is one which puts 
the cabinet in a position of great disadvantage, for a 
government would be superhuman that never made 
mistakes, and yet here is a method by which any of its 
acts can be brought before the Chamber, and a vote 
forced on the question whether it made a mistake or 
not. Moreover, members of the opposition are given 
a chance to employ their ingenuity in framing orders 
of the day so as to catch the votes of those deputies 
who are in sympathy with the cabinet, but cannot 
approve of the act in question. 1 Now if adverse votes 

1 A very good example of the various shades of praise or blame that 
may be expressed by orders of the day can be found in the Journal 
Officiel for July 9, 1893. There had been a riot in Paris, which had 
not been suppressed without violence and even bloodshed. The police 
were accused of wanton brutality, and an interpellation on the subject 
was debated in the Chamber of Deputies on July 8. The order of the 
day quoted in the text, " The Chamber, approving the declarations of the 
government, passes to the order of the day," was adopted, but the follow- 
ing were also moved : — 



INTERPELLATIONS. 121 

in the Chamber are to be followed by the resignation of 
the cabinet and the formation of a new one, it is evi- 
dent that to secure the proper stability and permanence 
in the ministry, such votes ought to be taken only on 
measures of really great importance, or on questions 
that involve the whole policy and conduct of the 

"The Chamber, disapproving the acts of brutality of which the police 
have been guilty, requests the government to give to the police instruc- 
tions and orders more conformable to the laws of justice and humanity." 

" The Chamber, disapproving the proceedings of the police, passes to 
the order of the day." 

" The Chamber, approving the declarations of the government, and per- 
suaded that it will take measures to prevent the violence of the police 
officials, passes to the order of the day." 

" The Chamber, censuring the policy of provocation and reaction on the 
part of the government, passes to the order of the day." 

" The Chamber, hoping that the government will give a prompt and 
legitimate satisfaction to public opinion, passes to the order of the day." 

" Considering that the government has acknowledged from the tribune 
that its policy has caused in Paris ' sad occurrences,' ' deeds that must 
certainly be regretted,' and ' some acts of brutality,' the Chamber takes 
notice of the admission of the President of the Council, demands that the 
exercise of power shall be inspired by the indefeasible sentiments of jus- 
tice, of foresight, and of humanity, and passes to the order of the day." 

" The Chamber, convinced that the government of the Republic ought 
to make the law respected and maintain order, approving the declarations 
of the government, passes to the order of the day." 

" The Chamber, regretting the acts of violence on the part of the 
police, and taking notice of the declarations of the government, passes to 
the order of the day." 

"The Chamber, approving the declaration whereby the government 
has announced its desire to put an end to the practices and habits of the 
police which have been pointed out, passes to the order of the day." 

" The Chamber, convinced of the necessity of causing the laws to be 
respected by all citizens, passes to the order of the day." 

In this case, by voting priority for the first of these motions and 
adopting it, the Chamber avoided the snares prepared for it by the in- 
genious wording of the others. 



122 FRANCE. 

administration. It is evident also that they ought not 
to be taken hastily, or under excitement, but only after 
the Chamber has deliberately made up its mind that it 
disapproves of the cabinet, and that the country would 
on the whole be benefited by a change of ministers. 
The reverse of all this is true of the French system of 
interpellations, and a cabinet which in the morning 
sees no danger ahead, and enjoys the confidence of the 
Chamber and the nation, may be upset before nightfall 
by a vote provoked in a moment of excitement on a 
matter of secondary importance. 

The frequency with which interpellations are used to 
upset the cabinet may be judged by the fact that out of 
the twenty-one ministries that have resigned in conse- 
quence of a vote of the Chamber of Deputies since the 
cabinet has been responsible, ten have fallen on account 
of orders of the day moved after an interpellation, or in 
the course of debate. 1 Several of these orders covered, 
indeed, the general policy of the cabinet, but others — 
like the one relating to the attendance of the employees 
of the state railroads at a congress of labor unions, 
which occasioned the resignation of Casimir-Perier's min- 
istry in May, 1894 — had no such broad significance. 

1 Cf . Haucour, Gouv. et Min.; Muel, Gouv., Min. et Const. Among the 
resignations brought about in this way, I have counted that of Rouvier's 
cabinet in 1887, although this was caused not by the vote of an order of 
the day, but by the refusal of the Chamber to postpone the debate on an 
interpellation, and although the cabinet continued to hold office for a 
few days pending the resignation of President Gre*vy. The proportion of 
ministries that fall on orders of the day seems to be increasing, for of the 
last six crises caused by a vote of the Chamber, five were due to orders of 
the day; and of these the last three at least did not involve the general 
policy of the government. 



INTERPELLATIONS. 123 

Moreover, the production of actual cabinet crises is by 
no means tbe whole evil caused by interpellations. The 
enfeebling of the authority of the ministers by hostile 
votes about affairs on which they do not feel bound 
to stake their office is, perhaps, an even more serious 
matter, for no cabinet can retain the prestige that is 
necessary to lead the Chambers in a parliamentary gov- 
ernment, if it is to be constantly censured and put in a 
minority even in questions of detail. The ministers are 
not obliged, it is true, to answer interpellations, 1 but 
unless some reason of state can be given for refusing, 
such as that an answer would prejudice diplomatic 
negotiations, a refusal would amount to a confession of 
error, or would indicate a desire to conceal the fact, and 
would weaken very much the position of the cabinet. 

The large part that interpellations play in French 
politics is shown by the fact that they arouse more pop- 
ular interest than the speeches on great measures ; 2 and, 
indeed, the most valuable quality for a minister to pos- 
sess is a ready tact and quick wit in answering them. 3 

The first two institutions referred to as not in har- 
mony with parliamentary government — that is, the 
method of electing deputies and the system of com- 
mittees in the Chambers — have real merit. Both tend 
to check the tyranny of party, and under a form of 
government where the existence of two great parties 
was not essential, they might be very valuable. But, 
except in a despotism, the interpellation followed by a 
motion expressing the judgment of the Chamber is a 

1 Poudra et Pierre, § 1555. 2 Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, p. 27. 

8 Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberie, p. 379. 



124 FRANCE. 

purely vicious institution. It furnishes the politicians 
with an admirable opportunity for a display of parlia- 
mentary fireworks ; but it is hard to see how, under any 
form of popular government, it could fail to be mis- 
chievous, or serve any useful purpose that would not 
be much better accomplished by a question followed by 
no motion and no vote. The plausible suggestion has 
been made that the administration, being free from 
supervision by the courts of law, can be brought to 
account for its acts only in this way ; * but surely the 
same result could be as well accomplished by the 
simpler process of the question, and it is hard to see 
any reason for imperiling the existence or the prestige 
of the cabinet to rectify some matter of trifling conse- 
T . quence. The practice arose from the fact 

J ealousy ■*- A 

JrfthemiS that, owing to the immense power of the 
p e art°oVtfe executive in France, and the frequency with 
Chamber. wn i cn that power has been used despotically, 
the legislature has acquired the habit of looking on the 
cabinet officers as natural enemies, to be attacked and 
harassed as much as possible. 2 But such a view, which 

1 See Vieomte d'Avenel, " La Re'f orme Administrative — La Justice," 
Revue des Deux Mondes, June 1, 1889, pp. 595-96. 

2 M. Dupriez, in the work already cited (vol. ii. p. 253 et seq.), has 
explained the strength of this feeling by a most valuable study of the 
history of the relations between the ministers and the legislature in 
France. He points out that it existed at the outbreak of the Revolution, 
for the cahiers or statements of grievances prepared by the meetings of 
electors held to choose members of the States General in 1789 express a 
widespread dislike and distrust of all ministers as such. He then shows 
how the Constituent Assembly tried to curtail the power of the ministers, 
and reduce their functions to a simple execution of its own orders. It is 
unnecessary here to follow the subject in detail. It is enough to remark 
that a large part of the political history of France since the Revolution 



INTERPELLATIONS. 125 

is defensible enough when the ministers are independ- 
ent of the Parliament, becomes irrational when they are 
responsible to it, and bound to resign on an adverse vote. 
Strange as it may seem, the development of inter- 
pellations has coincided very closely with that of parlia- 
mentary government ; * and, in fact, the French regard 
the privilege as one of the main bulwarks of political 
liberty. It is this same feeling of antagonism to the 
government that has given rise to the overweening 
power of the committees in the Chamber, and their 
desire to usurp the functions of the ministers. The 
extent to which this feeling is carried by the Kadicals 
is shown by the proposal made a few years ago to 
divide the whole Chamber into a small number of per- 
manent grand committees, such as existed in 1848, in 
order to bring the ministers even more completely 
under the control of the deputies ; the ideal of the 
Extreme Eadicals being the revolutionary convention, 
which drew all the powers of the state as directly and 
absolutely as possible into its own hands. 2 The less 

is filled with struggles for power between the executive and the legisla- 
ture, in which the former has twice won a complete victory, and deprived 
the representatives of the people of all influence in the state. Under 
these circumstances the suspicion and jealousy of the cabinet shown by 
Liberal statesmen is not surprising. 

1 The practice was first regularly established at the accession of Louis 
Philippe, the period when cabinets became thoroughly responsible to the 
Chamber ; and it was freely used during the Republic of 1848. After the 
Coup oVEtat it was, of course, abolished ; but toward the end of his reign 
Napoleon III., as a part of his concessions to the demand for parliamentary 
institutions, gradually restored the right of interpellation. Finally, under 
the present Republic the right has been used more frequently than ever 
before. See Poudra et Pierre, §§ 1544-49; Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 305, 317-18. 

2 Cf . De la Berge, " Les Grands Comite's Parlementaires," Revue des 
Deux Mondes, Dec. 1, 1889. 



126 FRANCE. 

violent Republicans are, no doubt, very far from accept- 
ing any such ideal, but still they cannot shake out of 
their minds the spirit of hostility to the administration 
which has been nurtured by long periods of absolute 
rule. They fail to realize that when the ministry 
becomes responsible to the deputies, the relations be- 
tween the executive and the legislature are radically 
changed. The parliamentary system requires an entire 
harmony, a cordial sympathy, and a close cooperation 
between the ministers and the Chamber; and to the 
obligation on the part of the cabinet to resign when the 
majority withdraws its approval, there corresponds a 
duty on the part of the majority to support the min- 
isters heartily so long as they remain in office. Par- 
liamentary government, therefore, cannot be really 
successful in France until a spirit of mutual confidence 
between the cabinet and the Chamber replaces the 
jealousy and distrust that now prevail. 

A comparison of the political history of France and 
Com arison England during the last few years shows to 
French what extent the French procedure interferes 
SS^ndthe ^h discipline and disintegrates the parties. 
HanSJt of r I n England the Liberals came into power after 
the elections of 1892 with a small majority 
in the House of Commons; and, although the sup- 
porters of the government were far from harmonious, 
were, in fact, jealous of each other and interested in 
quite different measures, the perfection of the parlia- 
mentary machinery enabled the ministers to keep their 
followers together and maintain themselves in office 
for three years. In France, on the other hand, the 



EFFECTS OF THE STATE OF PARTIES. 127 

elections of 1893 produced a majority which, if not 
so large, was far more homogeneous j and indeed, if we 
compare the position of some of the outlying groups 
with that of certain sections of the English Liberal 
party, it is fair to say that the majority in France was 
both larger and more homogeneous. Yet within two 
years this majority suffered three cabinets which rep- 
resented it to be overthrown on interpellations about 
matters of secondary importance, and finally became 
so thoroughly disorganized that it lost control of the 
situation altogether. 

We have surveyed some of the causes of the condi- 
tion of political parties in France. Let us Results of 
now trace a few of its results. In the first ]|? n c f ndi ~ 
place, the presence of the Reactionaries de- parties - 
prives cabinet crises of the significance they might 
otherwise possess. The defeat of the min- ^ . 

L m m Owing to the 

isters does not ordinarily mean the advent presence of 

*> the reae- 

to power of a different party, because there ^n^of* 1 
is no other party capable of forming a cabi- jjj™jjj 
net, 1 — not the Eeactionaries, for they are Elgeof 
irreconcilable and hostile to the Republic ; party ' 
nor those Republicans who have helped the Right to 
turn out the ministers, because by themselves they do 
not constitute a majority of the Chamber. The new 
cabinet must, therefore, seek its support mainly in the 
ranks of the defeated minority, and hence is usually 
formed from very much the same material as its prede- 

1 Except in the cases of the recent Bourgeois and Me'line cabinets, a 
change of ministry has never meant the advent to power of a substantially 
different party since MacMahon yielded to the Republicans in 1877. 



128 FRANCE. 

cessor. In fact, a number of the old ministers have 
Effects of generally kept their places, at most an attempt 
this. being made to gain a little more support from 

the Eight or Left by giving one or two additional port- 
folios to the Moderates or the Eadicals. 1 When a min- 
istry falls, the parliamentary cards are shuffled, a few 
that have become too unpopular or too prominent are 
removed, and a new deal takes place. So true is this, 
that out of the twenty-four ministries that have suc- 
ceeded each other since President MacMahon appointed 
a Republican cabinet on December 13, 1877, only three 
have contained none of the retiring ministers, the aver- 
age proportion of members retained being about two 
fifths. 2 Now, the fact that the fall of the cabinet does 
not involve a change of party has two important 
effects : by removing the fear that a hostile opposi- 
tion will come to power, it destroys the chief motive 
for discipline among the majority ; 3 and by making 
the Chamber feel that a change of ministers is not a 
matter of vital consequence, it encourages that body to 
turn them out with rash indifference. The result is 
that the cabinets are extremely short-lived ; and indeed 
during the twenty-three years the Republic has enjoyed 
responsible ministries, — that is, since MacMahon's 
election in May, 1873, — there have been thirty-four 
of them, so that the average duration of a French 

1 Lebon, France as It Is, p. 94. 

2 Cf . Haucour, Gouv. el Min. ; Muel, Gouv., Min. et Const. ; Dupriez, 
vol. ii. pp. 338, 343. The three exceptions were the cabinets of Brisson 
in 1885, Bourgeois in 1895, and Midline in 1896. 

3 This is very clearly pointed out by Dupriez, Les Ministres, vol. ii. 
p. 390. 



CABINETS SHORT-LIVED AND WEAK. 129- 

j 

cabinet has been less than eight months and a half. 1 
The same fact explains, moreover, the persistence of 
the system of interpellations, for if a change of min- 
istry does not imply a different programme, there is no 
self-evident impropriety in overthrowing a cabinet on a 
question that does not involve a radical condemnation 
of its policy. 

The subdivision of the Eepublican party into sepa- 
rate groups has also an important bearing on Qwin 
the character of the ministry. Instead of 3^™^f 
representing a united party, the cabinet must JJS& a 
usually rely for support on a number of these ^Se- 
groups, and the portfolios must be so dis- foreweak - 
tributed as to conciliate enough of them to form a 
majority of the Chamber. 2 As a rule, therefore, the 
cabinet is in reality the result of a coalition, and suffers 
from the evils to which bodies of that kind are always 
subject. The members tend to become rivals rather 
than comrades, and each of them is a little inclined 
to think less of the common interests of the cabinet 
than of his own future prospects when the combina- 
tion breaks up. 3 Such a government, moreover, is 
essentially weak, for it cannot afford to refuse the de- 
mands of any group whose defection may be fatal to 

1 I have not counted the reappointment of the Dupuy ministry on the 
election of Casimir-Perier to the presidency as the formation of a new 
cabinet. 

2 The first part of the term of the present Chamber is the only time 
when the cabinet has been supported by a group which contained by itself 
anything like a majority of the deputies. 

8 Cf . Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 348-49. Lebon, France as It Is, p. 85, speaks 
of the never-ending struggles for mastery within the cabinet. 

VOL. I. 



\ 



130 s FRANCE. 

its existence. 1 The ministers are not at the head of a 
great party that is bound to follow their lead, and yet 
they must secure the votes of the Chamber or they 
^annot remain in office. Hence they must seek support 
fc best they may, and as they cannot rule the majority, 
they are constrained to follow and flatter it ; 2 or rather 
they are forced to conciliate the various groups, and, 
it must win as ^ ne m e mDers of the groups themselves 
Ranting are loosely held together, they must grant 
favors. favors to the individual deputies in order to 

secure their votes. This is not a new feature in French 
politics. It is said that during the reign of Louis 
Philippe, the government kept a regular account with 
each deputy, showing his votes in the Chamber on one 
side, and the favors he had been granted on the other, 
so that he could expect no indulgence if the balance 
were against him. 3 Nor has the cause of the evil 
changed. It is the same under the Third Republic that 
it was under the Monarchy of July, for in both cases 
the lack of great national parties with definite pro- 
grammes has made the satisfaction of local and personal 
interests a necessity. 

We are, unfortunately, only too familiar in this 
Political use country with the doctrine that to the victors 
of offices * b e i on g tne spo ii s> j n France we find the 

same thing, although it is not acknowledged so openly, 
and is disguised under the name of epuration, or the 

i Cf. Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 347-48, 434-35. 

2 Cf. Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, ch. vii. p. iii. 

3 Hello, Du Regime Constitutionnel, quoted by Minghetti, / Partiti 
Politici, p. 101 ; and see G. Lowes Dickinson, Revolution and Reaction in 
Modern France, pp. 118-20. 



PATRONAGE USED TO PLEASE DEPUTIES. 131 

purification of the administration from the enemie> of 
the Kepublic. The practice of turning political fojas 
out of office and substituting one's friends seems to 
have begun during President MacMahon's contest with 
the Chamber, when the Keactionary party dismissed ^ 
large number of officials who had served under former 
cabinets. 1 After the Right had been overthrown in 
1877, there arose a cry that the Eepublic ought not 
to be administered by men who did not sympathize 
with it, and would naturally throw their influence 
against it ; but although the fear of danger to the form 
of government was no doubt genuine at first, the cry 
became before long a transparent excuse for a hunt 
after office. 2 In speaking of this subject, however, it 
must be remembered that France is not divided into 
two great parties which succeed each other in power, 
and hence a wholesale change of public servants, such 
as has often taken place after a presidential election in 
the United States, does not occur. The process is con- 
tinuous, but slower and less thorough. On andother 
the other hand, the evil in France is by P rivile & es - 
no means limited to office-seeking, for owing to the 
immense power vested in the government, the favors 
which the deputies demand and exact as the price of 
their votes extend over a vast field. Nor do 'they show 
any false modesty about making their desires known. 

1 See Channes, pp. 18-19, 231-32. 

2 See the remarkable little book by Edmond Scherer, La Democratic et 
la France ; Channes, Nos Fautes (passim) • Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, 
pp. 114-15, and ch. vi. ii. ; Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 502-9 ; Lamy, La Repub- 
lique en 1883, pp. 6-8, 22 ; and see a highly colored account by Hurlbert, 
" The Outlook in France," Fortnightly Rev., vol. 55, p. 347. 



132 FRANCE. 

They do not hesitate to invade the executive offices, 
and meddle directly in the conduct of affairs. 1 Even 
the prefect, who has the principal charge of local ad- 
ministration, is not free from their interference. He 
is liable to lose his place if he offends the Kepublican 
deputies from his department, and is therefore obliged 
to pay court to them and follow their lead. In short, the 
prefect has become, to a great extent, the tool of these 
autocrats ; and his dependence is increased by the fact 
that nowadays he does not usually remain in office long 
enough to acquire a thorough knowledge of the local 
wants, or to exercise a strong personal influence. I do 
not mean that he has become corrupt ; far from it. 
The level of integrity among French officials appears to 
be extremely high, and though wedded to routine, their 
efficiency is great ; 2 but the discretion in their hands 
is enormous, and in using it they must take care not 
to displease his Majesty the Deputy. 3 

Of course the deputies do not wield this immense in- 
Deputies fluence to forward their own private ends alone. 
cu£y e fav°or Tnev are representatives, and must use their 
Seal com- position for the benefit of the persons they 
represent. But whom do they represent? 
The people at large? No representative ever really 
does that. So far as he is actuated by purely conscien- 
tious motives he represents his own ideas of right, and 
for the rest he represents primarily the men who have 

1 Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 435, 507-8 ; Channes, pp. 253-56 ; Lamy, pp. 
21-26 ; Laffitte, Le Suffrage Universel, pp. 54-59. 

2 Simon, " Stability of the French Republic," The Forum, vol. 10, p. 383. 
8 Cf . Channes, Letter of Oct. 1, 1884 ; Laffitte, pp. 56-58 ; Dupriez, 

vol. ii. pp. 471-72, 506-9. 



POWER OF LOCAL COMMITTEES. 133 

elected him, and to whom he must look for help and 
votes in the next campaign. In some countries this 
means the party, and those classes that hang on the 
skirts of the party and may be prevailed upon to fall 
into line. But in France there are no great organized 
parties, and hence we must consider how candidates are 
nominated there. The government, at the present day, 
does not put forward official candidates of its own, as 
was commonly done during the Second Empire ; 1 and, 
indeed, it is not supposed to take an active part in 
elections. This last principle is not strictly observed, 
for the administrative officials at times exert no little 
influence in important campaigns, and the government 
is said to have spent a good deal of money to defeat 
Boulanger in 1889. Still there is nothing resembling 
the control of elections under Napoleon III., and es- 
pecially there is no interference with the selection of 
candidates, this matter being left to the spontaneous 
movement of the voters themselves. The usual method 
of proceeding is as follows : a number of men in active 
politics in a commune, or what we should call the wire- 
pullers, form themselves into a self-elected committee, 
the members usually belonging to liberal or semi-liberal 
professions, and very commonly holding advanced views, 
which are apt to go with political activity in France. 
The committees or their representatives meet together 
to form an assembly, which prepares the programme, 
nominates the candidate, and proclaims him as the can- 
didate of the party. 2 These self-constituted committees, 

1 Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberie, p. 372. 

2 Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, pp. 17-25 ; Scherer, La Democratie et la 



134 FRANCE. 

therefore, have the nomination entirely in their own 
hands; 1 and, except in the larger cities, a candidate 
owes his position largely to local influence and personal 
interests. 2 Sometimes he has won prominence by a 
clever speech at a local meeting. Sometimes he has 
earned gratitude by services rendered in his profession, 
or otherwise. 3 

After the candidate is nominated, his first care is to 
issue his programme, and under the system of single 
electoral districts, each candidate, as has already been 
observed, has a separate programme, which expresses 
only his particular views. The active campaign is car- 
ried on by means of placards posted on walls and 
fences, which make a great show, but win few votes ; 
and what is far more effective, by means of newspapers 
and the stump. 4 The stump, curiously enough, is used 

France, pp. 22-24 ; Keinach, La Politique Opportuniste, 186-88 ; Laffitte, 
op. cit., pp. 64-69. 

1 Since the system of scrutin de liste has been given up and the single 
electoral districts have been reestablished, the matter is said to have 
become somewhat more simplified. It is stated that the nominating com- 
mittees are now formed, at least in many cases, without any meeting of 
delegates from the communes ; and that their function lies not in the 
selection of a candidate, but rather in helping the candidate in whose 
behalf they have been organized, and acting as his sponsors. (See Alfred 
Naquet, " The French Electoral System," North American Rev., vol. 155, 
p. 466. But see Charles Benoist, "De l'Organization du Suffrage Uni- 
versel," Revue des Deux Mondes, July 1, 1895, pp. 15-20.) However this 
may be, the close relations between the deputy and a small self-consti- 
tuted clique of local politicians, which is the essential point in the French 
electoral system, remains very much the same. 

2 Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, pp. 24-25. 
8 Chaudordy, La France en 1889, p. 96. 

4 Alfred Naquet, "The French Electoral System," North American 
Rev., vol. 155, pp. 468-70. 



POWER OF LOCAL COMMITTEES. 135 

very little except by the candidates themselves/ who 
constantly speak at political rallies, of late years fre- 
quently holding joint debates. 2 Far too often, unfor- 
tunately, they also truckle to the personal ambition of 
individual voters by flattery and the promise of favors, 
a course that deters some of the best men from political 
life. 3 The wire-pullers, indeed, are not over-anxious for 
really strong characters, because they prefer men whom 
they can control, and use for their own purposes. 4 If 
they want anything they exert a pressure on the deputy, 
who in his turn brings a pressure to bear on the min- 
isters; and hence it has been a common saying that 
the electoral committees rule the deputies, and the 
deputies rule the government. 5 

It is asserted that, since the re-introduction of single 
electoral districts, the power of the committees has sen- 
sibly diminished, 6 and, whether this be true or not, it is 

1 Theodore Stanton, supplement to the article of Alfred Naquet, 
p. 473. 

2 Alfred Naquet, lb. The newspapers at election time are full of 
accounts of these meetings for joint debate, called Reunions publiques 
contradictoires. 

8 Cf . Scherer, La Democratie et la France, pp. 24-25, 39. Direct bribery 
of voters, though not unknown, seems to be rare, but the complaint that 
elections have been getting a good deal more expensive of late years is 
general. Naquet, lb. ; Reinach, pp. 189-90 ; Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberie, 
p. 373 ; Souviens toi du Deux Decembre, p. 91. 

4 Channes, Nos Fautes, pp. 379-81 ; Laffitte, p. 69 et seq. 

5 Channes, pp. 238-39 ; and see Scherer, La Democratie et la France, 
p. 27; Simon, Dieu, Patrie, Liberte,^. 378. 

For this reason one frequently hears it said that the deputies do not 
see the real people, but only their own political dependents. Channes, 
p. 38 ; Simon, Souviens toi du Deux Decembre, pp. 165-66. 

6 Naquet, " The French Electoral System," North American Rev., vol. 
155, p. 466. But see on the other side the article of Benoist in the 
Revue des Deux Monaes, July 1, 1895, pp. 17-19. 



136 FRANCE. 

certainly easy to exaggerate their influence, for the dep- 
The depu- u ty mus t always consider other people beside 
thereon- t ne wire-pullers. He must try to strengthen 
stituents. j^ g enera i popularity throughout his district. 
He is, indeed, expected to look after the political business 
of his constituents, and is a regular channel for the pre- 
sentation of grievances and the distribution of favors ; 
one of the complaints most commonly heard in France 
being that the deputies represent local and personal in- 
terests rather than national ones. But even this does not 
end his responsibilities. The traditions of centralization 
which make all France look to Paris for guidance, and 
the habit of paternal government that makes men turn 
to the state for aid, have caused many people to regard 
the deputy as a kind of universal business agent for 
his district at the capital, and burden him with all sorts 
of private matters in addition to his heavy public duties. 
Sometimes this is carried to an extent that is positively 
ludicrous. A few years ago a couple of deputies gave 
an account at a public dinner of the letters they had 
received from their districts. Some constituents wanted 
their representative to go shopping for them ; others 
asked him to consult a physician in their behalf ; and 
more than one begged him to procure a wet nurse, 
hearing that this could be done better in Paris than in 
the provinces. 1 Is it to be wondered that the French 
deputy should bend under the weight of his responsi- 
bilities ? 

If I seem to have drawn a somewhat dark picture of 
the position of the deputy, I do not want to be under- 

1 This is quoted by Scherer in La Democratie et la France, pp. 34-35. 



THE DEPUTY A CHANNEL FOR PRIVATE FAVORS. 137 

stood as implying that all deputies are alike ; that many 
of them are not men of high character, who will not 
yield to the temptation and pressure with which they 
are surrounded. My object is simply to describe a 
tendency ; to point out a defect in the French political 
system, and to show clearly the characteristic evils 
which that defect cannot fail to develop. The recent 
scandals about the bribery of deputies in connection 
with the Panama Canal, with which the newspapers 
were filled for three months, have thrown a dismal 
light over public life in France, and, although at first 
the credulous Parisians no doubt exaggerated the ex- 
tent of the corruption, still there was fire enough under 
the smoke to show what baleful influences haunt the 
corridors of the Palais Bourbon. 

Before closing, let us consider for a moment the 
political prospects of the country. The gen- 
erous enthusiasm that greeted the Republic at the Repub- 
the outset has faded away, and even its most 
ardent advocates have found to their sorrow that it has 
not brought the promised millennium. Such a feeling of 
disappointment is not surprising. On the contrary, it 
might have been surely predicted, for in every form of 
government that has existed in France since the Revo- 
lution the period of enthusiasm has been followed by 
one of disenchantment, and to this latter stage the Re- 
public has come in the natural course of events. Now 
this period may well be looked upon as crucial, because 
as yet no form of government in France has been able 
to live through it. After a political system has lasted 
about half a generation, the country has always become 



138 FRANCE. 

disgusted with it, torn it down, and set up another, — a 
course that has made any steady progress in public life 
impossible. The effect has, in fact, been very much 
like that which would be produced by a man who 
should constantly root out his crops before they came 
to maturity, and sow his field with new and different 
seed. 

The reason for such a state of things is not hard to 
Hitherto no ^ n ^* Since the Revolution every form of 
party laf government in France has been the expres- 
Sout d a s i° n or outward sign of a definite set of 
revolution, political opinions. So close, indeed, has the 
connection been between the two, that it has been 
impossible for men to conceive of one without the 
other, and therefore a fundamental change of opinion 
has always involved a change in the form of govern- 
ment. Any one who studies the history of the nation 
will see that there has never been a change of party 
without a revolution. There has often been a shifting 
of control from one group to another of a slightly dif- 
ferent coloring, but the real party in opposition has 
never come to power without an overturn of the whole 
political system. Under the Restoration, for example, 
the ministers were sometimes Moderate and sometimes 
extremely Reactionary, but were never taken from 
the ranks of the liberal opposition. Again, during the 
Monarchy of July the different groups of Liberals dis- 
puted fiercely for the mastery, but neither the Radicals 
nor the Reactionaries had the slightest chance of com- 
ing to power. If space permitted, this truth might be 
illustrated by taking up in succession each of the gov- 



PROSPECTS OF THE REPUBLIC. 139 

ernments that have flourished since the Revolution, but 
perhaps it is enough to refer to the only apparent 
exception that has occurred. While General MacMahon 
was President of the Third Republic, power was cer- 
tainly transferred from the Reactionaries to the Repub- 
licans, but the circumstances of this case were very 
peculiar. The Republic had hardly got into working 
order, and the struggle of the Reactionaries may be 
looked upon as a final effort to prevent it from becom- 
ing firmly established. The French themselves have 
always considered the occurrence, not as a normal 
change of party, but as the frustration of an attempt at 
a coup d'etat or counter-revolution. This case, there- 
fore, from the fact that it has been generally regarded 
as exceptional, may fairly be treated as the kind of 
exception that tends to prove the rule. A revolution 
in France corresponds in many ways to a change of 
party in other countries, but with this grave disadvan- 
tage, that the new administration, instead of reforming 
the political institutions, destroys them altogether. Of 
course such a method puts gradual improvement out 
of the question, and before the nation can perfect her 
government she must learn that the remedy for defects 
is to be sought through the reform, not the overthrow, 
of the existing system. 

One would suppose that under the Republic no such 
difficulty could arise, because a republic means the rule 
of the majority, and the majority is sure to be some- 
times on one side and sometimes on the other. But 
this is not the view of most French Republicans, and 
especially of the Radicals. These men, recognizing 



140 FRANCE. 

that, on account of a want of training in self-govern- 
ment, the people can be cajoled, or frightened, or 
charmed, or tricked into the expression of the most con- 
tradictory opinions, refuse to admit that any vote not in 
harmony with their own ideas can be a fair test of the 
popular will, and assume for themselves the exclusive 
privilege of declaring what the people really want. As 
M. Edmond Scherer has cleverly said : u Let us add 
that the God (universal suffrage) has his priests, whose 
authority has never been quite clear, but who know 
his wishes, speak in his name, and, if resistance occurs, 
confound it by an appeal to the oracle whose secrets 
are confided to them alone." 1 The Eadicals, therefore, 
cannot admit a possibility that the true majority can be 
against them, and nothing irritates them so much as to 
hear the other parties claim that the people are on 
their own side. It has been said that the Kepublic will 
not be safe until it has been governed by the Conserva- 
tives, 2 and the remark has a special significance in this 
connection : first, because, until the Conservatives come 
to power, it will not be clear whether the Kepublic has 
enough strength and elasticity to stand a change of 
party without breaking down ; and second, because the 
right of the majority to rule, which is the ultimate 
basis of the consensus on which the Republic must 
rest, will not be surely established until each party has 
submitted peaceably to a popular verdict in favor of the 
other. 

1 La Democratic et la France, p. 18. 

2 " La Rdpublique et les Conservateurs," Revue des Deux Mondes, March 
1, 1890, pp. 120-21. This means, of course, the conservative elements 
among the people, and not merely the conservative Republicans. 



PKOSPECTS OF THE REPUBLIC. 141 

That the existing political system will be accepted as 
final by all classes of the people, so that the republican 
form of government will cease to be the dogma of a 
party and become the creed of the whole nation, seems 
extremely probable ; for, if the enthusiasm for the 
Republic has waned, the passionate attachment for the 
Monarchy and the Empire has grown cold also. The 
Republic has passed her first youth, and a generation 
of men are crowding upon the stage who have not 
shared the loves and hatreds of their fathers, and who 
care more for immediate ends than for historic tradi- 
tions. It is not surprising, therefore, that throughout 
the country dynastic questions are giving way to others 
that have a more direct bearing on the welfare of the 
people. The Holy See has thrown its influence in this 
direction, and there can be no doubt that if it persists 
in its present policy, the last Reactionaries must abandon 
their irreconcilable attitude. Apart, therefore, from 
war or from some terrible economic convulsion, there 
is every reason to expect that the Republic will prove 
lasting. 

When the Reactionaries have accepted the Republic, 
the immediate danger will be, not that they will exert 
too little influence, but that they will exert too much ; 
that they will rule the Right as the Radicals dominated 
the Left; that the liberty of the press will be re- 
strained, and the church brought too closely into 
contact with political affairs, — a course that would be 
certain to excite violent revolutionary feelings among 
the Radicals. But this danger also, it may be hoped, 
will be removed by time, for the peaceful alternation in 



142 FRANCE. 

power of men of opposite parties, which France as yet 
has never known, would gradually educate the people, 
and produce moderate and practical opinions in politics. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that the Republic 
has had to contend hitherto not only with deep-seated 
prejudices derived from the fierce struggles of the last 
century, but also with a lack of political experience, 
resulting in an inaptitude for self-government on the 
part of the nation at large. This has made the people an 
easy prey to glittering theories and resounding phrases. 
But free discussion, popular meetings, and attempts at 
political combination have extended widely within the 
last few years, 1 and cannot fail to develop a capacity for 
judging of public affairs that will render the people 
far less susceptible to the influence of extremists. 

There is one real danger ahead of the Eepublic, 
Financial which cannot be treated too seriously, and 
dangers. ft^t is the condition of the finances. For 
some time after the war with Germany the treasury was 
admirably managed, and France astonished the world 
by the rapidity with which she paid the war indemnity ; 
but before long she fell into the habit, so common in 
our day, of framing golden dreams of the future, and 
discounting them at once. She poured out money like 
water for roads, railroads, and schools ; rolled up a 
huge debt to pay for them, and even then was unable to 
satisfy the expectations she had awakened among her 
people. 2 At the same time she built huge fortifications, 
set up universal military service, and strove to maintain 

1 Lebon, France as It Is, p. 94. 

2 See Channes, Letter of Jan., 1885. 



PROSPECTS OF THE REPUBLIC. 143 

a stronger army and a more powerful fleet than her 
larger neighbor. Meanwhile a bad system of financier- 
ing prevented her from seeing how fast she was going. 
A habit grew up of dividing the expenditure into 
ordinary and extraordinary, of which the former alone 
was defrayed out of the annual receipts, while the 
latter, as something unusual that would not occur again, 
was provided for by loans. Nevertheless, the items for 
extraordinary expenses reappeared every year, being in 
fact a normal part of the budget. 1 Thus the country 
sank deeper and deeper into debt, with a gloomy pros- 
pect of bankruptcy before it in case of war. Fortu- 
nately, the finances have of late been put into a much 
better condition. Instead of the constantly recurring 
deficits, there has more than once been surplus in 
the last few years, and what is really of even greater 
importance, many of the extraordinary expenses have 
been cut off and transferred to the regular budget. 2 
It will probably be a good while before this is done 
with all of them, and, until the extraordinary budgets 
are suppressed entirely, the finances of the country will 
not be upon a thoroughly solid basis. As yet, indeed, 
the danger has by no means disappeared, because the 
equilibrium has been brought about by a heavy increase 
of taxation, and there is always a risk that in a time of 

1 See Simon, Nos Hommes d'Etat, ch. iv. 

2 See Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 419-20; Cucheval-Clarigny, "La Situation 
Financiere et le Budget de 1892," Revue des Deux Mondes, Nov. 1, 1891. 
The credit of this change is due to M. Rouvier, who was for several years 
Minister of Finance, but who was brought into disgrace in 1893 by having 
accepted money for campaign purposes from the agents of the Panama 
Canal. 



144 FRANCE. 

economic disaster some cabinet, fearing to acknowledge 
the real condition of the finances, or to add to the 
taxes, will renew the policy of contracting loans to meet 
current expenses. 

If the Republic proves lasting, the form of its institu- 
Probabie tions will no doubt be gradually modified, but, 
FreSSTiS whatever changes take place, one thing is 
stitutions. c i ear: the responsibility of the ministers to 
parliament must be retained. In a country like the 
United States, where power is split up by the federal 
system, where the authority in the hands of the 
executive is comparatively small, and, above all, where 
the belief in popular government and the attachment 
to individual liberty and the principles of the common 
law are ingrained in the race, there is no danger in 
intrusting the administration to a President who is 
independent of the legislature. But this would not be 
safe in France, because, owing to the centralization of 
the government and the immense power vested in the 
executive, such a President would be almost a dictator 
during his term of office ; and the temptation to pro- 
long his authority, from public no less than from selfish 
motives, would be tremendous. Nor, in view of the 
tendency of the mercantile classes, and even of the 
peasants, to crave a strong ruler, would it be difficult 
for him to do so, as Louis Napoleon proved long ago. 
A President is able to overthrow a popular assembly 
because the French have long been accustomed to 
personal government, and because an assembly is in- 
capable of maintaining a stable majority ; because, in 
short, the French know how to work personal but not 



PROSPECTS OF THE REPUBLIC. 145 

representative government : and the danger will con- 
tinue until parliamentary institutions are perfected, and 
their traditions by long habit have become firmly 
rooted. The French President cannot, therefore, be 
independent, and the only feasible alternative is to 
surround him with ministers who are responsible to the 
Chamber of Deputies. But if the parliamentary system 
must be retained, it is important to remove the defects 
that it shows to-day, and especially is it necessary, on 
the one hand, to diminish the autocratic power of the 
administration, which offers a well-nigh irresistible 
temptation to both minister and deputy ; and, on the 
other hand, to give the cabinet more stability, more 
dignity, and more authority ; to free it from the yoke 
of the groups in the Chamber, and from dependence on 
local interest and personal appetite ; to relieve it from 
the domination of irresponsible committees, and from 
the danger of defeat by haphazard majorities ; to enable 
it to exert over its followers the discipline that is required 
for the formation of great, compact parties; to make it r 
in short, the real head of a majority in parliament and 
in the nation. 

VOL. I. 



CHAPTER IE. 

ITALY: INSTITUTIONS. 

The perfection of its organization and the excel- 
Causesthat l ence °f ^s laws preserved the life of Eome 
uSon e of the l° n g a ^ er i* s ^al f° rce had become ex- 
Italy ' hausted ; and when the Teutonic tribes had 

once broken through the shell of the western empire, 
the j overran it almost without resistance. Europe 
sank into a state of barbarism, from which she re- 
covered to find her political condition completely 
changed. Slowly, during the Middle Ages, the nations 
were forming, until at last Europe became divided 
into separate and permanent states, each with an inde- 
pendent government of its own. In two countries, 
however, — Italy and Germany, — this process of de- 
velopment was delayed by the existence of the Holy 
Roman Empire, which claimed an authority far greater 
than it was able to wield, and, while too weak to consoli- 
date its vast dominions into a single state, was strong 
enough to hinder them from acquiring distinct and 
national governments. The condition of Italy was 
further complicated by the presence of the Pope ; for 
although the Papacy was an immense civilizing force in 
mediaeval Europe, yet the constant quarrels of the Pope 
and the Emperor, and the existence of the States of 
the Church, tended greatly to prevent the development 



FORMATION OF THE KINGDOM. 147 

of Italy as a nation. The country was broken into 
a multitude of jarring elements, and even Dante saw 
no hope of union and order save under the sway of 
a German emperor. The north of Italy was full of 
flourishing cities enriched by commerce and manufac- 
tures and resplendent with art, but constantly fighting 
with each other, and, except in the case of Venice, 
a prey to internal feuds that brought them at last 
under the control of autocratic rulers. 1 The south, on 
the other hand, fell under the dominion of a series 
of foreign monarchs, who were often despotic, and, by 
making the government seem an enemy of the gov- 
erned, destroyed in great measure the legal and social 
organization of the people. For thirteen centuries — 
from the reign of Theodoric the Ostrogoth to the 
time of Napoleon — the greater part of Italy was never 
united under a single head, and in both of these 
cases the country was ruled by foreigners. Yet short- 
lived and unnatural as the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy 
was, it had no small effect in kindling that longing for 
freedom and union which was destined to be fulfilled 
after many disappointments. 

By the treaty of Vienna, in 1815, Italy was again 
carved into a number of principalities, most 
of them under the direct influence of Austria, teles the 
Most of them, but not all, for in the north- in^h? 
western corner of the peninsula, between the Italian inde- 

ii i t\« i it pendenee. 

mountains and the sea, lay Piedmont, ruled by 

a prince of the house of Savoy, with the title of King 

1 Genoa was torn with factions, and was at times, though not perma- 
nently, subject to Milan or to France. 



148 ITALY. 

of Sardinia. During the great popular upheaval of 

1848, Charles Albert, a king of this line, granted to 

his people a charter called the Statuto, and 

in that year and the following he waged war 

with Austria for the liberation of Italy. He was badly 

beaten, but succeeded in attracting the attention of all 

Italians, who now began to look on the King of 

Sardinia as the possible saviour of the country. After 

his second defeat, at Novara, on March 23, 1849, 

Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his son, 

Victor Victor Emmanuel, who refused to repeal the 

Emmanuel. _ „ 

►Statuto in spite ot the oners and the threats 
of Austria, — an act that won for him the confi- 
dence of Italy and the title " II Ee Galantuomo," the 
King Honest Man. The reliance, indeed, which Victor 
Emmanuel inspired was a great factor in the making of 
Italy; and to this is due in large part the readiness 
with which the Italian revolutionists accepted the mon- 
archy, although contrary to their republican sentiments. 

In fact, the chivalrous nature of the principal 
character of actors makes the struggle for Italian unity 

more dramatic than any other event in modern 
times. 1 The chief characters are heroic, and stand out 
with a vividness that impresses the imagination, and 
gives to the whole history the charm of a romance. 
Victor Emmanuel is the model constitutional king; 
Cavour, the ideal of a cool, far-sighted statesman ; 
Garibaldi, the perfect chieftain in irregular war, dash- 
ing, but rash and hot-headed; Mazzini, the typical 

1 Professor Dicey speaks of this, and draws a comparison between 
Italian and Swiss politics, in a letter to The Nation of Nov. 18, 1886. 



FORMATION OF THE KINGDOM. 149 

conspirator, ardent and fanatical ; — all of them full of 
generosity and devotion. The enthusiasm which their 
characters inspired went far to soften the difficulties in 
their path, and to help the people to bear the sacrifices 
entailed by the national regeneration. Over against 
these men stands Pius IX., who began his career as a 
reformer, but, terrified by the march of the revolution, 
became at last the bigoted champion of reaction. The 
purity of his character and the subtle charm of his 
manner fitted him to play the part of the innocent 
victim in the great drama. 

When Cavour first became prime minister of Victor 
Emmanuel in 1852, his plan was a confeder- Cavour's 
ation of the Italian States under the Pope ftaSan con- 
as nominal head, but practically under the e eratlon - 
lead of the King of Sardinia. Now, in order to make 
this plan a success, it was necessary to exclude the 
powerful and reactionary House of Habsburg from all 
influence in the peninsula, and with this object he 
induced Napoleon III. to declare war against Austria 
in 1859 ; but when the Emperor brought the war to a 
sudden end by a peace that required the cession of 
Lombardy alone, and left Venice still in the hands of 
the enemy, Cavour saw that so long as Austria retained 
a foothold in Italy, many of the principalities would 
remain subject to her control. He therefore changed 
his scheme, and aimed at a complete union changed to 
of Italy under the House of Savoy. 1 The ^ fora 
whole country was ready to follow the lead mg om * 

1 Jacini, I Conservators e V Evoluzione dei Partiti Politici in Italia, p, 
56 et seq. 



150 ITALY. 

of Victor Emmanuel, and, except for Venice and Rome, 
which were guarded by foreign troops, the march of 
events was rapid. The people of the northern States 
had already risen and expelled their rulers, and early 
in 1860 they declared for a union with Sardinia. 
Later in the same year Garibaldi landed at Marsala 
with a thousand men, roused the country, and quickly 
overran Sicily and Naples, which decided by popular 
vote to join the new kingdom, — a step that was soon 
followed by Umbria and the Marches. The rest of 
Italy was won more slowly. Venice was annexed in 
1866, as a result of the war fought against Austria 
by Prussia and Italy ; and Rome was not added until 
1870, after the withdrawal of the French garrison and 
the fall of Napoleon III., who had sent it there to 
protect the Pope. 

It is curious that Sardinia expanded into the King- 
Govemment dom of Italy without any alteration of its 
domofitafj. fundamental laws, for the Statuto, originally 
The statuto. granted by Charles Albert in 1848, remains 
the constitution of the nation to-day. It has never 
been formally amended, and contains, indeed, no pro- 
vision for amendment. At first it was thought that 
any changes ought to be made by a constituent 
assembly, and in 1848 a law was passed to call one, 
although, on account of the disastrous results of the 
war, it never met. By degrees, however, an opinion 
gained ground that the political institutions of Italy, 
like those of England, could be modified by the ordi- 
nary process of legislation. This has actually been 
done, to a greater or less extent, on several occasions \ 



THE STATUTO. 151 

and now both jurists and statesmen are agreed that 
unlimited sovereign power resides in the King and 
Parliament. 1 The Statuto contains a bill of rights; 
but, except for the provision forbidding censorship of 
the press, and perhaps that protecting the right of 
holding meetings, 2 it was not designed to guard against 
oppression by the legislature, but only by the executive. 
The Statuto is, in fact, mainly occupied with the 
organization of the powers of state, and has gradually 
become overlaid with customs, which are now so strong 
that many Italian jurists consider custom itself a source 
of public law. They claim, for example, that the habit 
of selecting ministers who can command a majority in 
Parliament has become binding as part of the law of 
the land. 3 

Let us consider the powers of state in turn, begin- 
ning with the King and his ministers, then passing 
to the Parliament, then to the local government and 
the judicial system, and finally to the position of the 
Catholic church. 

1 Brusa, Italien, in Marquardsen's Handbuch, pp. 12-16, 181-82 ; Ruiz, 
"The Amendments to the Italian Constitution," Ann. Amer. Acad, of Pol. 
Sci.y Sept., 1895. It may be noted that the various contributions to Mar- 
quardsen's work are of very different value, and that Brusa's is one of 
the best. He remarks (p. 15) that, before changing any constitutional 
provision, it has been customary to consult the people by means of a gen- 
eral election, and that it is the universal opinion that Parliament has not 
power to undo the work of the popular votes by which the various prov- 
inces were annexed ; in other words, that Parliament cannot break up 
the kingdom. It has been suggested that the courts can consider the 
constitutionality of a law which involves a forced construction of the 
Statuto, but this view has not prevailed. (Brusa, pp. 182, note 3, 229-30.) 

2 Arts. 28, 32. 

8 See Brusa, p. 19. 



152 ITALY. 

At the head of the nation is the King, whose crown 
is declared hereditary, according to the prin- 
ciples of the Salic law; that is, it can be 
inherited only by and through males. 1 It sounds like 
Power a paradox to say that the King is a constitu- 

exerSed tional sovereign, but that the constitution 
does not give a correct idea of his real func- 
tions, and yet this is true. By the Statuto, for example, 
his sanction is necessary to the validity of laws passed 
by the Parliament, 2 but in point of fact he never 
refuses it. 3 Again, the constitution provides that 
treaties which impose a burden on the finances or 
change the territory shall require the assent of the 
Chambers, 4 leaving the Crown free to conclude others 
as it thinks best ; but in practice all treaties, except 
military conventions and alliances, are submitted to 
Parliament for approval. 5 The King is further given 
power to declare war, to appoint all officers, to make 
decrees and ordinances, to create Senators, to dissolve 
the Chamber of Deputies, and so forth ; 6 but the 
Statuto also provides that no act of the government 
shall be valid unless countersigned by a minister ; and 
in fact all the powers of the King are exercised in his 
name by the ministers, who are responsible to the 
popular House. 7 He is, indeed, seldom present at 

1 Statuto, Art. 2. 

2 Statuto, Art. 7. 

3 Brusa, pp. 105, 153 ; cf. Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 281, 292-97. 

4 Statuto, Art. 5. 

5 Brusa, p. 106. 

6 Statuto, Arts. 5-9. 

7 Statuto, Art. 67 ; and see Brusa, p. 105. 



THE KING AND HIS MINISTERS. 153 

cabinet meetings, and has little or no direct influence 
over current domestic politics/ although it is said that 
his personal opinion has a good deal of weight on 
the relations with foreign states. 2 When, however, a 
cabinet crisis occurs and the ministry resigns, the King 
has a great deal of latitude in the appointment of its 
successor; for the Chamber is not divided into two 
parties, one of which naturally comes into power when 
the other goes out, but, as in France, it is split up into 
a number of small groups, so that every ministry is 
based upon a coalition. The King can, therefore, send 
for almost any one he pleases and allow him to attempt 
to form a cabinet. It often happens, moreover, that 
the man selected feels that he cannot get the support 
of a majority in the existing Chamber, but, hoping for 
a favorable result from a new election, is willing to 
undertake to form a cabinet if allowed to dissolve 
Parliament. In such cases the King exercises his own 
discretion, and grants permission or not as he thinks 
best ; for, contrary to the habit in France, dissolutions 
in Italy are by no means rare. Thus the Italian King, 
although strictly a constitutional monarch tied up in a 
parliamentary system, is not quite so powerless as the 
French President or the English Queen. 

In the selection of his ministers the King is not 
limited by law to members of Parliament, but, The minis _ 
if a man is appointed who is not a member of ters - 
either House, he is obliged by custom to become a can- 

1 Brusa, p. 108. Dupriez, vol. i. p. 289, says that he presides only when 
peculiarly important matters are under discussion. 

2 Dupriez, vol. i. p. 296. This is a common opinion. 



154 ITALY. 

didate for the next vacant seat in the Chamber of 
Deputies, unless he is created a Senator. 1 As in other 
parliamentary governments on the Continent, however, 
the ministers and their under-secretaries have a right to 
be present and speak in either Chamber, although they 
can vote only in the one of which they happen to be 
members. 2 The work of the Parliament is, indeed, 
chiefly directed by them \ for, while individual members 
have a right to introduce bills, the power is used only 
for matters of small importance. 3 As a rule, each 
minister has charge of a department of the administra- 
tion; but it is allowable, and was at one time not 
uncommon, to appoint additional ministers without port- 
folios, whose duties consisted solely in helping to shape 
the policy of the government, and defending it in the 
Chambers. 4 

The Italian Parliament has two branches, — the Senate 
and the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate is 
composed of the princes of the royal family, 5 

1 Brusa, p. 108; and the same thing is true of the parliamentary 
under-secretaries. Id., p. 196. 

2 Statuto, Art. 66 ; Law of Feb. 12, 1888, Art. 2. 

8 Brusa, p. 172. Dupriez (vol. i. p. 308) says that the ministers in 
Italy have not so complete a monopoly of initiative as in other countries, 
and that private members often propose measures with success. But in 
saying this he must not be understood to deny that the laws enacted as 
a result of private initiative are unimportant compared with the govern- 
ment measures, both as regards number and character. 

4 Brusa, p. 197. See, also, the lists of the different ministries published 
in the Manual of the Deputies. This manual, by the way, is a most valua- 
ble production, for it contains the text of many important laws and a large 
amount of interesting information. For the organization and functions of 
the various departments, see Brusa, p. 200 et seq. 

6 Statuto, Art. 34. 



THE SENATE. 155 

and of members appointed by the King for life from 
certain categories of persons defined by the i tscompo _ 
Statuto. 1 These are : bishops ; 2 sundry high Sltl0n 
officials, civil, military, and judicial; 3 deputies who 
have served three terms, or six years ; 4 men who have 
been for seven years members of the Royal Academy of 
Science ; men who pay over three thousand lire (about 
six hundred dollars) in taxes ; 5 and men deserving ex- 
ceptional honor for service to the state. Owing to 
the extreme severity of the Senate in recognizing such 
desert, no appointment from the last class has been 
made since 1879 ; for the Senate itself has the strange 
privilege of deciding whether a person selected by the 
King belongs properly to one of these classes, and is 
qualified to be a Senator. 6 Except for money 

. *■ and powers. 

bills, which must be presented first to the 
Chamber of Deputies, the legislative powers of the two 
Houses are the same, but the Senate has also judicial 
functions. It can sit as a court to try ministers im- 
peached by the Chamber of Deputies; to try cases of 
high treason and attempts on the safety of the state ; 7 

1 Statuto, Art. 33. All the appointed members must be forty years old. 

2 Since the quarrel with the Pope in 1870 this class has not been avail- 
able. Brusa, p. 119. 

3 Except in the case of the highest officials, persons of this class can be 
appointed only after a period of service which varies from three to seven 
years, according to the office they hold. In 1890 there were over one 
hundred Senators from this class. Id., p. 119. 

4 Out of a total of about three hundred and sixty, there were about one 
hundred Senators from this class. Id., p. 119. 

5 There were about one hundred Senators from this class also. Id., 
p. 119, note 3. 

6 Brusa, p. 119 ; and see the Statuto, Art. 60. 

7 Statuto, Art. 36. 



156 ITALY. 

and to try its own members, — the Italians, curiously 
enough, having copied in their Senate the antiquated 
privilege which entitles the English Peers to be tried 
for crime only by members of their own body. 1 As a 
matter of fact, the Senate has very little real power, and 
is obliged to yield to the will of the Lower House. 2 In 
1878-80 it did, indeed, refuse to abolish the unpopular 
grist-tax for more than a year, but gave way before a 
newly elected Chamber of Deputies. 3 It would proba- 
bly not venture even so far to-day, for the number of 
Senators is unlimited, and on several occasions a large 
batch of members has been created in order to change 
the party coloring of the body, — in 1890 as many as 
seventy-five having been appointed for this purpose at 
one time. 4 As in other countries where the parlia- 
mentary system exists, the cabinet is not responsible to 
1 the Upper House ; and it is only occasionally, and as 
it were by accident, that a minister has resigned on 
account of an adverse vote in the Senate. 5 

The Chamber of Deputies consists of five hundred 

and eight members, elected on a limited fran- 
berof Depu- chise. By the earlier law, the suffrage was so 

restricted that less than two and a half per 
cent, of the population were entitled to vote ; but this 

1 Statuto, Art. 37. 

2 The changes made by the Senate in bills have usually a legal rather 
than a political importance. Dupriez, p. 313. 

8 Brusa, pp. 155-56. See Petruccelli della Gattina, Storia d' Italia, 
1860-1880, pp. 420-21, 558-59. 

4 In 1886 forty-one were appointed together, and in 1892 forty-two. 
See the list of Senators with their dates, in the Manual of the Deputies 
for 1892, p. 806 et seq., and p. 876. 

6 Brusa, p. 158, note 3. 



THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. 157 

was felt to be too small a proportion, and in 1882 it was 
increased by an act whose provisions are still The fran _ 
in force. 1 By this statute a voter must be able chlse * 
to read and write, and must have passed an examination 
on the subjects comprised in the course of compulsory 
education, 2 except that the examination is not required 
in the case of officials, professional men, graduates of 
colleges, and others who could, of course, pass it ; nor in 
the case of men who have received a medal for military 
or civil service, or who pay a direct tax of nineteen lire 
and four fifths (about four dollars), or who pay rents of 
certain amounts. The change more than tripled the 
quantity of voters at once; 3 and, although these still 
include only a small part of the citizens, it is to be 
observed that with the spread of elementary education 
their number will gradually increase until the suffrage 
becomes substantially universal. 4 

At first the members were chosen each in a separate 
district, but after the times of enthusiasm for Italian 
unity were over, and the generous impulse that had 

1 Brusa, pp. 122-27. This law, with its amendments, recodified in 
1895, may be found in full in the Manual of the Deputies for that year. 

2 Education is compulsory in Italy only between the ages of six and 
nine. Act of July 15, 1877, Art. 2. 

3 It raised the number from 627,838 to 2,049,461. Brusa, p. 127. When 
the law went into effect, the voters were not very unequally divided into 
those who passed the examination, those who paid the taxes, and the other 
excepted classes. Id., p. 126, notes 1-2. 

4 In order to restrict the arbitrary influence of the government over 
elections, and to prevent the abuses which had been common before, a 
procedure for preparing the lists of voters and insuring the secrecy of the 
ballot was established by the same law (see Brusa, pp. 127-28, 130-32) ; 
and in this connection it is to be noticed that soldiers and sailors in active 
service (including subalterns and police officials) are not allowed to vote. 
Law of March 28, 1895, Art. 14. 



158 . ITALY. 

stirred the country began to give way before the selfish 
motives of e very-day life, it was found that the deputies 
failed to take broad views of national questions, and 
were largely absorbed by personal and local interests. 
It was found, in short, that they represented the nation 
too little and their particular districts too much ; 1 and it 
was hoped that by increasing the size of the districts 
they would be freed from the tyranny of local influence, 
and enabled to form compact parties on national issues. 2 
With this object the Act of 1882 distributed the five 
hundred and eight seats among one hundred and thirty- 
five districts, which elected from two to five deputies 
apiece; 3 and, in order to give some representation to 
minorities, it was provided that in those districts which 
elected five deputies no one should vote for more than 
four candidates. 4 The new system, called the scrutinio 
di lista, did not produce the results that were expected 
from it. On the contrary, in Italy as in France, where 
the same remedy was applied to the same evil, the 
organization and power of the local wire-pullers grew 
with the increase in the number of deputies elected in 
a district, while the influence of the latter over the 
ministers and the provincial officers was greater than 
ever before. 5 An Act of May 5, 1891, has therefore 

1 Brusa, p. 16. 

2 Minghetti, / Partiti Politici, p. 18 ; Petruccelli della Gattina, p. 504. 

3 Three districts elected two deputies, sixty-one elected three, thirty- 
six elected four, and thirty-five elected five. Brusa, p. 129. See Arts. 
44 and 45 of the Act of 1882, and the table of districts annexed thereto. 

4 Act of 1882, Art. 65. 

5 Brusa, lb. ; and see Turiello, Governo e Governati in Italia, 2d ed. ; 
Fatti, p. 326 ; Proposte, p. 171. 



THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. 159 

abolished the scrutinio di lista and reestablished single 
electoral districts. 1 

In accordance with the general practice in Europe, 
the deputies are not required to be residents 
of their districts, the only important limita- tionofthe 
tions on the choice of candidates being the 
requirement of the age of thirty years, and the pro- 
vision excluding priests who have active duties, mayors 
and provincial counselors in their own districts, and all 
officials paid from the treasury of the state with the ex- 
ception of ministers, under-secretaries, and a few others. 2 
The deputies receive no pay for attendance, but are 
given free passes over the railroads, 3 and it is no doubt 
partly for this reason that the small attendance in the 
Chamber has long been a crying evil. 

The Chamber is elected for five years, but so far 
its life has always been cut short by a dis- 
solution, and in fact the average length of of the 
term has been less than three years. 4 The 
budget and the contingent of recruits are adjusted by 

1 This law is printed in the Manual of the Deputies for 1892, in place 
of Arts. 44, 45, of the Act of 1882. 

2 Brusa, pp. 132-34 ; and see Acts of Dec, 1860 (Arts. 97, 98), July 3, 
1875, May 13, 1877, July 5, 1882, March 28, 1895 (Arts. 81-89). There 
is a curious provision that only forty officials of all kinds (except minis- 
ters and under-secretaries), and among them not more than ten judges 
and ten professors, can be deputies at the same time, and if more are 
elected they are reduced to that number by lot. Law of March 28, 1895, 
Art. 88. On account of some scandals that occurred at one time it is 
further provided that no officers of companies subventioned by the state, 
and no government contractors, can sit in the Chamber. Brusa, p. 134 ; 
law of March 28, 1895, Arts. 84-85. 

3 Brusa, pp. 159-60. 

4 Id., p. 139. 



160 ITALY. 

annual laws, and there would naturally be a new session 
every year; but in order not to interrupt the work of 
Parliament, and especially the consideration of the 
budget, which is apt to be behindhand, a curious habit 
has grown up of prolonging the sessions, so that three 
recent Parliaments have had only a single session apiece, 
one lasting two and a half and another three and a half 
years, all of them unbroken save by occasional recesses. 1 
The Chamber of Deputies elects its own President 
The Presi- an( ^ °ther officers, and the vote for President 
dent. use( j j. Q kg an occasion for a trial of party 

strength, as in most other legislative bodies. Of late 
years, however, the English habit has prevailed of re- 
electing the same man without regard to party affilia- 
tions ; 2 and this is the more striking because the President 
appoints the committees on rules and contested elections, 3 
which have, of course, no little importance. The idea 
that the presiding officer ought to be strictly impartial 
is not the only valuable suggestion the Italians have 
derived from England, for they have inherited Cavour's 
admiration for British parliamentary procedure, and in 
general they attempt to follow it. Unfortunately they 
have not done so in all cases, for, as we shall see when 
we come to consider the actual working of the govern- 

1 Brusa, p. 139; and see the list of the sessions of the various Parlia- 
ments in the Manual of the Deputies. 

2 Brusa, pp. 140 and 156, note 2. Biancheri was President of the 
Chamber continuously from 1884 to 1892. Manual of the Deputies for 
1892 (pp. 800-802). In that year he was dropped for party reasons, 
and in fact the practice of looking on the President as the representative 
of a party has unfortunately revived. 

8 Rules of the Chamber of Deputies, Art. 12. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. 161 

ment, the system of committees and of interpellations or 
questions has been copied mainly from the French and 
not the English practice. 

Such, briefly stated, are the position of the King and 
the composition of the Parliament ; but although the 
King and his ministers on the one hand, and the Par- 
liament on the other, are the great political forces 
whose interaction determines the character of the 
government, still it is impossible to appreciate the re- 
lations between the two, without some knowledge of 
the method of administration, the principles of local 
government, and the control exercised by the courts of 
law, because these matters have a direct bearing on the 
functions of the cabinet, and hence on the nature of 
the influence exerted upon it by the Parliament. 

The administration both of national and local affairs, 
and to some extent the judicial system of The admin- 
Italy, are modeled on those of France, and f^iiSij 
they present the defects without all the ad- t c ffof from 
vantages of the original. This is particularly Franee - 
true of the administrative system, where Italy has 
copied the centralization, but has been unable to ac- 
quire the traditions which give real solidity to the 
body of officials. At first sight it seems strange that 
Cavour and his successors, with their admiration for 
English institutions, should have turned to the French 
bureaucracy as a pattern ; but there were Reasons for 
several reasons for their course. In the first this ' 
place the Napoleonic rule had already made the Italians 
familiar with the French form of administration. A 
far stronger motive came from the fact that after Cavour 

VOL. I. 



162 ITALY. 

gave up the idea of a confederation, and strove to 
create a united kingdom of Italy, it became important, 
in view of the possible interference of foreign powers, 
to consolidate the different provinces as completely and 
rapidly as possible. The Italian statesmen tried, there- 
fore, to make the people homogeneous ; to remove as 
far as possible all local differences ; and to destroy all 
possibility of local opposition. 1 The country, more- 
over, was very backward, and a great work of regen- 
eration had to be undertaken, especially in the south, 
where society was badly disintegrated and brigandage 
was rife. To accomplish this a highly centralized and 
autocratic system, in which the government could make 
itself quickly and decisively felt, was thought essen- 
tial ; 2 and it was believed, not without reason, that 
until the union was accomplished, and order had been 
established in Naples and Sicily, it was impossible to 
introduce general local self-government or universal 
liberty. The old territorial divisions were therefore 
swept away, and replaced by artificial districts devoid, 
of course, of real local life. A centralized form of 
administration was set up, and the government was 
given a highly arbitrary power to interfere with the 
freedom of the individual. Such a system might have 
worked very well in the hands of a wise dictator, but, 
as some of the Italian writers have themselves remarked, 
it was so entirely inconsistent with the parliamentary 
form of government that one of them was sure to spoil 

1 See Brusa, pp. 23, 337 ; Jacini, / Conservator!, p. 55 et seq., Due 
Anni di Politica Italiana, pp. 93-94. 

2 See Brusa, pp. 253-54. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. 163 

the other, and experience has shown that both of them 
have suffered grievously from the combination. 1 

There is a marked contradiction in Italy between 
the theory and practice of government ; for Contrast in 
there is a strong ambition to be abreast of J^en^ 
the times and a general belief in the prin- practiced 
ciple of personal liberty ; but the actual con- govermnent * 
dition of the nation has made it impossible to live up 
to these standards. A striking example of the con- 
trast between aspirations and results is furnished by 
the state of the criminal law, for capital punishment 
has been abolished, in spite of the fact that homicide 
is more common than in any other civilized country in 
Europe, 2 and yet criminal procedure is in such a condi- 
tion that thousands of people have been arrested on sus- 
picion, kept in prison sometimes for years, and finally 
released because there was not sufficient ground for 
trial. 3 Thus by her code Italy appears to be in ad- 
vance of most other nations, but in her criminal prac- 
tice she is really far behind them. The truth is that 



1 Cf. Jacini, i" Conservatori, pp. 67-68 ; Minghetti, / Partiti Politici, 
p. 100 ; Pareto, " L'ltalie Economique," Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 
15, 1891 ; and see Bertolini, "I Pieni Poteri per le Riforme Orga- 
niche," Nuova Antologia, June 1, 1894. 

2 Turiello, Fatti, pp. 330-32. 

3 See Speyer, in Unsere Zeit y 1879, vol. i. p. 576. Petruccelli della 
Gattina says (Storia d' Italia, p. 258) that in 1876, 93,444 persons were 
arrested on suspicion and let off because there was no ground for trial. 
This, it is true, was eleven years before the code was finally enacted ; 
nevertheless it illustrates the contrast between ideals and practice in 
criminal matters, and in fact in that very year the abolition of the death 
penalty was voted by the Chamber of Deputies, but rejected by the 
Senate. 



164 ITALY. 

the successive governments, in view of the unsettled 
state of the country, have been afraid to place re- 
straints on their own power, and weaken an authority 
thought necessary for the preservation of order. Of 
course the result has been a good deal of arbitrary offi- 
cialism and disregard of the rights of the citizen, 1 but 
while this is a misfortune for the north of Italy, ex- 
traordinary and autocratic power has at times been in- 
dispensable in Sicily and the south. 2 The impossi- 
bility, indeed, of giving effect to the theories of liberty 
that are constantly proclaimed from every quarter was 
forcibly illustrated by the only serious attempt that 
has been made to do so. When Cairoli and Zanardelli 
became ministers in 1878 they tried to carry out their 
principles thoroughly. They permitted the constitu- 
tional right of public meeting to be freely exercised, 
and gave up the despotic practice of preventive arrest, 
trusting to the courts to punish offenders against the 
law ; but brigandage increased so fast, and other dis- 
turbances became so alarming, that the cabinet was 
driven from office, and its policy was abandoned. Of 
late years Zanardelli has again held office, and has 
succeeded in improving the administrative and judicial 
system to some extent, but the progress of the reform 
has been extremely slow, and the arbitrary power of 
the government, although reduced, still conforms even 
in quiet times far more nearly to French than to 
Anglo-Saxon notions. 

There are two matters in connection with the admin- 

i Cf. Brusa, p. 183. 

2 Cf. Speyer, in Unsere Zeit, 1879, vol. i. p. 581. 



LEGISLATION BY ORDINANCE. 165 

istration that require special notice. One of them is 
the power of the executive officials to make 

rrn • l e or( ^~ 

ordinances. This is even more extensively nance 

. power. 

used than in France, and there are complaints 
that it is sometimes carried so far as to render the provi- 
sions of a statute nugatory, 1 although the constitution 
expressly declares that "the King makes the decrees 
and regulations necessary for the execution of the 
laws, without suspending their observance or dispensing 
with them." 2 The interpretation put upon this provi- 
sion is in fact so broad that the government is practically 
allowed to suspend the law subject to responsibility to 
Parliament, and even to make temporary laws which 
are to be submitted to Parliament later, — a power that 
is used when a tariff bill is introduced, to prevent large 
importations before the tariff goes into effect. 3 The 
Parliament has, moreover, a habit of delegating legis- 
lative power to the ministers in the most astonishing 
way. In the case of the recent criminal code, for 
example, the final text was never submitted to the 
Chambers at all, but after the subject had been suffi- 
ciently debated, the government was authorized to 
make a complete draft of the code, and then to enact 
it by royal decree, harmonizing it with itself and with 
other statutes, and taking into account the views ex- 

1 Brusa, pp. 170-72. 

2 Statuto, Art. 6. The courts have power to refuse to apply an ordi- 
nance which exceeds the authority of the government, but, in practice, 
this is not an effective restraint. Brusa, pp. 171-72, 175, 187. 

3 Brusa, pp. 186-87. In 1891 the customs duties on several articles 
were increased by royal decree, which was subsequently ratified by Par- 
liament. 



166 ITALY. 

pressed by the Chambers. The same was true of the 
electoral law of 1882, of the recent laws on local gov- 
ernment and on the Council of State, and of many 
other enactments. 1 It may be added that although the 
Statuto does not expressly provide for it, the ministers, 
prefects, syndics, and other officials are in the habit of 
making decrees on subjects of minor importance. 2 The 
preference indeed for administrative regulations, which 
the government can change at any time, over rigid 
statutes is deeply implanted in the Latin races, and 
seems to be especially marked in Italy. 3 

The other matter referred to as requiring special 
notice is the civil service. The host of offi- 
serviceand cials, who are, unfortunately, too numerous 
political and too poorly paid, 4 can be appointed or dis- 
missed very much at the pleasure of the 
government, for although there are royal decrees regu- 
lating appointments and removals in many cases, they 

1 Brusa, pp. 175-76; Bertolini, "I Pieni Poteri," Nuova Antologia, 
June 1, 1894. Several laws of this kind may be found in the Manuals of 
the Deputies. They are issued in the form not of statutes, but of ordi- 
nances, and begin by reciting the legislative authority under which they 
are made. It is a curious fact that Italian statutes vary a great deal, 
sometimes containing only general principles, and leaving to the govern- 
ment the task of completing them by supplementary regulations, and 
sometimes going into minute details (Brusa, p. 171). Dupriez, who looks 
at the matter from a French standpoint, says (vol. i. p. 336) that in the 
struggle between the government and the Parliament over the limits 
of the ordinance power, the government has tried to extend its authority 
beyond measure, and the Parliament to dispute it even in the matter of 
organizing the administrative service. 

2 Brusa, pp. 188-90. 

3 Minghetti, pp. 293-94. 

4 Brusa, p. 260. 



THE ABUSE OF PATRONAGE. 167 

do not appear to furnish a satisfactory guarantee. 1 
Here, then, is a great mass of spoils, in the distribution 
of which the politicians take an active part. 2 In 1889 a 
bill on the tenure of office, fixing rules for the appoint- 
ment of officials, and preventing their removal except 
with the approval of a permanent commission, passed 
the Senate, and was favorably reported in the Cham- 
ber of Deputies, but failed to become law owing to 
the dissolution of Parliament. 3 It will, no doubt, be 
enacted before long, and then one of the great evils of 
Italian politics will be removed. 4 

Let us look for a moment at the local government. 

1 Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 337-40 ; Brusa, pp. 252-55. For the scope of 
these decrees, see p. 261 et seq. 

2 Brusa, pp. 152-53 ; and see Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 340-42. 
8 Brusa, pp. 251. 

4 There are two bodies that exercise a considerable control over the 
government. One of these is the Council of State, which has, however, 
only an advisory power, except in matters of administrative justice, and 
in the case of provincial and communal officials whom it protects from, 
arbitrary removal. On this subject see Brusa, p. 212 et seq. The laws 
of June 2, 1889, which regulate this body, may be found in the Manual 
of the Deputies for 1892, p. 357. The other is the Courts of Accounts 
(Corte del Conti), whose members can be removed only with the consent? 
of a commission composed of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of both 
Chambers. It has a limited supervision over the collection of the revenue, 
and passes finally on pensions and on the accounts of officials, provinces, 
and communes. It also makes a yearly report to Parliament on the 
accounts of each ministry ; but its most extraordinary function consists in 
the fact that all decrees and orders which involve the payment of more 
than 2,000 lire must be submitted to it for registration, and if it thinks 
them contrary to the laws or regulations it can refuse to register them. 
It is, indeed, obliged to register them if the Council of Ministers insists 
upon it, but in that case they must be transmitted to the Presidents of 
the Chambers together with the opinion of the Corte del ContL Law 
of Aug. 14, 1862, Arts. 14, 18, 19 ; and see Brusa, pp. 219-24. 



168 ITALY. 

The Italian statesmen had at first a general belief in 
Local gov- decentralization/ but the force of eircum- 
emment. stances and a repugnance to the idea of fed- 
eration were so strong that the old territorial divi- 
sions, which could alone have furnished a solid basis 
for a decentralized system, were abandoned, and the 
whole country was cut up into a series of brand-new 
districts. These are the provinces, the circondari, the 
mandamenti, and the communes, 2 of which the first 
and the last are the only ones of great importance. 
Until the Act of 1888, the powers conferred on the 
local bodies were extremely small, and even now they 
are far from extensive, for the whole system is copied 
from that of France, and, with some variations in de- 
tail, the organization and powers of the French local 
officers and councils have been followed very closely. 3 
A general description of the local government would 
therefore consist very largely in a repetition of what 
has been already said in the first chapter on France ; 
and hence it is only necessary to touch on a few salient 
points, hogging the reader to remember how great a 
power and how large a share of political patronage this 

1 In 1868 the Chamber actually voted an order of the day in favor of 
decentralization. Petruccelli della Gattina, pp. 192-95. 

2 In the provinces of Mantua and Venice the division is somewhat 
different, but is being brought into accord with the general plan. Brusa, 
p. 339. 

3 For a description of the local government see Brusa, p. 337 et seq. 
The full text of the law on the subject was fixed by royal ordinance 
on Feb. 10, 1889, in accordance with the Act of Dec. 30, 1888. It was 
followed by an elaborate ordinance regulating its execution, and on July 
7, 1889, and July 11, 1894, by acts amending the law. Manual of 
Deps., 1895, pp. 301-94. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 169 

system places in the hands of the central authorities. 1 
At the head of each province, which corresponds to 
the French department, is a prefect appointed by the 
King, and directly subject to the Minister of the In- 
terior. Like his French prototype, he is regarded as 
a political officer, and uses his influence more or less 
openly at elections. 2 The chief executive magistrate 
of the commune is the syndic ; who is chosen, like the 
mayor in France, by the communal council from its own 
members, if the commune has more than ten thousand 
inhabitants or is the capital of a province or circondaro ; 
and in other cases is selected by the King from among 
the members of the council.* As in France, both the 
provinces and the communes possess elected councils. In 
Italy they are chosen for six years, one half being renewed 
every three years ; but the suffrage for these bodies 
was exceedingly restricted, until by the Act of 188& it 
was extended so as to be somewhat wider, especially as 
applied to the peasants, than the suffrage for the elec- 
tion of deputies. 3 The abuse of local machinery for 

1 In practice the administration appears to be, if anything, even more 
centralized than in France, owing to the habit on the part of the officials 
of referring everything to the central government. Jacini, i" Conser- 
vatory p. 130 ; Minghetti, I Partiti Politici, pp. 240-41. 

2 Brusa, pp. 225, 277. On the eve of the elections in 1892, forty-six 
out of the sixty-nine prefects were dismissed or transferred to other 
provinces, in order to help the government to carry the country. 

* By a law of July 7, 1896, all the syndics are now elected. 

8 The other communal and provincial bodies are the municipal giunta, 
which is elected by the communal council, and has executive powers ; 
the provincial deputation, which occupies a similar position in the prov- 
ince, and is elected by the provincial council ; the prefectoral council, 
appointed by the central government to assist the prefect ; and the pro- 
vincial administrative giunta, partly appointed and partly elected, which 



170 ITALY. 

political purposes, and the results on the public life of 
the nation, will be discussed later ; but it is proper to 
remark here that the resources of the local bodies are 
not adequate for the fulfillment of their duties, and 
this, combined with a love of municipal display, has 
been the cause of heavy debts, especially in the case 
of the larger cities, many of which have long been on 
the verge of bankruptcy. 1 

There is one branch of the Italian government which 
The judicial nas no ^ been centralized, and that is the ju- 
system. dicial system. The lower courts are, indeed, 
new creations, organized on a symmetrical plan very 
much resembling the French ; but, in order apparently 
its deeen- no ^ to offend the bench and bar of the old 
traiizatkm. principalities, the highest courts have been 
suffered to remain in the more important capitals, so 
that there are now five independent Courts of Cassa- 
tion, those of Turin, Florence, Naples, Palermo, and 
Eome, each of which has final and supreme authority, 
within its own district, on all questions of ordinary 
civil law. 2 The Court of Cassation at Rome has, it is 
true, been given little by little exclusive jurisdiction 
over certain special matters ; 3 but the ordinary civil 

has a certain share in administrative justice, and whose approval is neces- 
sary for the validity of some of the most important acts of the local 
councils. For a list of these acts see the Local Government Law of 
Feb. 10, 1889, Arts. 142, 166-71, 173, and 223. 

1 See Brusa, pp. 365-67 ; Turiello, Proposte, pp. 56, 63-65. 

2 A Court of Cassation is a court of last resort, which considers only 
errors in law in the decisions of inferior tribunals. 

3 These are, conflicts of competence between different courts, or be- 
tween the courts and the administration ; the transfer of suits from one 
court to another ; disciplinary matters ; and writs of error in criminal 



THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. 171 

jurisdiction is still divided among the five Courts of 
Cassation, which bear the same relation to each other 
as the highest state courts in America. 1 There is no 
appeal from one to another, and no one of them feels 
bound to accept the decisions of the others, or to follow 
them as precedents. One cannot help thinking that this 
is an unfortunate condition, because there is nothing 
that tends more completely to consolidate a people, 
without crushing out local life, than a uniform admin- 
istration of justice. Italy has, indeed, a series of codes 
enacted at various times from 1865 to 1889, and cover- 
ing civil law, civil procedure, commercial law, criminal 
law, and criminal procedure ; but a code alone will not 
produce uniformity, because there is still room for 
differences of interpretation, and in fact the Italian 
Courts of Cassation often disagree, and there is no tri- 
bunal empowered to harmonize their decisions. 2 

As we have already seen in the case of France, the 
decision of civil and criminal questions forms 
only a part of the administration of justice in and the 
continental Europe, on account of the distinc- 
tion drawn between public and private law. 3 In order, 
therefore, to form a correct estimate of the position of 

cases, in complaints for violation of election laws, in civil suits against 
judges, and in questions of taxes and of church property. 

1 For the organization and jurisdiction of the courts, see Brusa, pp. 
231-38. 

2 Cf. Speyer, in Unsere Zeit, 1879, vol. i. p. 576. 

3 Belgium presents an exception, for there the officials can be sued, 
and the acts of the government can be reviewed by the courts, as in an 
Anglo-Saxon country. Cf. Kerchove de Denterghem, De la Responsabilite 
des Ministres dans le Droit Public Beige. For Switzerland, see chap. xi. 
infra. 



172 ITALY. 

the courts, we must consider their relation to the gov- 
ernment, and their power to determine the legality of 
the acts of public officers. In Italy the prefects, sub- 
prefects, syndics, and their subordinates still enjoy the 
so-called administrative protection, that is, they cannot 
be sued or prosecuted for their official conduct with- 
out the royal consent. 1 This privilege is generally un- 
popular, and will no doubt be abolished when the pro- 
posed bill on the tenure of office is passed. Meanwhile 
the benefit of it is claimed more and more frequently, 
although the permission to proceed appears to be usually 
granted. 2 But even when this protection has been 
taken away, the courts will not have as much authority 
as in England or America. The reader will remember 
that the officers of the French government formerly 
possessed a similar privilege, and were deprived of it 
after the fall of the Second Empire. He will remember 
also that the change made very little practical difference, 
because it was held that the ordinary courts had no 
power to pass on the legality of official acts, such ques- 
tions being reserved exclusively for the administrative 
courts. The result of abolishing the privilege will not 
be precisely the same on the other side of the Alps, 
because the problem has been worked out on somewhat 
different lines, a curious attempt having been made to 
establish a compromise between the English and the 
French systems. 

1 Law of Feb. 10, 1889, Arts. 8, 139. 

2 Brusa, p. 282 ; Turiello, Fatti, pp. 210-11. The permission to prose- 
cute is not necessary in the case of offenses against the election laws. 
Law of Feb. 10, 1889, Art. 100 et seq. ; Brusa, pp. 73, 130, note 1. 



ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. 173 

The subject of administrative law is, indeed, very 
confused in Italy, and a few years ago it was Adminis . 
in a thoroughly unsatisfactory condition. trativela ^- 
When the union was formed, several of the component 
states possessed administrative courts of their own ; but 
in order to produce uniformity, and also with 
a view of furnishing the rights of the citizen the ordinary 
with a better guarantee, an act of March 20, 
1865, abolished all these tribunals, and provided that 
the ordinary courts should have exclusive jurisdiction of 
all criminal prosecutions, and of all civil cases in which 
a civil or political right was involved, the Council of 
State being empowered to decide whether such a right 
was involved or not. 1 It was not clearly foreseen that 
this last provision would place in the hands of the 
government an effective means of tyranny ; 2 but such 
proved to be the case, for the Council of State, com- 
posed, as it was at that time, of members who could be 
removed at pleasure, 3 showed little inclination in dis- 
puted cases to recognize that any private rights were 
involved, and, there being no administrative courts at 
all, the government had an absolutely free hand as 
soon as the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts was 
ousted. 4 The attempt to place the rights of the citizen 

1 Legge sul Contenzioso Administrativo (March 20, 1865). See, espe- 
cially, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 13. 

2 Perhaps it would he more correct to say that it was not foreseen 
how this power would be used for party purposes. Minghetti, / Partiti 
Politici, p. 270 et seq. 

3 See Legge sul Consiglio di Stato of March 20, 1865, Art. 4. 

4 See Brusa, pp. 212-13, 247 ; Minghetti, i" Partiti Politici, p. 147 et 
seq. 



174 ITALY. * 

more fully under the protection of the ordinary courts 
than in France had resulted in freeing the officials more 
completely from all control ; for, except when strong 
political motives come into play, arbitrary conduct on 
tHe part of the French officials is restrained by the 
administrative courts. This state of the law in Italy 
gave rise to bitter complaints, but it lasted until 1877, 
when the decision of conflicts, as they are called, or 
Administra- disputes about jurisdiction between the ad- 
tive courts. mm i s tration and the courts, was transferred 
to the Court of Cassation at Rome. 1 Still there was 
no system of administrative justice, and hence, however 
illegal, and however much in excess of the authority of 
the official who made it, a decree, ordinance, or other 
act might be, no redress could be obtained from any tri- 
bunal unless it could be shown that an actual legal right 
was violated. 2 This omission in the judicial system was 
finally supplied by the statutes of 1889 and 1890, 
which reorganized the Council of State, created a spe- 
cial section of it to act as an administrative court, and 
conferred an inferior administrative jurisdiction on the 
provincial giunta. 3 In order to give the council a con- 
siderable degree of independence, it was provided at 
the same time that the members, whose number is lim- 
ited, should be retired only on account of sickness and 
removed only for breach of duty, and in each case only 
after hearing the opinion of the Council of State itself. 4 

1 Law of March 31, 1877 (Manual of Deps. 1892, p. 374). 

2 Cf. Brusa, pp. 247-50. 

3 These acts, June 2, 1889, and May 1, 1890, are printed in the Manual 
for 1892, at pp. 357 and 377. 

4 Act of June 2, 1889, Art. 4. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS. 175 

The section which acts as an administrative court 
enjoys a still greater degree of protection; for it is 
composed of a president and eight other members 
selected from among the Councillors of State by the 
King, and of these eight not less than two nor more 
than four can be changed in any one year/ so that, 
although the body has not the permanence of a court 
of law, it is by no means a mere tool of the govern- 
ment. Except in purely political matters, and in certain 
questions relating to customs duties and conscription, 
it has power to decide whether the acts of the cen- 
tral or local officers are authorized by law, unless some 
special tribunal or the ordinary courts have jurisdic- 
tion. 2 In brief, therefore, the legality of official acts 
is determined in civil cases by the ordinary courts 
when a question of private right, and by the adminis- 
trative courts when a question only of interest, is in- 
volved. The function of the ordinary courts in these 
cases is, however, strictly limited to the protection of 
the individual, and does not involve an authoritative 
declaration of the law, for it is expressly provided that 
the judgment must be confined to the case at bar, and 
in that alone is the administration bound by the deci- 
sion. 3 This principle is deeply rooted in the jurispru- 
dence of the nation, for the Statuto itself declares that 
the interpretation of the law in such a way as to be 
universally binding belongs exclusively to the legisla- 
tive power. 4 The Italian, indeed, has a dread of judge- 
made law, which is really the most wholesome form of 

1 Act of June 2, 1889, Art. 8. 2 Id., Art. 24. 

8 Act of March 20, 1865, Art. 4. 4 Statuto, Art. 73. 



176 ITALY. 

legislation, — a prejudice that certainly seems very 
strange when we consider what a large part of the law 
of the civilized world, and especially of the law of the 
Latin races, was developed by means of the edicts of 
the Koman praetors. 

It will be observed that the Italian system of admin- 
The Italian istrative law differs from that of every other 
admlnistea- nation. According to the English principle, 
differafrom the ordinary courts have jurisdiction in all 

cases, and the very idea of administrative law 
as a distinct branch of jurisprudence is unknown. In 
most of the continental countries, on the other hand, 
all matters involving the legality of official acts are 
reserved for a special class of courts, which have exclu- 
sive cognizance of those questions which constitute the 
domain of administrative law ; but in Italy both classes 
of tribunals are called upon to decide the same ques- 
tions, the ordinary courts being specially empowered to 
protect legal rights. 

As seen on the statute-book, the Italian judicial 

system appears to be very good. It seems 
system a P - to provide the individual with more ample 
strong, but remedies, and a better guarantee against arbi- 

trary conduct on the part of the officials, 
than can be found in most of the countries of conti- 
nental Europe. But in fact the judiciary is not strong 
enough to protect the citizen effectually. This is 
chiefly due, no doubt, to the absence of those deep- 
seated traditions that are necessary to give the magis- 
trates a controlling authority over public opinion. It 
is due also to the existence of the five independent 



WEAKNESS OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. 177 

Courts of Cassation, which prevents any one court from 
having the power that might be acquired by a supreme 
national tribunal; and indeed it is self-evident that 
a decentralized judiciary can hardly be expected to 
restrain a centralized administration. Nor i nsufficient 
is the protection afforded to the bench sat- £| °^ tion 
isfactory. The constitution provides that * udges * 
judges, except in the lowest courts, shall be irremovable 
after three years of service, 1 and by statute they can be 
retired only on account of illness, and removed only 
for crime or neglect of duty, and in these cases only 
with the approval of the Court of Cassation at Home. 
But a judge is not protected against a transfer from 
one judicial post to another of the same rank, and 
although by royal decree a commission annually ap- 
pointed by the court at Rome must be consulted before 
such a transfer can be made, its advice is not binding 
on the government. 2 The judges are, therefore, by 
no means entirely independent of the executive, and 
complaints are often made that they are altogether too 
much under its control. It is impossible to say how 
far these complaints are justified, 3 but it is certain that 

1 Statuto, Art. 69. 

2 Brusa, pp. 277-78. In 1878 this decree was repealed for a time, and 
one hundred and twenty-two transfers were made in six months. Min- 
ghetti, pp. 134-35. 

3 Writing in 1878, Jacini (7 Conservatory p. 29) said that, so far, the 
judiciary had resisted all party pressure, but since that time this does 
not seem to have been true. See Minghetti, ubi supra ; Turiello, Fatti, 
p. 316 ; Proposte, pp. 234-35 ; De Vitidi Marco, " The Political Situation 
in Italy," Nineteenth Cent, Oct., 1895 ; Pareto, " L'ltalie Economique," 
Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 15, 1891, Giornale dei Economisti, March, 
1895, p. 353 ; Ruiz, Ann. Amer. Acad, of Pol. Sci., Sept., 1895, p. 54 ; 

VOL. I. 



178 ITALY. 

the judiciary either has not enough power, or does not 
feel sufficiently free, to protect individuals against an 
oppressive abuse of political power, especially in local 
matters. This is true even in tranquil times, while 
the wholesale resort to martial law by the proclamation 
of the state of siege during the recent troubles in 
Sicily and at Carrara shows that the courts are unable 
to cope with disorder on any large scale. 1 

The judicial system has been dwelt upon here at 
what may seem an inordinate length because its condi- 
tion is one of the most important factors in the present 
political condition of the kingdom. 

There is one institution in Italy which is not strictly 
The church. a P ar ^ °^ ^ ne government, but is so closely 
The Italians connec ted with it, and has so direct an influ- 
whoiiy ence on P°htics, that it cannot be passed over. 

Catholic. T]lis is the Catholic church. Within the 
last quarter of a century every country in central 
Europe has found itself confronted with the Catholic 
question, and has been obliged to grapple with it ; but 
the matter has a peculiar importance in Italy. Not 
because the Italian is fanatical. On the contrary, his 
intense religious fervor seems to have burned itself 
out during the Middle Ages, and has left him com- 

Wolffson, " Italian Secret Societies," Contemp. Rev., May, 1891 ; Lord, 
"Italia non Fara da Se," Nineteenth Cent., March, 1892. The charge 
that the courts were subject to political influence was made by the Parlia- 
mentary committee on the bank scandals in December, 1894. 

1 Contrast with these events the Chicago riots of 1894, where not only 
the military authorities never superseded the judicial, but where the na- 
tional troops were called into action solely by means of the United States 
courts. 



CHURCH AND STATE. 179 

paratively indifferent ; yet he clings to the church with 
a tenacity that is out of proportion to his zeal. 1 This 
is due partly to the fact that he knows no other creed, 
and partly to his conservative nature, but chiefly, per- 
haps, to the fact that the ceremonies and rites of the 
Catholic faith, having been moulded for the most part 
by his own race, are closely fitted to his temperament, 
and therefore continue to attract him strongly, espe- 
cially on the sesthetic side. The nation is almost wholly 
Catholic, and to-day, as in the past, the church in Italy 
is assailed, not by heretics, but by her own children. 

Cavour proclaimed the doctrine of a free church in 
a free state; but although the church is 
more independent of the government than trine of a 

f rGG cliiircli 

might have been expected, it is impossible to in a free 

• • i n • state. 

carry the principle out fully in a country 
where there is only one religious body, and where that 
body has always been intimately connected with public 
life. The church could not be independent of the 
state in Italy in the same senseNthat it is in America, 
and this fact has led some of the Italian advocates of 
the doctrine to misunderstand it completely. They 
complain, for example, that the actual relation between 
church and state is based on the idea that the church 
is a private association instead of a public institution, 
and lament that the state has surrendered too much its 

1 Sir Charles Dilke, in his Present Position of European Politics 
(pp. 261-62), quotes the saying that the Italians would be a nation of 
freethinkers if they had ever been known to think, and remarks that 
although the epigram is unfair, there is a certain measure of truth under- 
lying it. 



180 ITALY. 

control over the education of priests, 1 — expressions 
which amount to a complaint that the church is too 
free. But, although the principle cannot be applied 
rigorously in Italy, it has been carried out to a consid- 
erable extent. The state has abandoned the right of 
nomination to ecclesiastical offices, which had existed 
in some of the former Italian principalities; and th& 
bishops are no longer required to take an oath of 
allegiance to the King. 2 Moreover, the so-called exe-^ 
quatur and placet, that is, the requirement of permits 
from the government for the publication and execution 
of the acts of ecclesiastical authorities, have been given 
up. 3 The state has also renounced all control over 
the seminaries for priests in Rome, 4 and rarely inter- 
feres with those elsewhere ; 5 and finally the church has 
been granted freedom of meeting, of publication, and 
of jurisdiction in spiritual matters. 6 Conversely, the 
acts of the ecclesiastical authorities have ceased to be 
privileged. They have no legal force if they are con- 

1 See, for example, Brusa, pp. 426-27, 429. 

2 Act of May 13, 1871, Tit. ii. Art. 15. It has been decided that in 
the case of the lower clergy the oath was not dispensed with wherever 
it had been required by earlier laws (Brnsa, p. 428) ; and even the 
bishops are not entirely independent of the state, for the royal exequatur 
is still required for the enjoyment of their revenues (Id., p. 437). At 
times these have actually been withheld, notably in 1877. Speyer, 
in Unsere Zeit, 1878, vol. ii. p. 604. 

3 Act of May 13, 1871, Tit. ii. Art. 16. 

4 Id., Tit. i. Art. 13. 

5 Brusa, p. 438. 

6 Id., Tit. ii. Arts. 14, 16, 17. Keligious processions outside the 
churches may be forbidden by the local authorities, if they are liable to 
interfere with public order or public health. Law of June 30, 1889, 
Art. 8. 



THE MONASTIC ORDERS. 181 

trary to law or violate private rights, and they are not 
exempt from the provisions of the criminal code. 1 

A thorny question for the new kingdom was involved 
in the position of the monastic orders, many Treatment 
of which still held great tracts of land, but n f as £ c emo " 
had long outlived their usefulness and were orders; 
felt to be an anachronism. The solution adopted, 
though almost a necessity, was drastic, and illustrates 
how far the theory of a free church in a free state 
was at this time from being a reality. The order 
of Jesuits was absolutely excluded from the king- 
dom ; 2 and even in the case of the other bodies, which 
had not aroused such violent antipathy, the govern- 
ment determined, while sparing the existing members, 
to forbid the enrollment of any new recruits. By 
the statutes of 1866 and 1867, therefore, all these 
monastic institutions and most of the benefices without 
a cure of souls were suppressed, and their property 
transferred to the state to be employed for the support 
of religion ; but a pension for life was reserved to the 
present possessors, who were also allowed to remain in 
their establishments. 3 Every traveler will remember 
the aged monks in white frocks who may still be 
seen wandering among the cloisters of the Val d' Ema, 
near Florence. These are the last representatives of a 
mighty order that once overshadowed Christendom, and 

1 Act of May 13, 1871, Tit. ii. Art. 17. The Penal Code of 1888 
specially punishes abuse of language by the clergy. Brusa, p. 61. 

2 Brusa, p. 56, note 4. 

3 Acts of July 7, 1866, and Aug. 15, 1867. See, also, Brusa, pp. 431- 
33. By an Act of 1873 these provisions were applied to Rome, but in 
a modified form. Brusa, lb. 



182 ITALY. 

with the spirit of romance which Italy cannot shake off 
even if she would, they have been allowed to drop away 
one by one until the monastery becomes silent forever. 

The convents were not the only great landowners 
and of the ^ n the church. Many of the higher secular 
oftn™cu- s clergy were also richly endowed. But there 
lar clergy. wag a strong f ee ling that the soil of the 
country ought to be controlled by laymen, and that 
the larger ecclesiastical incomes ought to be reduced. 
This feeling found its expression in the same statutes 
of 1866 and 1867, by which all church lands, except 
those belonging to parishes, those used by bishops 
and other dignitaries, and buildings actually devoted 
to worship, were taken by the state and converted into 
perpetual five per cent, annuities ; * while all ecclesias- 
tical revenues, not of a parochial nature, were taxed 
thirty per cent., or in other words partially confiscated. 2 

By far the most difficult question was presented by 
The position the papacy. The Holy See had ruled over 
of the Pope. a territory of considerable size extending 
across the peninsula from the Mediterranean to the 
Adriatic. It pretended to trace its rights from a 
grant made in the fourth century by the Emperor 
Constantine the Great to Pope Sylvester, and in fact 

1 Act of July 7, 1866, Arts. 11-18. 

2 Act of Aug. 15, 1867, Art. 18. By the Act of July 7, 1866, Art. 
31, the revenues of bishops exceeding 10,000 lire are taxed progressively 
for the benefit of the general fund for religion, the whole excess above 
60,000 lire being so taken. But if, on the other hand, the income of a 
bishop falls below 6,000 lire, it is made up to that sum out of the gen- 
eral fund (Art. 19). Similar taxes for the benefit of the fund are 
imposed on other ecclesiastical revenues. In the Act of 1873, Rome was 
more gently treated. Brusa, pp. 432-33. 



THE POPE. 183 

its dominion was as old and well founded as that of 
any monarch in Europe. It felt that the sovereignty 
over its own States — the so-called Temporal Power — 
was necessary for its independence, and that if the 
Pope lived in a city subject to another ruler he could 
not remain entirely free in spiritual matters. But the 
Italians felt no less strongly that their country would 
never be a complete nation until it included everything 
between the Alps and the sea, with Eome as its capi- 
tal, and this feeling was fully shared by the Romans 
themselves. 

The northern and eastern part of the Papal States 
was annexed to the new Kingdom of Italy The Papal 
at the same time as Naples and Sicily, that neledb?" 
is in 1860 ; but Rome and the country about ta y * 
it was protected by Napoleon III., whose power de- 
pended so much on the support of his ultramontane 
subjects that he could not safely desert the cause of 
the Pope. Italy chafed under his interference, and 
waited uneasily until the war with Prussia forced him 
to recall his troops. Then came the revolution that 
overturned his throne. An Italian army at once 
crossed the frontier of the Papal States, and entered 
Rome on September 20, 1870. 

The problem before the government was a delicate 
one, because any appearance of an intention The law of 

i t» t ,. -.. ,, the Papal 

to treat the rope as an Italian subject would Guarantees. 
have excited the indignation of the whole Catholic 
World, and might have led to foreign complications, 
or even to an armed intervention in favor of the Tem- 
poral Power. The cabinet determined, therefore, that 



184 ITALY. 

a law fixing definitely the position and privileges of 
the Holy See should be passed before the seat of 
government was moved to Rome. Recognizing the 
peculiar relations of the Pope to other States, the 
ministers proposed to make this law one of interna- 
tional bearing, so that it would have an effect analo- 
gous to that of a treaty, but they yielded to the firm 
opposition of the Left in the Chamber, and the act 
was finally passed as a piece of domestic legislation. 1 
This is the celebrated Law of the Papal Guarantees, 
which was enacted in May, 1871, and remains un- 
changed at the present day. Its object is to insure 
the freedom of the Pope in the exercise of all his 
spiritual functions, and for that purpose it surrounds 
him with most of the privileges of sovereignty. His 
person is declared sacred and inviolable ; assaults or 
public slander directed against him being punishable 
like similar offenses against the King. Public officials 
in the exercise of their duties are forbidden to enter 
his palace or its grounds ; and the same exemption 
applies to the place of meeting of a Conclave or (Ecu- 
menic Council. Searching any papal offices that have 
solely spiritual functions, or confiscating papers there- 
from, is prohibited, and it is provided that priests 
shall not be punished or questioned for publishing, 
in the course of their duties, the acts of the spiritual 
authority of the Holy See. The Pope is accorded the 
honors of a sovereign prince, and persons accredited 
to him enjoy all the immunities of diplomatic agents. 
He is guaranteed free intercourse with the bishops, 

1 Petruccelli della Gattina, Storm d' Italia^ pp. 93-94. 



THE POPE. 185 

and indeed with the whole Catholic world, messages 
sent in his name being placed on the same footing 
as those of foreign governments. Moreover he is 
granted a perpetual annuity of over six hundred 
thousand dollars, which is entered in the great book 
of state debts, and is free from all tax. This grant 
he has always refused to accept, and every year it is 
returned to the treasury. Finally he is left in abso- 
lute possession of the palaces of the Vatican, the 
Lateran, and Caste! Gandolfo, with all their buildings, 
gardens, and lands, free of taxes. 1 

It will be observed that this law, — which appears, 
by the way, to have been faithfully carried Refusal of 
out by the Italian government, — assures to accept the° 
the Pope absolute freedom in the exercise of situation - 
his functions as head of the Catholic church, and 
guards him against all personal disrespect. Neverthe- 
less neither Pius IX. nor his successor Leo XIII. has 
been willing to accept it ; and indeed they could not 
have done so without acknowledging the authority of 
the government by /which it was enacted, and this 
they have never been willing to do. They have not 
ceased for a moment to protest against the destruction 
of the Temporal Power; in fact, they have avoided 
everything that could possibly be construed as a rec- 
ognition of the Kingdom of Italy. The Pope has 
affected to consider himself a prisoner, and since the 

1 This is the law of May 13, 1871, several sections of which have 
already been cited. There is a criticism of the legal situation of the 
Holy See from a papal standpoint by Comte Rostworowski, entitled " La 
Situation Internationale du Saint-Siege," in the Ann. de VEcole Libre 
des Sciences Politiques, 1892, p. 102. 



186 ITALY. 

royal cannon opened a breach in the Eoman walls at 
the Porta Pia, he has scarcely placed his foot outside 
the grounds of the Vatican. 1 He has even refused to 
allow the clerical party to vote for deputies to Parlia- 
ment, on the ground that this would involve a tacit 
acknowledgment of the legality of the existing gov- 
ernment; and thus a large portion of the Italian 
people takes no part in national politics, although 
the same men vote freely and sometimes win victories 
at municipal elections. Such a condition of things 
is very unfortunate, for it tends to create a hostility 
between religion and patriotism, and makes it very 
hard for a man to be faithful both to his church and 
his country. If the Italians had any liking for other 
sects, these would no doubt increase rapidly ; but as 
religion and Catholicism are synonymous terms in 
Italy, the antagonism between church and state merely 
stimulates skepticism and indifference. 

It is not easy to see how the papal question will 

finally be solved. The present Pontiff is a 

the papal man of great tact, and with marvelous dexterity 

question dif- 1 _. . 

ficuitforthe he has changed the policy or the Vatican so as 

Vatican. ,..*? , - , i • , 

to bring it into harmony with the nmeteenth 
century. He made a peace with Bismarck by which 
the Iron Chancellor virtually acknowledged defeat; 
and by his conciliatory tone towards the French Re- 
public he seems to be in a fair way to checkmate the 
Radicals in France with their hatred of the church. 
Yet even Leo XIII. has not been able to come to 
terms with Italy. One thing is clear. Italy will 

1 Until 1888 he did not even appear in St. Peter's. 



THE POPE. 187 

never give up Rome, nor is there the slightest prob- 
ability that any foreign country will try to force 
her to do so ; and, indeed, it is said that even in the 
Vatican the restoration of the Temporal Power is 
considered hopeless. 1 To the outside observer it 
hardly appears desirable in the interest of the papacy 
itself, because with the loss of its secular functions, the 
Holy See has gained enormously in ecclesiastical 
authority. This is not an accident, for the destruc- 
tion of the Temporal Power is one step in the long 
movement for the separation of church and state, 
which during the last hundred years has been break- 
ing the local and national ties of the clergy in the 
different countries, and has thus made the Catholic 
church more cosmopolitan, more centralized, and more 
dependent on its spiritual head. Such, however, is 
not the view of many ardent Catholics, who are so 
dissatisfied with the present situation that a departure 
of the Pope from Eome has often been suggested ; but 
although on more than one occasion a removal has 
been said to be imminent, it is in the highest degree 

1 In an answer (" Italy, France, and the Papacy," Contemp. Rev., Aug., 
1891) to an article entitled " The Savoy Dynasty, the Pope, and the Re- 
public," by an anonymous writer (Contemp. Rev., Apr., 1891), Crispi 
speaks of the possibility of a French intervention in favor of the Tern-, 
poral Power as a real danger. One cannot help feeling that this must 
have been said rather for its effect than from conviction. In a previous 
answer to the same article (" Italy and France," Contemp. Rev., June, 
1891), Crispi makes the interesting statement that even in Rome only 
the highest church dignitaries want the Temporal Power, while over tha 
rest of Italy the clergy never were papal, and are not so now. In a 
later number of the same Review the Triple Alliance and the papal 
question are further discussed by Emile de Laveleye (" The Foreign 
Policy of Italy," Contemp. Rev., Feb., 1892.) 



188 ITALY. 

unlikely, for the Holy See could not get from any 
other state in whose territory it might settle terms 
more favorable than those accorded by the Law of the 
Papal Guarantees, and even if it should accept a grant 
of complete sovereignty over some island or small tract 
of land, the loss in prestige from the change of resi- 
dence would be incalculable. The veneration of the 
past still clings to Kome, and although the splendor 
of the Vatican is gone, the Pope bereft of his Tem- 
poral Power wields a greater spiritual influence than 
he has had for centuries. 



CHAPTER IV. 

ITALY: PARTIES. 

In the last chapter we examined the structure of the 
Italian government ; the organization of the The ^^^ 
two Chambers, and their relation to the King ^TitaiLn 
and his ministers ; the method of administra- £° vernment - 
tion and local government ; the judicial system ; and 
finally the position of the Catholic Church. Let us 
now inquire how the government actually works, espe- 
cially in regard to the nature and activity of political 
parties. 

For this purpose it may be instructive to take a brief 
survey of the political history of the king- The political 
dom. 1 Cavour, who shaped the destiny of the king- 
Italy, was not a party man. He was decid- '. 
edly independent in politics, and fought for Cayour. 
his own plan without a great deal of regard to party 
affiliations. In general he may be said to have relied 
on the support of the Moderates or Centre, but as the 
greatness of his statesmanship came to be understood, 
opposition to him faded away so thoroughly that in the 
first Italian Parliament (elected in January, 1861, after 
the whole country except Rome and Venice had been 

1 Cf . Jacini, I Conservatori e V Evoluzione Naturale dei Partiti ; Bon- 
fadini, " I Partiti Parlamentari," Nuova Antologia, Feb. 15, 1894 ; Pe- 
truccelli della Gattina, Storia (T Italia. 



190 ITALY. 

united), his supporters numbered four hundred and 
seven, while the opposition consisted of only thirty-four 
Kadicals on the Left and two Clericals on the Eight. 
Before the end of the following June Cavour 
the parties was dead, and his followers, who did not 

of the Right ,.., 

and Left are really rorm a political party, and had been 
held together only by his commanding influ- 
ence, soon fell apart. They separated into a Right and 
a Left, of which the Eight believed in moving slowly 
and cautiously towards the completion of 
by the Italian unity, waiting till the turn of Euro- 

pean politics should give a favorable chance 
to take a decisive step, while the Left was impatient, 
anxious to force the issue, and ready to follow the pop- 
ular impulse. Twice only (in 1862 and 1867) the Left 
under Eattazzi came to power, and both times its policy, 
after a short trial, proved a failure. 1 On each occasion 
Garibaldi, with the connivance of the ministers, as it 
was supposed, invaded the papal territory at the head 
of a band of volunteers, only to find his expedition 
checked by the interference of Napoleon III. In 1862 
the Italian government, to prevent a serious collision 
with France, arrested him at Aspromonte, and in 1867 
his forces were dispersed by French troops at Mentana. 
On each occasion, moreover, a fear that Italy would be- 
come embroiled in a quarrel with the Emperor quickly 
replaced the Eight in office. The Left having shown 
itself incapable of completing the unity of the nation, 
the Eight remained in power until this work was ended 

1 In the first of these cases the cabinet did not belong purely to the 
Left, Sella, a leader of the Right, being a member of it. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 191 

by the annexation of Rome in 1871 ; and even then 
there remained a task for it to accomplish. The mak- 
ing of Italy had been very expensive, and the govern- 
ment had spared no cost in the operation. It had spent 
money lavishly, not only in war, but also in creating an 
army and navy and in railroad building, and the result 
was a large debt and an annual deficit in the finances. 
The Right now set itself to work to bring about an 
equilibrium in the budget, and this it succeeded in 
doing in 1876. Then its work was ended and 
it fell. The Right had, in fact, been kept in Right in 
power during the last few years only by a de- 
sire to see the equilibrium established ; for while upright 
in its administration, it had been rigid and autocratic, 
and the crushing weight of the taxes, together with the 
disappointment of the people who had expected the mil- 
lennium to come with the union of Italy, had made it 
so generally unpopular that the elections, held shortly 
after its fall, resulted in an overwhelming victory for its 
opponents. 

The transfer of power to the Left in 1876 marks a 
turning-point in Italian political history. Not Effect of the 
that any decided change of policy took place, po^rTofhe 
for although during the time the Right was Left ' 
in office the Left had been telling the nation how much 
better it would govern if it had a chance, and had been 
declaiming about liberty and a reduction of taxes, it 
found itself compelled on assuming power to follow 
much the same course as its predecessor. After some 
years it did, indeed, extend the electoral franchise, and 
abolish the unpopular grist tax, without, however, much 



192 ITALY. 

lightening the general burden o£ taxation ; but it con- 
tinued to use when in office the same arbitrary powers 
it had condemned in opposition, and showed as a rule 
no greater tenderness for the liberty of the individual 
than the Eight had done before. In short, the Left 
which proclaimed itself liberal proved to be quite as con- 
servative as its rival. The real change that took place 
in 1876 was in the character of the parties themselves, 
rather than in the policy pursued, and the result was 
not so much a new departure as an exaggeration of 
the existing state of things. The process to which I 
refer is the breaking of the parties into groups. After 
the death of Cavour two opposing parties had been 
formed, but even during the struggle for Venice and 
Eome, when these parties were divided by a real 
difference of opinion, neither of them was solidly united 
within itself, while sundry lesser groups, which some- 
times supported the government of the Right and 
sometimes opposed it, formed and dissolved with bewil- 
dering rapidity. In fact, the parties were badly disin- 
tegrated. On the Eight, for example, the harmony 
between the two most prominent leaders, Sella and 
Minghetti, was so slight that they were never members 
of the same cabinet, and indeed the chiefs of the party 
frequently helped to upset each other's ministries. The 
Eight held office almost continuously for fifteen years, 
and yet its cabinets were constantly overthrown to be 
replaced by others from the same side of the Chamber. 1 
This condition of politics was increased by the change 

1 In one instance (in 1867) Depretis, a leader of the Left, held for a 
short time a portfolio in a ministry of the Right. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 193 

of parties, for the Left had no programme and never 
acted as a united party after it came to power in 1876. 
It was merely a collection of groups whose members 
were held together by personal attachment to rival 
chiefs, sometimes allied and sometimes in open hostility 
to each other, — a state of things which became more 
and more marked as time went on. The personal de- 
pendence and mutual assistance between the chief and 
his followers, the relation, in short, of patron and client 
in political life, was an innovation that came in, at least 
in its most virulent form, with the advent to power of 
the Left. It started in the south from causes that I 
shall point out later, and spreading through all grades 
of politics, local and national, it has honeycombed pub- 
lic life in Italy. The Eight, indeed, had filled the 
offices, and especially those of the prefects, with its own 
followers, but its use of the authority of the state to 
reward political service does not seem to have gone 
much further. The Left, on the other hand, used the 
immense power of the government in almost every con- 
ceivable direction for the private advantage of deputies 
who supported the cabinet, or rather for that of their 
local patrons, and hence the prefects and other govern- 
ment officials became subject to the influence and 
control of the deputies as they had never been before. 1 
When the long supremacy of the Right came to an 
end, Rattazzi, the former leader of the Left, First cabinet 
had died without leaving a successor. His ofDe P ietls - 

1 For a strong statement of the extent to which the parties lost all 
principles and were held together only by material interests, see Pareto, 
" L'ltalie Economique," Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 15, 1891. 

VOL. I. 



194 ITALY. 

authority had become divided among a number of 
chiefs, most of them more radical than himself. All 
of these men had, indeed, begun life as followers of 
Mazzini, whose revolutionary temper and republican 
principles helped very much to break down the old 
order of things, but did little or nothing towards build- 
ing up anything in its place. With the good sense, 
however, that is characteristic of Italians, the leaders of 
the Left accepted loyally the constitutional monarchy 
after it had been firmly established, and except for a 
few extremists all the public men abandoned their re- 
publican doctrines. The formation of the first cabinet 
of the Left was intrusted to Depretis, the leader of 
the most moderate group in the party. He took the 
position of President of the Council or Prime Minister, 
and distributed the other portf olios among a number of 
different groups, the most important appointment being 
Nicotera's that °^ Nicotera as Minister of the Interior. 
poHcTand Nicotera was strongly impressed with the 

V." t 11 

necessity of maintaining order, and especially 
of suppressing brigandage and destroying the power 
of the Camorra in Naples and the Mafia in Sicily. In 
this he was to a great extent successful, but as the 
means he used were autocratic and not always legal, he 
became thoroughly unpopular ; and when in December, 
1877, he was accused of violating the privacy of tele- 
grams, the indignation of the Chamber rose to such a 
height that a hostile order of the day was voted, and 
the ministry resigned. Depretis then formed another 
cabinet, in which the most significant change was the 
substitution of Crispi for Nicotera, the other ministers 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 195 

remaining very nearly the same as before. The new 

cabinet had, however, a short life, for Crispi, 

who was expected to add to its strength, was Crispi min- 

found to have more than one wife, and was 

forced to retire on March 6, 1878, the whole cabinet 

following a few days later. 

The final cause of the resignation of the ministry 
was the choice as President of the Chamber of Depu- 
ties of Cairoli, who had for some time been so bit- 
terly hostile to Depretis that his election was looked 
upon as equivalent to a vote of want of confidence. 
The King, therefore, intrusted Cairoli with cairoii's 
the formation of a cabinet. Now, Cairoli fat08Wn8t 
was the leader of the most radical part of the Left that 
was loyal to the monarchy, and yet he gave three port- 
folios to members of the Right, — a fact which shows 
how completely the parties had ceased to stand for any 
definite principles. The combination was all 
the more unnatural because the Minister of leniency and 

fall. 

the Interior, Zanardelli, was the only promi- 
nent leader who had a sincere faith in the doctrines of 
personal liberty which the Left had always preached. 
He had a great respect for the freedom of the citizen, 
and believed in a strict construction of the authority of 
the government in matters of police ; and, what was far 
more unusual, he tried to carry its theories into practice. 
The result was an outbreak of lawlessness and political 
agitation in various parts of the country, followed 
by dissensions in the cabinet, and the resignation of 
the ministers belonging to the Right. The disorder 
in the country increased, brigandage revived, and 



196 ITALY. 

complaints were loud of insufficient protection to person 
and property, until finally a bomb was thrown into a 
crowd in Florence, and an attempt was made at Naples 
to murder the King. The knife of the assassin was 
warded off by the Prime Minister himself, and, as an 
Italian historian has remarked, the stroke killed not 
the King, but the cabinet. 1 The ministers were inter- 
pellated in the Chamber from both Right and Left, 
and were heavily beaten on an order of the day in 
December, 1878. 

The contrast between the policies of Nicotera and 
Significance Zanardelli is instructive, as showing how little 
trastbe- n " unity of opinion there is in the political 
poHcieso? parties in Italy, and how the course of the 
anTzanar- government depends, not on any principles of 
the party in power, but on the personal views 
of the ministers. Nicotera, who held the portfolio of 
the Interior in the first cabinet of the Left, in his efforts 
to suppress disorder, resorted to arbitrary repressive 
measures, and stretched the police system to the utmost ; 
while Zanardelli, who also belonged to the Left, and 
occupied the same position a few months later, tried, on 
the contrary, to leave to the citizen the largest possible 
amount of freedom. The attitude of these two men 
furnishes also an example of the lack of harmony in 
Italian cabinets, and illustrates the way in which each 
minister sometimes directs his own department without 
regard to the opinions of his colleagues ; for Zanardelli 
was himself a member of the very cabinet in which 
Nicotera was Minister of the Interior. 

1 Petruccelli della Gattina, Storia <T Italia, p. 345. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 197 

After the defeat of the Cairoli-Zanardelli ministry, 
Depretis again came into power at the head 
of a cabinet from the Left, which contained, net of 
however, few men of note, and was defeated 
in the following July (1879) on a question of taxation, 
the Eight, and most of the leaders of the Left, taking 
part against it. It was then the turn of 

rn • ■»• i n i • • ■ Second cabi- 

(Jairoli, who once more iormed. a ministry, net of 
but this time abandoned Zanardelli and his 
principles. The new ministers were almost all men of 
secondary importance, and the cabinet lasted only until 
November, when Cairoli, rinding his position growing 
weaker and weaker, offered to make a coali- 
tion with Depretis. Of course, such an al- Depretis 

__ . •II «i i • i ministry. 

nance could not extinguish the rivalry which 
it smothered, but the crafty old Depretis, knowing that 
it would not be long before he could get rid of his 
colleague, accepted the offer, and took the portfolio of 
the Interior. The fact that these two men, who for 
a couple of years had been constantly opposed to each 
other and had been alternately at the head of the 
state, could form a coalition of this kind proves how 
completely Italian politics had become a question of 
/persons instead of principles. Even in their personal 
qualities the men were very different. Cairoli was 
highly respected for his character, but he was by no 
means a statesman, and still less a politician, while 
Depretis was a manipulator of marvelous dexterity, 
and by his tact and skill succeeded, in spite of the un- 
certainties of Italian parliamentary warfare, in keeping 



198 ITALY. 

himself in office all the rest of his life. 1 The new 
cabinet had by no means a compact majority in Parlia- 
ment, and more than once it was defeated on a vote in 
the Chamber, but owing to the weakness of its adver- 
saries, and a fear on the part of the Left that if it were 
overthrown the next cabinet would be formed from 
the Right, it managed to preserve its existence for 
eighteen months. 

At last the opportunity for which Depretis had been 
waiting arrived. Cairoli was Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, and in May, 1881, the indignation produced by the 
French annexation of Tunis compelled him to resign. 
Depretis then became President of the Council, and 
held the place without a break until his death on July 

27, 1887. This does not mean that the same 
cabinets of ministers remained in office all that time. On 

the contrary, Depretis had no less than five 
separate cabinets, for instead of retiring from office 
and leading an opposition when his government was 
defeated in the Chamber, he made what was called a 
Rimpasto ; that is, he dropped those of his colleagues 
who,, by giving offense or making themselves unpopular, 
had become a drag upon him, and replaced them by 
new men. Nor did he confine himself in the choice of 
ministers to the members of one party, but finding that 
the country was getting over its dislike of the Right, 
which was gaining in strength at the expense of the 
Left, he made a coalition with it in May, 1883, and 
admitted one of its members to the cabinet. This 
change of front, called the Transformismo, involved a 

1 The Leisure Hour for 1891 (pp. 160, 235) gives an interesting 
description of the recent Italian leaders. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 199 

quarrel with all the other five leaders of the Left, who 
formed a hostile alliance known as the Pentarchy, and 
complained bitterly that Depretis had deserted his old 
friends. 1 There was now, in fact, little or no difference 
in political principles between the parties, and the 
ministries were fought for on the basis "that they 
should take who have the power, and they should keep 
who can." Under these circumstances, with no strong- 
party organizations to direct and limit the path of am- 
bition, politics were sure to be in an unstable condition 
in which no combination could long endure. It was 
not a great while, therefore, before the coalition with 
the Eight began to show itself less strong than had 
been hoped. Rents appeared in the government ma- 
jority, and although one portfolio was almost always 
held by a member of the Right, 2 a larger and larger 
section of that party became hostile to the ministry. 

At last, after a couple more Rimpasti, the position 
of the government became so weak that Depretis again 
changed his policy, and abandoning the Right, effected 
a reconciliation with two members of the Pentarchy, — 
Crispi and Zanardelli, — to whom he gave seats in the 
cabinet. This was in April, 1887, only three months 
before his death. 

Depretis had succeeded, thanks to his own subtle 
tactics and to the dissensions of his rivals, in Unpariiar 
keeping himself at the head of the state for ScticTof 
six years. But he did it by an entire distor- Depretis - 

1 They were Cairoli, Crispi, Nicotera, Zanardelli, and Baccarini. 

2 It is characteristic of the group system of parties that this member 
was never one of the leaders of the party. 

L.oj C. 



200 ITALY. 

tion of the nature of parliamentary government, for 
instead of being held to account as the leader of a 
united cabinet, he had made himself the permanent 
chief of a corps of ministers who were liable to be 
overthrown separately by the Chamber. He had vir- 
tually substituted himself for the King as the irre- 
sponsible head of the state, and at the same time he 
had deprived the cabinet of collective responsibility. 
To such an extent was this true that he not only re- 
mained continually in office himself, but he always 
kept Magliani, one of the ablest of Italian financiers, 
as his Minister of the Treasury. The course of Depretis 
would clearly have been out of the question if he had 
stood for any policy, or indeed if the parties in the 
Chamber had had any real programmes. 1 It was ren- 
dered possible only by the fact that there had ceased to 
be any essential difference between the principles of the 
various groups, so that the struggles in the Chamber 
were chiefly based on personal ambition ; and it is 
worthy of note that until he admitted Crispi to the 
cabinet in 1887, he always retained in his own hands 
the Department of the Interior, which was the main 
reservoir of patronage. 

Crispi was the natural successor of Depretis, and he 
The rule tried to carry on the same practice of remod- 
of Cnspi. eling his cabinet, when he met with a hostile 
vote. For a time this worked well, and he might have 
continued in office indefinitely had he not been made 
of very different stuff from his predecessor; but he 
is a man of strong personality, who cannot be colorless, 

1 Cf . Dupriez, Les Ministres, vol. i. p. 304. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 201 

or help identifying himself with his administration. 
At first he seemed to be omnipotent, but his enormous 
expenditures which entailed a heavy deficit in the 
budget, the commercial quarrel with France, and his 
own uncontrollable temper, caused his overthrow on 
January 31, 1891. His fall illustrates how little the 
support of a minister in Italy is due to the policy 
he pursues, for at the general elections in November, 
1890, the course of the government seemed to be al- 
most universally approved. The Extreme Left, or Rad- 
icals, alone conducted an active campaign against the 
cabinet, whose supporters carried about four hundred 
out of the five hundred and eight seats in the Cham- 
ber. Yet in less than three months Crispi lost his 
majority, and after his defeat only a few deputies re- 
mained faithful to him. 

Crispi was succeeded by a coalition between the 
opposition of the Eight and Left, whose lead- The minig _ 
ing representatives in the cabinet were the RuJinfand 
Marchese de Eudini and Nicotera, 1 but this GiolittL 
ministry lived only a little more than a year, and was 
followed in May, 1892, by a cabinet containing none of 
the- distinguished party leaders. It is, indeed, a notice- 
able fact that Italian politics at the present day do not 
seem to produce statesmen of the calibre of those who 
developed during the struggle for national existence. 

The new cabinet was opposed by a coalition of the 
Eight and the Extreme Left, and was supported by the 

1 Cf. "The Italian Ministry," Westminster Rev., Sept., 1891 ; Giaco- 
metti, " Cinq Mois de Politique Italienne," Revue des Deux Mondes, Sept. 
15, 1891. 



202 ITALY. 

groups of the Centre and Left, both Crispi and Zanar- 
delli giving it their cooperation at the outset. The 
majority was, however, insecure, and at the close of 
the session Parliament was dissolved. Official pressure 
was freely used in the campaign; two thirds of the 
prefects were removed or transferred to other provinces ; 
and as is almost always the case in Italy, the govern- 
ment won a victory at the polls. In spite of the fact 
that Crispi withdrew his support, the cabinet obtained 
a vote of confidence by a large majority ; but the pre- 
vailing commercial distress was rapidly bringing the 
country into a condition which required a far stronger 
hand than that of Giolitti. The state of the finances 
was deplorable. Gold and silver had almost gone out 
of circulation, and the budget showed a huge deficit, 
which the government could not fill because it was 
unable to induce the deputies to consent to the econ- 
omies it proposed. Nothing was left but an increase 
of taxation, and when Giolitti proposed this the peas- 
ants in Sicily, who were already overburdened, broke 
out in riot and wrecked the offices of the tax-gatherers. 
Meanwhile the reputation of the cabinet had been 
stained by the discovery of the fraudulent mismanage- 
ment of the Banca Romana, in which public men were 
manifestly implicated. After resisting as long as he 
could, Giolitti finally consented to the appointment of 
a parliamentary committee of inquiry, whose report, 
laid before the Chamber at the opening of the session 
on November 23, 1893, brought his career to an end. 
It stated that most of the papers seized at the house of 
the governor of the bank had been put out of sight 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 203 

by the government; and the ministers, without chal- 
lenging a vote of confidence, laid their resignation be- 
fore the King. 

Crispi, as the only man able to face the situation, 
returned to power. He proclaimed martial 
law in Sicily, suppressed by force the insur- toration and 
rection which had assumed alarming dimen- 
sions, and throughout the kingdom his measures for 
the maintenance of order, if of doubtful legality, were 
energetic and effective. His treatment of the Parlia- 
ment was no less vigorous. The cabinet relied for sup- 
port chiefly on the Centre and the Left, that is, in the 
main, on the same elements that had followed the pre- 
vious ministry; but as the opposition contained not 
only the Extreme Left and part of the Right, but also 
the groups of Giolitti and Zanardelli, the majority was 
exceedingly precarious. 1 By clever management, how- 
ever, Crispi was able to keep the Chamber under his 
control for more than a year. At last, in December, 
1894, Giolitti caused an explosion* by producing the 
papers he had concealed, which showed that Crispi 
himself had received money from the Banca Romana. 

During the next five months the cabinet was at war 
with the majority in the Chamber, and parliamentary 
government was virtually suspended. Parliament was 
prorogued and taxes were decreed without legislative 
sanction ; but no universal storm of indignation fol- 

1 Bonghi (" Gli Ultimi Fatti Parlameutari," Nuova Antologia, Jan. 1, 
1895) remarks that apart from the Extreme Left all the deputies ought 
properly to be classed as belonging to the Centre, so completely have the 
parties lost all political significance. 



204 ITALY. 

lowed, because the conduct of the deputies for many 
years had not been such as to awaken enthusiasm or 
allow them to play the part of veritable champions of 
popular rights, while to the middle classes Crispi seemed 
the only protection against anarchy. When, therefore, 
a dissolution was ordered and elections were held in the 
following May, the government obtained a majority 
and the parliamentary forms were resumed. 

Crispi was playing a game which could be justified 
only by necessity, and was bound to be severely con- 
demned in case of any lack of success. For a time, 
indeed, his success appeared to be complete. Open dis- 
order had been suppressed, and he had acquired the 
control of Parliament ; but in 1896 trouble came from 
an unexpected quarter. Italy had been investing in 
colonial speculation an amount of men and money she 
could ill afford to lose, and that without any adequate 
return. The post on the Red Sea had been a con- 
stant source of expense, and at last it brought her into 
a quarrel with the^King of Abyssinia, who routed, 
on March 1, the small Italian army sent against him. 
When news of the disaster reached Italy the excite- 
ment became intense ; riots occurred in several places, 
and Crispi was the object of such violent attack that 
he was forced to resign without waiting for the judg- 
ment of the Chamber. He has been succeeded by a 
cabinet under Rudini, which as usual has begun by 
talking economy. 

The story of the political life of Italy since she be- 

Comparison came a kingdom shows how far the English 

itafyand m parliamentary system has been from producing 

the same results as in its native land. Instead 



THE ATTITUDE OF THE CLERICALS. 205 

of two great parties which are alternately in power and 
in opposition, we find, as in France, a number of groups, 
sometimes united and sometimes hostile to each other, 
ever forming new combinations, until it becomes 
almost impossible to follow their evolutions. 1 The 
resemblance between the condition of parties in France 
and in Italy is indeed so striking, and at the same time 
the difference between them is so great, that a compari- 
son of the two is very instructive. In the first place 
we find in both countries a large body of irreconcil- 
ables who in each case are Clericals; but 

, ., . -~ , . . . , TheCleri- 

wnile in .b ranee the reactionaries sit m the caisand 
Chamber, and by their presence force the two ence on 

-n i -I • • • parties. 

wings of the Republicans to maintain a preca- 
rious alliance, in Italy the partisans of the Holy See 
refuse to vote for deputies, and have no seats in the 
Chamber. 

The absence of the irreconcilables from the Italian 
Parliament saves that body from a great deal of bitter- 
ness, and allows the members to group themselves more 
freely, yet their existence in the country has a marked 
effect on the condition of parties, for the Clericals are 
neither few nor passive. They have a large number of 
supporters who take an active part in municipal elec- 
tions, and hence there is a real opposition in the state, 
although it finds no place in Parliament. The people 
are separated into two factions, the adherents of the 

1 Jacini, as early as 1867, wrote : " I ministri Italiani sono unafantas- 
magoria di uomini che vanno e vengono, come proteiforme giuoco oV injiuenze, 
di persone, di gruppi, di coalizione ; nascono e muoiono senza indovinare il 
perche " (quoted by Petruccelli della Gattina, Storia d' Italia, p. 194). 



206 ITALY. 

Tiara and of the Crown ; and this antagonism, by dimin- 
ishing the apparent importance of any other issue, tends 
to prevent it from forming a basis for a division into 
two great parties. During the time that elapsed after 
Italy had become a nation, and before Venice and 
Eome had been won, political passion ran high over the 
policy to be pursued in obtaining those provinces, and 
the deputies were pretty sharply divided into two op- 
posing sections. But with the taking of Rome in 1870 
the conflict with the church became more acute, and 
since that time there has arisen no question great 
enough to absorb public interest and cast the religious 
quarrel into the shade. Moreover the Clericals are the 
real Conservatives in the state, and their absence from 
Parliament allows the supporters of the monarchy, who 
are really all Liberals, to break up into groups instead 
of forming a single party. 1 To use an antithesis, it 
may fairly be said that in France the presence of the 
irreconcilables in the Chamber forces together men 
whose political principles are essentially different, while 
in Italy their absence fosters divisions among members 
whose principles are really very much the same. 

In the chapter on France several details of the politi- 
cal machinery were pointed out that helped 

Committees J . ,...,. 

and inter- to break up the parties by diminishing the 

pellations. . L A . . J ° 

authority and stability of the cabinets, and 
among the most important of these were the system of 
committees in the Chambers, and the practice of inter- 

1 Dupriez, Les Ministres, vol. i. p. 302 ; Speyer, in Unsere Zeit, 1879, 
vol. i. pp. 579-80 ; Jacini (/ Conservatory pp. 24-25) says that what Italy 
needs in order to get rid of personal politics is a conservative party. 



COMMITTEES IN THE CHAMBER. 207 

pellations. 1 Both of these peculiarities are to be found 
in Italy, but they have been so modified as to be some- 
what less repugnant to the parliamentary system than 
in France. 

The Chambers are divided in the same way by lot 
into sections, called Uffici, 2 which elect most 
of the committees, but in each branch of mitteesys- 

, . ill tem better 

.Parliament the committee on the budget, in Italy than 

,.,., . i» n • i ™ France. 

which is the most important or all, is chosen 
directly by the Chamber itself. 3 This gives the cabinet 
a chance to exert a good deal of influence over its com- 
position, and in fact its election has been considered 
of late years a regular test of the strength of the gov- 
ernment. The result is that the choice of a hostile 
committee is sometimes regarded as a vote of want of 
confidence ; 4 but if, on the other hand, the ministers 

1 The third institution that was mentioned in the chapters on France as 
tending to break the parties into groups, namely, the requirement of an 
absolute majority for the election of the deputies, is not discussed here, 
because it did not exist in Italy during the ten years from 1882 to 1892 
when the Scrutinio di Lista was in force. A majority was formerly 
required, but in 1882 a plurality was substituted. (See Brusa, p. 132, 
and see Art. 74 of the Act of 1882.) By the Act of June 28, 1892 
(Art. I.), the necessity of a majority vote was restored, and of course it 
tends as in France to encourage the various groups to present separate 
candidates at the first ballot, knowing that they can combine at the 
second if they want to do so. 

2 There are nine of these in the Chamber of Deputies, and five in the 
Senate, and they are renewed every two months. Rules of the Chamber 
of Deputies, Arts. 18-21 ; Rules of the Senate, Arts. 14-22. 

8 Rules of the Senate, Art. 23, of the Deputies, Art. 13. The Chamber 
of Deputies also elects directly the committees on petitions, and on decrees 
registered by compulsion by the Corte dei Conti, while the committees 
on elections and on rules are appointed by the President of the Chamber. 
Rules of the Deputies, Arts. 12, 13. 

4 Brusa, p. 156, note 2. The whole committee is not chosen from any 
one party, but minorities are proportionately represented. Brusa, p. 146. 



208 ITALY. 

succeed in getting their partisans elected, they are in 
some measure relieved from the labor of wrangling with 
a committee not in sympathy with their views. They 
are a little better able than in France to take their 
stand on a budget prepared by themselves, instead of 
being obliged to submit to all the amendments and 
distortions suggested by an independent or unfriendly 
set of committee-men. The practice is by no means 
a perfect one, and does not prevent the Chamber 
from constantly forcing on the ministers an increase 
of appropriations ; 1 but its good effects are seen in the 
fact that the government is rarely upset on the budget, 2 
although the enormous size of the expenditures com- 
pared with the wealth of the country renders the finances 
of Italy very difficult to manage. They are shown per- 
haps even more strongly by the fact that the eminent 
financier Magliani was able to remain at the head of 
the treasury for nine consecutive years, whereas in 

1 See Brusa, p. 156, note 1 ; Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 318-19. Marco Besso, 
in the Nuova Antologia (" Megalomania e Micromania," Feb. 1, 1894), 
remarks that the Parliament is the open enemy of taxes and the secret 
enemy of economies. 

2 See Brusa, p. 156, note 2. Dupriez (vol. i. p. 328) says that since 1849 
the disagreements between the government and the Chamber which have 
caused cabinet crises have been exclusively on financial questions. This 
statement seems to be erroneous. It is by no means easy in every case 
to assign a single definite cause for the fall of a ministry, because the 
occasion for a hostile vote in the Chamber may be very different from the 
real cause. I have tried, however, to classify the cabinet crises from its 
death of Cavour in 1861, through May, 1896, and leaving out of account 
seven changes of ministry which were not directly brought about by the 
action of the Chamber at all, I find that out of eighteen cases in which a 
cabinet has resigned in consequence of a vote of that body, only six arose 
out of financial matters, and with at least half of these the committee on 
the budget had no connection. 



COMMITTEES IN THE CHAMBER. 209 

France the ministers of finance have constantly found 
the position untenable. 1 A recent authority on par- 
liamentary government, and one of the few writers who 
understand the importance of the committee system, 
is very severe in his strictures on the Italian commit- 
tees. 2 He remarks that the ministers take no part in 
their debates ; 3 that the committees themselves are by 
no means always friendly to the cabinet, and not being 
restrained by party discipline, sometimes amend the 
government proposals radically, sometimes delay their 
report for the sake of defeating a measure, and some- 
times even bring in a bill based on diametrically op- 
posite principles. He says that the reporter of the 
committee is less a helper than a rival of the ministers, 
and he adds that in the case of the budget the cabinet 
can rarely combat openly the decisions of the committee, 
but is often obliged to accept a compromise. These 
criticisms are, no doubt, perfectly just, and they illus- 
trate forcibly the entire inconsistency with the parlia- 
mentary form of government of any committees that 
are not under the control of the cabinet ; 4 but it does 
not follow that the Italian method of selecting the 
committee on the budget is not a slight improvement 
upon the French. Within a few years Italy has made 

1 Rouvier in France was at the head of the finances from March, 1890, 
to January, 1893, and this was an unusually long period. 

2 Dupriez, Les Ministres, vol. i. p. 309 et seq. See, also, Minghetti, i" 
Partiti Politicly p. 322. 

8 On this point see, also, Brusa, p. 146, note 2. 

4 On visiting the Chamber of Deputies in 1890, the writer was struck 
by the way the place reserved for the committee symbolized its political 
position. The committee whose report is debated occupies a special 
bench facing that of the ministers. 

VOL. i. 



210 ITALY. 

a still more important modification of her procedure. 1 
In 1888, after a long struggle, the Chamber of Dep- 
uties introduced experimentally a process of three read- 
ings, whereby the Chamber can, if it desires, order a 
general debate and vote on a bill before it is referred 
to a committee, and in that case, the main principle of 
the measure having been approved by the Chamber, 
the discussion in the committee is limited to a con- 
sideration of the details. When this procedure is fol- 
lowed the committee is elected by the Unici, unless the 
Chamber prefers to choose the members directly, or 
to request the President to appoint them. The process 
has the additional advantage of preventing the commit- 
tees from smothering bills by neglecting to take any 
action upon them, for it is provided that in case a com- 
mittee does not report within thirty days, the govern- 
ment or any member of the Chamber may move that a 
day be fixed for the second reading of the bill. 2 This 
was, indeed, Crispi's chief motive in urging the change 
of system. The new procedure can hardly fail to in- 
crease the authority of the cabinet by diminishing the 
power of the committees. 3 

The practice of interpellations, that is of questions 
The inter- addressed to the ministers and followed by 
Abetter a debate and vote on an order of the day 
expressing the opinion of the Chamber, also 
prevails in Italy. It is, however, better arranged than 
in France, for although a motion can be made imme- 

1 Rules of the Deputies, Arts. 53-62 ; Brusa, p. 147, note 1. 

3 Rules of the Deputies, Art. 58. 

8 Dupriez is clearly of this opinion, vol. i. p. 308. 



in 
France. 



INTERPELLATIONS. 1 

diately after the minister has answered the interpella- 
tion, the debate and vote, instead of taking place at 
once while the Chamber is in a state of excitement, is 
postponed to a future day, so that the members have 
time to cool down and consider soberly whether they 
wish to turn out the cabinet or not. 1 

These modifications in the system of committees and 
interpellations have not made the Italian cabi- p ar ii ament . 
nets much more permanent than the French, %* better*" 
but have endowed them with a somewhat KticaimaT 
longer term of life. 2 They appear also to than 
have given them a little more dignity and 
independence in the face of the deputies, and made 
them less the sport of excitement or caprice. But 
while the procedure in the Chamber accords better 
with cabinet responsibility in Italy than in France, the 
political material is less adapted to the formation of 

1 Rules of the Deputies, Arts. 104-8. Dupriez (vol. i. pp. 322-24) re- 
gards this as a useless waste of time, and goes so far as to regret that in 
the case of simple questions the Chamber has not power to cut short the 
dialogue between the deputy and the minister by an order of the day. 
He points out (vol. ii. p. 441) that interpellations are more numerous 
and waste more time in Italy than in France, and he attributes their 
quantity to the number of groups into which the Chamber is divided. 
(Vol. i. p. 324.) It is curious that a man of his keen insight should 
consider the waste of time as the chief evil of the system, and should not 
see that the interpellations help to weaken the cabinet and keep the 
groups alive. His description of the long dialogues over simple ques- 
tions conveys, by the way, a wrong impression ; for the Rules of the 
Chamber provide (Art. 105) that the answer of the minister shall give 
rise neither to a declaration on the part of the deputy, nor to a debate. 

2 From Cavour's death in June, 1861, to June, 1896, there have been 
thirty-one different cabinets, whose average duration has therefore been 
over thirteen months and a half ; while the average life of French 
cabinets has been less than eight months and a half. 



ITALY. 

parties and hence to the parliamentary form of 

government. There is a marked lack of abil- 

anity among ity to cooperate for public ends in matters 

the minis- ", . . . 

ters a symp- oi national importance, and this accounts for 

torn of this. ITT ... 

the fact that the Italian ministries, in spite of 
their greater stability, have been, as a rule, even less 
united within themselves than the French. Now con- 
sider what this means. The theory of the parliamentary 
system is based upon the idea that the government of 
the country is intrusted to a committee, the members 
of which are jointly responsible to the popular Chamber 
for the whole conduct of the administration, so that a 
hostile vote on any question is a condemnation of each 
and all of them. Hence the theory implies that the 
ministers must cling to each other and present to the 
Chamber a single front and a consistent policy. This 
is the reason for the secrecy of cabinet consultations, 
for if the differences between the ministers were exposed 
to public view, it would be impossible for them to main- 
tain an appearance of harmony. It has already been 
pointed out that such a system tends normally to divide 
Parliament into two opposing parties, because so long 
as the ministers act in concert and stand or fall together, 
the members of the Chamber cannot support one of 
them and oppose another, but must follow their lead 
absolutely, or turn them all out. Under normal condi- 
tions, therefore, Parliament must be sharply divided 
into the supporters of the cabinet and the opposition ; 
and unless there is some disturbing element, the mem- 
bers of each of these sections, by constantly working 
together for a single end, tend to become consolidated 



THE CABINETS LACK UNITY. 213 

into a compact party with a continuous life. But this 
result depends on the fact that the ministers hold to- 
gether and stand before the Chamber as a united and 
inseparable body. If they do not do so, any member of 
the Chamber may bear allegiance to one of them alone, 
and thus each minister may have his own band of fol- 
lowers who support his colleagues only provisionally; 
and in that case the governmental majority will not be 
a party, but a collection of separate groups, bound 
together by a more or less precarious alliance. In 
almost all the states on the continent this is true to 
some extent; and the various methods of parliament- 
ary procedure already mentioned, together with certain 
peculiarities of condition and temperament among the 
people, have tended to foster it. The English parlia- 
mentary practice has been generally followed so far as 
the form is concerned, for the whole cabinet habitually 
resigns on a hostile vote in the Chamber ; 1 but in sub- 
stance the ministers are by no means jointly responsible, 
because as soon as they have resigned a new cabinet is 
formed, which often contains several members of the 
old one. This state of things has been especially 
marked in Italy, and Depretis developed it so far as to 
make scapegoats of his colleagues instead of resigning 
himself, when the Chamber voted against the cabinet 
of which he was the head. The result is that every 
prominent political leader, instead of being a member 

1 This rule is not as strictly observed in Italy as elsewhere, the res- 
ignation of a single minister on an adverse vote in Parliament being 
not uncommon. Two ministers resigned in this way in 1871, one in 
1873, one in 1879, two in 1885, two in 1888, and an under-secretary in 
1890. 



"214 ITALY. 

of a great party, is a free lance who fights on his own 
account at the head of his retainers. 

The interest, indeed, in Italian politics centres to an 
Prominence unusua l degree about the personal struggles 
sonai e eie- r between the chiefs of rival factions in the 
Mian 1 poll- same P ar ty 5 or ? to P ut this truth in a more 
tlcs * • general form, — one of the most striking fea- 
tures in Italian public life is the prominence of the 
personal element. Any one who has read the daily 
papers in Italy cannot fail to have observed an illus- 
tration of this in the large space allotted to the de- 
scription of the altercations between the President of 
the Chamber and some refractory debater. 1 Now such 
a prominence of personal matters as compared with 
questions of principle is not an accident. It is a 
symptom of a social condition that pervades the whole 
country, although far more marked in the south than 
in the north. The Italians are very different from the 
French. They are not attracted to the same extent by 
abstract theories, and hence they do not form a number 
of parties or groups, each clinging obstinately to an 
ideal form of government, and striving to bring about 
an ideal organization of society. 2 On the contrary, 
they are endowed with a great deal of shrewd common 
sense in politics, and with a pretty clear perception of 
what is attainable and what is not. The way in which 

1 Jacini says the newspapers found that descriptions of personal con- 
tests increased their sale, i" Conservatory p. 73. 

2 Turiello (Fatti, p. 92) says that, contrary to appearances, the faith in 
political theories is stronger in Italy than in France. Nevertheless, I 
believe that the common impression is correct. Turiello admits {Id., pp. 
115-16) that the Italian parties are commonly based on personal grounds. 



POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION. 215 

the Kepublican followers of Mazzini, with a mere hand- 
ful of exceptions, gave up their theories and accepted 
the monarchy is sufficient evidence of this. The Ital- 
ian is not so excitable as the Frenchman, but is com- 
paratively indolent, and this also tends to make him 
practical. On the other hand, he is far more prone to 
form cliques, or to attach himself to a patron, in order 
to obtain some private advantage. 

The causes of this last tendency run far back into 
mediaeval history. The long -continued op- Soeial 
pression in southern Italy, and the lack of a zatSf l^the 
firm and stable authority that maintained so- south ' 
cial order and administered justice between man and 
man, made the people look on every government as 
a natural enemy instead of a protector ; and hence so- 
ciety disintegrated, and there developed a want of mutual 
confidence, and a general absence of social cohesion. 
The community was reduced to its first elements, and 
men did just what they have always done when there 
was no higher power to which they could appeal. 
They banded themselves together for mutual assistance. 
The process was precisely the same as that which gave 
birth to the feudal system, after the fall of Eome had 
plunged Europe into a state of anarchy. Each man, 
feeling his weakness and isolation, joined himself to 
another man or body of men stronger than he, and 
rendered service on condition of receiving protection. 
This is the origin of the relation of patron and client 
in southern Italy ; and indeed, the only ties that seem 
to be thoroughly natural there are those of the family 
and of patronage. 1 The vendetta or family blood feud, 

1 Turiello, Fatti, pp. 125-26. 



216 ITALY. 

which has caused so many tragedies, arose from the 
same necessity for mutual defense, and in some form 
or other it is certain to flourish wherever the law fails 
Secret *° P un i sn crime. Another and more terrible 

societies. result of the social condition has been the 
Camorra in Naples and the Mafia in Sicily, of which 
we have heard so much since the lynching of the Ital- 
ians at New Orleans in 1891. These societies were 
formerly recruited from all ranks in the community, 
the poorer members obeying the orders of the richer, 
and enjoying in return an immunity from punishment ; 
but of late years they have undergone a great modifi- 
cation, and are now confined to the lowest classes. 
The ' Camorra, indeed, appears to have ceased to be 
really dangerous, and even the Mafia has become far 
less active ; but it is very difficult to find out the exact 
truth in regard to Italian secret organizations, because 
the people who could give evidence about them are 
intimidated and do not dare to testify. 1 

Since Italy has been united under the monarchy the 

associations in the south have tended to pur- 

ditionof sue a double course. Violence has become 

late years. 

confined to the criminal classes, who combine 
for protection against justice into bands of malefactors, 
known by the general name of the Mala Vita or Bad 
Growth and Ii^ e - The classes, on the other hand, that 
poHtlcai fthe ta ke an active part in politics have formed 

innumerable cliques, whose vital principle is 
the relation of patron and client, and whose object is 

1 See an article by L. Wolff sohn, on the "Italian Secret Societies,' ' in 
the Contemp. Rev., May, 1891. 



POLITICAL CLIQUES. 217 

the use of the public authority for their private benefit. 
These cliques started in Naples, and the system was 
called Spagnolismo, from the old Spanish territory in 
which it took its rise. 1 At first they were kept down 
by the active work of national regeneration, but after 
the Left came to power in 1876, they spread like 
tubercles throughout the whole body politic, although 
they are still most highly developed in the south. 
Here the social conditions are peculiarly suited to 
them, and they extend from the rural communes^ 
where they are interwoven with family ties, and the old 
family feuds, all through the political system, to the 
minister and the deputies who form his personal retinue. 
Some communes and provinces are, indeed, excellently 
governed, but in others a clique perverts the local 
administration into an instrument for promoting the 
private interests of its members, and even for oppress- 
ing its foes. Goods belonging to the friends of the 
clique have, it is said, been known to be passed through 
the municipal custom house free of duty, while those 
of its enemies were heavily assessed; 2 and this does 
not seem to be the only method in which the power to 
levy local taxes has been grossly abused. 3 It is com- 

1 One of the most authoritative and forcible descriptions of this aspect 
of Italian politics has been given by the late Marco Minghetti, in his 
book, / Partiti Politici. See, also, Jacini, I Conservatori ; Turiello, 
Governo e Governati in Italia. The last of these writers gives an interest- 
ing account of the recent history and condition of the Neapolitan prov- 
inces. Id., Fatti, p. 134 et seq. For the state of Sicily in this respect, 
see San Giuliano, Le Conditione Presente della Sicilia ; Colajanni, In 
Sicilia. 

2 Minghetti, lb., p. 175. 

8 Colajanni, chaps, viii. and ix. ; San Giuliano, pp. 116-17. 



218 ITALY. 

monly asserted, moreover, that the councils have been 
dissolved and the electoral lists falsified in the interest 
of a faction/ and complaints are loud that the commu- 
nal lands are managed for the exclusive benefit of the 
ruling class. 2 That the local administration is often 
misused in these and other ways for personal ends there 
can be no doubt; and in fact the extension of local 
self-government is thought by some people to have 
been a very doubtful blessing on that account. 3 It 
was to correct this state of things, which the ordinary 
courts were powerless to remedy, that the administra- 
tive tribunals were created, but as complaints have not 
ceased, it may be assumed that these courts have also 
proved unequal to the task. Nor does the action of the 
central government lessen the evil, but rather aggravates 
it, because the cabinet depends for its tenure of office 
on the votes of the deputies, who are in league with the 
local cliques. 

The relation of the representative to the factions in 
his district varies no doubt a great deal in the different 
parts of the country. It is closest in the Neapolitan 
provinces, where the system is most fully developed, 
and where the deputies are themselves often the pa- 
trons of the cliques. In the north, on the other hand, 
the wire-pullers are more commonly the instruments 
of the public men ; while in Sicily the deputy is apt 
to consider himself a general patron of the whole of 
the ruling class, which forms a sort of clique for the 

1 Minghetti, pp. 176, 246 ; Colajanni, ubi sup. • San Giuliano, pp. 114- 
16 ; and see Pareto, "La Dictature en Italie," Bib. Univ., April, 1895. 

2 Turiello, Fatti, pp. 238^6 ; Colajanni, ubi sup. 

8 Turiello, Fatti, pp. 72-74 ; Proposte, p. 12 et seq. 



BANEFUL EFFECT OF CLIQUES. 219 

district to the exclusion of the artisans and peasants. 1 
But however the local factions are organized, the deputy 
must seek to propitiate them, and must in turn be con- 
ciliated by the ministers; and on the other hand the 
extensive functions and arbitrary power of the govern- 
ment render every local interest and every commercial 
enterprise more or less dependent upon its good will, 
and thus compel every one to secure its countenance 
through the intervention of the members of Parlia- 
ment. 2 The deputies, in fact, look upon themselves as 
agents to procure favors for their constituents, and a 
striking illustration of the extent to which this is car- 
ried is furnished by the difficulty the government found 
when it managed the railroads in running fast express 
trains, on account of the interference of the members 
of the Chamber, who insisted that all the trains pass- 
ing through their districts should stop at way stations. 
That such a condition of things excited no general dis- 
approbation may be judged from a remark made in the 
debate on the railroad bill in 1876 by Crispi, then one 
of the leaders of the opposition, who said that it was 
unavoidable, because the political parties were interested 
in making for themselves an army of friends. 3 

1 Cf. Turiello, Fatti, p. 196. 

2 Cf. De Viti de Marco, " The Political Situation in Italy," Nineteenth 
Cent, Oct., 1895. 

8 Minghetti, / Partiti Politici, pp. 156-57. One of the few branches of 
the public service that has been kept almost entirely out of politics, and 
hence retains the respect of the people, is the army. Turiello, Fatti, pp. 
199, 316. This is used as an educational as well as a military institution, 
and has no doubt done a certain amount of good in that way ; for not 
only do the recruits receive direct instruction, but they are moved away 
from their own part of the country, and thus given some of the advan- 
tages of travel, which few of them would ever get otherwise. 



220 ITALY. 

The liberal use of patronage again suggests a com- 
Comparison panson with France, — a comparison which 
an! patron- nas nruch the same advantage as placing two 
l?aiSe and shades of color side by side, for the contrast 

y * not only brings out the difference between 

the two, but also helps to make clear the precise 
quality of each of them. In both countries the depu- 
ties have bands of supporters in their districts, and 
use their influence in Parliament to promote the special 
interests of these dependents. In both the attitude of 
the deputies toward the ministry is influenced by ques- 
tions of local administration, and conversely the action 
of the government in matters of local concern is to 
some extent determined by the relation of the deputies 
to the cabinet ; and thus the issues that arise in Parlia- 
ment are a good deal involved with those that affect 
only the province or the commune. Such a connec- 
tion between general and local questions is peculiarly 
marked where the administration is highly centralized, 
but it exists in some form almost everywhere. 

In all conn- T . , , 

tries party In any country with a popular government 

lines tend to _ . i i i • 

be the same party lines tend to become the same m na- 

in national . iii 

and local tional and local politics, where the franchise 

politics. , ... 

in both cases is substantially alike. I do not 
mean that the same issues are necessarily involved, or 
even that similar political principles are always applied 
to both, for a party may advocate economy in one case 
and favor extravagance in the other, or it may be pro- 
gressive in one and conversative in the other. Nor do 
I mean that the same party must prevail in both, for 
there may be independents who vote for the local can- 



NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARTIES. 221 

didates of one party and the national candidates of 
the other, so that one party may be victorious in local 
elections and the other in national ones. This has 
often occurred in the United States in the case of the 
vote of a State for the President and the governor, 
and it happens regularly in Canada. What I mean 
is that all political struggles, whether national or local, 
in which party lines are drawn at all, are usually 
carried on between the same parties. There R easons for 
are two reasons for this. The leaders of a this * 
party understand very well the importance of keeping 
up its organization and discipline, and they know that 
these would be greatly impaired if their followers were 
allowed to break ranks and take part in a battle on 
opposite sides. They realize how hard it would be to 
rally them under the old standard after they had been 
disbanded, and hence they want to keep up the party 
organization by bringing it into every contest. This 
motive is, of course, strongest where the organization 
is most highly developed, but to some extent it must 
be present everywhere, even when the ties of party are 
as loose as in France and Italy. The other reason goes 
deeper down into human nature. When men have 
attached themselves heartily to a party, they tend to 
become identified with it. It engages their sympathies 
and colors their judgment. Whatever may be their 
motives for joining it, — and these are often uncon- 
scious and always hard to analyze, — they are to some 
extent forgotten in the heat of the strife. The ultimate 
objects for which the party exists are more or less lost 
sight of. It ceases to be merely a means to an end, 



222 ITALY. 

and becomes in itself a proximate end. Now it is 
impossible for most men to feel a strong allegiance of 
this kind for two separate parties, at least on subjects 
tbat are at all connected, because they cannot keep 
their passions, their attachments, and their antipathies 
sufficiently distinct. It is hard to separate an act from 
the actor, to preserve unimpaired our esteem for the 
character and good judgment of a man who pursues 
what we believe to be a mischievous policy, or to turn 
away from leaders whom we have been in the habit of 
trusting. The partisan is inclined, therefore, to mag- 
nify the wisdom and integrity of the men on his own 
side, and djstrust those of his opponents. He cannot 
avoid bringing his prejudices into play in every politi- 
cal question, and inclines in any contest to associate 
himself with those people in whom he has learned to 
have confidence in a kindred struggle. If, therefore, the 
lines of cleavage of national and local parties are sub- 
stantially different, the loyalty to one or both of them 
is liable to become enfeebled until it ceases altogether. 
Hence it is very difficult to maintain in national and 
local politics separate parties which are really independ- 
ent, and whose lines are essentially different. 1 There 
are, of course, cases where such a separation of party 
lines exists. A number of instances may be found 
among the smaller cities in England and America, in 
some of which the municipal elections have for many 

1 See that keen analysis of American city politics, The Boss, pp. 49, 50. 

Where one of the national parties has an overwhelming majority in 
some part of the country, it sometimes breaks up there into factions which 
fight among themselves over local matters. But this is really a case of 
the subdivision of a party, not of distinct parties for national and local 
politics. It is a peculiar case within the rule, not an exception to it. 



NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARTIES. 223 

years had little or no connection with national politics. 
But perhaps the most striking example of all has been 
furnished by the history of the new county council of 
London, In the last election to that body, however, 
the campaign came dangerously near being conducted 
on party lines, and it does not seem probable that the 
Moderates and Progressives in the council will long 
remain distinct from the Conservatives and Liberals in 
the nation. 

When the national and local party are the same, it 
is clear that both national and local questions Parties are 
must enter into the formation of parties ; but o^ftiSl5 y 
it does not follow that both must enter to an ^JSf 17 



on 

issues. 



equal degree. On the contrary, one of them 
has usually a decided preponderance over the other, so 
that either the local parties are formed chiefly on 
national issues, or the national parties are based mainly 
on local ones. Now the former is the case in France, 
the latter in Italy. 

The French parties are formed chiefly on national 
questions ; for, although the deputies demand In France 
favors for their districts greedily, owe their ^edom^ 
nominations largely to their personal influence nate * 
there, and are constantly subjected to pressure from 
home, still their election turns in the main on national 
issues. The essential difference between a Moderate, 
an Opportunist, and a Radical consists in their gen- 
eral political theories, and their views on the course 
which the central government ought to pursue. While, 
therefore, the question who shall be the candidate of 
the Eadical party depends on local considerations, the 



224 ITALY. 

question whether the district shall be represented by a 
Kadical at all is determined mainly on national grounds. 
In Italy, on the other hand, since the enthusiasm 
in Italy the tnat attended the birth of the kingdom faded 
latter. away, the deputies, especially in the south, 

have been elected mainly on local and personal issues, 
with less regard to their views on national questions, 
and therefore the groups in the Chamber are based 
chiefly on personal and geographical motives. 1 With 
the exception of the sn&Jl groups of Republicans and 
Socialists there cannot be said to be any national parties 
at all, 2 for, although a grand reunion of a party is 
sometimes held, its programme is apt to be vague, and 
is hardly meant seriously. In France there is a real 
difference in the principles, the opinions, and the tone 
of mind of the Radicals and the Moderates; but in 
Italy, at least if we leave the Extreme Left out of 
account, it is hard to discern any distinction between 
the various groups. The bulk of the deputies assemble 
at Rome virtually unpledged to any definite policy, or 
rather most of them are pledged only to support the 
cabinet of the hour, and when that begins to totter 
they are ready to form any coalition that their own 
ambition or the local interests of their clients may 
suggest. Now it is a singular fact that in the Nea- 
politan provinces, where the constituents are most eager 
to control the state patronage, the deputy is more free 
than in the rest of Italy to follow his own convictions 
on national affairs. 3 In short, the exceptional greed for 

1 See Turiello, Fatti, p. 327. 2 Id., p. 319 et seq. 

8 Id., p. 195. 



ABSENCE OF NATIONAL PARTIES. 225 

private favors is accompanied by a comparative indif- 
ference on public questions, and in this case, as in many 
others, it may be observed that what is peculiarly true 
of Naples is true in some degree of the whole of Italy ; 
for, as a recent writer from that city has remarked, the 
Neapolitan is an exaggerated type of Italian. 1 

The popular indifference on public questions has a 
curious effect. It has a tendency to remove Effeet of 
those questions from the heat of party strife, this • 
They may, of course, be made the occasion for a battle, 
but this is not necessarily the case, for a vote on them 
one way or the other entails no breach of party prin- 
ciple, no violation of electoral pledges, and hence if the 
cabinet is influential and commands respect, it has a 
good chance of passing its measures without fighting 
a systematic party opposition. The more completely, 
therefore, the elections turn on local and personal 
issues, the more absolutely must the government use its 
administrative powers to please the deputies, but the 
more free will it be to follow its own opinions in 
matters of general policy that do not directly affect 
private interests. This is to a great extent the case in 
Italy, and the result is a certain inversion of the natural 
functions of the branches of the government. The 
legislature has lost much of its importance in legisla- 
tion, while the representatives, not indeed as a body but 
individually, exert over executive acts an influence 
that lowers the tone of political morality and degrades 
the administration. The abuse of political influence 
for private purposes has always existed under every 

1 Turiello, Fatti, p. 104. 

VOL. I. 



226 ITALY. 

form of government, but it has a peculiar danger in 
Dan er of democracies : first, because the poorer classes 
tenfLT wno f urn i sn a large part of the voters have, 
democracy. or think they have, comparatively little interest 
in the economical administration of public affairs ; and 
second, because the smaller the fragments into which 
power is divided, and the larger the electorate, the 
more difficult it is for patriotic individuals to oppose 
the pressure of selfish organizations. 

The Italians themselves are fully alive to the blight- 
ing effect of the spoils system and of the 
curing the relation of patron and client with which it 

social dis- . 1 . . to 

organiza- is associated in then* country. In fact, an 

tion which . . • ■■ 1 

causes the Italian writer has truly said that m order to 

cliques. _ . ^ 

create Italy it is necessary to destroy the 
cliques ; 1 but the task is by no means light. We have 
\een that in the south, where these grow most rank, 
they are due to the same cause that formerly gave rise 
to the Camorra and the Mafia and still disposes men to 
seek aid and protection from one another ; that is, to 
a want of mutual confidence, and to an absence of 
respect for law and government, to a lack, in short, of 

political civilization. Now the onlv wav in 
administra- which social order can be perfected rapidly is 
inappro- by enforcing public authority rigorously and 

affording absolute security to the people who 
obey it, so that every man may rely on the determina- 
tion and ability of the government to maintain justice, 
and may look for protection to the state instead of to 

1 " Per fare V Italia bisogna disfare le sette" Foscolo, quoted by Turi- 
ello, Fatti, p. 197. 



PARLIAMENT SPOILS THE ADMINISTRATION. 227 

his powerful neighbors. Such a result can be attained 
either by means of the administrative officers, or 
through the courts of law; and, as we have already 
seen, order was brought into France by the first method 
and into England by the second. The enforcement of 
public authority by means of the administration is, 
indeed, peculiarly suited to an absolute monarchy like 
that of the French kings, for the ruler's tenure being 
permanent, he is lifted as far as possible above consid- 
erations of person and party, if he has sufficient 
character to resist the blandishments of his courtiers. 
But it is clear that a system which involves the use of 
power in its nature arbitrary can work successfully 
only in case favoritism is excluded, and the 

<>p • i p i • j • i tvt i because in- 

onicials are firm and impartial. JNow under consistent 

v . P « . i • withapar- 

a parliamentary iorm ot government arbi- Hamentary 

-, . , . . ,, system. 

trary power cannot be exercised impartially, 
because the ministers are dependent upon the Cham- 
ber, and no cabinet can long pursue the steady auto- 
cratic policy that is necessary if it is to be continually 
called to account by deputies whose constituents have 
suffered in the process. The advantage of enforcing 
order by means of the administrative officials, instead 
of by the courts, lies in the fact that the ruler is not 
tied down to rigid legal formulas, but can exercise his 
discretion according to the needs of the case, and that 
is a very great gain in certain conditions of society ; 
but it is this very discretionary element that makes 
the system incompatible with a parliamentary form of 
government. The inconsistency in Italy is, indeed, 
only too apparent. 



228 ITALY. 

This method of perfecting social order being, there- 
Thejudi- ^ ore > cer ^ am *° work badly under the exist- 
powerM i n g ^ 0Tm °$- government, the only alternative 
enough. mus t be found in the courts of law, provided 
of course the country has at last reached a point where 
arbitrary rule can be dispensed with. But if the courts 
are to produce the desired result they must in turn be 
able to afford absolute protection to the citizen, and to 
do so they must have final power to administer justice 
in all cases. We have already seen that until lately 
they were very far from having any such authority in 
Italy, because the government often had a right to inter- 
fere when they touched upon an official act ; and even 
under the recent laws on administrative justice they do 
not hold the position which is necessary to enable them 
to fulfill so great a task. These laws, indeed, do not 
strengthen at all the ordinary courts, whose influence, 
moreover, is weakened by the existence of the iive 
courts of cassation. Now, in order to magnify the 
authority of law, and to give it the character of some- 
thing eternal and immutable, independent of time and 
place, it is important to make the administration of 
justice as uniform throughout the nation as possible. 
For this reason a centralization of the judicial system 
is certainly desirable. In order to raise the moral 
force of the courts to the highest point, it is also 
essential to inspire the utmost confidence in the im- 
partiality of the judges, and in this matter the Italians 
might well find a suggestion in the ancient practice of 
their own cities. It was the habit in the Middle Ages 
to appoint to the office of Podesta, or highest judicial 



NEED OF A STRONGER JUDICIARY. 229 

magistrate, a stranger from another city, on the ground 
that he would be more free from local influence, 
more independent of the factions of those days. This 
example might, perhaps, be profitably followed now, 
and the judges from Kome might sit in circuit and 
hold court in the different provinces, like the English 
justices in eyre. But whatever method may be adopted, 
it is certain that the result must be attained before 
the present government can work really well. Owing 
to the lack of a strong system of courts, or rather to 
a political condition in which such courts cannot exist, 
the South American republics present a constant parody 
of the United States, whose institutions they have 
meant to copy ; and in the same way Italy furnishes 
an illustration of the difficulty of making the parlia- 
mentary form of government a success without a 
powerful judiciary. 

The Italian statesmen have had great obstacles to 
encounter. They found the country divided into a 
number of separate provinces, each of them with its 
own peculiar habits and traditions, and some of them 
socially disorganized. They found it defenseless and 
poor, and for the most part well-nigh devoid of rail- 
roads or telegraphs. They have welded these provinces 
together into a single nation, to which they have given 
a uniform administration and enlightened codes of law. 
They have almost completely suppressed brigandage, 
and have nearly rooted out the Camorra and Mafia. 
They have created a large army and a powerful fleet, 
and they have covered the land with a network of 
railroads and telegraphs. What wonder if it should 



230 ITALY. 

appear that amidst all this labor some things had been 
left undone and others had been done imperfectly ; if 
it should prove that, in establishing a free government 
among a people with a defective political training, some 
institutions had been set up "which are inconsistent 
with each other, or ill adapted to the condition of 
the country. The nation has not yet worked out her 
problems, but she has two great advantages : her people 
are patient and sensible in polities, and have shown 
themselves willing to bear the immense cost of national 
regeneration ; and she has a number of men, both 
among scholars and in active public life, who are fully 
sensible of her difficulties, and are trying earnestly to 
solve them. 

The greatest immediate danger to Italy is economic. 
The finan- ^he ^ s a P oor comr try> possessing little capital 
cmi danger. an( j a comparatively small amount of com- 
merce or manufactures, and in Sicily, at least, saddled 
with customs in regard to labor and the tenancy of land 
that make industrial progress extremely difficult ; yet 
she strives to play a great part in Europe. Her immod- 
erate ambition is said to be fostered by the prevalent 
classical education which keeps before the mind of her 
people the glories of ancient Rome ; but whether this 
be the cause or not, the effects are disastrous. The 
country has rolled up a large debt, and her army and 
navy are more expensive than she can properly afford. 
The result is that although the taxes appear to be as 
heavy as the country can bear, deficits in the budget 
have reappeared within the last few years, and the im- 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE. 231 

migration from the rural districts is alarming. 1 But in 
spite of the dark shadows that fall across her path, one 
cannot help believing that the country which has led 
the world once in arms and once in arts, which has 
given laws to the whole of Europe, which in these last 
times has freed her soil from the foreigner, and has 
made herself a great nation, will find in her people 
the sagacity and the self-denial necessary to overcome 
her difficulties and regain a share of her ancient pros- 
perity. 

1 Pareto, "L'ltalie Economique," Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. W^ 
1891. 



CHAPTEE V. 

GERMANY: THE STRUCTURE OF THE EMPIRE. 

Cherbuliez has remarked that most countries which 
have grown in size have started with a com- 
of Germany pact territory and increased it hy absorbing 
Holy Roman the adjacent lands, but that Prussia began 
with her frontiers and afterwards filled in 
between them. The statement is almost literally true, 
for early in the seventeenth century the Electors of 
Brandenburg, who were the ancestors of the Kings of 
Prussia, acquired the large Duchy of Prussia on the 
Baltic and the Duchy of Cleves on the Rhine, posses- 
sions which form to-day very nearly the extreme limits 
of the Prussian monarchy on the east and west. At 
that time these duchies did not touch the Electors' 
other territories, and in fact until less than thirty years 
ago several States were so wedged in among the Prus- 
sian dominions as to cut the kingdom quite in two. 
Nor was this the case with Prussia alone. The whole 
map of Germany as it stood in the last century was a 
mass of patches of different color mingled together in 
bewildering confusion. Not only were some of the prin- 
cipalities inconceivably small, but they often consisted in 
part of outlying districts at a distance from one another, 
and entirely surrounded by the estates of some other 
potentate. The cause of such a state of things is to be 



THE GROWTH OF PRUSSIA. 233 

found in the excessive development of the feudal sys- 
tem, which treated sovereignty as a private right of the 
ruler, so that princes dealt with their fiefs very much as 
men do with their lands to-day. They acquired them 
freely in all directions by inheritance, by marriage, and 
even by purchase, and, what was worse, at their death 
they divided them as they pleased among their sons. 
Still another source of confusion was presented by the 
bishops and other high church dignitaries, who held 
large estates which they ruled as temporal sovereigns. 
The result was that Germany was divided in a most 
fantastic way among several hundred princes, who owed, 
it is true, a shadowy allegiance to the Emperor as head 
of the Holy Koman Empire, but for all practical pur- 
poses were virtually independent. 

Almost alone among the German States Prussia was 
steadily gaining in size and power. Her The growth 
growth may be traced primarily to the Con- of Prussia - 
stitutio Achillea of 1473, which forbade the splitting 
up of the monarchy among the sons of the Electors, and 
thus kept all their dominions together ; but it was due 
chiefly to the thrift, the energy, and the sagacity of the 
rulers of the House of Hohenzollern. At the close of the 
thirty years' war, in 1648, the Great Elector obtained 
possessions which made his domains larger than those of 
any other German State except Austria, and in the next 
century the annexations of Frederic the Great 
more than doubled the population of his king- a time, but 
dom. The growth of Prussia was suddenly helped by 

. & . nil- i Napoleon. 

checked by an event that tended ultimately 

to hasten its development. This was the outbreak of 



234 GERMANY. 

the French Revolution and the career of Bonaparte. 
When a series of victories had laid Germany at his feet, 
Napoleon suppressed a large number of petty principali- 
ties including all the ecclesiastical ones, and combined 
the smaller States that remained into the Confederation 
of the Rhine. He also deprived Prussia of half her 
territory, thinking by these means to reduce her to 
impotence, and create in the heart of Germany a body 
that would always be devoted to the cause of France. 
But in fact the petty principalities had been too small 
to act separately or to combine effectively, and too 
independent to be made serviceable by any sovereign ; 
and by suppressing them Napoleon had given the Ger- 
mans some little capacity for organization, which was 
used against him as soon as the tide turned. 1 

After his overthrow Germany was reorganized by 
The Ger- * ne treaty of Vienna, and the States, which 
Sanation" now numbered only thirty-nine, were formed 
and the Diet, j^ a looge con f e a e ration. This was not 

properly a federal union, but rather a perpetual in- 
ternational alliance, the States remaining separate and 
independent, except for matters affecting the external 
and internal safety of Germany. The only organ of 
the Confederation was a Diet composed of the diplo- 
matic agents of the different States, who acted like 
ambassadors, and voted in accordance with the instruc- 
tions they received from their respective governments. 

1 This is very well stated by Colonel Malleson in his Refounding of the 
German Empire, pp. 4-6. Napoleon prophesied that within fifty years all 
Europe would be either Republican or Cossack. One of the chief causes 
of the failure of this prediction has been the creation of a united Germany, 
which Napoleon himself unwittingly helped to bring about. 



THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION. 235 

It had power to declare war and make peace, to or- 
ganize the federal army, to enact laws for the purpose 
of applying the constitution, and to decide disputes 
between the States ; but it had no administrative offi- 
cers under its command, the federal laws being exe- 
cuted entirely by the officials of the States. Hence the 
only means of getting its orders carried out in case a 
State refused to obey them was by the process known 
as federal execution, which meant that the Diet called 
on one or more members of the Confederation to at- 
tack the recalcitrant State, and by invading its territo- 
ries to compel submission. The procedure in the Diet 
was a complicated one. For ordinary matters it acted 
by sections called curice, when the eleven largest 
States had one vote apiece, the other twenty-eight 
being combined into six groups each of which had a 
single vote. For constitutional questions, on the other 
hand, and those relating to peace and war, the Diet 
proceeded in plenum, and in that case each of the 
smaller States had one vote, while the fourteen largest 
had two, three, or four votes apiece. 1 This distribution 
of votes was by no means in proportion to population, 
for the largest States were much more than four times 
as big as the smallest, but it was a distinct recognition 
of an inequality of rights on the part of the States, 
and as such it still retains an especial importance 
because the arrangement of the votes in the plenum 
has continued almost unchanged in one of the chief 
organs of the Empire to-day. It must not be supposed, 

1 Six of the States had four votes, five had three, three had two, and 
twenty-five had one. 



236 GERMANY. 

however, that the influence of the States in the Diet 
was determined by the number of their votes, for 
Austria, which had a permanent right to the presi- 
dency of the Assembly, and Prussia, which had a per- 
manent right to the vice-presidency, exercised in fact 
a controlling authority. When these two great powers 
agreed they had their own way ; when they disagreed, 
which often happened, the opinion of Austria usually 
■prevailed. 

The wars of Napoleon did a great deal more for 
Failure of Germany than to suppress petty principal- 
attemp^to 1 ities an( l gi ye ™ e to a clumsy confederation. 
SS n y^ er " They awakened a sentiment of German na- 
tion ality. At first this was only a sentiment, 
and for a long period it had no practical results. It 
was especially strong among the Liberals, and grew 
stronger as time went on ; but under the reaction that 
followed the overthrow of Napoleon, the Liberals had 
little influence, until the convulsions of 1848 and 1849 
brought them to the front. At this time they tried 
hard to bring about a national union of Germany, but 
they were sadly hampered by their theoretical views 
and their want of political experience. Their aim was 
a German state constructed on an ideal model, and 
they lacked the quality which is essential to real states- 
manship, — the power to distinguish the elements in 
the existing order of things which have a solid basis, 
to seize upon these, and adapt them to the end in view. 
Hence their efforts expended themselves in declamation 
and academic discussion, and came to nothing. In 
May, 1848, they succeeded in bringing together at 



LIBERAL MOVEMENTS OF 1848. 237 

Frankfort a National German Parliament elected by 
universal suffrage, and if this body had proposed 
quickly any rational plan for a union of Germany, the 
chances of its adoption would have been very good, 
for every government in the country had been forced 
to give way before the fierce onslaught of the Liberal 
movement. But unfortunately more than four months 
of precious time were consumed in debating the pri- 
mary rights of the citizen, and when these were finally 
disposed of the tide was beginning to ebb. At last, 
in March, 1849, a constitution was agreed upon, and 
the imperial crown was tendered to the King of Prus- 
sia ; but the offer came too late. Had it been made 
in the preceding summer it might have been accepted, 
but now the revolution had spent its force. Austria, 
at first paralyzed by insurrection, had now recovered 
from the shock, was rapidly putting down her rebel- 
lious subjects, and under the able leadership of Prince 
Schwartzenberg was determined to prevent any re- 
organization of Germany which would diminish her 
influence. After a feeble struggle Prussia yielded 
to her more determined rival, the revolutionary move- 
ment came to an end, and the old Confederation was 
restored. 

Again a period of reaction set in, which lasted about 
ten years, when Germany was thrilled by the 
events in Italy, and the Liberals again be- 
came powerful. Whether they would have avoided 
their former mistakes and succeeded better it is im- 
possible to say, for just at this time there appeared 
upon the scene a man who was destined to stamp his 



238 GEEMANY. 

will on Germany, and change the whole face of Euro- 
pean politics. That man was von Bismarck. He be- 
longed to the lesser Prussian nobility, which is the 
most conservative class in the race ; but he was of far 
too large a calibre to be bound down by traditional 
prejudices; and indeed he had already formed very 
decided opinions of his own on the subject of German 
unity. He had served as a representative of Prussia 
at the Diet, and had learned that a German nation 
was impossible so long as the two great powers — 
Austria and Prussia — were contending for a mas- 
tery. He saw that the first step must be the forcible 
expulsion of Austria from all share in German politics, 
and he believed that union could never be brought 
about by argument, that the Germans could not be 
persuaded, but must be compelled to unite, that the 
work must be done, as he expressed it, by blood and 
iron. 

An important advance towards closer relations be- 
tween the States had, indeed, been made long ago by 
the creation of the Zollverein or customs union. 
This had been founded by Prussia in the early part 
of the century, and had gradually been extended until 
it included almost all the German States, except Aus- 
tria, which had been jealously excluded by the Prus- 
sian statesmen ; but valuable as the Zollverein was 
in teaching the people their common interests, Bis- 
marck was no doubt right in thinking that no further 
progress could be expected without the use of force. 
Now it was precisely on this point that his methods 
differed from those of the Liberals, for war formed no 



BISMARCK AND THE WAR OF 1866. 239 

part of their programme, and for that very reason they 
were unable to understand his policy. In 
1859 they had obtained a majority in the tutionai con- 
lower house of the Prussian Parliament, and 
had very soon become involved in a quarrel with King 
William over the reorganization of the army, on which 
he had set his heart. 1 In 1862 the King turned to 
Bismarck and made him the President of the Council. 
Bismarck submitted to the chamber a budget contain- 
ing the appropriations for the military changes, and 
when the chamber refused to pass it he withdrew it, 
and governed without any budget at all. This he was 
enabled to do, because the taxes were collected under 
standing laws which required no reenactment, and in 
fact could not be changed without the consent of the 
crown ; and because a doctrine was developed that in 
case the King and the two houses were unable to 
agree upon appropriations, the King was entitled to 
make all those expenditures which were necessary in 
order to carry on the government in accordance with 
the laws regulating the various branches of the admin- 
istration. 2 The Liberals were furious at this budget- 
less rule, but Bismarck proceeded in spite of them. 
He persuaded Austria to join Prussia in wresting the 
duchies of Sclileswig and Holstein from Denmark in 
1864, and then contrived to quarrel with her about 
the disposition to be made of them. The majority in 
the German Diet sided with Austria, and ordered the 

1 William became Regent on Oct. 7, 1858, and on the death of his 
brother Frederick William IV., on January 2, 1861, he became King. 

2 See page 298, infra. 



240 GERMANY. 

troops of the Confederation mobilized against Prussia. 
rp, t Then followed the war of 1866, and the 

The war of ? 

1866. crushing defeat of Austria and the smaller 

German States that took her part. 

Bismarck had originally intended to compel all the 
Prussian States except Austria to form a federal union, 
and e ?n a e ions but tne intervention of Napoleon III. forced 
ma^Confed- h™ to abandon the plan, and limit the Gen- 
eration, federation to the country north of the river 
Main. 1 He therefore determined as a compensation to 
increase the direct strength of Prussia by annexing the 
States that had fought against her. 2 Hanover, Electo- 
ral Hesse, 3 Nassau, and Frankfort, besides Schles- 
wig-Holstein, were accordingly incorporated in Prussia, 
while with the other States north of the Main a new fed- 
eral union was formed under the name of the North 
German Confederation. 4 This had for its president 
the Prussian King ; and for its legislature two cham- 
bers, — one the Eeichstag, a popular assembly elected 
by universal suffrage, and the other the Bundesrath, 
or federal council, which was copied from the old 

1 Luxemburg and Limburg, which belonged to Holland, had been a 
part of the old Confederation, but were allowed to drop out at this time, 
and were not included in the reorganization of Germany. This was true 
also of the tiny principality of Lichtenstein in the south. 

2 Von Sybel, Begrundung des Deutschen Reiches, book xix. ch. ii. 

3 Also called Hesse-Cassel to distinguish it from Hesse-Darmstadt or 
grand-ducal Hesse, which, being the only Hesse remaining in existence 
as a separate State, is hereinafter called simply Hesse. 

4 The constitution of the Confederation was first agreed upon by the 
governments of the several States, then accepted with slight modifica- 
tions by a National Assembly elected by universal suffrage for the pur- 
pose, and finally ratified by the legislatures of the States. 



THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION. 241 

Diet, and composed in the same way of the plenipo- 
tentiaries of the different States, but was endowed 
with peculiar and extensive powers. Austria was ex- 
cluded from all participation in German politics ; while 
the four States south of the Main — Bavaria, Wurtem- 
berg, Baden, and Hesse 1 — became independent, and 
were expressly left at liberty to form a separate union 
among themselves. As a matter of fact, they made 
offensive and defensive alliances with the Confeder- 
ation, and formed with it a Zollverein or customs 
union, whose organs were the two chambers of the 
Confederation reinforced by representatives from the 
southern States. Every one felt that the union of 
Germany was incomplete so long as these States were 
not a part of it ; but Bavaria and Wurtemberg were 
reluctant to surrender their independence ; and the 
enthusiasm aroused by the war with France in 1870 
was required to raise the sentiment for German 
nationality to such a pitch as to sweep them into line. 
Even then they demanded and obtained special privi- 
leges as the price of their adhesion ; but at last all 
the difficulties were arranged, and in the autumn of 
1870 treaties were made with the four southern States 
whereby they joined the union. The name of the 
Confederation was changed at the same time to that 
of " German Empire," the president being The German 
given the title of Emperor ; and in the course Em P ire - 
of the following winter the changes and additions 

1 This is Hesse-Darmstadt. It lay on both sides of the Main, but 
the part on the north of that river was already included in the North 
German Confederation. 

VOL. I 



242 GERMANY. 

entailed by these treaties were embodied in a new draft 
of the constitution. 1 

The constitution has nothing about it that is abstract 
Practical or ideal. It was drawn up by a man of 
the^ti- * affairs who knew precisely what he wanted, 
tntlon * and understood very well the limitations im- 

posed upon him, and the concessions he was obliged to 
make to the existing order of things. , His prime object 
was to create a powerful military state, and hence, as 
has been pointed out, the articles on most subjects are 
comparatively meagre, but those on the army, the navy, 
and the revenue are drawn up with a minuteness 
befitting the by-laws of a commercial company. 2 

Before proceeding to a description of the organs of 

1 Cf. Laband, Deutsches Staatsrecht, 2d ed. ch. i. In 1873 three 
amendments were made in this instrument. The first (that of Feb. 25) 
abolished the provision limiting the right to vote in the Reichstag, on 
those matters which by the constitution are not common to the whole 
Empire, to the representatives of the States affected. The second 
(that of March 3) put the lighthouses, buoys, etc., along the coast under 
the control of the federal government ; and the third (that of Dec. 20) 
extended the legislative power of the Empire over the whole field of civil 
and criminal law. It had previously covered contracts, commercial law, 
and criminal law. Except for a change in the term of the Reichstag in 
1888 from three to five years, the constitution has remained unaltered 
since that time, but substantial changes in the fundamental law of the 
Empire have been made without a formal modification of the text. 
(See Laband, vol. i. pp. 48-49, 51.) Some of the German jurists main- 
tain that such a practice is wrong (von Ronne, Staatsrecht des Deutschen 
Reiches, 2d ed. pp. 31-34; Meyer, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, 
p. 416) ; others that it is quite proper, provided the majority required in 
the Bundesrath for a formal amendment of the constitution is in fact 
obtained. (Laband, vol. i. pp. 545-49; Arndt, Verfassung des Deutschen 
Reiches, pp. 290-91.) For the method of amending the constitution, see 
pages 246, 250-51, infra. 

2 Lebon, Etudes sur VAllemagne Politique, Introcl., p. iii. 



THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION. 243 

the state, it will be worth while to examine the nature 
of the Confederation. We are in the habit of 
speaking of the German Empire as a federal the Confed- 
government, and rightly ; but we must bear 
in mind that it departs essentially from the type which 
we commonly associate with that term, and which is 
embodied in our own constitution. We con- Lar le 
ceive of a federal system as one in which there gnSii eScu- 
is a division of powers between the central tlve P° wers - 
government and the States, according to subjects, so 
that in those matters which fall within the sphere of 
federal control the central government not only makes 
the laws, but executes them by means of its own 
officials. Thus Congress enacts a tariff; the United 
States custom house collects the duties ; and the fed- 
eral courts decide the questions that arise under the 
law. But all this is very different in Germany. There 
the legislative power of the central government is far 
more extensive than in this country, for it includes 
almost everything that is placed under the control of 
Congress and many other matters besides. In addition 
to such subjects as customs duties and taxes, the army 
and navy, the consular service, and the protection of 
foreign commerce, which are obviously essential, the 
list comprises many matters of domestic legislation. It 
covers not only the posts and telegraphs, 1 transporta- 
tion on streams running through more than one State, 
and extraditions between the States, but also in general 
terms railroads, 2 roads and canals, citizenship, travel, 

1 Except in Bavaria and Wurtemberg. 

2 Except in Bavaria. 



244 GERMANY. 

change of residence, and the carrying on of trades, 
also the regulation of weights and measures, of coinage 
and paper money, and of banking, patents, copyrights, 
and of medical and veterinary police. Moreover, it 
includes the regulation of the press and associations, 
and finally the whole domain of ordinary civil and 
criminal law and of judicial proceedings. All these 
things are declared subject to imperial legislation and 
supervision. 1 

The administrative power of the Empire, on the other 
hand, is very small, the federal laws being carried out 
in the main by the officers of the States as under the 
Confederation of 1815. Except, indeed, for foreign 
affairs, the navy, and to some extent the army and the 
postal and telegraphic service, the executive functions 
of the Empire are limited for the most part to the 
laying down of general regulations, and a supervision 
of their execution by the several States. 2 Thus the 
federal government can enact a tariff, make regula- 
tions which shall govern the custom-house officers, and 
appoint inspectors to see that they are carried out ; but 
the duties are actually collected by state officials. 3 One 

1 Art. 4 of the constitution and the amendment of Dec. 20, 1873. 

2 See Laband, § 66. In the case of the army (Const. Arts. 63-66) and 
the posts and telegraphs (Art. 50), the highest officers are appointed by 
the Emperor, who gives them their orders, while the subordinates are 
appointed by the States. 

3 As a rule the whole net revenue flows into the imperial treasury, but 
by the tariff act of 1879 the net revenue from customs duties above one 
hundred and thirty million marks is divided among the States in propor- 
tion to their population. In case the receipts of the Empire are not equal 
to its expenses, the deficiency is covered by means of contributions called 
Matricularleitrage assessed on the different States in proportion to their 



NATURE OF THE FEDERAL UNION. 245 

naturally asks what happens if a State refuses or fails 
to carry out a federal law. The matter is reported to 
the Bundesrath, which decides any controversy about 
the interpretation of the law. 1 But suppose the State 
persists in its refusal to administer the law, what can 
the federal government do ? It cannot give effect to 
the law itself, nor has it any officials for the purpose. 
Its only resource is federal execution, — that is, an 
armed attack on the delinquent State, — which can be 
ordered by the Bundesrath, and is carried out by the 
Emperor. 2 This last resort has never been used, nor is 
it likely to be, because the Emperor is also the King of 
Prussia, and Prussia alone is not only larger than any 
other State, but larger than all the rest put together. 
Execution against Prussia is therefore doubly out of 
the question ; and any other State would be so easily 
overpowered that it is certain to submit, rather than 
provoke an appeal to force. 

Another conception that we associate with federal 
government is an equality of rights among the mem- 
population. (Const. Art. 70, and see Laband, § 126.) This was originally- 
intended to be a subsidiary and exceptional source of revenue, but owing 
to the quarrel between Bismarck and the Reichstag on the subject of 
federal taxation, the Matricularbeitrage became large and permanent. 
(Cf. Lebon, Allemagne, p. 106 et seq.) Under the present system the 
excess of customs duties is paid to the States, and returned by them as 
contributions, — a practice established in order to preserve the control of 
the Reichstag over the imperial revenues, for the assessments upon the 
States require a vote of that body, whereas the customs duties once voted 
can be collected without further authorization, and the tariff cannot be 
repealed without the consent of the Bundesrath, which for this purpose 
is entirely subject to the will of the Emperor. See page 249, infra. 

1 Const. Art. 7, § 3. 

2 Const. Art. 19, and see Laband, vol. i. pp. 105-6. 



246 GERMANY. 

l>ers. But in the German Empire all is inequality. It 
inequality would, indeed, have been impossible to make 
aLong*the a federation on really equal terms between 
members. a num ]3 er f States, one of which contained 
three fifths of the total population, while the other 
twenty-four contained altogether only two fifths. The 
compact could not fail to resemble that between the 
lion and the fox, or rather a compact between a lion, 
Privileges of na ^ a dozen foxes, and a score of mice. The 
Prussia. larger States are accorded all sorts of privi- 
leges, and so much of the lion's share of these falls to 
Prussia that it is hardly too much to say that she rules 
Germany with the advice and assistance of the other 
States. In the first place she has a perpetual right to 
have her King the Emperor of Germany. 1 Secondly, 
amendments to the constitution — although 

Under the . . , , . . . 

constitu- requiring only an ordinary majority vote in 
the Eeichstag — are defeated in the Bundes- 
rath if fourteen negative votes are thrown against them, 
and as Prussia has seventeen votes in that body, she 
has an absolute veto on all changes of the constitution. 2 
Besides this, it is expressly provided that in the case of 
all bills relating to the army, the navy, the customs 

1 Const. Art. 11. 

2 Const. Art. 78. In the North German Confederation a two thirds 
vote in the Bundesrath was necessary for a change in the constitution, 
but when the South German States were admitted, Prussia had no longer 
a third of the delegates, and in order to preserve her veto the proportion 
required was increased to three quarters. Finally at the instance of 
Bavaria, which wanted to enlarge the power of the States of the second 
size, it was agreed that fourteen negative votes should be enough to 
defeat an amendment to the constitution. Arndt, p. 290; Robinson, 
The German Bundesrath } p. 40. 



PRIVILEGES OF PRUSSIA. 247 

duties, or the excises, and in the case of all proposals 
to revise the administrative regulations for collecting 
the revenue, the vote of Prussia in the Bundesrath is 
decisive if cast in favor of maintaining the existing 
institutions. 1 In other words, Prussia has a veto on all 
measures for making changes in the army, the navy, 
or the taxes. She has also the casting vote in case of a 
tie in the Bundesrath, 2 and the chairmanship of all the 
standing committees of that body. 3 

These are Prussia's constitutional privileges ; but she 
has others obtained by private agreement with 
her smaller partners ; for the several States are eiai conven- 

. tions with 

at liberty to make conventions or treaties with the other 

i -i ' ■ ^ nc • • States. 

each other in regard to the affairs that remain 

subject to their control. 4 When the North German 

Confederation was formed, universal military 

, .p ..,.,, The army. 

service and a uniform organization like that 
of Prussia were introduced into all the States, but the 
army was not made exclusively a national or left en- 
tirely a state institution. 5 The constitution provides 
that the military laws shall be made by the Empire, 6 and 

1 Const. Arts. 5, 35, and 37. 2 Const. Art. 7. 

3 Const. Art. 8 ; Laband, vol i. p. 264. Except the committee on 
foreign affairs, where, as will be explained hereafter, it would be of no 
use to her. 

4 Laband, § 63. To some extent the States are at liberty to make 
separate conventions with foreign powers, and they have a right to send 
their own representatives to foreign courts. Laband, § 71. 

5 Const. Arts. 57-68. The last eight of these articles do not apply to 
Bavaria, and only partially to Wurtemberg. See page 250, infra. The 
expense of maintaining the army is borne by the Empire. Unlike the 
army, the navy is a purely national institution. Art. 53. 

6 The double position of the Prussian monarch comes out curiously 
here, for the constitution provides : first, that the military laws and regu- 



248 GERMANY. 

declares that the forces of the country shall be a single 
army under the command of the Emperor, whose orders 
they are bound to obey. It gives him a right to inspect 
and dispose of the troops, and to appoint all officers 
whose command includes the entire contingent of a 
State. It provides also that the selection of the gen- 
erals shall be subject to his approval, but it leaves to 
the States the appointment of all inferior officers, and 
the management of their troops in other respects. Now 
these reserved rights were of little value, and all but 
three of the States transferred them to Prussia, chiefly 
in consideration of an agreement on the part of the 
Emperor not to remove the troops from their own ter- 
ritory except in case of actual necessity. Thus the 
contingents of these States are recruited, drilled, and 
commanded by Prussia, and form, in short, an integral 
part of her army. 1 

A number of conventions of a similiar character, af- 
fecting other public matters, such as the pos- 
with Wai- tal service and the -jurisdiction of the courts, 

deck. 

have been concluded between the States ; but 

lations of Prussia shall be in force throughout the Empire ; second, that 
thereafter a comprehensive imperial military law shall be enacted; 
and third that any future general orders of the Prussian army shall 
be communicated by the military committee of the Bundesrath to the 
commanders of the other contingents for appropriate imitation. 

1 Some of the States transferred all their rights (Baden with a pro- 
vision that her troops should form a separate corps) ; others retained 
certain rights, mainly of an honorary nature, but agreed that their 
troops should be united with the Prussian army, and that Prussia should 
appoint the officers. Only Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg still exer- 
cise the military functions reserved to them by the constitution. Cf. 
Laband, § 94, iii. ; Schulze, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, § 335; 
Meyer, Lehrbuch, § 197. 



PRIVILEGES OF PRUSSIA. 249 

the most comprehensive compact of all was made by 
Waldeck. The ruler of this little principality was 
crippled with debts, and unable to raise the money 
required for the reorganization of his army, So he 
sold his governmental rights as a whole to the King 
of Prussia, retired from business, and went to Italy 
to live upon his income, while the Prussian govern- 
ment, having bought the good-will of his trade, pro- 
ceeded to carry it on as his successor. 1 There is some- 
thing decidedly comical in treating the right to govern 
a community as a marketable commodity, to be bought 
and sold for cash; but to Bismarck the matter pre- 
sented itself as a perfectly natural business transac- 
tion, and in fact the contract bears a strong resem- 
blance to the lease of a small American railroad to a 
larger one. 

Such are the special privileges of Prussia. Those 
reserved to the other States are far less exten- 

-r» • 1 Privileges 

sive. By the constitution Hamburg and of the other 
Bremen had a right to remain free ports, out- 
side of the operation of the tariff laws ; 2 but and Bre- 
both of them have now surrendered this privi- 
lege. 3 The other special rights are mostly enjoyed by 
the southern States, and were given to them as an in- 
ducement to join the Confederation. Thus Bavaria, 

1 Cf . p. 353, infra. 

2 Const. Art. 34. 

3 The treaty for this purpose was made with Hamburg in 1881, and 
went into effect Oct. 1, 1888. That with Bremen was made in 1885. 
For an account of these treaties and the way they were brought about, 
see Blum, Das Deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarck's, p. 360 et seq. ; Laband, 
vol. ii. pp. 901-4. 



250 GERMANY. 

Wurtemberg, and Baden are exempt from imperial ex- 
Bavaria, c ^ ses on brandy and beer, and have a right 
TbIS?lnd to ^ a y excises of their own on these articles. 1 
Baden. Bavaria and Wurtemberg have their own 
postal and telegraph services, which are subject only to 
general imperial laws. 2 Except for the principle of 
universal military service, and the agreement to con- 
form to the general organization of the imperial army, 
Bavaria has in time of peace the entire charge of her 
own troops, the Emperor having only a right to inspect 
them; while Wurtemberg, although not so much fa- 
vored as this, has greater military privileges than the 
remaining States. 3 Bavaria is further exempt from 
imperial legislation in regard to railroads, 4 and to resi- 
dence and settlement; 5 and finally, by the constitu- 
tion or by military convention, Bavaria, Saxony, and 
Wurtemberg have a right to seats on the committees 
of the Bundesrath on foreign affairs and on the army 
and fortresses. 6 In order to guarantee more effectually 
these privileges, it is provided that they shall not be 



1 Const. Art. 35. But in 1887 they gave up their privileges in regard 
to brandy. See Blum, p. 532 ; Laband, vol. ii. pp. 920, 923-24. 

2 Const. Art. 52. 

3 Treaties of Nov. 23, 1870, with Bavaria ; and Nov. 25, 1870, with 
Wurtemberg ; incorporated in the constitution by a reference in the Ap- 
pendix to Part XI. 

4 Except in the case of lines that have a strategic importance. Const. 
Art. 46. 

5 Const. Art. 4, § 1. 

6 Const. Art. 8 ; Laband, vol. i. p. 113. By the treaty of Nov. 23, 
1870 (Schlussprotokoll, Art. ix.), Bavaria has a right to preside over the 
Bundesrath in the absence of Prussia, but as this never happens, the privi- 
lege is merely honorary. 



PRIVILEGES OF THE SMALLER STATES. 251 

changed without the consent of the State entitled to 
them. 1 

From this description of the privileges of the differ- 
ent States it is evident that the German Em- 

• pp. i • pit' p The empire 

prre is very tar irom being a iederal union 01 a eonthma- 
the kind with which we are familiar. It is oiTconfed- 
rather a continuation of the old Germanic modified 
Confederation, with the centre of gravity 
shifted from the States to the central government, and 
the preponderating power placed in the hands of 
Prussia, — the other large States retaining 
privileges roughly in proportion to their size. 2 sorgans 

1 Const. Art. 78. Meyer (LehrbucJi, p. 421) and Zorn (Staatsrecht 
des Deuischen Reiches, pp. 88-93) think this provision applies only to the 
limitations on the competence of the Empire, and not to the privileges 
given to the several States in the organization of the government, such 
as the presidential rights of Prussia, the allotment of the votes in the 
Bundesrath, the seats on committees, etc. Their opinion, however, is 
not generally accepted. Laband, vol. i. pp. 110-14 ; Schulze, § 249 ; 
v. Ronne, vol. ii. pp. 43-48. It is universally agreed that an affirmative 
vote in the Bundesrath by the delegate of the State is a sufficient consent 
by that State to a law affecting its privileges so far as the Empire is 
concerned ; but there is a difference of opinion on the question how far 
the ruler of the State is bound, or can be bound, by state law to consult 
his parliament. Laband, vol. i. pp. 114-17 ; Schulze, bk. ii. p. 19 ; 
v. Ronne, vol. ii. pp. 36-43 ; Meyer, p. 422 ; Zorn, pp. 94-98. 

2 In saying this I am speaking only of the political structure of the 
government, and do not mean to touch the philosophical question whether 
the sovereignty has or has not been transferred from the States to the 
Empire. This point has been the subject of elaborate argument, and in 
fact the same juristic questions about the origin and nature of the fed- 
eral government have been discussed in Germany as in the United 
States, (For a reference to these discussions see Laband, vol. i. pp. 30- 
33, 52 et seq., and see especially Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenver- 
bindungen.') Some of the German publicists maintain that the sovereignty 
resides in the Bundesrath, a view which, as Burgess points out in his 



252 GERMANY. 

Its chief organ of government is still the old Diet, re- 
named the Bundesrath or Federal Council, to which 
have been added on one side an Emperor, who is com- 
mander-in-chief of the forces, and represents the Em- 
pire in its relation with foreign powers ; and, on the 
other, an elected chamber, called the Reichstag, created 
for the sake of stimulating national sentiment and 
enlisting popular support as against the local and dy- 
nastic influences which have free play in the Bundes- 
rath. Let us consider each of these organs in detail. 

The Reichstag is elected for five years by direct 
The universal suffrage and secret ballot. 1 The 

Reichstag. vo £ ers mus t be twenty-five years old, and not 
in active military service, paupers, or otherwise disquali- 
its compo- fied. 2 The members are chosen in single elec- 
sition. toral districts fixed by imperial law. 3 These 

had originally a hundred thousand inhabitants apiece, 4 
but they have not been revised for more than a score 
of years, and with the growth of the large cities have 
gradually become very unequal. In the case of Berlin 
the disproportion is enormous, for the city has now 
over a million and a half inhabitants, but is still rep- 

Politicdl Science (vol. ii. pp. 90-93) is somewhat artificial. For those who 
think as I do, that sovereignty is not in its nature indivisible, the question 
loses much of its importance. (Cf. Essays on Government, chapter on the 
Limits of Sovereignty.) 

1 Cf. Laband, § 34 ; Const. Arts. 20, 24. Until 1888 the period was 
three years. 

2 Wahlgesetz, May 31, 1869, §§ 1-3. Every voter who has been a 
citizen of any State for a year is eligible in any district in the Empire 
without regard to residence. Soldiers in active service, though not al- 
lowed to vote, are eligible. (Id., § 4.) 

8 Wahlgesetz, § 6. * Except in the smallest States. 



THE REICHSTAG. 253 

resented by only six members. The government, how- 
ever, is not anxious for a redistribution of seats, be- 
cause Berlin elects Eadicals and Socialists, who form 
a troublesome opposition, — a tendency which is also 
true of other large centres. As in the United States, 
no district can be composed of parts of different States, 
so that every State, however small, elects at least one 
representative. The three hundred and ninety-seven 
seats are in fact distributed as follows : Prussia has 
two hundred and thirty-five, or about three fifths of 
the whole number, Bavaria forty-eight, Saxony twenty- 
three, Wurtemberg seventeen, Alsace-Lorraine fifteen, 
Baden fourteen, Hesse nine, Mecklenburg-Schwerin six, 
Saxe-Weimar three, Oldenburg three, Brunswick three, 
Hamburg three, Saxe-Meiningen two, Saxe-Coburg- 
Gotha two, Anhalt two, and all the rest one each. 1 As 
regards the method of election the system of ballotage 
prevails ; that is, an absolute majority is required for 
election on the first ballot, and if no one obtains this, 
a second ballot takes place which is confined to the 
two candidates who have received the largest number 
of votes. 2 

Universal suffrage was looked upon as an experi- 
ment of a somewhat hazardous character, and p ayment of 
Bismarck insisted on the non-payment of the members - 
members of the Eeichstag as a safeguard. 3 This has 

1 Wahlgesetz, § 5 ; Const. Art. 20 ; Act of June 25, 1873 (Alsace- 
Lorraine), § 3. 

2 Wahlgesetz, § 12. Lebon (p. 82) thinks this last provision, by cut- 
ting out all the candidates but the two highest on the list, favors the 
government and hampers the free expression of opinion. 

8 Const. Art. 32. 



254 GERMANY. 

been a bone of contention with the Liberals ever since, 
— the Eeichstag having repeatedly passed bills for the 
payment of members, which the Bundesrath has inva- 
riably rejected. The absence of remuneration has not 
been without effect, for it has deterred university pro- 
fessors and other men of small means, usually of liberal 
views, from accepting an office which entails the expense 
of a long residence in Berlin, but it has not fulfilled 
the predictions that were made either by its foes or its 
friends, for it has not caused a dearth of candidates, 
or discouraged the presence of men who make poli- 
tics their occupation. 1 The provision has, however, a 
meaning one would hardly suspect. In 1885, when 
the Socialist representatives were paid a salary by their 
own party, Bismarck, claiming that such a proceeding 
was illegal, caused the treasury to sue them for the 
sums of money they had received in this way, and, 
strange to say, the Imperial Court of Appeal sustained 
the suits. 2 The object of withholding pay from the 
members is, of course, to prevent the power of the 
v^ poorer classes from becoming too great ; but a much 
more effectual means to the same end is the habit of 
holding elections on working days, instead of holding 
them on Sundays, as is done in France and most of the 
other Catholic countries. 3 

1 Blum, pp. 36-37. 

2 Laband, § 38 ; Lebon, p. 78. The members cannot be arrested dur- 
ing the session except for certain flagrant offenses, and if a criminal 
prosecution is pending against one of them the Reichstag can order him 
to be set at liberty (Const. Art. 31), but, in fact, it has not always been 
easy to make this last right effective. Lebon, pp. 84-85. 

3 Lebon, p. 82. 



THE REICHSTAG. 255 

The Keichstag has the ordinary privileges of a legis- 
lative assembly, electing its own president, 
making its own rules, and deciding upon the mittee sys- 
validity of elections. 1 Its internal organiza- 
tion conforms to the pattern generally followed in con- 
tinental chambers. At the beginning of each session 
the members are divided by lot into seven Abthei- 
lungen or sections, which correspond to the Bureaux 
of the French Chambers, but differ from these in the 
important respect that they last during the whole 
session, instead of being renewed at short intervals. 
The duties of the sections consist in making a prelimi- 
nary examination of the validity of elections to the 
Reichstag, and in the choice of committees, each section 
electing one or more committee-men, according to the 
importance of the committee. 2 As in France and Italy, 
however, the choice by the sections is really cut and dried 
beforehand. It is in fact controlled by the Senioren- 
Convent, a body composed of the leaders of the dif- 
ferent parties, who determine in advance the number 
of seats on the committee to which each party shall 
be entitled. 3 Bills are not always referred to a com- 
mittee; but it is noteworthy that the more advanced 
Liberals have constantly urged such a reference in 
the case of government bills, because the authoritative 
influence of the ministers is thereby diminished, and 
greater opportunity is given for criticism and amend- 

1 Const. Art. 27. 

2 Laband, vol. ii. pp. 327-29. Unlike the French Bureaux, their choice 
is not confined to members of their own section. Lebon, p. 88. 

3 Lebon, lb. • Dupriez, vol. i. p. 526 ; Laband, vol. i. p. 328. 



256 GERMANY. 

ment ; while the more moderate parties, following the 
lead of the government, have often preferred an imme- 
diate discussion of important measures by the full 
house, without the intervention of any committee at all. 
The powers of the Eeichstag appear very great on 

paper. All laws require its consent, and so 
of the do the budget, all loans, and all treaties which 

involve matters falling within the domain of 
legislation. It has a right to initiate legislation, to ask 
the government for reports, and to express its opinion 
on the management of affairs. 1 In reality, however, 
its powers are not so great as they seem. The consti- 
tution provides, for example, that the budget shall be 
annual, 2 but the principal revenue laws are permanent, 
and cannot be changed without the consent of the 
Bundesrath, 3 while the most important appropriation, 
that for the army, is virtually determined by the law 
fixing the number of the troops, and this has hitherto 
been voted for a number of years at a time. 4 The 
chief function of the Reichstag is, in fact, the consid- 
eration of bills prepared by the Chancellor and the 
Bundesrath. These it criticises and amends pretty 
freely ; but its activity is rather negative than positive, 
and although important measures have occasionally 

1 Const. Arts. 5, 11, 23, 69, 73 ; Laband, § 33. 

2 In 1867 Bismarck wanted triennial sessions, and in 1888, when the 
term of the Reichstag was changed to five years, he wanted the sessions 
held only every other year. 

8 It is to be remembered, moreover, that the bulk of the civil adminis- 
tration is in the hands of the States, which provide the means of carrying 
it on. 

4 In 1871, for three years ; in 1874, 1880, and 1887 for seven years ; 
and in 1893 for five years. 



THE REICHSTAG. 257 

been passed at its instigation, 1 it cannot be said to 
direct the policy of the state either in legislation or 
administration. 2 

The influence of the Reichstag is also diminished 
by the fact that it can be dissolved at any The ri ht of 
time by the Bundesrath with the consent of d^ 0111 * 1011 - 
the Emperor. 3 In most constitutional governments at 
the present day the power of dissolution is the com- 
plement of the responsibility of the ministers, and 
is used, at least in theory, to ascertain whether the 
cabinet possesses the confidence of the nation. But 
in Germany it exists without any such responsibility, 
and hence is simply a means of breaking down re- 
sistance in the Reichstag. It has, indeed, been used 
for this purpose on three memorable occasions: first, 
in 1878, when the Reichstag refused to pass a bill 
for the repression of agitation by the Socialists ; after- 
wards in 1887, when it refused to pass the bill fixing 
the size of the army for seven years ; and again in 1893, 
when it refused to sanction changes proposed in the 
military system. In each case the new Reichstag sup- 
ported the plans of the government, and thus a serious 
conflict with the Chancellor was avoided, and the 

1 A striking example of this was the amendment to Art. 4 of the con- 
stitution extending the competence of the Empire to ordinary civil and 
criminal law. 

2 Cf. Lebon, pp. 113-16. The debate in the budget is used as an 
occasion for criticism of the government, and for the expression of 
opinion, but in the budget itself few changes are made. The reductions 
have little importance, while the rejection of an appropriation asked for 
is extremely rare, and an increase is almost unknown. Dupriez, vol. i. 
pp. 543-44. 

8 Const. Art. 24. 

VOL. I. 



258 GERMANY. 

question of the ultimate authority of the different 
organs of the state was postponed. 

The rules of the Reichstag provide for interpella- 
Interpeiia- tions, but the question to whom these shall 
tions. | 3e ^dressed involves one of the paradoxes, 

or contradictions between theory and practice, which 
are common in the government of the Empire. There 
is no imperial cabinet, and the Chancellor, who is the 
only minister, has no right, as such, to sit in the 
Reichstag. In theory he comes there only as one of 
the delegates to the Bundesrath, — all whose members 
have the privilege of being present in the Reichstag, 
where a special bench is reserved for them. They 
appear as the representatives of the united governments 
of Germany, and are entitled to speak whenever they 
choose; for the Bundesrath is not only a collection 
of delegates from the governments of the different 
States, but has also some of the attributes of an im- 
perial cabinet. In form, therefore, interpellations are 
addressed to the Bundesrath, but in fact they are com- 
municated to the Chancellor, who usually answers them 
himself, or allows one of his subordinates to do so. A 
debate may ensue if demanded by fifty members, but 
it is not followed by an order of the day expressing 
the opinion of the House, 1 and, indeed, interpellations 
have no such importance as in France and Italy, because 
the parliamentary system does not exist ; that is, the 

1 Lebon, p. 105 ; v. Ronne, p. 268. A resolution can, of course, be 
moved in accordance with the ordinary rules of procedure, and this was 
done on the occasion of the expulsion of the Poles in Jan., 1886. Blum, 
pp. 498-501. Dupriez (vol. i. p. 545) comments on the Polish incident. 



THE BUNDESRATH. 259 

Chancellor does not resign on an adverse vote of the 
Reichstag, nor does he feel obliged to conform to its 
wishes. 

Let us now examine more closely the Bundesrath, — 
that extraordinary mixture of legislative cham- The Bun _ 
ber, executive council, court of appeal, and desrath - 
permanent assembly of diplomats. It is the most thor- 
oughly native feature of the German Empire, and has, 
therefore, a peculiar vitality. The Bundesrath is com- 
posed of delegates appointed by the princes Its composi . 
of the States and the senates of the Free tlon * 
Cities ; 1 and it is to be observed that Alsace-Lorraine, 
which was taken from France in 1871, is not strictly a 
member of the union, but only Seichsland or imperial 
territory, and hence has no right to a representative 
in the Bundesrath, although as a part of the empire 
it elects members of the Reichstag. Its position is in 
some ways analogous to that of one of our Territories, 
while the other parts of the Empire correspond to our 
States. Curiously enough, Alsace-Lorraine has been 
allowed since 1879 to send to the Bundesrath dele- 
gates who, like the representatives of the Territories in 
Congress, can debate, but cannot vote. 2 

The seats in the Bundesrath are distributed among 
the States and Cities in such a way that each of them 
is entitled to the same number of votes as in the 

1 Const. Arts. 6-10. 

2 Laband, vol. i. pp. 219-20. In the law of 1879, as originally drawn 
up by Bismarck, Alsace-Lorraine was entitled to ordinary delegates to 
the Bundesrath ; but that body, in order not to increase the seats virtually 
controlled by the King of Prussia, insisted that they should have no vote. 
Blum, pp. 635-36. The number of these delegates is four. 



260 GERMANY. 

diet of the old Germanic Confederation when that body 
proceeded in plenum ; except that Bavaria, as part 
of the inducement to join the Empire, was given six 
delegates instead of four/ and Prussia obtained those 
of the States she absorbed in 1866. 2 

There are in all fifty-eight members, of which Prussia 
has seventeen, Bavaria six, Saxony and Wurtemberg 
four each, Baden and Hesse three each, Brunswick and 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin two each, and the remaining 
fourteen States and three Free Cities one each. But 
Prussia has really three votes more, because the 
contract for the government of Waldeck already men- 
tioned gave her the vote of that State, and in 1884-85 
she caused the Duke of Cumberland to be excluded 
from the succession in Brunswick, got a Prussian 
prince appointed perpetual regent, and thus obtained 
the virtual control of these two votes also; 3 so that 
she has in reality twenty votes out of the fifty-eight. 
This, of course, is much less than her proportion of the 
population ; 4 but twenty votes in the same hand count 

1 She had six votes in the Bundesrath of the Zollverein from 1866 
to 1871. 

2 Laband, vol. i. p. 220. The votes acquired by Prussia in this way were 
those of Hanover, 4 ; Hesse Cassel, 3 ; Holstein-Lauenburg, 3 ; Nassau, 
2 ; and Frankfort, 1. 

3 The Duke was excluded because as son and heir of the late King of 
Hanover he insisted on his right to that kingdom, and refused to acknow- 
ledge its incorporation in Prussia. For an account of this transaction, 
see Blum, p. 489 et seq. 

4 The population of Germany on Dec. 1, 1890, was about forty-nine 
millions, of which Prussia had thirty millions, Bavaria five millions and 
a half, Saxony three millions and a half, Wurtemberg two millions, 
Alsace-Lorraine and Baden a million and a half apiece, Hesse one mil- 
lion, and the other nineteen States together four millions. 



THE BUNDESRATH. 261 

far more than the same number held by different 
States, and she has only to win ten ^additional votes, — 
those of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, for example, or 
those of some of the smaller States, — in order to 
have an absolute majority. In fact, she has usually 
had her way, although on several notable occasions the 
other States have combined and defeated her. This 
happened in 1877, when the seat of the Imperial 
Court of Appeal was fixed at Leipsic instead of Berlin 
as she desired ; 1 and in 1876 on the more important 
question of the imperial railroad law. At that time 
Bismarck refrained altogether from introducing into 
the Bundesrath a bill for the purchase of railroads by 
the Empire, knowing that it would be defeated by the 
opposition of the middle-sized States, although the 
project was one on which he had set his heart. 2 
Again, in 1879, another railroad bill was killed in the 
Bundesrath by the opposition of Bavaria, Saxony, and 
Wurtemberg, 3 and in the same year a conference of 
the finance ministers of the States refused to consent 
to the tobacco monopoly. 4 

The members of the Bundesrath are diplomats rather 
than senators. 5 They enjoy at Berlin the privileges of 
foreign ambassadors, and are appointed and removed 

1 Cf. Blum, pp. 146-47. The vote in favor of Leipsic was thirty to 
twenty-eight ; and it is noteworthy that if Prussia had then controlled 
the votes of Brunswick the majority would have been the other way. 

2 Cf . Blum, pp. 165-68. 

3 Blum, p. 345. 

4 Blum, p. 312. On this point, however, they yielded some years later. 

5 The constitution (Art. 10) provides that the Emperor shall vouchsafe 
to them the protection accorded to ambassadors, while the members of 
the Reichstag have the ordinary privileges of members of a parliament. 



262 GERMANY. 

at will by the States they represent, — which also pay 

them or not as they please. The votes they 

the Bundes- cast are the votes of the States, not those 

position of of its representatives, and it is therefore pro- 

its in giu 1)6 1* s 

vided that all the delegates of a State must 
vote alike. In fact, all the votes belonging to a State 
are counted without reference to the number of dele- 
gates actually voting ; * and thus the seventeen votes 
of Prussia, for example, can be cast in her name by a 
single representative, just as at the meeting of a pri- 
vate corporation a properly authorized agent can vote 
on all the shares of stock belonging to his principal. 
The delegates, moreover, vote according to the instruc- 
tions of their home government, and the constitu- 
tion expressly declares that votes not instructed shall 
not be counted. 2 This last provision has given rise to 
some comment. It does not mean that a delegate must 
produce his instructions before he is allowed to vote. 
On the contrary, the Bundesrath appears to take no 
cognizance of instructions, which may, indeed, be of 
any kind, including an authority to vote as the delegate 
thinks best ; and it is even asserted that a vote is valid 
whether it is in accord with the instructions or not. 3 
The provision in the constitution is probably a mere 
survival; but it has been suggested that its object is, 
on the one hand, to allow a delegate to excuse himself 
from voting on the plea that he has not been instructed, 
and on the other to make it clear that a vote can be 
taken, although the delegates have not all received 

1 Laband, vol. i. p. 223. 2 Const. Art. 7. 

3 Laband, vol. i. p. 229. 



THE BUNDESRATH. 263 

their instructions, thus taking away an excuse for delay 
that might otherwise be urged. 1 

A delegate is usually an officer of the State he repre- 
sents, often one of its ministers, or even the head of its 
cabinet, and in any case the ministers of a State are 
responsible according to its own laws for their instruc- 
tions to the delegates. 2 In fact, the ministers are fre- 
quently questioned in the local Landtag or legislature, 
about the instructions they have given, or propose to 
give ; and resolutions are sometimes passed in regard to 
them. 3 If, indeed, the strict parliamentary system 
existed in any of the German States, the cabinet would 
no doubt be held responsible to the Landtag for these 
instructions as for every other act of the government. 

Although the delegates are frequently officers of 
the State they represent, they are not necessarily even 
citizens of it; and it is not uncommon for several of 
the smaller States, from motives of economy, to em- 
power the same man to act as delegate for them all 
jointly. This habit grew to such an extent that in 
April, 1880, when a stamp act proposed by the 
Chancellor was seriously amended by a vote of thirty 
to twenty-eight, thirteen of the smaller States were not 
represented by any delegates of their own, their votes 
being cast by two delegates from other States. Bis- 
marck tendered his resignation in disgust, and this 

1 Cf . Robinson, " The German Bundesrath," Pub. Univ., Pa. Pub. Law 
Series, vol. iii. no. 1, pp. 34-35. 

2 Laband, vol. i. pp. 225-27. 

8 Interpellations, for example, were presented and answered in several 
States in regard to the proposal for the purchase of railroads by the Em- 
pire, to which allusion has already been made (Blum, p. 167). 



264 GERMANY. 

caused the Bundesrath to reconsider its action and 
vote the tax. But the Chancellor was not satisfied. 
He complained that the practice of substitution de- 
prived the Bundesrath of the presence of members 
who were open to argument, and he insisted on the 
adoption of a rule dividing the session into two periods, 
in one of which the important matters should be 
considered, and delegates from all the States should be 
present, while the other should be devoted to current 
affairs, when the States might appoint substitutes if 
they pleased. This rule was adopted, and for the con- 
venience of the delegates the former period is made as 
short as possible. 1 

The Bundesrath is in its nature unlike any other 
body in the world, and its peculiarities can be ex- 
plained only by a reference to the Diet of the old Ger- 
manic Confederation. It is not an international con- 
ference, because it is part of a constitutional system, 
and has power to enact laws. On the other hand, it is 
not a deliberative assembly, because the delegates vote 
according to instructions from home. It is unlike any 
other legislative chamber, inasmuch as the members do 
not enjoy a fixed tenure of office, and are not free to 
vote according to their personal convictions. Its es- 
sential characteristics are that it represents the govern- 
ments of the States and not their people, and that each 
State is entitled to a certain number of votes which it 
may authorize one or more persons to cast in its name, 
these persons being its agents, whom it may appoint, 
recall, or instruct at any time. The true conception of 

1 Blum, pp. 348^9; Laband, vol. i. pp. 256-57. 



THE BUNDESRATH. 265 

the Bundesrath, therefore, is that of an assembly of 
the sovereigns of the States, who are not, indeed, 
actually present, but appear in the persons of their 
representatives. 

The internal organization of the Bundesrath is in 
accord with its federal character and the The internal 
privileged position of the larger States. We 5S™SS? 
have already seen that the seventeen votes desrath - 
of Prussia are more than enough to defeat any con- 
stitutional amendment, and that she is expressly given 
a veto on all proposals to change the laws relating to 
the army or the taxes. Besides this, the constitution 
declares that the Emperor, that is, the King of Prussia, 
shall appoint the Chancellor, who presides over the 
body and arranges its business, and through whose 
hands all communications from the Reichstag and all 
motions and petitions must pass, 1 and who is in fact 
always one of the Prussian delegates. 2 But the con- 
stitution goes into much smaller details in regulating 
privileges of the States, and prescribes even The 
the composition of the committees ; for the 
Germans have shown a remarkable astuteness in this 
matter, and nowhere else in the world can we find 

1 Const. Art. 15. Cf. Robinson, p. 37. 

2 Most of the German jurists argue that the Chancellor must always be 
a Prussian delegate, because Art. 15 of the constitution implies that he 
must be a member of the Bundesrath, and the Emperor has power to 
create such members only in his capacity as King of Prussia. Laband, 
vol. i. pp. 253-54 ; Meyer, Lehrbuch, § 124 ; Schulze, vol. ii. p. 91. 
Hensel (Die Stellung des Reichskanzlers, pp. 10-12) denies this and quotes 
Bismarck in his favor. The Chancellor is authorized to commit the duty 
of acting as chairman to a substitute, and in fact he rarely presides in 
person. See Dupriez, vol. i. p. 522, and Blum, p. 143. 



com- 
mittees. 



266 GERMANY. 

the important influence of committees in a legislative 
body so thoroughly recognized. There are eight stand- 
ing committees of the Bundesrath established by the 
constitution. 1 The members of one of these — that 
on the army and fortresses — are appointed by the 
Emperor; but it is provided by the constitution that 
Bavaria, and by military convention that Saxony and 
Wurtemberg, shall have places upon it. The members 
of the committee on maritime affairs are also appointed 
by the Emperor; while the committees on taxes and 
customs, on trade, on railroads, posts and telegraphs, 
on justice, and on accounts, are elected every year by 
the Bundesrath itself. On each of the last seven 
committees, five States at least must be represented, 
of which one must always be Prussia, whose member 
is always the chairman. But here again we have an 
illustration of the fact that the Bundesrath is an 
assembly of diplomats and not of senators, for the 
practice followed by the Emperor or the Bundesrath 
— whichever has the power of appointment — is to 
designate the States to be represented, and the dele- 
gation from each of those States chooses one of its 
own members to sit on the committee. The seat on a 
committee belongs, therefore, not to the representative 
selected, but to the State which he represents. There 
is one other committee provided for by the constitu- 
tion, — that on foreign affairs. Its functions are pe- 
culiar ; for it does not report like the other committees, 
but its members listen to the communications made to 
them by the Chancellor, and express the views of their 

1 Const. Art. 8. 



THE BUNDESRATH. 267 

respective governments thereon. It is thus in reality 
a means by which the ministers of the larger States 
may be consulted upon foreign affairs ; and it consists 
of representatives of Bavaria, Saxony, "Wurtemberg, 
and two other States designated every year by the 
Bundesrath. As its only function is to consult with 
the Chancellor, who is virtually the Prussian minister 
for foreign affairs, Prussia has no seat upon it, and 
in her absence Bavaria presides. 1 - 

Another illustration of the federal character of the 
Bundesrath is to be found in the provision 0nlydele „ 
that on matters not common to the whole |?ates° fthe 
Empire, — such, for example, as the excise aUowedto 
on beer, from which Bavaria, Wurtemberg, vote * - * +"9 *- ^ 
and Baden enjoy an exemption, — only those States / *> ° X 
which are interested can vote. 2 There was at first a 
similar provision for the Keichstag, but it was felt to 
be inconsistent with the spirit of a national house of 
representatives, and was repealed. 3 

The powers of the Bundesrath are very extensive, 
and cover nearly the whole field of govern- 
ment. It is a part of the legislature, and theBundes- 
every law requires its assent. 4 But, more 

1 There are also three standing committees not provided for by the 
constitution : those on Alsace-Lorraine, on the constitution, and on rules. 
All the standing committees may sit when the Bundesrath is not in 
session. On the subject of the committees, see Laband, § 31. 

2 Const. Art. 7. 

8 Amend. Feb. 24, 1873. 

4 Including treaties that fall within the domain of legislation, Const. 
Art. 11. Each State has the right of initiative (Art. 7), which is, of 
course, most frequently used by Prussia. 



268 GERMANY. 

than this, it has the first and last word on almost all 
the laws, for the Keichstag has not succeeded 
in making its right of initiative in legislation 
very effective, and by far the larger part of the statutes 
(as well as the budget) are prepared and first discussed 
by the Bundesrath. They are then sent to the Reich- 
stag, and if passed by that body, are again submitted 
to the Bundesrath for approval before they are pro- 
mulgated by the Emperor. 1 The Bundesrath may 
therefore be said to be not only a part of the legisla- 
ture, but the main source of legislation. 

It is also a part of the executive. As such, it has 
power to make regulations for the conduct 
of the administration, and to issue ordinances 
for the completion of the laws, so far as this power has 
not been specially lodged by statute in other hands. 2 
In regard to finance its authority is even more exten- 
sive, for it has been given many of the functions of a 
chamber of accounts. 3 It enjoys a share of the power 
of appointment, for it nominates among other officials 
the judges of the Imperial Court, and elects the mem- 
bers of the Court of Accounts ; while collectors of 

1 Laband, vol. i. p. 542 ; Schulze, vol. ii. p. 118. 

2 Const. Art. 7. It exercises this power with great freedom. Robin- 
son, pp. 50-53. There is some difference of opinion how far this power 
extends. Laband, vol. i. pp. 236-37 ; v. Ronne, vol. i. pp. 213-15 ; Arndt, 
pp. 115-19. Arndt has also published a treatise on this subject, Das 
Verordnungsrecht des Deutschen Reiches. It is also empowered to decide 
upon defects that appear in the execution of the laws. Const. Art. 7, § 3. 
The meaning of this clause has been much discussed. Laband, vol. i. 
pp. 238-42, 246 ; v. Ronne, vol. i. pp. 215-16 ; Arndt, Verfassung des 
Deutschen Reiches, p. 119 ; Robinson, pp. 56-59. 

8 Laband, vol. i. pp. 244-46. 



THE BUNDESRATH. 269 

taxes and consuls can be appointed only with the 
approbation of its committees. 1 Under this head of 
executive power must also be classed the provisions by 
which its consent is required for a declaration of war, 2 
for a dissolution of the Reichstag, 3 and for federal 
execution against a refractory State. 4 The Bundesrath, 
moreover, acts in some ways like a ministry of state, 
for it designates one or more of its members to support 
in the Reichstag the measures it has approved ; and in 
fact a practice has grown up of informing the Reich- 
stag during the progress of a debate what amendments 
to a bill the Bundesrath is willing to accept. 5 But 
the federal nature of the Bundesrath comes into play 
again curiously here, for each of the members also 
represents in the Reichstag his particular government, 
and can express its views, although contrary to those 
of a majority of his colleagues. 6 

The Bundesrath has no little power of a judicial 
or semi-judicial nature. It decides disputes 
between the imperial and state governments 
about the interpretation of imperial statutes. 7 It is 
virtually a court of appeal in cases where there is a 
denial of justice by a state court. 8 It decides contro- 
versies between States, which are not of the nature 

1 Laband, vol. i. pp. 242-43. 

2 Except on the ground that an attack has been made on the territory 
of the Empire. Const. Art. 11. 

3 Const. Art. 24. 

4 Const. Art. 19. 

5 Laband, vol. i. p. 537, n. 5. 

6 Const. Art. 9. 

7 This is deduced from Const. Art. 7, § 3. See page 268, note 2, supra. 

8 Art. 77. 



270 GERMANY. 

of private law, if appealed to by one of the parties ; ! 
and, finally, when a constitutional question arises in a 
State which has no tribunal empowered to decide it, 
the Bundesrath must try to settle it by mediation if 
requested to do so by one of the parties, or if this fails, 
it must try to dispose of the matter by imperial legis- 
lation. 2 

The Bundesrath has not only far more extensive 
Special powers than the Eeichstag, but it has also 
the Y B e iSde°s- certain privileges that enhance its prestige 
rath * and increase its authority. Thus the Eeich- 

stag cannot be summoned to meet without the Bundes- 
rath, whereas the latter can sit alone, and must in fact 
be called together at any time on the request of one 
third of its members. 3 Unlike the Reichstag, moreover, 
the order of business in the Bundesrath is not broken 
of! by the ending of the session, but is continuous, so 
that matters are taken up again at the point where 
they were left, and thus its work is made far more 
Privacy of effective. 4 The most important privilege it 
meetings. enjoys, however, is that of excluding the 
public from its meetings. 5 This has given it the 

1 Const. Art. 76. If unfitted to decide the question, it can substitute 
for itself some other body, and this it did in 1877 in the case of the con- 
troversy between Prussia and Saxony in regard to the Berlin-Dresden 
railroad, selecting the Court of Appeal of Liibeck. Laband, vol. i. p. 249, 
note 2. 

2 Const. Art. 76, § 2. 

3 Const. Arts. 13-14. 

4 Laband, vol. i. p. 253. 

5 The constitution does not provide whether the sessions shall be public 
or not, and in fact they have always been secret (v. Ronne, vol. i. pp. 
210-11). A brief report of the matters dealt with and the conclusions 






THE BUNDESRATH. 271 

advantage of concealing to some extent its internal 
differences, and has enabled it to acquire a reputation 
for greater unanimity, and consequently to exert more 
influence than it would otherwise possess. Privacy, 
indeed, would seem to be almost as essential to the 
Bundesrath, as to the cabinet in a parliamentary gov- 
ernment, or to an Anglo-Saxon jury. It is easy to 
perceive that the twelve jurors would seldom agree, if 
the public were allowed to witness the mysterious 
process of reaching a verdict; and it is equally clear 
that harmony in the Bundesrath would be very seriously 
imperiled, if its galleries were filled with spectators. 
One can imagine how the newspapers would gloat over 
the last altercation between the Chancellor and the 
representative of Bavaria or Saxony, and how hard it 
would be for the contending parties to make the con- 
cessions necessary to effect an agreement after their 
differences had been discussed in public. The work 
of the Bundesrath must be an unending series of 
compromises, and a compromise is a thing with which 
the world at large has little sympathy. If, therefore, 
the meetings of the Bundesrath were open, it would 
be a hotbed of dissensions between the governments 
of the different States, instead of a bond of union and 
a means of mutual understanding. 

In regard to the power and influence actually 
wielded by the Bundesrath, the most contradictory state- 
reached is given to the press after each session, but the Bundesrath can 
vote to withhold from the public all information about any matter, and 
the rules provide that the oral proceedings both in the Bundesrath and 
its committees shall be kept secret in all cases. Laband, vol. i. p. 259. 



272 GERMANY. 

ments are made. It is said on the one hand to be the 
Actual in- m ost important body in the Empire, 1 and on 
fheBundes- the other that it is a mere nullity which 
moves almost entirely at the dictation of 
Prussia. 2 Both these statements are largely true, for 
considered as an independent council with a will of 
its own the Bundesrath is a nullity, because it derives 
its impulse exclusively from outside forces ; but, con- 
sidered as an instrument by means of which the 
governments of the larger States, and especially of 
Prussia, rule the nation, it is probably the most im- 
portant, although the least conspicuous, organ in the 
Empire. The extent of Prussia's authority in the 
Bundesrath cannot be accurately determined, owing to 
the secrecy of the proceedings. That her will, or rather 
the will of the Chancellor acting in her name, is the 
chief moving and directing force, is evident ; but that 
he is not influenced by the opinions of the other States, 
that he does not modify his plans in consequence of 
their objections, or make compromises with them on 
contested points, it seems hazardous to assert. The 
members are usually wise enough not to talk about 
their differences in public, and hence these are only 
partly known to the world. At one time the minister 
of Wurtemberg complained openly in the Eeichstag 
that bills were presented to the Bundesrath drawn up 
in a complete form by Prussian officials, and filled 
exclusively with a Prussian spirit ; 3 but we know that 

1 Robinson, p. 43. 

2 Lebon, pp. 145-51 ; Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 478, 517-23. 
8 See Blum, p. 140. 



THE EMPEROR. 273 

this has not always been the case, and that important 
measures have frequently been considered and discussed 
by the ministers of all the larger States before they 
were introduced at all. 1 We know also that in more 
than one instance Bismarck found it impossible to per- 
suade the Bundesrath to adopt his views, 2 and that 
on another occasion he thought a threat of resigna- 
tion necessary to compel submission. 3 In this case 
the threat produced the desired result, but it may well 
be doubted whether it would have the same effect in 
the mouth of any one but the Iron Chancellor, whose 
strong will dominated also the Keichstag and the 
throne. 4 

We now come to the Emperor. 5 The title seems to 
denote an hereditary sovereign of the Empire, The Em _ 
but from a strictly legal point of view this is peror * 
not his position. He is simply the King of Prussia, 
and he enjoys his imperial prerogatives by virtue of 
his royal office. There is, in fact, no imperial crown, 
and the right to have her King bear the title, and 
exercise the functions of Emperor, is really one of the 
special privileges of Prussia. The language of the 
constitution is: "The presidency of the union belongs 



1 This was notably true in the case of the Gerichtsverfassunggesetz in 
1873 (Blum, p. 141). 

2 See page 261, supra. 

8 See pages 263-64, supra. 

4 Lebon (p. 147) thinks that Prussia has a good deal of influence in 
the appointment of delegates by the other States, and refers to the case 
where Bismarck procured the recall of the Bavarian representative in i 
1880. 

6 Cf. Const. Arts. 11-19. 

VOL. I. 



274 GERMANY. 

to the King of Prussia, who bears the title of German 
Emperor." The succession is therefore determined 
solely by the law of the Prussian Eoyal House, and in 
case of incapacity the Eegent of Prussia would, ipso 
facto, exercise the functions of Emperor. 1 

It has been said that as commander-in-chief of the 
His power & rm y and navy the Emperor has in theory 
SwSplra- tne personal direction of military matters, but 

tively small; ^ ^ aU ^^ he ^ ag ^ ddegate Q f 

the confederated governments, under the direction of 
the Bundesrath; 2 and even if this statement is not 
strictly accurate, it gives a very fair idea of his prerog- 
atives. He has charge of foreign affairs, makes trea- 
ties subject to the limitations already mentioned, and 
represents the Empire in its relation to other countries, 
to the States, or to individuals. He declares war with 
the consent of the Bundesrath, and carries out federal 
execution against a State when it has been ordered by 
that body. He summons and adjourns the Chambers, 
and closes their sessions, and with the consent of the 
Bundesrath he can dissolve the Reichstag. He pro- 
mulgates the laws, and executes them so far as their 
administration is in the hands of the Empire, subject, 
however, to the important qualification that most of 
the administrative regulations are made by the Bundes- 
rath. He appoints the Chancellor and all other offi- 
cers, except in cases where the Bundesrath has been 
given the right of appointment or confirmation ; but it 
must be remembered that the laws are mainly adminis- 
tered by the state governments under federal super- 

1 Laband, vol. i. pp. 202^4. 2 Lebon, pp. 154-55. 



THE EMPEROK. 275 

vision, and hence there are comparatively few federal 
officials to appoint. In short, the executive power of 
the central government is very limited \ and even that 
limited power is shared by the Bundesrath. 

The Emperor has, therefore, very little power as such, 
except in military and foreign matters. His but as King 
authority as Emperor, however, is vigorously ^iTvery 3, 
supplemented by his functions as King of great> 
Prussia. Thus as Emperor he has no initiative in 
legislation ; * and indeed he is not represented in the 
Eeichstag at all ; for the Chancellor, strictly speaking, 
appears there only as a member of the Bundesrath. 2 
But as King of Prussia the Emperor has a complete 
initiative by means of the Prussian delegates to the 
Bundesrath whom he appoints. As Emperor he has 
no veto, but as King he has a very extensive veto, — 
for it will be remembered that the negative vote of 
Prussia in the Bundesrath is sufficient to defeat any 
amendment to the constitution, or any proposal to 
change the laws relating to the army, the navy, or the 
taxes. His functions as Emperor and as The two sets 
King are, indeed, so interwoven that it is stringeiy ns 
very difficult to distinguish them. As Em- interwoven - 
peror he has supreme command of the army and 
appoints the highest officers. As King of Prussia he 

1 Laband, vol. i. p. 537. Strictly speaking, the initiative in the 
Bundesrath belongs to the States, and in the Reichstag it is confined to 
the members. Laband, vol. i. p. 534. 

2 Cf. Lebon, pp. 155-56 ; Dupriez, vol. i. p. 534. If, as the German 
jurists maintain, the Chancellor's right to preside in the Bundesrath 
depends on his being a Prussian delegate, the Emperor, as such, is not 
represented in the Bundesrath at all. See p. 265, n. 2, supra. 



276 GERMAOT. 

appoints the lower officers, and has the general man* 
agement of the troops over most of Germany. As 
Emperor he instructs the Chancellor to prepare a bill. 
As King he instructs him to introduce it into the 
Bundesrath, and directs how one third of the votes of 
that body shall be cast. Then the bill is laid before 
the Eeichstag in his name as Emperor/ and as King 
he directs the Chancellor what amendments to accept 
on behalf of the Bundesrath, or rather in behalf of the 
Prussian delegation there. After the bill has been 
passed and become a law, he promulgates it as Em- 
peror, and in most cases administers it in Prussia as 
King ; and finally as Emperor he supervises his own 
administration as King. This state of things is by no 
means so confusing to the Germans as might be sup- 
posed ; for it is not really a case of one man holding 
two distinct offices, but of the addition of certain im- 
perial functions to the prerogatives of the King of 
Prussia. The administration of the country is vested 
in the sovereigns of the States, among whom the King 
of Prussia is ex officio president; and until one has 
thoroughly mastered this idea, it is impossible to under- 
stand the government of Germany. 2 

There is no imperial cabinet, and the only federal 

The Chan- minister is the Chancellor, who has subordi- 

on^yfeleiS nates but no colleagues. 3 The reason for 

this is to be found partly in Bismarck's perr 

1 Const. Art. 16. 

2 Schulze (Preussen, in Marquardsen, pp. 33-34) remarks that the two 
offices are so closely bound together that it is impossible to think of 
them separately. 

8 Laband, vol. i. p. 348 ; and see § 40, 



THE CHANCELLOR 277 

sonal peculiarities, and partly in the nature of the 
ties that bind Prussia to the Empire. In the first place, 
Bismarck preferred to stand alone, and did not want 
to be hampered by associates. He had had experience 
enough of the Prussian cabinet, where each of the 
ministers was very independent in the management of 
his own department, and he did not care to create for 
himself a similar situation in imperial matters. After 
he had decided on a course of action, he hated, as he 
said, to waste his time and strength in persuading his 
colleagues, and all their friends and advisers, that his 
policy was a wise one. Hence he would not hear of 
an imperial cabinet. 1 In the second place, he did not 
originally intend to have any federal ministers at all. 
According to his plan the general supervision and con- 
trol of the administration was to be exercised by the 
Bundesrath, while those matters — such as military 
and foreign affairs — which from their nature must be 
intrusted to a single man, were to be conducted by the 
King of Prussia as President of the Confederation, all 
others being left in the hands of the several States. 
The Chancellor was to be a purely Prussian officer, who 
should receive his instructions from the King, and be 
responsible to him alone. 2 This plan is very interest- 
ing, because, although in form it was not accepted, in 
substance it presents an almost exact picture of the 
real political situation, except that the power of the 
Prussian King has become greater than was at first 

1 Cherbuliez, VAllemagne Politique, 2d ed., pp. 228-29. Meyer, in his 
Grundziige des Norddeutschen Bundesrechts (pp. 88-97), discusses Bis- 
marck's objections to a collegiate ministry. 

2 Lebon, p. 152. 



278 GERMANY. 

intended. 1 The Liberals objected to it, and under 
the lead of Bennigsen the constituent Reichstag 
amended the draft of the constitution, by providing 
that the acts of the President 2 should be countersigned 
by the Chancellor, who thereby assumed responsibility 
for them, — thus making the Chancellor a federal offr 
cer responsible to the nation. 3 The principle wag 

excellent, but has remained unfruitful; for 
politically the Chancellor is not responsible criminally, 
to the and Bismarck refused to hold himself polit- 

ically responsible to any one but the monarch. 
He always insisted that the motto " The King reigns 
but does not govern " had no application to the House 
of Hohenzollern. In short, the parliamentary system 
does not exist in the Empire, and the Chancellor is not 
forced to resign on a hostile vote in the Reichstag. If 
that body will not pass one of his measures, he gets 
on as well as he can without it ; or, if he considers the 
matter of vital importance, he causes the Reichstag to 
be dissolved and takes the chance of a new election, 
a course which up to this time has always been crowned 
with success. 4 

1 It is a striking fact that the high imperial officials are almost always 
selected from among the Prussian functionaries. Lebon, p. 157. 

2 This was in 1867, before the King of Prussia was given the title of 
Emperor. 

3 Const. Art. 17. Unlike matters of military administration, the acts 
of the Emperor as commander-in-chief of the army are not treated as 
requiring a countersignature. Schulze, Lehrbuch, p. 93. 

4 I do not mean that no imperial official has ever been driven from 
office by the Reichstag. The fall of a minister may be occasionally 
brought about by the opposition of a popular chamber, although there 
is no general cabinet responsibility. 



THE CHANCELLOR. 279 

The Chancellor is at the head of the whole body of 
federal officials. Besides this he presides in Hisfunc- 
the Bundesrath, and is, in fact, its leading tlons * 
and moving spirit. He also takes an active part in 
the debates in the Reichstag, where he is the chief 
representative of the policy of the government. But 
like his royal master he has a double nature, and his 
functions are partly imperial and partly Prussian. 
As Chancellor appointed by the Emperor he is at the 
head of the national administration, and presides in 
the Bundesrath; but it is as Prussian delegate that 
he votes in that body, and indeed his influence there 
is mainly due to the fact that he speaks in the name 
of Prussia, and casts as he chooses the twenty votes 
which she controls. In the Reichstag, on the other 
hand, he nominally appears as commissioner for the 
Bundesrath or as one of its Prussian members, while 
his importance is really due to his position as chief 
of the federal government. It is obviously essential 
to the Chancellor's position that he should be the 
leader of Prussia's delegation in the Bundesrath, and 
able to direct her imperial policy. For this reason 
the Chancellor, except for short intermissions, has been 
also the president of the Prussian cabinet. We shall 
consider this matter more fully in the chapter which 
treats of the actual working of the German govern- 
ment. 

The powers of the German Chancellor in Bismarck's 
day were greater than those of any other Hissubsti- 
man in the world, and his work and respon- tutes * 
sibilities were heavier than even his iron frame could 



280 GERMANY. 

bear. In order, therefore, to relieve him in part, an 
act was passed in 1878 providing for the appointment 
by the Emperor of substitutes, whenever the Chan- 
cellor should declare himself prevented from doing 
his work. These offices were expected at first to be 
temporary, especially that of V ice-Chancellor, or gen- 
eral substitute, who was intended to act only during 
the illness of the Chancellor ; but with the increase of 
business they have become a permanent necessity, the 
Chancellor declaring that he is prevented from doing 
his work by the fact that he has too much of it to do. 
For many years there has been a Vice-Chancellor con- 
tinuously, and it has been the habit to make as many 
of the Secretaries of State as possible special substi- 
tutes for their own departments, 1 appointing them at 
the same time Prussian delegates to the Bundesrath, in 
order that they may be able to speak both in that 
body and in the Eeichstag. 2 The substitutes counter- 
sign the acts of the Emperor in the Chancellor's stead, 
but are nevertheless subject to his orders, and thus he 
still remains sole head of the government, and is mor- 
ally responsible for its whole policy. 3 

1 Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 495-97. The substitution can be made only for 
those matters which the Empire administers directly. Dupriez, lb. ; La- 
band, vol. i. p. 358. 

2 Dupriez, vol. i. p. 522. 

8 Laband, vol. i. p. 359 ; Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 497-99. The federal 
administration began in a very simple form, for there was only one chan- 
cery office (Bundeskanzleramt), divided into three sections, the Prussian 
officials doing in some departments a good deal of federal work. But as 
the number of affairs to be attended to has grown, the federal machinery 
has become more elaborate. The general chancery office has disap- 
peared, and there are now many separate departments, each with a secre- 



THE COURTS OF LAW. 281 

The judicial branch of the imperial government 
remains to be considered. Justice is admin- The . udi 
istered in the first instance by the state ciary * 
courts; but curiously enough, the organization of 
these courts is regulated by imperial statutes. 1 Their 
rules of practice are also derived from the same source, 
for the federal government has enacted general codes 
of civil and criminal procedure, which apply to the 
state tribunals. 2 It has, moreover, enacted a univer- 
sal criminal code and a commercial code, and has just 
added to these a general code of civil law; so that 
there are in each State a similar series of courts or- 
ganized on an imperial plan and expounding imperial 
laws in accordance with imperial forms of procedure, 
but whose members are appointed by the local sov- 
ereign and render their decisions in his name. 

Apart from administrative and consular courts, there 
is only one federal tribunal, called the Eeichs- The Reicns _ 
gericht, or Court of the Empire. It has gericht - 
original jurisdiction in cases of treason against the 
Empire, and appellate jurisdiction from the federal 
consular courts, and from the state courts on questions 
of imperial law. 3 It is to be observed, therefore, that 

tary of state, or president of a bureau, at its head. Such are the Interior, 
Foreign Affairs, Navy, Post Office, Justice, Treasury, Railroads, Invalid 
Funds, Debt Commission, and Imperial Bank. Laband, § 41. 

1 The Gerichtsverfassunggesetz of Jan. 27, 1877. Laband, § 86, and see 
§ 81. This is true only of the ordinary courts of law, the subject of 
administrative courts being left for the most part in the discretion of the 
several States. See Laband, vol. ii. p. 368. 

2 The Civilprozessordnung of Jan. 30, 1877. The Strafprozessordnung 
of Feb. 1, 1877. 

3 Laband, § 84. 



282 GERMANY. 

with the completion of the system of national codes 
this year, the imperial tribunal has become a general 
court of error in all cases arising under the ordinary 
civil or criminal law. 1 

While speaking of the judicial branch of the govern- 
Powerof nient, it is interesting to notice that there 
tohSd 3 * 3 nas been a g reat deal of discussion among 
S'coiSi- German publicists over the question whether 
a court of law can inquire into the constitu- 
tionality of a statute. Some writers maintain that it 
can do so/ while others insist that the promulgation by 
the Emperor settles conclusively the validity of a law. 3 
The problem is not, of course, confined to the Empire, 
but may arise in the States whenever a legislature 
passes a law that violates the state constitution ; the 
solution depending ultimately on the question whether 

1 A State which has several courts of error can create a supreme court 
of appeal and confer upon it the appellate civil jurisdiction of the 
Reichsgericht, but this has been done by Bavaria alone. Laband, vol. 
ii. pp. 365-66. 

2 v. Ronne, vol. ii. pp. 62-63. This was maintained as a general principle 
by Robert von Mohl, in his Staatsrecht, Volkerrecht u. Politik (1860), I. 3. 

3 E. g. Laband, vol. i. pp. 551-58 ; Zorn, Staatsrecht des Deutschen 
Reiches, § 7, iii. Gneist, who is commonly cited in favor of the authority 
of the court, came to the conclusion, in his Soil der Eichter auch iiber die 
Frage zu befinden haben, ob ein Gesetz verfassungsmdssig zu Stande gekonv- 
men, that the courts can decide whether an ordinance issued by the 
executive is within its constitutional powers, and whether a law has 
received the assent of the chambers as required by the constitution, but 
that they cannot inquire whether the substance of a law passed in 
proper form violates the provisions of that instrument. 

The constitution of Prussia declares expressly (Art. 106) that statutes 
and ordinances are binding if promulgated in the form prescribed by law, 
and that the legality of royal ordinances regularly issued can be examined 
only by the chambers. 



UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS. 283 

the constitution shall be treated as a law of superior 
obligation, or whether it shall be regarded merely as 
establishing a rule for the guidance of the legislator. 

The matter, however, is one in which practice is far 
more important than abstract theory, and it is certain 
that the courts have not in fact exercised any general 
power of refusing to apply statutes on constitutional 
grounds. The late Brinton Coxe, in the recent work 
on " Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation," 
has collected the most important German cases on the 
subject. 1 In one of these the Hanseatic Court of 
Appeal held in 1875 that a statute enacted in Bremen, 
which deprived a person of property without compen- 
sation, was in conflict with the constitution of the city, 
and that the court must regard the latter as a binding 
law and refuse to apply the statute. 2 Eight years later 
the doctrine of this case was expressly overruled by 
the federal court in another suit that arose in Bremen 
upon a similar state of facts, the court declaring that 
the constitutional provision was to be understood only 
as a rule for the legislative power to interpret. 3 Since 
that time no German tribunal appears to have held a 
statute unconstitutional, but in 1889 the federal court 
remarked, in the course of an opinion, that the question 
whether the judiciary had a right to examine the con- 
stitutionality of an imperial law was still an open one, 
although the weight of authority was in the affirmative. 4 

i Ch. ix. 

2 Gabade v. Bremen, Seuff, Arch., vol. xxxii. No. 101. 
8 K. and Others v. Dyke Board of Niedervieland, Dec. of the Reichs- 
gericht, vol. ix. p. 233. 
4 Dec. of the Reichsgericht, vol. xxiv. p. 3. 



284 GERMANY. 

As the question is the same for imperial and state laws, 
the remark would seem to imply a change of opinion on 
the part of the court. It is not at all likely, however, 
that the Reichsgericht will have the courage of its con- 
victions, and venture to disregard statutes passed by 
the legislature of the Empire. 

Even in a federal system such a power could be 
effectively used only where the central government was 
exceedingly weak, 1 or where the authority of the courts 
had been raised to a pitch like that which it has ac- 
quired in Anglo-Saxon countries from the prolonged 
judicial centralization of England. It would, indeed, 
seem absurd to draw a distinction between public and 
private law, as is commonly done in Germany, and deny 
to the courts the right to consider the legality of an 
administrative ordinance on the ground that it falls 
into the province of public law, and at the same time 
give them power to pass on the validity of a statute 
enacted by the legislature. 

To sum up what has been said, the German Empire 
Character of * s a federal government of a peculiar type, in 
fe| e r a e iTys- which legislative centralization is combined 
with administrative decentralization. The 
centre of gravity is to be found in the body repre- 
senting the governments of the several States, and 
here Prussia has a controlling influence, and a veto 
on the most important matters. In fact, the Con- 
federation is not a union of States with equal rights, 
but rather an association of privileged members, so 

1 That the courts cannot exercise such a power in a centralized State, 
see the writer's Essays on Government, pp. 40-45. 



SYNOPSIS OF THE SYSTEM. 285 

contrived that Prussia has the general management, 
subject only to a limited restraint by her associates. 
And herein there is a marked contrast between the 
American and German federal systems. That of the 
United States is based on the equality of the members ; 
and a decided preponderance on the part of any one 
State would destroy the character of the union. That 
of Germany, on the contrary, is organized on a plan 
that can work successfully only in case one member 
is strong enough to take the lead, and keep the main 
guidance in its own hands; 1 for if the States were 
nearly equal, their mutual jealousy would effectually 
prevent the sovereign of any one of them from infus- 
ing a real vitality into the office of Emperor, while the 
control of the Bundesrath over the administration 
would paralyze the executive unless that body derived 
its impulse from a single source. 

1 Cf. Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 475-77. 






CHAPTEE VI. 

GERMANY : PRUSSIA AtfD THE SMALLER STATES. 

The preponderating influence of Prussia in the 

German Empire makes a knowledge of her 

ment^TthT institutions necessary for a thorough compre- 

Empire can- i • n . i • • -t . iii o 

not be un- nension oi the imperial system, and tneretore 
without a a sketch of the Prussian government must 

knowledge , , ,. . „ ~ 

of Pmssian precede any general discussion oi German 

institutions. . .. 

politics. 
The present constitution of Prussia, which dates 

from January 31, 1850, was granted by the 
sianconsti- King after the revolutionary movement of 

1848 had begun to subside, and is far less 
democratic than the Liberals would have liked. 2 In 
some ways it is even less liberal than the text would 
lead one to suppose ; for although it contains quite an 
elaborate bill of rights, Professor Gneist spoke of it 
as a lex imperfecta, owing to the absence of machinery 
for giving effect to its provisions. 3 It purports, for 

1 The area of Prussia is 134,463 square miles out of a total of 208,670 
for the whole Empire, while her population by the census of Dec. 1, 1890, 
was 29,957,367 out of 49,428,470. 

2 Dupriez (vol. i . pp. 349-50), after pointing out that the constitution 
of Prussia is largely copied from that of Belgium, remarks that the 
latter rests on the sovereignty of the nation, while the former is based 
on the sovereignty of the king. 

3 Soil der Richter, 3d ed. p. 20. 



THE CONSTITUTION. 287 

example, to guarantee the liberty of instruction ; * but 
as no statute has been passed to carry this out, the 
previous laws remain in force, whereby no school can 
be opened without permission from the government. 2 
Again, it declares that the right to assemble without 
arms, except in the open air, shall be free ; 3 but in fact 
notice of every meeting held to discuss public affairs 
must be given to the police, who have a right to be 
present, and a very extensive power of breaking it up. 4 
The result of such a state of things is that neither 
the parliament nor the citizens have sufficient means 
of defending their rights ; and although the recent in- 
crease of local self-government and the establishment 
of administrative justice have done something towards 
remedying this defect, 5 personal and political liberty 
are still far from enjoying the same protection as in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. The constitution was clearly 
not intended as a restraint on legislation, for it can be 
changed by a simple majority vote of both chambers, 
sanctioned by the King ; the procedure in such a case 
differing from the ordinary process of enacting a stat- 
ute only in the fact that there must be two separate 
votes, between which an interval of twenty-one days 
must elapse. 6 

1 Const. Art. 22. Cf. Arts. 26 and 112. 

2 v. Ronne, Das Staatsrecht der Preussischen Monarchies 4th ed. § 169; 
and see Schulze, Preussen, in Marquardsen, p. 123. 

3 Const. Art. 29. Cf. Art. 30. 

4 v. Ronne, lb., § 145 (and see p. 193, note 8, p. 194, note 1). 

5 Schulze, p. 32. 

6 Const. Art. 107 ; v. Ronne, § 158. Amendments have in fact been 
made on more than a dozen different occasions. 



288 PRUSSIA. 

At the head of the state is the King, whose crown is 
hereditary according to the principles of the 
Salic law, that is, it can be inherited only by 
and through males. 1 Every statute requires his con- 
sent, as well as that of the chambers, 2 and he appoints 
directly or indirectly all the officers of the state. 3 He 
has power also to confer titles of nobility, — a prerog- 
ative, by the way, that as Emperor he does not pos- 
sess. 4 The civil list, which is granted not for the life 
of the monarch as in England, but in perpetuity, is 
absolutely at his disposal, and out of it he is expected 
to provide for all the members of the royal family ; 
and in this connection it is worth while to observe, as 
an illustration of the relation of the imperial office to 
the royal one, that the Emperor as such has no civil 
list, and that there is no imperial household, with its 
chamberlain, its marshal, and so forth, all these high 
dignitaries being officers of the Prussian court. 5 

The constitution declares that all the acts of the 
The minis- King must be countersigned by a minister, 
ters. w k thereby becomes responsible for them ; 6 

1 Const. Art. 53 ; Schulze, pp. 47-50. 

2 Const. Art. 62. As a matter of fact he does not need to withhold his 
consent, because he can always get the Peers to reject a Liberal bill, 
but no one doubts that he would withhold it in case of need. (Cf . Du- 
priez, vol. i. p. 409.) 

8 See Const. Arts. 45-47 ; v. Ronne, § 99. 

4 Schulze, p. 45. 

5 Id., p. 47. 

6 Const. Art. 44. In practice the countersignature of a minister is not 
required, for orders to the army issued by the king as commander-in- 
chief, for ordinances concerning the administration of the Evangelical 
church, of which the king is the head, for the conferring of decorations 



THE KING AND HIS MINISTERS. 289 

but as the ministers are in reality responsible t>nly to 
the King himself, this provision does not Th eirre _ 
diminish the royal authority. The ministers ^^^^ 
and their substitutes have, indeed, a right to appear 
in either chamber, where they enjoy the privilege of 
speaking as often as they please, although the members 
themselves do not. They must even be given the floor 
at any time they ask for it, unless a member is actually 
addressing the house, 1 and in fact they take a very 
active part in the debates ; 2 but they do not resign on 
an adverse vote, and are not responsible in the parlia- 
mentary sense of the term. They are, in short, the 
servants, not of the chambers, but of the crown, a fact 
that finds its outward expression in the frequency with 
which they refer to the personal opinions of the King. 3 
Nor are they subject to an effective control of any kind 
on the part of the legislature, for although the consti- 
tution provides that they can be prosecuted for bribery, 
treason, or violation of the constitution, upon a resolu- 
tion passed by either house, 4 there is no statute pre- 
scribing any penalties, and hence the provision is a 
dead letter. 5 A real restraint on the ministers is, how- 



and titles, or for addresses to the chambers, v. Ronne, vol. i. p. 418 ; 
Meyer, Lehrhuch, p. 187. 

1 Const. Art. 60 ; v. Ronne, § 73 and notes. 

2 Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 401, 407. 

3 Dupriez, vol. i. p. 401. The royal rescript of Jan. 4, 1882, insists on 
the right of the king to direct personally the politics of his government. 
Cf. Blum, p. 479. 

4 Const. Art. 61. 

6 v. Ronne, vol. ii. pp. 356-59 ; Schulze, pp. 42^43. In France, curi- 
ously enough, a similar provision is held to authorize the High Court to 

VOL. I. 



290 PRUSSIA. 

ever, supplied by the Chamber of Accounts (Oberrech- 
nung shammer), which is independent of them, inasmuch 
as its members are protected from removal like the 
judges. This body examines all the finances, and 
reports to the Landtag ; 1 but if a minister has exceeded 
the appropriations and the Landtag refuses to vote a 
supplementary credit to cover the amount, there is no 
way of holding him legally responsible for it. 2 This 
restraint, therefore, while very important morally, has 
no legal sanction. 

One of the most marked peculiarities of the Prussian 

ministers is their lack of cohesion. There 

pendenceof is, indeed, a Minister President, but he has 

each other. . . 

no authority over his colleagues and cannot 
compel them to adopt his views. There is also a 
ministry of state (Staatsministerium) composed of all 
the ministers sitting together; but this body bears very 
little resemblance to the cabinet in England or France. 
It has power, when the public safety requires it or un- 
usual distress prevails, and the Landtag is not in session, 
to make temporary laws in the form of royal ordinances, 
which are binding until the Landtag next assembles, 
when they must be submitted to it for approval. 3 Its 
consent is necessary, moreover, in certain other matters, 
and notably for proclaiming the state of siege, which 

impose any penalty it sees fit. Lebon, Frankreich, in Marquardsen, pp. 
55-58. 

1 This body was also made the Chamber of Accounts for the Empire ; 
the Bundesrath being empowered to appoint additional members. Schulze, 
pp. 73-74. 

2 v. Ronne, vol. ii. p. 353, note 6 ; Schulze, p. 112. 

8 Const. Art. 63 j v. Ronne, vol. iii. p. 77 ; Schulze, pp. 71-72. 



THE KING AND HIS MINISTERS. 291 

involves a temporary suspension of personal liberty in 
the places to which it applies ; 1 but except for these 
special cases where the ministers are obliged by law to 
act together, they are in the habit of administering 
their several departments without much regard to each 
other's opinions. Ordinances of 1814 and 1817 pro- 
vide, it is true, that the ministry of state shall meet 
once a week, and that all matters of general importance 
shall be referred to it, 2 but this statute has not united 
the members because the decisions of the majority do 
not bind the minority, their effect being simply that of 
advice to the King. 3 The result is that the ministers 
are far more independent of each other than in most 
countries, often differing widely in their political tend- 
encies. 4 In seeking an explanation of this fact we may 
observe that the parliamentary system does not exist, 
and hence the ministers not being jointly responsible 
for the whole conduct of the administration, are not 
compelled to hold together and support one another. 
Their responsibility is only to the King, and there is 
no reason why he should dismiss them all because he 
is dissatisfied with one of them. He selects them for 
their administrative qualities rather than their political 
opinions, and requires of them administrative capacity 
and obedience to himself. 5 The ministers, therefore, 
stand each on his own feet, or as the lawyers say in a 

1 v. Ronne, lb. ; Schulze, lb. 

2 v. Ronne, vol. iii. pp. 75-76 ; Schulze, p. 71. 

3 Cf. Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 367-71. 

4 Cf. Id., vol. i. pp. 361, 363. 
6 Id., vol i. pp. 359-60. 



292 PRUSSIA. 

deed of trust, they are liable each for his own acts and 
defaults, and not one for those of the others. 

The number of the ministers, their functions, and 
Organiza- ^ ne arrangement of their staff of officials are 
depart- the regulated by the King at his pleasure, sub- 
ments ' ject only to the vote of the necessary appro- 

priations for salaries by the Landtag ; and it is no 
doubt partly for this reason that the organization of 
the several departments is not uniform or based on 
any systematic plan, but has developed according to 
the needs of each case. There are at present nine 
ministers : those for Foreign Affairs ; * Interior ; Trade 
and Commerce ; Public Works ; Agriculture, Domains, 
and Forests ; Religion, Education, and Medicine ; Jus- 
tice; Finance; and War; to which must be added as 
forming part of the ministry of state the Imperial 
Secretaries of State for the Interior and Foreign 
Affairs. 2 

1 The Minister for Foreign Affairs is also, of course, the Chancellor of 
the Empire. 

2 Schulze, p. 62 et seq. ; Dupriez, vol. i. p. 448 et seq. There is also 
a Staatsrath, or Council of State, which in composition resembles some- 
what the English Privy Council. It deserves mention for its insignifi- 
cance rather than its importance, for in fact it amounts to nothing. 
(v. Ronne, vol. iii. pp. 73-75 ; Schulze, pp. 72-73.) In 1884 Bismarck 
tried to give it new life by intrusting it with the consideration of bills to 
be submitted to the Bundesrath, but after a few days of activity it re- 
lapsed into its dormant condition. (Lebon, pp. 211-13.) Another body 
with analogous functions is the Volkswirthschaftrath created by royal ordi- 
nance in 1880 and composed of thirty members appointed by the King, 
and forty-five more selected by him from a number twice as large nom- 
inated by the Chambers of Commerce and Trade and the Agricultural 
Associations. It considers and gives advice upon all bills affecting trade 
and agriculture. (Schulze, p. 67.) This was one of Bismarck's pet 
institutions, but was not generally popular. (See Blum, pp. 353-54.) 



THE BUREAUCRACY. 293 

Subordinate to the ministers is the bureaucracy, 
which is certainly one of the most efficient Thebureau- 
Ibodies of officials in the world. Its members c^aey • 
are intelligent, honest, and active, and although some- 
what rigid and autocratic, do not appear to be exces- 
sively tied down by routine. Nor is the administra- 
tive system in its actual working highly concentrated 
as compared with those of other continental nations, 
for the officials do not feel obliged to refer every im- 
portant question to their superiors, but are willing to 
act on their own responsibility within their spheres of 
duty. An apprenticeship and examination are required 
for admission, 1 and a severe discipline is maintained by 
means of special tribunals composed of administrative 
officers, whose consent is required for the dismissal 
without a pension of any permanent member of the 
civil service. 2 These conditions explain the existence 
of a dictatorial power on the part of the officials, and a 
constant interference in the affairs of every-day life, 
which under a system of favoritism and spoils would 
be well-nigh intolerable. Not that the service is strictly 
non-partisan, for the government does not give offices 
to its political enemies, but neither the deputies nor 
the parties have any control over appointments, and 

1 The upper and lower administrative services are kept distinct, dif- 
ferent qualifications and separate examinations being required for each 
branch, v. Ronne, § 256. 

2 Id., §§ 251, 260, 264. The Disciplinarhof (which has jurisdiction 
over officials appointed by the King or the ministers, and must be con- 
sulted in cases of appeals by other officials) contains in addition to the 
administrative members at least four judges of the Court of Appeals, all 
the members being appointed for three years. Id., vol. iii. p. 387. 



294 PRUSSIA. 

hence the bureaucracy, though at times actively used 
to influence elections/ does not degenerate into the 
creature or the tool of party. ' 

Notwithstanding the excellent organization of the 

bureaucracy, its enormous power could hardly 
tive justice be endured without the restraint exercised by 

the administrative courts. Before the present 
century the elaborate system of administrative appeals, 
and the permanence of traditions that prevailed in the 
bureaucracy, many of whom were learned in the law, 
preserved a great uniformity in the administration, and 
furnished a real guarantee against arbitrary conduct on 
the part of the officials. But with the spread of new 
ideas after the French Eevolution, a marked change 
took place. The sharp distinction drawn between jus- 
tice and administration deprived administrative pro- 
cedure of its judicial character, and made the decisions 
of the officials turn less on law and more on expedi- 
ency. By an ordinance of 1808 the officers of the 
government were, indeed, subjected to the ordinary 
tribunals in certain specified cases, which came to be 
known by the curious name of ffliklaven, or oases of 
justice ; but except to this limited extent the officials 
enjoyed an entire immunity from judicial control. 
Moreover, the torpid old bureaucratic system, with its 
delays and its conservatism, offered a serious hindrance 
to the reforms planned by Stein and Hardenberg. They 
needed and created a more elastic form of government 

1 Cf. Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 446-48. This caused a great deal of com- 
plaint and aroused much discussion after the elections to the Reichstag in 
1881. Blum, pp. 478-81. 






THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS. 295 

in which an impulse could make itself quickly and 
decisively felt from a central point, not dreaming for a 
moment that the vast discretionary power they gave to 
the officials, and especially to the ministers, would ever 
be abused for party purposes. But in fact the system 
they introduced was adapted only to the rule of a 
benevolent autocrat, and its defects became manifest 
after the outbreak of 1848 had given rise to a parlia- 
ment. 

In 1850 the Conservatives, or rather the landowners, 
who formed the ruling element in the party, came into 
power, and made a free use of their vast public author- 
ity to help their partisans. The confirmation of local 
officials, the granting of passports, of building permits, 
and of licenses for hotels and saloons, and even the 
direction of the police at Berlin, were employed as a 
means of influencing elections. The evil continued 
unabated for eight years, when William became Regent 
and put a stop to it ; but before any permanent remedy 
could be applied the conflict with the Parliament broke 
out, and the reform was postponed till after the Franco- 
Prussian war. Then at last a series of administrative 
tribunals was established in connection with the new 
scheme of local government, and the result has been a 
return of confidence in the justice of the bureaucracy 
without serious detriment to its energy. 1 

The administrative courts in Prussia are more inde- 

1 Cf. Gneist, Das Englische Verwaltungsrecht, 3d ed. pp. 367-72, 413- 
21 ; Zur Verwaltungsreform in Preussen, pp. 1-53; "Les Rdformes Ad- 
ministratives en Prusse," Revue Gen. du Droit et des Sciences Pol, Oct. 1, 
1886 ; Sehulze, pp. 153-65 ; Goodnow, book vi. div. ii. ch. vii. 



296 PRUSSIA. 

pendent of the government, and hence in a better po- 
sition to control the officials than in France ; 

istrative for in the lower ones a majority of the mem- 
courts. _ . . . _ i i i -i 
bers are private citizens chosen by the local 

representative assemblies and serving without pay ; 1 
while the highest, the so-called Oberverwaltungsge- 
richt, is composed of men appointed by the King for 
life, and protected like the ordinary judges, so that 
they can neither be removed, suspended, nor trans- 
ferred without the approval of a judicial tribunal. The 
whole subject of administrative justice as a 

Their possi- - in • • i • «n • • • r> 

bie develop- branch oi positive law is still in its miancy, 
and is liable to undergo grave modifications. 
From this point of view the independent position of 
the members of the Prussian Oberverwaltungsgericht, 
and their consequent separation from the mass of gov- 
ernment officials, is likely to have important results. 
Every judicial body has a natural tendency to follow 
precedents, and hence to develop fixed rules of deci- 
sion. If this has been true of the judicial section of 
the French Council of State whose members are remov- 
able, it will, no doubt, be even more true of the Prus- 
sian court. It is probable, therefore, that alongside of 
the ordinary civil law there will grow up in Germany 
an equally logical and equally inflexible administrative 
law, which will control the officials as effectually as the 
common law does in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is not 
improbable also that the inconvenience of two sys- 

1 There are two sets of these courts, the Bezirksausschusse and the 
Kreisausschusse, which will be described under the head of local govern- 
ment in the subsequent part of this chapter. 



THE LANDTAG. 297 

terns of law enforced by separate courts will in time 
bring about a fusion of the two in the same way that 
the English common law and equity are tending to 
become fused ; and if this happens, the government 
officers will lose their peculiar privileges and become in 
the end subject to the same tribunals as the rest of the 
community. From an Anglo-Saxon standpoint such a 
result is certainly desirable, but it must be observed 
that the Germans prefer their own system to the Eng- 
lish, on the ground that the administrative courts are 
inclined to take a broader view of public interests than 
the ordinary judges, who are constantly occupied with 
questions of private law. 1 If this is an advantage, it 
applies with especial force to the lower courts, whose 
members are actively engaged in the work of adminis- 
tration. 

The legislative power in Prussia is vested in the 
King and the Landtag, or Diet. The latter The 
consists of two houses, which always sit sep- an ag * 
arately, unless the King becomes insane, or the crown 
passes to an infant, when they meet in joint session to 
vote the need of a regency, and to appoint a regent in 
case the King has no male relative who is entitled 
under the constitution to occupy that position. 2 The 
Landtag must be summoned to meet at least once every 
year, and cannot be adjourned for more than thirty 
days, or more than once in a session, without its own 

1 E. g. Gneist, Der Rechtsstaat, 2d ed., pp. 269-74 ; v. Ronne, vol. ii. 
p. 331. The same view is expressed by Goodnow, vol. i. pp. 9-14. 

2 Const. Arts. 56 and 57. 



298 PRUSSIA. 

consent. 1 These privileges, however, are not as impor- 
tant as they seem, because the King can close the ses- 
sion at any time and can dissolve the lower house. In 
the latter case there is, indeed, a provision requiring 
that elections shall be held within sixty days, and the 
new Landtag called together within three months, 2 
but the power of dissolution is unlimited, and it has 
happened several times, when the elections have been 
unfavorable to the government, that the new Landtag 
has been dissolved before it met. 3 

The powers of the Landtag of a strictly legislative 
itsiegisia- character are on their face decidedly broad, 
tive power, ^jj } aws ^q^^g ^s consent, 4 and so do the 

taxes, the loans, and the yearly budget. 5 But, as we 
have already seen, the right to vote the appropriations 
has once been virtually suspended. 6 This was during 
the period of conflict with the crown which preceded 
the war with Austria, and although since that time no 
attempt has been made to spend money without the 
consent of the Landtag, the constitutional question has 
never been definitely settled. Most of the Prussian 
jurists still teach the doctrine that the popular Chamber, 
not having power alone to repeal a law, has no right to 

1 Const. Arts. 76 and 52. The two houses must be summoned and 
adjourned at the same time. Id., Art. 77. 

2 Const. Art. 51. 

3 Schulze, p. 61. 

4 Const. Art. 62. Except in case of urgency when it is not in session. 
Art. 63. 

6 Arts. 99, 100, 103. The budget in Prussia is really the work of the 
government, that is, the reductions made by the Landtag are unimpor- 
tant and an increase is rare. Dupriez, vol. i. p. 418. 

6 See page 239, supra. 



THE LANDTAG. 299 

bring about the same result by refusing the money 
required for its execution ; and that in case of a dis- 
agreement between the different powers in the state 
the King has a right to carry on the government in ac- , 
cordance with the standing laws, and make the expendi- 
tures necessary for that purpose. 1 Hence it would be 
rash to assert that if another serious conflict with the 
crown should arise, Bismarck's practice would not be 
revived. 

The Landtag has the right to initiate legislation, 2 
but this is not much used, and in fact the bulk of the 
bills introduced, and almost all those that are enacted, 
are proposed by the government. 3 In regard to their 
own bills, moreover, the ministers are not so much 
afraid of rejection as they are of serious amendments, 4 
and hence we may fairly say that the chief activity of 
the Landtag consists in the consideration and amend- 
ment of measures submitted by the crown. 

The control of the Landtag over the administration 
is very slight. It can appoint commissions to 

, . . k , -, Its control 

make investigations, but the government can over the ad- 
forbid the officials to give them any informa- 
tion, and in fact the ministers have insisted that such 
commissions, like all the committees of the Landtag, 

1 Cf. Schulze, pp. 102^1 ; Gneist, Die Militarvorlage von 1892 und der 
Preussische Verfassungslconflilct. The authorities are collected and dis- 
cussed by Laband, vol. ii. pp. 993-95, 1037, et seq. ; v. Ronne (§ 118) is 
of the contrary opinion. Compare, in this connection, Const. Arts. 100, 
109. 

2 Const. Art. 64. 

8 Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 404, 405-6. 
4 Id., pp. 407-8. 
6 Const. Art. 82. 

L.-JC. 



300 • PRUSSIA. 

shall hold no direct communications with any officers 
but themselves. 1 It can require the presence of the 
ministers and ask them questions, 2 but they may answer 
or not as they please. 3 It can address interpellations 
to the government, but as the parliamentary system 
does not exist in Prussia these have not the same 
importance as in France and Italy. Each chamber 
can also present addresses to the King, 4 who may pay 
attention to them or not, as he thinks best. In short, 
the influence of the Landtag over the administration is 
confined to expressing an opinion which is not likely 
to have any great effect. 

Each house elects its own President, and makes its 
The pro- own ru l es / the f orms of procedure being 
cedure. yer y mucn ]fe e those of the Eeichstag, for 
which, indeed, they served as a pattern. 6 The houses 
are divided in the same way into Abtheihmgen, or 
sections, whose only duties are the choice of commit- 
tees, and in the lower house the preliminary examina- 
tion of elections. 7 There is also the same jealousy of 

1 v. E-onne, vol. i. pp. 294^96. 

2 Const. Arts. 60 and 81. 
8 Schulze, p. 59. 

4 Const. Art. 81. 

5 Const. Art. 78. 

6 Cf. Lebon, p. 207. 

7 v. Ronne, vol. i. pp. 331-34 ; Schulze, p. 59 ; Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 
389-90. In the House of Peers there are five sections ; in the House ef 
Representatives, seven. The sections differ from the French Bureaux in 
two respects. Instead of being renewed every month, they last during 
the whole session, and while in the lower house the division is made as 
in France by lot, in the Peers it is made by the President. A section is 
not obliged to select its representatives on a committee among its own 
members. 



THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 301 

the power of committees, for the ministers realize that 
an amendment proposed by a committee has a better 
chance of being adopted than one moved from the 
floor. Hence they prefer to have their measures con- 
sidered directly by the whole house, and a reference 
to a committee is so far from being a matter of course 
that a motion to that effect is beginning to be looked 
upon as a sign of hostility to the bill. 1 

Curiously enough, the constitution does not pre- 
scribe the composition of the Herrenhaus, The House 
or House of Peers, but delegates the power of Peers - 
to do so to the King, only providing that the members 
shall be appointed by the crown in heredity or for life, 
and that a royal ordinance on the subject once issued 
shall not be changed without the consent of the Land- 
tag. 2 By the ordinance of October 12, 1854, which is 
still in force, the house consists first of princes of 
the blood royal summoned by the King ; then of 
hereditary nobles whose ancestors were formerly inde- 
pendent princes of the Holy Roman Empire, and of 
hereditary members created at will by the crown ; then 
of life-members, four of whom are the holders of cer- 
tain great offices of state or of the household, while 
others are appointed by the King at his pleasure, and 
others again are appointed by him on the nomination 
of the larger landowners, of the universities, of evan- 
gelical bodies, and of certain cities. 3 The members 

1 Dupriez, vol. i. pp. 407-8. There are in each house eight standing 
committees, all the others being specially appointed to consider particular 
measures, v. Ronne, ubi supra. 

2 Const. Arts. 65-68, as amended May 7, 1853. 

8 Schulze, pp. 52-53. The constitutionality of some of these provisions 



302 PRUSSIA. 

appointed at will by the King are not limited in num- 
ber like the rest, and hence the crown by a creation 
of peers can control the house at any time. At present, 
however, the total number of members is about three 
hundred, of whom more than one third are hereditary 
nobles possessing large estates, while another third are 
nominated by the landowners, so that the house is 
really controlled by the landed gentry. 1 Now this 
class has strongly marked characteristics in Prussia, 
and is widely separated from the rest of the people. 
It is devotedly loyal to the throne, and at the same 
time extremely conservative and very jealous of its 
rights. It can always be relied upon, therefore, to sup- 
port the crown against any attempt at innovation on 
the part of the more popular house, and to refuse its 
consent to progressive measures, which the representa- 
tives of the people have passed, and the King does not 
want to sanction. But it is by no means equally ready 
to follow the crown in a liberal policy ; and this it 
showed in 1872, when it rejected the bill for the re- 
form of local self-government which Bismarck had 
determined to enact, and was chastised by the appoint- 
ment of twenty-four new members. 

Except for the fact that the budget and all money 
bills must be presented first to the lower house and 
must be accepted or rejected as a whole by the Peers, 2 

has been seriously questioned on the ground that many of the life-mem- 
bers are not really appointed for life, but keep their seats only so long 
as they retain the qualifications on which their appointment was based, 
v. Ronne, vol. i. pp. 205, note 7, 215, note 1. 

1 Lebon, p. 191. 

2 Const. Art. 62. 



THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 303 

the powers of the two houses are identical ; and in fact 
the Peers exercise their power of amendment with a 
good deal of freedom and no little effect. 

The Abgeordnetenhaus, or House of Representa- 
tives, has an organization nearly as singular 
as that of the Peers. 1 It is composed of four of Repre- 
hundred and thirty-three members elected for 
five years 2 by a suffrage, which although universal 3 is 
neither direct nor equal. The members are chosen in 
districts, each of which elects, as a rule, two deputies, 
but frequently only one, and sometimes as many as 
three. 4 The members, however, are not chosen by the 
people, but by electors, and for this purpose 

Trip "fTiTPP— 

the districts are subdivided into a number class system 
of smaller divisions called Urwahlhezirke, or 
original electoral districts, in each of which one elector 
is chosen for every two hundred and fifty souls, on the 
following curious system. The voters are divided into 

1 See Const. Arts. 69-74, as amended in 1851, 1867, 1876, and 1888 ; 
Schulze, pp. 53-54 ; v. Ronne, §§ 57-60, and the annotated translation of 
the constitution by J. H. Robinson, published by the Am. Acad, of Pol. 
and Soc. Science. The constitution provides (Art. 115) that until an 
electoral law is enacted the election of deputies shall be regulated by 
the royal ordinance of May 30, 1849. No such law has ever been passed, 
but this ordinance with its amendments is nearly identical with the pro- 
visions of the constitution. 

2 The term was originally three years, but like that of the Reichstag, 
it was changed to five years in 1888. 

8 The franchise extends to all Prussians twenty-four years old, and not 
disqualified by crime, pauperism, etc. The constitution says twenty-five 
years old, but the ordinance says twenty-four. 

4 The districts have not been changed since 1860, and are now very 
unequal. Berlin, for example, with about one twentieth of the whole 
population, elects only nine representatives. 



304 PRUSSIA. 

three classes according to the amount of taxes they 
pay ; the largest tax-payers who together pay one third 
of the taxes forming the first class ; the next largest 
tax-payers paying another third of the taxes forming 
the second class ; and the rest of the people who pay 
of course the remaining third forming the third class. 
Each of these classes chooses separately, and by abso- 
lute majority vote, one third of the electors to which 
the Urwahlbezirh is entitled. 1 All the electors so 
chosen in the district then meet together and elect the 
representative by absolute majority vote. 2 The system 
has another strange feature. The electors retain their 
functions during the whole term of the Landtag, so 
that when a seat in the house becomes vacant, the 
people do not proceed to, a new election, but the old 
electors are called together again to choose another 
representative. The result is that a by-election in- 
volves a fresh appeal, not to the constituents, but only 
to the electors, and these are not likely to have changed 
their party affiliations. 

The three-class system of election was devised in 
1849, and is a singular compromise between universal 
suffrage and property qualification. Under it every- 
body votes, and has a certain share in the direction of 

1 If after dividing the number of electors by three there is one elector 
left over, he is chosen by the second class. If two are left over they are 
chosen by the first and third classes. 

2 Any Prussian thirty years old, who is not a peer or disqualified from 
being a voter, is eligible, and may be chosen in any district without re- 
gard to residence or official position, but a member loses his seat by 
accepting any paid office or any official promotion. Const. Arts. 74 and 
78. 



THE THREE-CLASS SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 305 

public affairs ; but the largest tax-payers, that is, the 
richest men, who are, of course, comparatively few in 
number, choose as many electors as the great mass of 
laborers, or to put the same thing from the opposite 
point of view, property and the bearing of the public , 
burdens, as well as mere numbers, are taken into account 
in the apportionment of power. The same principle 
is applied in the Prussian cities and villages, where the 
councils are divided into three equal parts, one of 
which is elected by each of the three classes of tax- 
payers. 

In municipal government the system appears to have 
the good effect of making the administration 
of the city a matter of business rather than 
of politics ; but as applied to the legislature it assumes 
a somewhat different aspect, for there is a strong feel- 
ing that a representative body elected on such a plan 
does not really express the opinion of the nation, and 
this feeling deters a good many people from voting, 
especially among the Social Democrats of the large 
cities. The system has been praised even by foreigners 
on the ground that it is an attempt to represent social 
interests instead of geographical districts, 1 and this is 
becoming a favorite point of view with certain think- 
ers ; but it may well be doubted whether in a demo- 
cracy a political organization of the different classes is 
desirable. The obvious result is to make party lines 
coincide with social distinctions ; to array the different 
classes in separate groups ; and to accentuate the an- 
tagonism between rich and poor. This evil, from 

1 Cf. Prins, La Democratic et le Regime Parlementaire, chap. x. 

VOL. I. 



306 PRUSSIA. 

which Germany suffers in a peculiar degree, will be 
referred to at greater length in the following chapter 
on the actual working of parties in that country. 

Curiously enough, the effect of this method of election 
its effect on tne relative strength of the parties is by no 
on parties. means as marked as one would suppose ; and, 
indeed, the experience of all countries has shown that 
although a change in the suffrage may seriously modify 
the policy of the different parties, it has usually much 
less permanent influence on their proportions than is 
expected. The system has been said to favor the Con- 
servatives at the expense of the Liberals, 1 and it is no 
doubt true that the Social Democrats, who are mainly 
workingmen from the cities, hold a number of seats 
in the Reichstag and scarcely any in the Landtag. As 
regards the other parties, however, the result is by 
no means so clear, for if we compare the elections to 
the Prussian House of Representatives which are con- 
ducted in this way with those of the Prussian members 
of the Reichstag who are elected by direct universal 
suffrage, we find that from 1870 to 1878, when the 
government was allied with the Moderate Liberals and 
only partially friendly with the Conservatives, the 
former had an advantage over the latter in the elec- 
tions to the Landtag as compared with the elections to 
the Reichstag ; that in 1878-79, when Bismarck's rela- 
tions to the parties were still uncertain, the ratio of the 
different groups in the two representative bodies was 
not very unequal ; and that after this time, when the 
favor of the government was definitely transferred to 

1 Lebon, pp. 200-3. 



THE THREE-CLASS SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



307 



the Conservative parties, the proportion of these in the 
Landtag was decidedly larger than in the Reichstag. 1 
Such a result would seem to prove that the chief effect 
of the Prussian method of election is not so much the 
help it gives to the Conservatives as the opportunity it 
affords to the government for exerting pressure at elec- 
tions ; and this is probably due less to the three-class 
system than to the fact that the voting in the case oi 

1 It must be remembered that the National Liberals split in 1880, and 
the fraction which kept the name adhered to the government. The 
figures for the elections to the Reichstag in the following table are taken 
from the Monatshefte zur Statistic des Deutschen Reichs, 1875, v. p. 65 ; 
1879, vi. pp. 37, 73 ; 1882, iii. p. 35 ; 1885, i. p. 139 ; 1887, iv. p. 35 ; 
1890, iv. p. 61 ; 1893, iv. p. 3. For the Landtag I have not been able to 
get the official statistics, and the figures are taken from Miiller (Politische 
Geschichte de Gegenwart), who is apt to lump the smaller groups together 
as unclassed. The figures for the Prussian members of the Reichstag 
are printed in roman type, those for the Landtag in italics. 







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1870 


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3 



308 PRUSSIA. 

the Landtag is oral/ while for the Reichstag it is con- 
ducted by secret ballot. 

Before leaving this subject it is worth while to ob- 
serve that indirect elections in Prussia have worked in 
the same way as our method of choosing the President 
by means of a college of electors ; that is, the Prussian 
electors do not really select the representative, but are 
themselves almost always voted for in the name of a 
definite candidate whom they are pledged to support ; 2 
and, indeed, this must necessarily be the case whenever 
the electors have no other functions than the election. 

Although local institutions in Germany have not as 
Local gov- direct a bearing on general politics as in 
eminent. France, the subject of local government in 
Prussia has a profound interest on account of the light 
it throws on German political conceptions, and still 
more because it embodies a recent attempt to solve one 
of the most difficult problems of modern government. 3 

After the popular convulsion of 1848-49 had sub- 
The late sided, one of those reactions set in which have 
reforms. b een so common in the history of Prussia. 
The landowners and a section of the Liberal party that 

1 This is true of the voting both by the people for the electors, and by 
these for the representatives, the Liberal party having tried in vain to 
introduce the secret ballot, v. Bonne, vol. i. p. 232 ; Lebon, p. 200. 

2 Boettcher, " Der Parlamentarismus im Deutschen Eeiche " Unsere 
Zeit, 1881, 2, p. 520. 

3 For a description of the Prussian local government see v. Bonne, 
§ 204 et seq. ; Schulze, Abs. viii. ; Goodnow, book iii. chap. vii. On this 
subject see also Gneist's works, and especially Die Kreis-Ordnung, Zur 
Verwaltungsreform in Preussen, Das Englische VerwaltungsrecJit, 3d ed., 
pp. 369-72 and 413-21, and " Les Rdformes Administratives en Prnsse," 
in the Revue Generate du Droit et des Sciences Politiques for Oct. 1, 1883. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 309 

thought all property threatened formed a powerful coa- 
lition, which was in fact managed entirely in the interest 
of the landowners, and these, as we have seen when 
treating of administrative justice, abused their power 
beyond measure for the benefit of their partisans. As 
a part of their plan they effected an organization of the 
local administration which placed the control in their 
own hands, and in spite of all movements for reform 
the system they established lasted until the foundation 
of the Empire. 

At this time the late Professor Gneist, the great 
historian of the English Parliament, prepared a memoir 
on the subject of local government which was after- 
wards published with some alterations under the title 
" Die Kreis-Ordnung." He pointed out that the imi- 
tations on the continent of the English parliamentary 
system had in most cases been unsuccessful, because 
the institutions which stood at the top of the British 
form of government had alone been copied, while there 
had been no attempt to adopt those which lay at the 
base of the structure. He declared that the whole 
English system rested on the organization of the local 
bodies. In these the taxes were paid and the power 
exercised by the upper and middle classes, which formed 
in consequence a strong aristocracy, and became at the 
same time the natural leaders of public opinion. The 
result was harmony between all the classes, and the 
development in each electoral community of a collec- 
tive political conscience, producing there a continuous 
Liberal or Conservative tendency, and in the nation 
at large the permanence of party that is essential to 



310 PRUSSIA. 

the stability of parliamentary government. 1 He urged 
the application of a similiar principle in Prussia as 
being preferable both to the half-bureaucratic, half- 
feudal system in existence, and to the democratic sys- 
tem in vogue in other countries ; and he argued that 
by insisting on gratuitous service on the part of the 
upper and middle classes in local affairs, the state 
would not only improve the administration, but awaken 
a public sentiment strong enough to counterbalance the 
conflict of classes and consolidate the electoral bodies. 
Bismarck adopted these views, and in spite of the 
opposition at the outset of the general public, of all his 
colleagues, and of most of the high government officials, 
he succeeded, with the firm support of the King, in 
enacting from 1872 to 1883 a series of laws which 
remodeled the local government on the lines suggested 
by Gneist. 

One of the chief objects aimed at by the reformers 

was to lessen the privileges of the great land- 
ofthe owners. But on the other hand the control 

was not to be placed in the hands of the 
masses; the intention being to prevent class tyranny, 
which had been peculiarly active in Prussia in the 
past, and to give to each class a certain share of power 
without allowing any one of them to acquire a control- 

1 Gneist remarks that the change in the basis of political power in 
England from land to industry has resulted in class conflicts and rapid 
changes of party, which is not the school in which true public life is 
developed. (" Les Rdformes Administrative s," op. cit.) In this con- 
nection may be noticed the curious fact that Prussia has adopted the 
principles of the old English local government at the very time when 
England has begun to abandon them. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 311 

ling authority. Another object of the reformers was, 
by introducing compulsory unpaid offices, to lessen the 
influence of the bureaucracy in local affairs, and to 
draft into the public service the better class of private 
citizens. A third object was to establish a system of 
administrative justice, and for this purpose the reform- 
ers, instead of creating an entirely distinct set of tribu- 
nals, took as a model the English Justices of the Peace, 
and confided judicial and executive powers to the same 
local bodies. Finally, a fourth object was to do away 
with special legislation altogether, placing the duty of 
supervising local affairs entirely in the hands of the 
administrative officials. Now if special legislation is 
excluded the system needs to be elastic, and hence the 
functions of the local bodies in Prussia are not minutely 
prescribed, but power is given to them in general terms, 
while the exercise of this power is subjected to an 
extensive control on the part of the higher adminis- 
trative authorities. Appeals from each body to the 
next one above it in the hierarchical scale are allowed 
with great freedom, the result being a very complicated 
procedure. The whole system is, in fact, not a little 
confusing, and cannot be understood without keeping 
in mind certain principles which affect every part of the 
local government, and lie at the basis of the Prussian 
conception of administration. 

One of these principles is the separation of those 
matters which are supposed to affect the whole country 
(StaatsgescJicifte), and form a part of the general admin- 
istration of the state (Allgemeine Landesverwaltung), 
from those which have only a local bearing. The dis- 



312 PRUSSIA. 

tinction is common to most continental countries, but 
Se aration ^ ^ s n °t obvious to an American. In Prus- 
ol general s i a the subjects of police, religion, schools, 
adiSL- and the supervision of subordinate local 
tlon ' authorities, for example, are considered as 

affecting the whole country, and are placed in the 
hands of persons who act as agents of the central gov- 
ernment; while the construction of roads, the mainte- 
nance of almshouses and asylums, and the voting of 
appropriations for purely local purposes are treated 
as matters of local interest. The subjects falling into 
the domains of general and local administration in 
Prussia are sometimes confided to the same body, some- 
times to separate ones, but in all cases they are kept 
carefully distinct, the supervision and control of the 
government over the matters of general interest being 
more strict and far-reaching than over the others. 

Another distinction which it is important to notice 
is that between those officers who belong to 

Distinction . -, « •, !••.,• • i 

between the proiessional administrative service and 
and lay those who do not, for the laws expressly 
provide to which class the incumbent of each 
office shall belong. The first class are members of the 
Prussian bureaucracy, and, of course, are always paid. 
Before they are qualified to hold any position, they are 
required to go through an elaborate training, and to 
pass an examination which varies according as they 
intend to pursue a strictly administrative, or a judicial 
or semi-judicial career. The non-professional officers 
have no special training, but are selected from the 
community at large, and in most cases they receive no 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 313 

compensation, their work being, as a rule, both gratui- 
tous and compulsory. This separation of professional 
and lay offices has a strong tendency to discourage the 
pursuit of politics as a trade, and the use of appoint- 
ments as political rewards; for the professional posi- 
tions are open only to the members of the bureaucracy, 
and these are expected to be continually in office ; while 
the places reserved for laymen, being gratuitous, offer 
no pecuniary temptation. 

Prussia is divided into twelve provinces, — East Prus- 
sia, West Prussia, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Theprov- 
Silesia, Posen, Saxony, 1 Westphalia, the Rhine mces ' 
Province, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hesse-Nas- 
sau. These are not new arbitrary districts, but his- 
torical territories, which have been left so completely 
in their original form that parts of some of them 
comprise detached pieces entirely surrounded by the 
others. The new system of local self-government was 
originally applied only to the six provinces first named, 
lying in the eastern part of Prussia ; but the scope 
of the new laws has gradually been enlarged so as to 
cover all the provinces except Posen, which has been 
suffered to remain under the old bureaucratic rule, 
partly because it makes a very important frontier 
against Russia, and partly because the Poles, who form 
a large proportion of the inhabitants, have often shown 
great hostility to the Prussian government. But al- 
though the new system has been extended over almost 
the whole of Prussia, its application has not been 

1 The province of Saxony must not be confused with the kingdom of 
the same name. 



314 PRUSSIA. 

strictly uniform. Sometimes one name is given to a 
local subdivision or office, and sometimes another, while 
in a few points the method of government is substan- 
tially different in the different provinces. These varia- 
tions will be noted in passing, where they are of any 
considerable importance. 

The provincial government is closely connected with 

that of the lesser local divisions ; so closely, 
local divi- in fact, that before describing it one must 

explain what the other divisions are. The 
twelve provinces are divided into SegierungsbezirJce, 
or government districts, of which there are thirty-five 
in all. These again are subdivided into Kreise, or 
circles, of which there are four hundred and sixty- 
four, that is, on the average, thirty-nine in each prov- 
ince. The total population of Prussia, exclusive of 
Berlin, being about thirty millions, the average number 
of inhabitants in a Kreis is about sixty-four thousand, 
although, of course, the variations in this respect are 
very great. Smaller than the Kreise, there are districts 
for local police called Amtsbezirke, and smallest of all 
are the rural Gemeinde, or communes, which are in 
many cases hardly more than villages. The cities have 
a special municipal organization of their own. 

In the province, the matters that form part of the 

general administration of the state, and those 
of the prov- which have a purely local interest, are intrusted 

to entirely distinct sets of officials. This was 
not the original intention, for the bill as introduced 
contemplated only one board or council which should 
deal with both classes of subjects ; but the Conserva- 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 315 

tives in the House of Peers, in order to secure more 
independence in local affairs, and to obtain 

Matters 

greater power for themselves, brought about which form 
the creation of a separate council for each general ad- 

- 1 - ministration 

class. The chief executive officer of the prov- ^the 
ince for matters of general administration is 
the Oberpr'dsident, who is a purely professional official 
appointed by the King, and acts as the direct The 0ber _ 
representative of the ministers at Berlin. He P rasident - 
attends to all affairs of this nature that affect more than 
one Regierungsbezirk, watches, over the subordinate 
administrative and local authorities, and presides in a 
number of boards. For the conduct of matters of gen- 
eral administration, there is also a Provinzial- The Pro _ 
rath, or provincial council, composed of the vmzialratn - 
Oberprasident as chairman, of a single professional 
councillor appointed by the Minister of the Interior 
practically for life, and of five lay members elected for 
six years by the Provinzialausschuss, a body which will 
be described in due course. 1 The Provinzialrath has a 
direct executive authority over a very limited range of 
subjects, such as the duration of markets and the con- 
struction of certain roads ; but its chief power is indi- 
rect. Of this nature are its function of hearing and 
deciding appeals from some of the subordinate admin- 
istrative bodies, especially the city councils, and more 
important still its control over many of the acts of the 

1 As is generally the case in the Prussian organs of local government 
these lay members are not all elected at once, but they are chosen by 
twos and threes every three years ; and, as is also usually the case in 
these organs, a substitute for each member of the council is selected at 
the same time. 



316 PRUSSIA. 

Oberprasident, all whose ordinances, for example, require 
its consent. 1 By means of this indirect power the lay 
members, who form the majority, are enabled to exert an 
effective control over the bureaucracy, a result which, 
as we have seen, the authors of the reform intended to 
bring about. 

We come now to those matters which are considered 

as having a purely local interest. The legis- 

locaim- lative organ for this class of subiects is the 

terest. 

JProvinziallcmdtag, or assembly of the prov- 
^ifi!°~ ince, a body composed of members elected 
landtag. £ Qr ^ y ears *foy ^ e var i us Kreise into 

which the province is divided, half the members 
retiring every three years. The seats are distributed 
among the Kreise according to population ; but in order 
to avoid frequent elections by the people, the members 
are chosen not directly by them, but by the diets of the 
Kreise, or, in case a city forms a Kreis by itself (which 
happens whenever it has twenty-five thousand inhab- 
itants), they are chosen by the municipal authorities. 
The Provinziallandtag is summoned by the crown to 
meet at least every two years, and as much oftener as is 
necessary. Its duties cover the construction of roads, 
the maintenance of almshouses and asylums, agricultu- 
ral improvements, the creation of provincial offices, the 
enactment of by-laws, the giving of advice on provin- 
cial matters when asked to do so by the royal govern- 
ment, and the voting of appropriations and taxes, the 
latter being paid not directly by the citizens, but by 

1 In cases that are urgent, the Oberprasident can make ordinances valid 
for three months without such consent. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 317 

the various Kreise, which are thus the provincial unit 
for both taxation and representation. 1 It is impossible, 
however, to give a complete catalogue of the functions 
of the Landtag, because it is empowered in general 
terms to do anything it thinks best within the domain 
of provincial administration. But an authority so 
vague and comprehensive implies a careful supervision 
and control on the part of the government, and hence 
the Oberprasident, as the representative of the state, 
is given a right to be present in the Landtag, and can 
suspend any of its acts which are beyond its com- 
petence. 2 Moreover, its by-laws require the approval 
of the crown, while all loans, all taxes above a cer- 
tain amount, and a number of other acts, require the 
consent of one or more of the ministers at Berlin. 
Finally, in case the Landtag becomes refractory, it 
can be dissolved by the King. 

The executive organ of the province for local 
matters is the JProvinzialausschuss, or pro- 

. . , . -i p i The Pro- 

vincial committee, composed ot members vinziai- 

elected by the Provinziallandtag for six years, 

and varying in number according to the by-laws, from 

seven to fourteen. 3 This body carries out the votes 

of the Landtag, and has under its orders a salaried 

administrative officer called the Landeshauptmann or 

Landes director, who is ex officio one of its members, 

1 A considerable part of the revenues of the provinces is, however, 
derived from subsidies granted by the state. 

2 The Oberprasident does not preside, but acts only as a sort of royal 
commissioner, the Landtag being allowed, in accordance with the older 
traditions, to choose its own presiding officer. 

3 As usual, one half of them retire every three years. 



318 PRUSSIA. 

and is also elected by the Landtag, but must be con- 
firmed by the King. In the province, therefore, the 
administration of general and local matters is placed 
in entirely distinct hands, the former being confided to 
the Provinzialrath and the latter to the Provinzialaus- 
schuss. These are the two bodies that were combined 
in the original plan, but were separated by the in- 
fluence of the Conservatives in the House of Peers. 
Such a separation is not, however, carried into any of 
the smaller local divisions; for, although the two 
classes of subjects are kept distinct, there is no other 
case where they are intrusted to different organs 
existing side by side in the same district. 

There are some variations in the government of 
the different provinces which are not of 
sufficient consequence to require special men- 
tion here. But it is important to notice that Berlin 
is separated both for central and local administration 
from Brandenburg, and forms for these purposes vir- 
tually a province by itself. It has, however, no special 
provincial organization, all the duties that would other- 
wise fall to the provincial authorities being discharged 
by the municipal officers, except the police, which is 
confided to a commission appointed by the royal gov- 
ernment. 

In the province local affairs play a much more promi- 
The Regie- nen ^ P ar ^ than those which affect the whole 
rungsbezirk. state . j^t t he next divisions, the Regie- 
The Regie- vungsbezirke, exist solely for the conduct of 
rwaSm general administration. In each of these 

districts there is a Regierung, or government, com- 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 319 

posed exclusively of professional officials appointed by 
the King, and having at its head a Regierungsprasi- 
dent, who has a very considerable power of overriding 
its decisions. It has charge of questions relating to 
state taxes, churches, schools, and the public domain ; 
in other words, all matters that are administered 
directly by the officials of the district, except the 
police. This, together with the control of subordinate 
authorities, is confided to the Bezirksaus- TheBezirks- 
schuss, or district committee. The object aussclmss - 
of the arrangement was to keep state taxes and the 
other matters already enumerated exclusively in the 
hands of professional officials, but to place the police 
and the supervision of local bodies under control of 
laymen. In the Bezirksausschuss, therefore, the popu- 
lar or lay element predominates, for of the seven 
members four are non-professional men elected by the 
Provinzialausschuss for six years, one half being 
chosen every three years. Of the three remaining mem- 
bers, one is the Regierungsprasident ; another must be 
qualified for the judicial, and the third for the higher 
administrative service, both of the last being appointed 
by the King for life. The functions of the committee 
are threefold : first, its consent is required for police 
ordinances made by the Regierungsprasident ; second, 
with that officer as its chairman, it supervises the in- 
ferior local authorities, and hears appeals from their 
decisions in matters of official discretion ; lastly, it acts 
as an administrative court, and in that case the Re- 
gierungsprasident does not sit, but the judicial mem- 
ber presides, and all the members enjoy the immunity 
of judges. 



320 PRUSSIA. 

The organization of the Eegierungsbezirk seems to 
a foreigner needlessly complex, and the division of 
its functions between two bodies somewhat unneces- 
sary, especially when we consider that both of them 
act as agents of the central government, and deal 
only with those matters that are supposed to affect the 
whole state. But the system is, in fact, the result of a 
careful and logical application of the modern Prussian 
theories of administration. In the first place, it was 
thought, as we have seen, that the matters of state 
taxes, schools, etc., ought to be managed entirely by 
professional officials, but that the police, in its wider 
sense, and the supervision of the organs of local self- 
government, ought to be largely under the control of 
laymen. Hence the separation between the Regierung 
and the Bezirksausschuss. In the second place, it was 
felt that a sharp line ought to be drawn between execu- 
tive action and judicial decisions ; that the Eegierungs- 
prasident, who might be concerned with the issuing of 
police ordinances by the subordinate local authorities, 
ought not to sit in the tribunal that passed upon their 
legality. From 1872 to 1875 the same body had 
exercised both classes of functions, but experience 
showed the evils of this arrangement, and in the latter 
year two separate bodies were created. In 1882 they 
were again united, for the sake of simplicity, and the 
lay members were suffered to act in both capacities ; 
but it was provided that the professional members 
should be changed according to the nature of the 
business to be transacted. 1 

1 See Gneist, Zur Verwaltungsreform, ch. viii. ; Das Englische Verwal- 
tungsrecht, 3d ed., pp. 420-21, and " Les R.e'formes Administratives," op. cit. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 321 

In the Kreis, or circle, the distinction between the 
spheres of central and local administration is 
again preserved, but both are intrusted to 
the same organs, which exercise therefore a double set 
of functions. These organs, however, are subjected 
to a strict supervision and control, especially on the 
part of the Bezirksausschuss. The chief The Land- 
executive officer of the Kreis is the Land- rath# 
rath, who, although he is appointed by the King, 
is usually, but not necessarily, selected from a list 
presented by the Kreistag, or diet of the circle. He 
is a strictly professional officer, and must have passed 
examinations qualifying him for the higher admin- 
istrative service. As his competence extends to both 
central and local matters, his duties are analogous 
not only to those performed in the province by the 
Oberprasident, but also to those intrusted to the 
Landesdirector. Moreover, he presides over the Kreis- 
tag and the Kreisausschuss. 

The body last mentioned, composed of the Landrath 
and six lay members elected by the Kreistag The g^. 
for six years, is the executive committee of ausschuss - 
the circle, and as such it corresponds to the Pro- 
vinzialausschuss. But it has also functions analogous 
to those formerly exercised by the English justices of 
the peace in the special and quarter sessions. In 
this capacity it hears appeals from the acts of the 
subordinate officials. It is, indeed, the lowest ad- 
ministrative court : and herewith is connected a dis- 
tinction in procedure ; for when an executive matter is 
under consideration, the session is secret and the 

VOL. I. 



322 PRUSSIA. 

members are liable for their acts like other officials ; 
but when an administrative cause is tried, the session 
is public, the procedure is judicial, and the members 
are protected like judges. The preponderance of 
the lay element in the Kreisausschuss has prevented 
bureaucratic routine, while the presence of the Land- 
rath has preserved the interests of the state, and in 
fact this body, which is certainly one of the most 
characteristic features of the new system, is generally 
considered one of the most successful. 

Before turning to the Kreistag there is one officer 
TheAmts- wno mus ^ De considered, because he is in 
vorsteher. rea ]jty a member of the executive govern- 
ment of the Kreis. This is the Amtsvorsteher or 
Amtmann, whose authority extends over a district 
comprising a number of communes, and containing 
about fifteen hundred inhabitants. He occupies a 
position similar to that of an English justice of the 
peace (except that he has no strictly judicial func- 
tions), for he administers the poor and health laws 
and takes charge of the police, having under his orders 
for this purpose the mayors of the communes. He is 
appointed for six years from a list drawn up by the 
Kreistag, and is under the supervision of the Kreis- 
ausschuss. The object of creating this office was to 
take the control of the police out of the hands of the 
hereditary magistrates and intrust it, not to the bu- 
reaucracy, but to the better class of citizens selected 
from the community at large ; and hence the office is 
compulsory and unpaid. Like the English justice of 
the peace, the Amtsvorsteher is chosen as a rule from 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 323 

among the large landowners, who therefore continue to 
perform as officers of the crown the same functions 
they formerly exercised in their own right. 1 

The representative body of the Kreis is called the 
Kreistag, and like most of the other organs TheKreis- 
of local government it is elected for six tag ' 
years, one half of the members retiring every three 
years. It has power to make rules for the adminis- 
tration of local affairs, to create local offices, and to 
establish charitable and other institutions for the bene- 
fit of the Kreis ; but its most important business is 
raising a revenue, which it does by making additions 
to the direct state tax. It will be remembered that 
the expenses of the province, so far as they are not 
defrayed by donations from the state treasury, are 
assessed upon the Kreis, which thus votes the taxes 
required, not only for its own, but also for the pro- 
vincial administration. In order, therefore, to prevent 
extravagance, it is provided by statute that the Kreistag 
shall not, without the consent of the superior authori- 
ties, make an addition of more than fifty per cent, to 
the state tax, or contract any loans not specially au- 
thorized. 

The Kreistag is, however, a body of far greater 
importance than this description of its functions would 
indicate, for it chooses, directly or indirectly, all the 
elective officers of the Kreis, the Regierungsbezirk, 
and the province. It is thus the foundation on which 
rest all the organs of local self-government, except the 

1 C. Bornhak, " The Local Government of Country Communities in 
Prussia," Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Sci., Jan., 1893, p. 7. 



324 PRUSSIA. 

cities and the rural communes, because it is the source 
from which their members are derived. The charac- 
ter of the whole local government depends, therefore,* 
on the method of election to the Kreistag. Before 
1875 the franchise was so regulated that the great 
landowners held almost all the power; but although 
under the new system the three former electoral 
colleges of landowners, peasants, and cities have 
been retained, they have been reorganized with a 
view of preventing any one of them from acquiring 
a decided preponderance. The representatives are 
allotted to these three colleges, or Verbande, as they 
are called, in the following complicated manner : * 
first, they are divided between the cities and the rural 
districts according to population, subject, however, to 
the provision that all the cities in the Kreis shall not 
together elect more than one half of the members, 
or, if there is only one city, it shall not elect more 
than a third. The urban seats are then distributed 
among the cities, the representatives being chosen, 
not by the inhabitants, but by the municipal authori- 
ties ; and lastly the seats that fall to the rural dis- 
tricts are divided equally between the two remaining 
colleges. Of these, the college of the great land- 
owners, or rather the large tax-payers, is composed of 
all persons, natural or corporate, who pay within the 
Kreis and outside of the cities a tax on land or trade, 

1 A representative must be a member of the college by which he is 
chosen; and if, as in the case of the cities and rural communes, the 
election is made by districts, he must be a voter in the district which he 

represents. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 325 

which may be fixed by the Provinziallandtag at any 
sum from one hundred and fifty to four hundred 
and fifty marks, each member of the college having 
a single vote. The third college has a much more com- 
plicated organization. The electors consist, first, of 
all persons who pay within the rural portion of the 
Kreis a small tax on their trade or occupation ; second, 
of delegates chosen by the assemblies of the rural 
communes ; and third, of the proprietors of manors, 
which are treated like communes, but are, in fact, 
fast disappearing. It will be noticed that the method 
of electing the Kreistag is by no means democratic, 
since the suffrage is neither universal nor equal. The 
system is not based on the theory that every man 
ought to have an equal share in the management of 
public affairs, but proceeds on the principle of so 
balancing the various interests in the community that 
no one of them can oppress another. Interests, not 
numbers, are represented, and hence plural voting, 
which has been so much decried of late in England, 
is deliberately sanctioned, for residence in the Kreis 
is not required, but a man can vote wherever he owns 
property or carries on his business. Even the state is 
allowed to cast a ballot if it possesses land, — a privi- 
lege which, in the college of large tax-payers, is also 
extended to women, infants and lunatics acting by 
means of their representatives. 

The government of the Landgemeinde, or small 
rural communities, has recently been simpli- The rural 
fied by the statutes of 1891-92, which apply commu » es - 
to the seven eastern provinces and to Schleswig- 



326 PRUSSIA. 

Holstein. 1 By these acts the franchise, which was 
formerly confined to landowners, has been extended to 
all persons who pay a certain tax or have a certain 
income. Yet the more recent laws are in some ways 
less democratic than the older ones, for all the citizens 
who enjoyed the franchise were formerly treated alike 
and given a single vote apiece, but now one third of 
the total voting power is exercised by each of the 
three classes of tax-payers without regard to numbers. 
This is true of the smaller communes, where business 
is transacted by a mass meeting of all the voters, as 
well as of the larger ones, where it applies to the 
election of a representative council. 2 Owing to the 
small size of the communes, their powers are far 
from extensive, and their organization is comparatively 
simple. 

The mass meeting of citizens, or the representative 
body, as the case may be, regulates the common pas- 
turage, the churches, the schools, and the less important 
roads. It also elects for six years a mayor, known in 
some parts of the country as the Schulze, in others 
as the Gemeindevorsteher or Dorfsrichter ; and it 
chooses in the same way one or more assistants called 
Sckoppen, Gerichtsmanner, or Dorfsgeschworene? 
The Schulze is the executive head of the commune, 

1 For a review of these acts, see C. Bornhak, " The Local Government 
of Country Communities in Prussia," op. cit. 

3 In the western provinces the three-class system does not apply, 
but the larger tax-payers are given a special share of power. There 
appear to be elected councils in all the communes of these provinces. 

3 The choice of these officers can be vetoed by the Landrath with the 
consent of the Kreisausschuss. In the Rhine Province the Schulze is 
appointed by the Landrath. 






LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 327 

and subject to the control of the meeting of citizens, 
or the representative body, he administers the local 
affairs, the Sclibjopen being only his advisers. He is 
also an officer of the central government, and in that 
capacity has control of the police. He is not, how- 
ever, a professional member of the bureaucracy, and 
his position is both obligatory and unpaid. Many of 
the rural communes and manors are too small to per- 
form their duties properly, and, as they have shown 
themselves reluctant to unite voluntarily into larger 
groups, the acts of 1891-92 empowered the superior 
authorities, when necessary, to combine them, either 
for all local purposes, or for certain special ones. The 
change in the law aroused no little opposition on 
the part of the landed gentry, who want to preserve- 
as far as possible the political independence of their 
estates. 

Among the remnants of the feudal system that 
still exist in Prussia, there are many manors 

The manor. 

(Gutsbezirlce). These form communes by 
themselves, the administration of public affairs being 
in the hands of the lord of the manor, who bears all 
the charges at his own expense, and has a right to- 
act as mayor himself or appoint a deputy to fill the 
office, subject, however, in either case, to the approval 
of the Landrath. 

The government of the Prussian cities is regulated 
by statutes which are older than the reform 
laws of 1872, and which are not identical 
for all the different provinces. The general principles, 
however, are much the same in most parts of the 



328 PRUSSIA. 

kingdom. 1 The central organ of the system is the 
The city C ^J counc il; composed of members (Stadtver- 
councii. ordnete) chosen generally, if not always, by 
the citizens voting in three classes, according to the 
amount of taxes they pay, the method of election 
being the same as that employed in the case of the 
Prussian House of Eepresentatives. Of course, this 
system throws a controlling power into the hands of 
a comparatively small number of the richer men, as 
may be seen from the fact that in Bonn, at the elec- 
tions of 1885, the first class of highest tax-payers 
contained only five per cent, of the voters, and the 
second only fourteen and a half per cent. ; so that less 
than one fifth of the voters (or six hundred and thirty- 
three men out of a population of over thirty-five 
thousand), elected two thirds of the council, while the 
remaining four fifths elected the other third. 2 In 
Berlin the proportions are even more unequal, the first 
class containing less than two per cent, of the voters, 
the second less than thirteen per cent., and the third 
eighty-six per cent. Sometimes the inequality is still 
greater, as for example in Essen, which has been built 
up by the Krupp gun-works into a city of nearly one 
hundred thousand people, and yet where the class of 
highest tax-payers consists of only four men. 3 The 
members of the council are, as usual, elected for six 

1 In addition to the authorities already cited, see Leclerc, " La Vie 
Municipale en Prusse," Annates de VEcole Libre des Sciences Politiques, 
1888, p. 492 ; and Albert Shaw, Municipal Government in Continental 
Europe, chs. v. and vi. 

2 Leclerc, /&., pp. 504-5. 
8 Shaw, pp. 307-8. 



THE CITIES. 329 

years, one third retiring every two years. Their num- 
ber varies in the different cities, being on the average 
about fifty ; but in some cases it is much larger, as 
for example in Berlin, where it is one hundred and 
twenty-six. The council has general control of the 
city administration, electing the executive officials, 1 
and directing how the public business shall be con- 
ducted. It has, in fact, an exceedingly wide discre- 
tion, for the statutes do not define the functions which 
the municipality shall exercise, but allow the council 
to undertake whatever public services it sees fit, — a 
power which has been used in a number of Prussian 
cities to establish municipal savings banks and pawn- 
shops, and gas and electric plants for the supply of 
both public and private wants. An authority of such 
an unlimited character is not of course granted without 
some means of supervision, and this is found partly in 
the executive board of the city, which has power to 
veto any measures of the council that require its 
own active participation, and do not fall within the 
ordinary current administration, and partly in the 
Bezirksausschuss, whose consent is required for certain 
important matters, notably for loans and taxes above a 
certain limit. 

The executive body of the city (Gemeindevorstand, 
Magistratsrath, or Stadtrath) is in most of Thecity 
the provinces a board, consisting of a burgo- executlve - 
master and a number of professional and lay mem- 

1 In Hanover the members of the Stadtrath, or executive board of the 
city, take part in the election of their colleagues or successors. In 
Schleswig-Holstein these officers are chosen directly by the citizens. 



330 PRUSSIA. 

bers, the services of the last being obligatory and 
unpaid. 1 The board manages the different depart- 
ments of the administration by means of permanent 
commissions, each of which contains in like manner 
both professional and lay members selected by the 
city council with the approval of the executive board. 
The object of the system is to enlist a large number 
of private citizens in the service of the city, the 
necessary technical knowledge being supplied by the 
presence of the professional officials. The burgomaster 

The burgo- ^ s on ty ^ ne president of the executive board, 
master. an( j ] aas no S p ec i a X functions ; but his office 

is nevertheless the most important one in the city, 
owing to the great influence he derives from his pro- 
fessional training and his long tenure of office. The 
occupation is, indeed, a career, for when a city is in 
need of a burgomaster it advertises for applicants, 
and often takes one who has made a reputation in a 
smaller place. 2 Moreover, the appointment must be 
made for at least twelve years, and may be made for 
life ; but whatever the nominal term of office may be, 
the position is virtually permanent, a good man, it is 
said, being always reappointed. 3 It must be added 
that, as compared with the usual pay of officials in 
Germany, the salary is very large. 

1 In the Ehine Province, the cities have a right to establish either a 
board of this kind, or a single executive officer, — the burgomaster. 
Most of the cities have preferred the latter. Leclerc, ubi supra, pp. 
509-12. 

2 Goodnow, p. 333 ; Leclerc, p. 511; Shaw, pp. 317-19. 

3 From 1850 to 1888 Bonn had only two burgomasters. In fact, the 
first one was reelected for a third term of twelve years, but the govern- 
ment refused to confirm him. Leclerc, p. 510. 



THE CITIES. 331 

Like most of the agencies of local government, the 
Stadtrath exercises a double set of functions, and is 
placed under a double supervision. On the one hand, 
it is the executive organ of the city for matters of 
purely municipal interest, and as such it is controlled 
by the city council, subject to the supervision of the 
Bezirksausschuss. On the other hand, it is intrusted 
with the administration of affairs affecting the whole 
state, and in these it is checked by the Eegierung. 
But unlike the rural communities, this is not considered 
a sufficient guarantee of law and order. The state has, 
therefore, reserved the right to put the city police into 
the hands of a commission appointed by itself, and 
in the case of the large cities it has commonly done so. 1 
As an additional safeguard, moreover, the selection of 
the burgomaster, and in fact of all the professional 
members of the Stadtrath, requires the approval of the 
central government, which, in Bismarck's day, seems to 
have been often refused for political reasons. 

In regard to the actual working of local government 
in Prussia, a foreigner must express an opin- 
ion with great caution. This is especially working of 

„ , . _ . the system. 

true ot the provincial and rural institutions, 
both on account of the comparatively short time they 
have been in operation, and because it is difficult to 
acquire a thorough knowledge of the country districts, 

1 Cf. Shaw, p. 321. When a city has over twenty-five thousand inhab- 
itants, its share of the general or state administration is still further 
increased, because it forms a Kreis by itself. Under these circumstances 
a Stadtausschuss, composed of the burgomaster and four persons elected 
by the city council, is formed to act as an administrative court, and to 
attend to other duties usually performed by the Kreisausschuss. 



332 PRUSSIA. 

or to find any really decisive test of efficiency. The 
best evidence in favor of that part of the new scheme 
consists in the fact that its author, Professor Gneist, 
was well satisfied with its results. 1 In the case of the 
cities, on the other hand, it is possible to form a more 
positive judgment, and this is fortunate, because in 
most countries of the present day the problem of muni- 
cipal government is more pressing and far more difficult 
than that of rural administration. The Prussian sys- 
tem has succeeded in enlisting in the public service 
the best class of citizens. Merchants, professional 
men, and even scholars, think it an honor to sit in the 
council, and reflections are so general that a steady 
progressive policy can be pursued. Among the pro- 
fessional officials, also, capable public servants virtually 
enjoy a permanent tenure of office. In short, politics, 
in the lower sense of the term, seems, as a rule, to have 
very little to do with the administration of the city, 
which is conducted on strictly business principles ; and 
the result is not only honesty, but efficiency and econ- 
omy in a high degree. 2 Unfortunately the govern- 
ment that is best administered is not necessarily perfect, 
and the Prussian municipal system seems to have one 
grave defect. Its excellence is due to the fact that 
the city is governed by the most intelligent and 
thrifty class of citizens, by those who pay the taxes, 
and hence are anxious to see that the revenues are 
carefully and wisely spent. But the preponderating 

1 See Zur Verwaltungsreform, ch. vi. ; Der JRechtsstaat, 2d ed. pp. 314- 
20 ; " Les Rdformes Administratives," ubi supra. 

2 Cf. Shaw, pp. 311, 332-33 ; Leclerc, pp. 516-19. 



RESULTS OF THE NEW SYSTEM. 833 

influence given to the rich seems to be a cause of dis- 
content among the poor. Their indifference is shown 
by the small part of the lowest class of tax-payers who 
take the trouble to vote at municipal elections. At 
Berlin, for example, in 1893, forty-seven and a half 
per cent, of the first class of tax-payers voted, thirty- 
seven per cent, of the second, and twenty-six and a half 
per cent, of the third. 1 In Bonn the disproportion at 
the elections of 1885 was even greater, for sixty-four 
per cent, of the first class and sixty-six of the second 
voted, but only twenty-two of the third. In the last 
of these cities, indeed, it is a striking fact that while 
the proportion of voters in the first two classes had, 
on the whole, increased during the preceding ten years, 
that in the third had steadily diminished. 2 The in- 
difference on the part of the working-classes is not the 
result of mere apathy or lack of interest in public affairs. 
It is a symptom of a graver trouble. The large cities 
of Prussia are teeming with socialists, whose moving 
sentiment is a profound dissatisfaction with the political 
and social condition of the state, and not least among 
their causes of discontent may be placed their small 
share in the municipal administration. The present 
system of local government certainly has not produced 
in the cities the harmony between the different classes 
which was urged as one of the chief reasons for the late 
reforms. 3 

1 Shaw, pp. 307-8. 

2 The abstention of the poor is said to be due partly to the small im- 
portance of their votes, and partly to the fact that, the vote being oral 
and public, the workmen are afraid to declare themselves openly in favor 
of a candidate who is opposed by their employers. Leclerc, pp. 505-6. 

3 The actual municipal system antedates Gneist's memoir, but is quite 



334 SAXONY. 

The smaller German States are far less important 
factors in the Empire than Prussia, and yet a 
German description of the political system of Ger- 
many would not be complete without a refer- 
ence to their institutions. With the exception of the 
three Hanse cities, each of these States has a mo- 
narchical form of government ; and, on the other 
hand, in all of them save the Mecklenburgs, a repre- 
sentative body, elected on a more or less extended 
suffrage, has a general control over legislation and 
finance. The ministers, however, are nowhere respon- 
sible to this body in the parliamentary sense, and hence 
the princes exercise personally a great deal of power. 
Throughout Germany, therefore, the monarchical prin- 
ciple retains its vigor ; and while the representatives of 
the people have obtained a share in the direction of 
public affairs, in no State have they drawn the whole 
conduct of the government into their own hands. Let 
us consider briefly these States in succession. 

The existing Saxon constitution was made in 1831, 
Saxony. but smce that time amendments have been 
sqfm'fpop. Passed extending the franchise and increasing 
8,002,6 the power of the Landtag, 2 — an amendment 

in accord with its principles. On the other hand, when Gneist spoke of 
the harmony of classes, he was referring primarily to rural communities. 
Bornhak, in a memoir of Gneist, comments on the failure of his system 
in this respect. (Ann. Amer. Acad, of Pol. Sci., March, 1896, pp. 94-95.) 

1 The populations given in the text are those of the census of Dec. 1, 
1890. 

2 See Leuthold, SacJisen, in Marquardsen. The constitutions of all 
the German States in force in 1884 (except the Mecklenburgs, which 
have no written constitutions) may be found in Stoerk, Handbuch der 
Deutschen Verfassungen. 



THE KING. 335 

requiring in each chamber the presence of three quar- 
ters of the members and a vote of two thirds of those 
present. 1 In order to prevent conflicts on constitu- 
tional questions, there has been established in Saxony 
and in some of the other German States a special tri- 
bunal, called the Staatsgerichtshof, composed of six 
judges selected by the King, and six members of the 
Landtag, three of whom are chosen by each of the 
chambers. The duties of this body consist in trying 
impeachments, and deciding any disputes about the 
interpretation of the constitution. 

At the head of the state is the King, 2 whose admin- 
istrative authority and power to issue ordinances ap- 
pear to be, if anything, even more extensive than in 
most of the German States. His control over legisla- 
tion is also unusually wide, for not only do all laws 
require his consent, but he can require the Landtag to 
accept or reject a bill without amendment in the form 
in which he chooses to present it. Moreover, in case 
the Landtag fails to vote such supplies as the ministers 
think necessary, he can collect and expend the taxes for 
a year on his own authority. The constitution contains, 
indeed, the customary provision about countersignature 
by a minister ; but in Germany this does not practi- 

1 If the proposal comes from the Chambers and not from the crown, 
the amendment must pass two successive Landtage, a provision which 
shows a curious dread of popular impulse, considering the fact that in all 
cases an amendment requires the royal assent. 

2 The constitution is mentioned before the King for the sake of con- 
venience, but the reader must not suppose that the royal prerogatives 
are in any sense derived from that instrument. On the contrary, accord- 
ing to the German view of the matter, the constitution merely limits the 
exercise by the crown of its own inherent powers. 



336 SAXONY. 

cally limit the personal authority of the monarch, be- 
cause he appoints and removes the ministers at will. 

The Standeversammlung, or Assembly of Estates, 
which must be summoned to a regular Landtag at 
least every other year, consists of two chambers. The 
first contains the royal princes; certain nobles; high 
officials, clerical, educational, and municipal ; members 
appointed by the crown ; and representatives elected 
by certain privileged bodies. The second is composed 
of thirty-seven members from the cities and forty-five 
from the country, each of whom is chosen by direct 
secret ballot in a separate district fixed by the Minister 
of the Interior. 1 The franchise extends to all men who 
pay three marks a year in taxes on land or income, and 
the term is six years, one third of the members retiring 
every two years. The budget and all laws require the 
consent of the Landtag, as do all treaties touching 
matters that fall within its competence. 2 It has also 
power to address the crown, to initiate legislation, and 
to impeach and interpellate the ministers, who have, of 
course, a right to be present and speak on all occa- 
sions. According to the old German custom, it chooses 
a permanent committee of its own members (Landtags- 
ausschuss), which continues to act between the ses- 
sions, and whose chief duty is to help in the administra- 
tion of the public debt. 3 

1 A plurality elects. The members are paid. From a fear of the 
growing power of the Socialists the three-class system of election was 
introduced early in 1896. 

2 If the chambers do not agree about any measure, including the 
budget, a conference committee is appointed, and the report of this 
body is considered as adopted unless rejected by a two thirds majority 
in one of the chambers. 

3 This body exists in most of the German States. 



BAVARIA. 337 

The administrative system and the method of local 
government bear in their general traits a considerable 
resemblance to those of Prussia. 

In Bavaria 1 the constitution, which dates from 1818, 
was modeled a good deal on that of the king- Bavaria, 
dom of Westphalia, and in spite of later ^'ft'op? 
changes bears the trace of French ideas. The 5 ' 594 ' 982<) 
process of amendment is somewhat peculiar, for not 
only is a two thirds vote required in each chamber on 
three separate occasions, but the right of the Landtag 
to propose amendments, which was originally denied 
altogether, is still restricted. 

The King 2 has the usual powers, and there is the 
ordinary provision that his acts must be countersigned. 
By royal ordinance, indeed, the most important acts 
require the signatures of all the ministers. 

The Landtag has two chambers, of which one, the 
Heichsrath, is composed of the royal princes, of crown 
officers and high ecclesiastics, of mediatized nobles, and 
of members appointed by the king in heredity or for 
life. The other, the Ahgeordnetenkammer, consists 
of one hundred and fifty-nine members chosen for six 
years by electors, who in turn are chosen by the peo- 
ple, the franchise extending to all men who pay direct 
state taxes. 3 The electoral districts return from one to 
four members apiece; and, subject to certain general 
provisions of law, are determined not by statute but by 

1 See Von Seydel, Bay em, in Marquardsen. 

2 The present King being insane, the royal power is actually exercised 
by his uncle Luitpold as regent. 

8 The ballot is secret. An absolute majority is required for election. 
The members are paid. 

VOL. I. 



338 BAVARIA. 

the administration, — a power of which the ministers 
have made use more than once to change the districts 
on the eve of election in hopes of obtaining a majority 
favorable to themselves. 

The Landtag, which must be regularly summoned 
every other year, has practically control over the budget 
of expenses. Moreover, all laws which alter existing 
statutes, or touch personal freedom or property, require 
its consent, as do all direct taxes, and all changes in 
the indirect ones. The traces of French influence may 
be seen both in the restrictions placed upon it, and in 
the extent of the powers granted to it ; for the cham- 
bers are forbidden to debate matters that do not fall 
within their competence, or to issue addresses to the 
people, but, on the other hand, they are given unusual 
authority in the matter of holding inquests, requiring 
information, and interpellating the ministers. 1 

The Bavarian local government does not resemble 
the Prussian so closely as does that of Saxony, but, 
except in the cities, there is a similar effort to give a 
special share of power to the larger tax-payers, although 
the principle is worked out in a ruder form. 2 

The political history of Bavaria since 1869 has 
hinged upon the struggle on the part of the Ultra- 
montanes to make the cabinet responsible in the parlia- 

1 A minister must answer an interpellation or explain his reasons for 
not doing so. His answer may be followed by a debate, but no motion 
can be made at that time. The ministers have, as usual, a right to speak 
in the chambers. 

2 In Bavaria, there is a system of administrative courts. There is also 
a Staatsrath with advisory functions, but its duties are not very im- 
portant. 



POLITICAL PARTIES. 339 

mentary sense of the term. 1 In 1869, and again in 
1870, they succeeded in forcing out of office one or 
two ministers who were peculiarly obnoxious to them, 
but with these exceptions their efforts have failed, — 
a result which is the more extraordinary because they 
have had a small but almost uninterrupted majority 
in the popular house, while the ministers, although 
not always in harmony among themselves, and by no 
means the representatives of any party, have pursued 
in the main a decidedly liberal policy. 2 The success of 
the ministers in maintaining themselves in office in the 
face of a majority often bitterly hostile has been due 
partly to their dexterity in making timely concessions, 
partly to the help of the Reichsrath, which has usually 
been on their side, but above all, to the determined 
support of the crown. The entrance of Bavaria into 
the Empire, for example, was due to the personal con- 
victions of King Louis, and it may be doubted whether, 
if the cabinet had been responsible to the deputies, 
Bavaria would ever have taken that step. The un- 
willingness of the King to select his ministers among 
the Clericals is due to the fact that they are extreme in 
their views. In no other country of Europe, except 
Belgium, do the priests take such an active part in pol- 
itics, the wide suffrage rendering their influence over 
the peasants a controlling factor at elections. Hence 

1 See a series of articles by Miiller, in Unsere Zeit for 1870, 1874, 
1883, 1887, and 1891. 

2 At the elections of July, 1893, the Ultramontanes lost their majority. 
The seats they lost were won, however, not by the Liberals, but by the 
Social Democrats and the Peasants' League, both radical bodies, who now 
hold the balance of power. 



340 WURTEMBERG. 

the government cannot accept the guidance of the 
Clericals without submitting to the dictation of the 
church; and even Prince Luitpold, who had formerly 
been in sympathy with them, found himself compelled 
on becoming Eegent to follow the policy of the late 
King. 

The difficulties in the political situation at home 
have to some extent thrown the King into the arms 
of the Emperor, and brought about a greater harmony 
between the courts of Munich and Berlin than would 
probably have existed otherwise. The result is, how- 
ever, due to another cause also ; for, in speaking of her 
position in the Empire, it must be remembered that 
the reserved rights of Bavaria are greater in appear- 
ance than in reality, and that her King has more 
the show than the power of an independent sovereign. 
As has been remarked, he has a right to appoint 
ambassadors without the power to make treaties, and 
he has an army which he cannot command in time 
of war. 1 His share in the federal administration is 
chiefly advisory, and hence his influence depends to a 
great extent on the cordiality of his relations with the 
imperial government. 

The constitution of Wurtemberg is one of those 

granted in 1819, shortly after the formation 

berg. of the old Germanic Confederation : but it 

(Area,* 7,528 . ■- 

sq. m. ; pop., has, oi course, been seriously mocliriecL at 

2 036 522 ) 

different times, a two thirds vote of both 
chambers being required for amendment. 

1 "La Baviere et l'Empire Allemand," Junon, Annates de I'Ecole 
Libre des Sciences Pol, 1892, p. 283. 

2 See Gaupp, Wiirttemberg, in Marquardsen. 



THE KING AND THE ASSEMBLY. 341 

The King can do no political act (except conferring 
titles of nobility) without the signature of a minister, 
and all his most important acts must be considered 
by the whole cabinet. Acting through his ministers, 
however, his authority is unusually extensive, even for 
a German sovereign ; for he has the sole right of ini- 
tiative in financial matters, and his power to take meas- 
ures for the safety of the state in case of necessity 
is not limited to the times when the chambers are not 
in session. Nor does an ordinance issued under this 
power need to be submitted to them for approval. 1 

The legislature, which still bears the old name of 
Standeversammlung, or Assembly of Estates, consists 
of a House of Lords, which has a composition similar 
to that of the Upper House in Bavaria, and a House 
of Deputies, containing ninety-three members elected 
for six years. Of these ninety-three, thirteen are 
members of the landowning nobility chosen by their 
peers, nine are high dignitaries of the Protestant and 
Catholic churches, and one is the Chancellor of the 
University, while the seven principal cities and the 
sixty-three rural districts elect one deputy apiece by 
manhood suffrage. 2 This is the only lower house in 

1 It is unnecessary to repeat that the crown has power to dissolve the 
Assembly, and that all laws require its assent, as these rights exist in every 
monarchical German State. The same thing is true (except in the two 
Mecklenburgs) of the necessity of a countersignature for all acts of the 
crown, and of the right of the ministers to speak in the chambers. 
Curiously enough, the Assembly of Wurtemberg, on account of its jeal- 
ousy of the ministers, has refused to give them a general privilege of 
addressing committees. 

2 The election is direct and the ballot secret, the choice being made by 
absolute majority and ballotage. As usual in Germany, the age of voting 
is twenty-five years. The members are paid. 



342 WURTEMBERG. 

Germany that contains privileged members, and also 
the only one where members are elected by direct 
universal suffrage. 1 The Assembly must be summoned 
to meet once in three years, but is, in fact, called 
together every year. All laws, appropriations, and 
taxes, 2 and certain treaties, require its consent; and, 
in accordance with historic traditions, which formerly 
prevailed in all the German States, the public debt is 
managed by officials chosen by the houses in joint 
session and confirmed by the King, these officials being 
under the direction of committees of the Assembly. In 
order to prevent the houses from becoming too inde- 
pendent, they are forbidden to hold any communica- 
tions, either directly or through their committees, with 
any state officials or other persons except the ministers ; 
and although they may interpellate the latter, they 
cannot oblige them to answer. There is a standing 
committee, elected by the houses in joint session, whose 
duty consists in watching over constitutional rights, 
directing the management of the public debt, and giv- 
ing advice on financial matters when the Assembly is 
not in session. 

Local self-government in Wurtemberg is much less 
developed than in Prussia, and is far more under state 
tutelage. 3 

1 That is the only one in any German State that has two chambers. 

2 The House of Lords has no power to amend the budget passed by 
the deputies. If it rejects this budget, the positive and negative votes in 
both houses are counted, and the majority thus found is decisive. 

3 There is in Wurtemberg a system of administrative justice, and 
there is a special court to decide constitutional controversies, part of 
whose members are appointed by the King, and part elected by the 
chambers. 



POLITICAL PARTIES. 343 

The reader will no doubt have observed that the 
political organization of Wurtemberg is very far from 
liberal, even if judged by German standards, and yet 
the actual policy of the government has been by no 
means unprogressive. 1 The cause of this paradox is 
to be found in the character of the people, for there 
is no party in the state that can properly be called 
reactionary, but there is a powerful body of radicals, 
imbued with French ideas, who have repeatedly de- 
manded a single representative chamber elected by uni- 
versal suffrage, and it is chiefly a dread of the extreme 
principles of these men that has prevented any revi- 
sion of the existing constitution. The result is that, 
while the undemocratic forms have been retained, the 
country has been ruled by a ministry of moderate pro- 
gressive views supported by the Conservatives and 
National Liberals. This condition has lasted many 
years, for the present head of the cabinet, von Mitt- 
nacht, has held a portfolio continuously since 1867, 
and has had no serious difficulty with the Assem- 
bly since the war with France in 1870. Two things 
about the political history of Wurtemberg are especially 
noteworthy. The first is that, as in the other South 
German States, politics turn to a great extent on 
imperial questions, interpellations and motions being 
constantly made in regard to the instructions of the 
delegates to the Bundesrath. The second is that, 
unlike Bavaria, but like most other continental states, 
the deputies are divided not into two great parties, 

1 Some account of the recent political history of Wurtemberg may be 
found in Unsere Zeit for 1869, 1875, 1883, and 1891. 



344 BADEN. 

but into a number of groups. In Wurtemberg there 
are four of these, — the Conservatives, the National 
Liberals, the Democrats, and the Clericals ; the first two 
supporting the government, and the others forming 
the opposition. 

Baden. l n Baden 1 the constitution dates from 

s^m.'fpop ., 1818, but has been frequently amended, any 
1,657,867.) cnan g e requiring a two thirds vote of both 
chambers. 

The Grand Duke has the usual powers of a German 
monarch, and there is the universal provision about 
countersignatures. 

Of the two chambers of the Landstande, one is 
composed of the princes of the ducal house, of a 
Catholic bishop and a Protestant dignitary, of a pro- 
fessor chosen by each of the two universities, of the 
heads of the great noble families, of eight members 
elected by the nobles of the second grade, and finally, 
of eight members appointed by the Grand Duke for 
the session. The other chamber consists of sixty-three 
members, elected by universal suffrage and indirect 
secret ballot, in fifty-six districts which are not exactly 
equal in population, but are based to some extent on 
taxation. The term of this chamber is four years, one 
half of the members being elected every two years. 
The Landstande must be summoned at least every 
other year. All taxes, loans, and expenditures, 2 and 



1 Schenkel, Baden, in Marquardsen. 

2 In case of necessity, the government has the usual power to spend 
money without the consent of the Landstande, subject to their subsequent 
approval. In case of war, it can also levy taxes. Whenever a budget has 



INSTITUTIONS AND PARTIES. 345 

all laws which affect the freedom or property of the 
citizens, require its consent. This leaves a considerable 
room for legislation by ordinance; and although the 
domain in which the government makes laws without 
the consent of the chambers has been constantly nar- 
rowing in practice, the crown still controls, as in most 
of the German States, the organization of the adminis- 
trative service, except so far as its power is limited 
by the necessity of providing for the salaries in the 
budget. 

The system of local government in Baden resembles 
closely that of Prussia. In it the larger tax-payers are 
given an especial share of power, chiefly by means of 
the three-class method of election. Baden has also a 
series of administrative courts similar to the Prussian, 
and in fact she was the first of the German States 
to create independent tribunals of this character. 1 

Baden has been on the whole the most liberal of the 
German States, and, except for the reactionary period 
between 1850 and 1860, the government has steadily 
pursued a progressive policy. It has also been de- 
cidedly national in its tendencies. As early as 1860, 
both the ministers and the chambers favored a closer 
union of Germany ; and although the Grand Duke was 

not been voted, the government can continue to collect the existing taxes 
for six months. A provision of this nature is common, especially in the 
smaller States. If the upper chamber rejects the budget, the same 
practice is followed as in Wurtemberg. 

1 Before any official can be sued or prosecuted, his superior can require 
from the highest administrative court a decision whether the act com- 
plained of is contrary to law, and the opinion so given is binding on the 
ordinary courts. 



346 BADEN. 

forced by circumstances to take the side of Austria in 
1866, his troops displayed such a masterly inactivity 
that the general was accused of being a traitor to 
the South German allies. After the war, Baden was 
anxious to be admitted to the North German Con- 
federation, and, as her geographical position made this 
impossible for a time, her government maintained a 
close harmony with Prussia, until the war with France 
brought about the union of all Germany in the Empire. 
In the Chamber of Deputies the ministers are op- 
posed by the Clericals and Democrats, and rely for 
support upon the Liberal or National Liberal party, 
whose majority, sometimes overwhelming and some- 
times narrow, has continued without a break for more 
than thirty years. While, however, this party has, on 
the whole, acted in harmony with the cabinet, the 
relation between the two has been very different from 
that which exists in a parliamentary system. The 
majority has occasionally rejected or modified seriously 
the measures proposed by the government, and in 1880 
it forced out of office a minister whose concessions to 
the church it did not approve. At one time, indeed, 
the Liberals complained that a new cabinet had been 
formed without consulting them or including any of 
their members, and that the government did not 
sufficiently consider their opinions ; but the breach was 
healed by the aggressive attitude of the Clericals and 
Democrats, which caused the Liberals to rally to the 
support of the ministers against their common enemies. 3 

1 This was in 1868. The nearest approach to a parliamentary change 
of ministers occurred in 1860, when a reactionary cabinet was replaced 



HESSE. 347 

In Hesse/ again, the constitution, originally made in 
1820, though seriously modified, is still in Hesse 
force, the amendments requiring a two thirds gq'm'-p^ 5 
vote of both chambers. "*' 88U > 

At the head of the government is the Grand Duke, 
who rules by means of a cabinet composed of a Minis- 
ter of State and two other chiefs of departments. 

The first chamber of the Standeversammlung, or 
legislature, is similar to that of Baden, 2 while the sec- 
ond is chosen by electors, in their turn chosen by 
men who pay an income tax. There are in all fifty 
members, of whom ten are allotted to the cities, and 
the rest to the forty country districts, the urban and 
rural districts being carefully separated according to 
the German custom, in order to prevent the city voters 
from being swamped by the peasants. The members 
are elected for six years, one half being renewed 
every three years. The legislature has the same 
powers as in Baden ; but, in order to avoid deadlocks 
between the chambers, there is a curious provision, 
resembling that which regulates the voting of the 
budget in Wurtemberg and Baden. In case one of 
the chambers rejects a bill, the government may 
submit it at the next session; and if one chamber 

by a liberal one in consequence of a vote of the chamber ; but the 
change would probably not have taken place against the personal opinions 
of the Grand Duke. Miiller has given a sketch of the history of Baden, 
in his articles in Unsere Zeit, in 1872, 1883, and 1891. 

1 See Gareis, Hesse, in Marquardsen. 

2 It is interesting to note that among the families possessing hereditary 
seats is still found that of Baron Biedesel, who commanded the Hessians 
in the American Revolution. 



348 OLDENBURG. 

again refuses to pass it, the government may never- 
theless treat it as accepted, provided the whole number 
of affirmative votes in both chambers exceeds the total 
negative vote. 1 

The local government and the system of administra- 
tive justice have been copied from Prussia. 

The constitution of Oldenburg, 2 made in 1852, may 
Oldenburg be c l asse( l among those in which, from a 
i^™'. 2 ™ 9 German point of view, the amount of self- 
3o4,968.) government is quite large. It has worked 
smoothly and well; but in framing it a peculiar diffi- 
culty was presented by the geographical division of 
the territory, for the State consists of one large tract 
of land and two small outlying districts. One of these, 
the principality of Birkenfeld, lies far to the south, 
while the other, the principality of Lubeck, is close 
to the city of that name. Each of the two princi- 
palities is administered by a government board subordi- 
nate to the ministers, and has an elected council, which 
has a right to make suggestions and complaints about 
affairs specially affecting the principality, and must, 
indeed, be consulted in regard to them. These local 
organs have, therefore, an advisory voice about meas- 
ures that have a peculiar local interest, but the final 
determination rests with the Grand Duke and the 
Landtag which represents every part of the State. 
This system, although not perfectly satisfactory, has 
in practice given a sufficient influence to the opinions 
of the outlying districts. In Oldenburg, as in all the 

1 This does not apply to amendments of the constitution. 

2 Becker, Oldenburg, in Marquardsen. 



THE GRAND DUKE AND THE LANDTAG. 349 

monarchical German States that remain to be con- 
sidered, the Landtag consists of a single chamber. It 
is composed of thirty-four members 1 chosen by the 
tax-payers, the method of election being indirect, and 
the ballot secret. The term is three years, and a 
session must be held at least once during that period. 
The inconvenience that might arise from the infre- 
quency of its meetings is to some extent obviated 
by its election of an Ausschuss, or committee, which 
is charged with the duty of watching over the inter- 
ests of the Landtag and seeing that its votes are 
carried out, and which is authorized to consent to 
new laws and appropriations that are urgent but not 
important enough to warrant a special session of the 
Landtag. 

The officials in Oldenburg are subject to the ordinary 
courts to a greater extent than is usual in Germany ; 
but, on the other hand, there are no administrative 
courts, — an omission which Becker explains by point- 
ing out that the evil which has made these courts a 
necessity in other German States, that is, the abuse 
of administrative power for party purposes, does not 
exist here. The conflicts between the different classes 
which have brought so much bitterness into party strife 
in Germany find no place in Oldenburg, for there is 
neither a powerful nobility nor a large city population. 
In fact, the Landtag, which has become more and 
more exclusively composed of peasants, is no longer 
divided into parties; and the Grand Duke, who has 
been a wise and philanthropic ruler, has scarcely any 

1 The members are paid. 



350 BRUNSWICK. 

difficulties of a political nature with the representatives 
of the people. 

In Brunswick 1 the constitution was made in 1832, 
Brunswick an( ^ re( l u i res f° r amendment a vote of two 
(Area, 1,^4 thirds of all the members of the Landesver- 

SC[« lilt j P^Pm 

403,773.) sammlung. The nominal head of the state 
is the hereditary Duke, but the present possessor of 
the crown is not the actual ruler of the country. The 
late Duke was the last member of his branch of the 
family, and the next heir, the Duke of Cumberland, 
son of the King of Hanover, refused to acquiesce in 
the annexation of that kingdom by Prussia. Now the 
government of Brunswick by a prince hostile to Prussia, 
and out of sympathy with the political organization of 
Germany, would have produced constant friction ; and 
therefore an amendment to the constitution was adopted 
in 1879, providing for a regency on the death of the 
reigning Duke. "When this happened in 1884 Prince 
Albert, a member of the Prussian royal house, was 
chosen Kegent, and exercises the ducal powers. 

The Landesversammlung is elected for four years, 
and must be called together twice as often. 2 Its com- 
position is singularly complicated. It contains forty- 
six members, of whom ten are chosen by the cities, 
twelve by the rural communes, three by the clergy of 
the Evangelical church, and twenty-one by various 
classes of tax-payers. The powers of the body are no 
less complex than its organization. Statutes which 

1 Otto, Braunschweig ', in Marquardsen. 

2 Until the amendment of March 26, 1888, it was elected for six 
years, one half being renewed every three years. 



ANHALT. 351 

amend the constitution, change organic institutions, or 
affect the financial, military, criminal, or private civil 
laws, require its consent, but it need only be consulted 
about others, including police regulations to which 
small penalties are attached. The legislative power is, 
however, further complicated by the existence of an 
Ausschuss elected by the Landesversammlung, and pos- 
sessing an independent right to give its consent to a 
large class of statutes when that body is not in ses- 
sion. 1 

The local government resembles that of Prussia, and 
there is a system of administrative courts, the members 
of which are, however, all government officials. 

The constitution of Anhalt 2 dates from 1859, when 
the State was divided between two dukes; Anhalt 
but after it became united under one head if r Jf\ 9 i!l 

SQ» ID.. , pop.-) 

by the extinction of one of the ducal lines in 271 ' 963 -) 
1863, a number of important amendments were passed. 
The Duke rules by means of a Ministry of State, 
which is composed of a single minister and a number 
of councillors. 

i When the constitution is violated, and in certain other prescribed 
cases, the Ausschuss can call the legislature together. In addition to 
the powers mentioned in the text, the Landesversammlung can initiate 
legislation, demand redress of grievances, and impeach public officials. 
It also elects for life a Landsyndicus, who acts as its clerk and general 
adviser, having for this purpose a right to examine the administration of 
the finances. In case the taxes are not voted, the government has a right 
to continue to collect them for another year. As is not uncommon in 
the German States, it is provided that the Landesversammlung must not 
refuse the appropriations needed for expenses constitutionally incurred, 
but may make its own estimate of their amount. It is not clearly settled 
what happens in case of disagreement on this point. 

2 Pietscher, Anhalt, in Marquardsen. 



352 ANHALT. 

The Landtag, elected for six years, consists of thirty- 
six members, of whom two are appointed by the Duke, 
eight are chosen by the persons who pay a tax of 
twenty-one marks on land, and two by those who pay 
a tax of fifteen marks on trade, while the remaining 
twenty-four members are chosen by universal suffrage, 
indirect elections, and secret ballot, fourteen of them 
being allotted to the cities, and ten to the rural districts. 
The Landtag must be summoned at least once in three 
years, but in fact meets every year. Its approval is 
required for the budget and for all laws which affect 
the constitution or the rights or property of citizens, 
and in practice no laws are enacted without its consent. 
It can amend bills ; and although it has strictly no right 
of initiative, it can request the enactment of statutes. 

While dealing with Anhalt, it may be observed that 
in this duchy, as in many of the smaller German 
States, the administration of justice is not entirely 
conducted by the courts of the State. Thus the 
duchy has no supreme court of her own, an appeal 
from her highest court lying to one of the neighboring 
Prussian tribunals. This method of combining for 
the maintenance of courts, which is a striking illustra- 
tion of the absence of petty jealousy on the part of the 
German sovereigns, gives to the smaller States a better 
judiciary than they could afford by themselves, and 
also confers on the whole country some of the advan- 
tages of judicial centralization. 

The constitution of Waldeck 1 was made in 1852, 
and modified in 1878. Amendments require a two 

1 Bottcher, Waldeck, in Marquardsen. 



V 



WALDECK. 353 

thirds vote of the Landtag. The nominal head of the 
state is the Prince, who still retains the insig- 
nia of the reigning sovereign, but has really (Area, 433 
surrendered all his powers into the hands of 57,28i.') 
the King of Prussia, in consideration of the assumption 
by the latter of a part of the expense caused by the union 
of Germany and the adoption of universal military 
service. This arrangement was made in 1867 for ten 
years by a treaty ratified by the Landtag. At the expi- 
ration of that time it was renewed for ten years more, 
and finally in 1887 was prolonged indefinitely, subject 
to termination on notice given by the Prince. By its 
terms the King of Prussia takes the place of the Prince 
for the whole internal government, except so far as the 
church and the domains of the crown are concerned. 
The Prince reserved, it is true, the prerogative of par- 
don, and the right of giving his consent to changes in 
the constitution and to statutes, but he agreed at the 
same time that he would make no use of these powers 
that might be disagreeable to Prussia. 1 He retained also 
the nominal control of foreign relations, including the 
right to make treaties and to appoint the member of 
the Bundesrath, but these powers are exercised through 
the Landes director, who is appointed by the King of 
Prussia. The Prince can, indeed, object to the person 
selected for the office, but in that case his authority is 
limited to choosing between two other persons nomi- 
nated by the King. During the continuance of the 

1 The formula for the promulgation of laws recites that they are en- 
acted by the King of Prussia in accordance with the treaty, and with the 
consent of the Prince and of the Landtag. 

vol. 1. 



354 LIPPE-DETMOLD. 

treaty, theref ore, all the sovereign rights of the Prince 
are practically transferred to the Prussian monarch. 
The latter appoints the officers of state, who take an 
oath of allegiance to him ; and in fact the administra- 
tion is conducted largely by Prussian officials. Justice, 
moreover, is administered in the last instance by the 
Prussian courts; and, in short, the country is ruled in 
many respects like a Prussian province, a condition 
which is emphasized by the fact that the acts of the 
King are countersigned not only by the Landesdirector 
in accordance with the laws of Waldeck, but also by a 
minister at Berlin as acts of the Prussian crown. 

The Landtag, which is chosen for three years, and 
must be summoned annually, is composed of fifteen 
members elected indirectly by the three-class system. 1 
This system is also applied in the local government, 
which bears a strong resemblance to that of Prussia. 

The constitution of Lippe-Detmold 2 was made in 
1836, but the organization of the Landtag 

Lippe-Det- - n . in . 

moid. was changed in lo7o, a two thirds vote of 

(Area 469 

sq. m.'; pop., that body being required for amendments. 
The Prince rules partly through a single 
Minister of State, and partly by means of a govern- 
ment board, an old-fashioned institution, formerly very 
common in Germany. 

The Landtag, which has the usual powers, is com- 
posed of twenty-one members chosen by direct vote 
and secret ballot on the three-class system. 3 It is elected 

1 The voting is oral. The members are paid, and the powers of the 
body are broader than in many of the States. 

2 Falkmann, Lippe, in Marquardsen. 

3 The members are paid. 



SCHAUMBURG-LLPPE. 355 

for four years, and must be summoned at least every 
other year. 

In population, Schaumburg-Lippe 1 is the smallest of 
all the German States, but the hereditary 
rrmce enjoys the powers ot a sovereign on burg-Li PP e. 
equality with the rest. The constitution, sq.m.';po P ., 
which dates from 1868, was amended in 1879. 

The Landtag has a curious organization. It con- 
tains fifteen members, of whom two represent the crown 
domains and are appointed by the Prince, one is chosen 
by the landowning nobility, another by the clergy, and 
a third by the lawyers, doctors, and schoolmasters, while 
of the other ten three are elected by the cities, and 
seven by the rural districts. Its term is six years, but 
it meets annually. The yearly budget, all laws and all 
treaties which affect commerce or impose burdens or 
duties on the state or on individuals, require its con- 
sent, and it has the power of initiative. It also elects 
an Ausschuss of three members to watch over its 
rights while it is not in session. 

We now come to the Thuringian States, a group of 
eight small principalities lying in the centre 
of Germany, broken fragments of the terri- rfngian 
tory possessed by the Ernestine branch of the 
House of Saxony. The territory has, indeed, been 
subdivided in a singular way, most of these little prin- 
cipalities consisting of two or more tracts of land, 
which are separated from one another. They retain, 
however, some joint institutions, which recall their 
common origin. Thus the four Saxon duchies still 

1 Bomers, Schaumburg-Lippe, in Marquardsen. 



356 SAXE-WEIMAR. 

maintain a common university at Jena, and the Ober- 
landesgericht at the same place acts as a court of 
appeal for all Thuringia (except Schwarzburg-Sonders- 
hausen), as well as for some of the adjoining parts of 
Prussia. 

Saxe-Weimar, 1 the largest of these principalities, has 

the oldest constitution in Germany. It was 

Weimar. granted in 1816, but the powers of the 

(Area, 1,388 ° 7 . f, 

sq.m.; pop., Landtag were enlarged in looO, amendments 
requiring a two thirds vote of that body and 
the presence of three quarters of the members. 

The sovereign is the Grand Duke, who is assisted 
by a cabinet composed of the Minister of State and two 
other heads of departments, all his acts being counter- 
signed by one of these three officials. 

The Landtag consists of thirty-one members, of 
whom one is elected by the landowning nobility, four 
by the other landowners who have an income of three 
thousand marks, five by persons having an income of 
the same size from other sources, and twenty-one by 
electors chosen by universal suffrage. Professor Meyer 
is of opinion that the privilege given to the rich classes 
has proved an advantage by insuring the presence 
in the legislature of men of culture ; but he thinks 
that the indirect method of choosing the representa- 
tives of the people at large has had the bad effect of 
making the voters indifferent, and to this system he 
attributes the fact that in the larger cities scarcely 
ten per cent, of the voters go to the polls. One finds 
it a little difficult to understand why the placing of an 
1 Meyer, Sachsen- Weimar- Eisenach, in Marquardsen. 



SAXE-MEININGEN. 357 

additional cog-wheel in the electoral machinery should 
produce that result. But a sufficient cause of a lack 
of interest on the part of the voters may, perhaps, be 
found in the fact that the popular representatives form 
only two thirds of the Landtag, whose powers, more- 
over, are rather limited, and whose regular sessions are 
held only once during its term of three years, — a term 
for which the budget also is voted. 

In the local government, the principle of giving 
special privileges to the higher tax-payers is applied 
in the smaller communes, but not in the larger ones. 
In none of these small states are there any administra- 
tive courts. 

In Saxe-Meiningen * the constitution dates from 1829, 
but has been amended, notably by acts passed 
in 1873 and 1875. The Duke governs by Meiningen. 
means of a minister, and a number of other sq.m. ;P op., 

223, 832.) 

heads of departments, of which there have 
been of late years only two. 

The Landtag, whose powers are somewhat broader 
than usual, contains twenty-four members ; four being 
elected in two districts by persons who pay a tax of 
sixty marks on land, four in four districts by persons 
who pay certain other taxes, and sixteen in as many 
separate districts by all the other citizens voting directly. 
The term is six years, and the budget is triennial, but 
in fact the Landtag meets every year. 

As in Saxe-Weimar, the higher tax-payers have a 
privileged vote in the smaller communes, but not in 
the cities. 

1 Kircher, Sachsen-Meiningen, in Marquardsen. 



358 SAXE-COBUKG-GOTHA. 

The two duchies of Coburg and Gotha * are not con- 
Saxe- tiguous, although each of them comprises 

and Gotha. * rac ^ s °^ l an( l inclosed in the territory of the 
sqfm.'^pop., °ther. Until 1852, moreover, their only po- 
206,513.) Htical connection was the fact that they had 
the same sovereign, but in that year the Duke, after 
trying in vain to consolidate them, succeeded in getting 
a common constitution adopted which created a union 
of a strangely federal character. Certain matters are 
declared to be common to both duchies. These are : 
the relations to the Duke, to the Empire, and to for- 
eign countries ; the constitution ; the joint Landtag ; 
the ministry ; the courts ; the archives ; and the laws 
governing the conduct of officials. The matters not 
common to both duchies are the ordinary internal 
administration, the schools, churches, and finance. 

The Duke 2 governs by means of a joint ministry, 
which is, however, divided into two sections, one for 
the special affairs of each duchy, the joint affairs being 
confided to the section to which the Minister of State 
happens to belong. This officer is at the head of the 
whole ministry, and in practice is treated as solely re- 
sponsible for all the acts of both sections. The subor- 
dinate officials are partly joint and partly several, but 
are governed in all cases by the common administra- 
tive laws. 

The legislative system is even more complicated. 
Each duchy has a separate Landtag, elected by indirect 
vote for four years by all citizens who pay a direct tax 

1 Forkel, Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha, in Marquardsen. 

2 The present sovereign is the Duke of Edinburgh. 



SAXE-ALTENBURG. 359 

and have households of their own. These bodies meet 
regularly in the first and fourth years of their terms, 
and attend to all matters which are not common. The 
Landtag of Coburg contains eleven members, that of 
Gotha nineteen, and these thirty meet together at least 
once every four years to form a joint Landtag, whose 
competence extends to those affairs which are made 
common by the constitution, or are subsequently 
declared to be such. In order, however, to protect 
the representatives from Coburg from being outvoted 
by their colleagues, it is provided that no amendment 
shall be made in the constitution, no addition shall be 
made to the common affairs, and no change shall be 
made in the administrative organization whereby an 
office is transferred from one duchy to the other, 
without the consent of a majority of the representa-- 
tives from each duchy. 

The finances, as we have seen, are not common to- 
the two duchies, and hence the joint Landtag does not 
vote a budget. It merely approves the estimates for 
joint expenses, and thereupon these are inserted in the 
budgets of the separate Landtags in the proportion of 
three tenths for Coburg and seven tenths for Gotha. 

Considering the size of the community, one feels, 
in examining this complicated mechanism, as if he 
were studying entomology with a microscope. 

The constitution of Saxe - Altenburg, * which was 
made in 1832 and modified in 1870, can be Saxe-Aiten- 
amended by the Duke and the Landtag with- (Area, 511 

. ,. mi -,-v -. sq. m. ; pop. 

out any special formalities. The Duke gov- 170,864.) 

1 Sonnenkalb, Sachsen-Altenburg, in Marquardsen. 



380 SAXE-ALTENBURG. 

erns with the aid of a cabinet, composed of the Minis- 
ter of State and two other heads of departments. 

In the Landtag, which is elected for three years, the 
representation of property is carried out more elabo- 
rately than in any other State. Of the thirty mem- 
bers, nine are chosen in as many districts by the largest 
tax-payers, the line being drawn so high that only one 
person is admitted into this class for every five hundred 
inhabitants of the district. The other twenty-one seats 
are distributed among seven districts (three urban and 
four rural) returning three members apiece, one deputy 
being elected by each of the three classes into which 
the remaining tax-payers of the district are divided. 
The franchise extends, therefore, only to persons who 
pay a tax, and these are divided into four classes ac- 
cording to the amount of taxes they pay, the highest 
class choosing nine representatives and the other three 
seven apiece. 1 The powers of the Landtag are more 
circumscribed than usual. It has no authority to ini- 
tiate legislation, but only a general right of petition ; 
and, apparently from a fear that an assembly chosen 
by tax-payers might have a tendency to parsimony, 
it is provided that the Landtag shall not reduce the 
appropriations for current expenses below the amounts 
granted in the previous budget without the consent of 
the government. 2 

1 The three-class system of election is also applied in the local govern- 
ment, which is not unlike that of Prussia. 

2 The budget is voted for three years at a time. There is a provision, 
which is common in the smaller States, that in case of a failure to agree 
on the budget the government can continue to collect and expend the 
existing taxes for another year. In Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt this can be 
done for three years. 



SCHWARZBURG-RUDOLSTADT. 361 

In Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, 1 the constitution, made 
in 1854, and amended in 1861 and 1870, can Sehwarz _ 
be changed only by a two thirds vote of the stTJt Rudo1 " 
Landtag when three quarters of the members ]^S , ; ^. 
are present. The sovereign of the State is 85,863) 
the Prince, whose cabinet consists of a Minister and 
three other heads of departments. 

The Landtag contains sixteen members, four of 
whom are elected in separate districts by persons who 
pay one hundred and twenty marks in direct taxes, the 
remaining twelve being chosen in separate districts by 
all the other tax-payers. 2 The term and the budgetary 
period are three years, and unless there are pressing 
matters that require attention, only a single session is 
held during that time. One would suppose that a body 
of sixteen members living near together could meet so 
easily that it would hardly be necessary for them to 
appoint a committee to represent them between the 
sessions ; but the ancient practice is nevertheless fol- 
lowed of electing an Ausschuss which not only pre- 
pares business, and watches over the constitutionality 
of public acts, but also has authority by unanimous 
vote to sanction the enactment of statutes. 

The constitution of Schwarzburg - Sondershausen 3 
dates from 1857, and can be amended only Q , 

7 J feenwarz- 

by a two thirds vote of the Landtag repeated Je^umsen. 
after an interval of fourteen days. The cabi- sq.m a, ; 3 pop., 
net of the Prince consists of three members, 75 ' 510) 

1 Klinghammer, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt , in Marquardsen. 

2 The higher tax-payers have no special privileges in the local govern- 
ment. 

3 Schamback, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, in Marquardsen. 



362 SCHWAKZBURG-SONDERSHAUSEN. 

the control tending always to fall into the hands of 
the chief minister. 1 

The Landtag is composed of five members elected 
directly by the highest tax-payers, five elected indirectly 
by all the other voters, and not more than five ap- 
pointed by the Prince for fife. The term is four years ; 
but a session must be held every other year, although 
the budget is voted for four years at a time. The 
legislature has the usual powers, 2 and it elects an Aus- 
schuss, which prepares its business and can be intrusted 
with other duties. In local government the three-class 
system of election is applied. 

In Eeuss-Schleiz 3 the constitution rests on the laws 

of 1852 and 1856, modified by the electoral 

Schieiz. law of 187 1. 4 This little principality de- 

sq.m. ;pop., serves admiration from all historians for sim- 

119,811.) . 

plifying the nomenclature of its sovereigns 
by the artless device of naming all the scions of the 
princely house Henry. 5 The boys receive successive 
numbers in the order of their birth, and each new 
century begins with number one. Thus the reign- 
ing Prince is Henry XIV., and his father was 
Henry LXVII. Unfortunately, this is the only val- 
uable contribution to the art of government that Reuss 

1 As in many of the smaller states there are more departments, but in 
practice they have not all different heads. 

2 As is commonly the case in the smaller states, the rules of procedure 
are not made by the Landtag at its pleasure, but are fixed by statute, 
and hence cannot be changed without the consent of the Prince. 

3 Muller, Reuss jiingerer Linie, in Marquardsen. 

4 No particular formality seems to be necessary for amendments. 

5 The practice is not new, and in fact dates back to the eleventh cen« 
tury. 



REUSS-SCHLEIZ AND REUSS-GREIZ. 363 

has made. In other respects her political system does 
not differ materially from that of the other little Ger- 
man States. 

The Prince rnles with the help of a cabinet, consist- 
ing of a minister and two other heads of departments ; 
and the Landtag, whose powers are fully as broad as 
usual, is composed of the head of the princely line of 
Keuss-Kostritz, of three members chosen by the highest 
tax-payers, and of twelve more elected directly and by 
secret ballot by all other men twenty-six years old who 
pay a small tax. 1 Its term is three years, and it must 
be summoned at least once during that period to vote 
the triennial budget. It chooses an Ausschuss to rep- 
resent it between the sessions. 

The constitution of Reuss-Greiz 2 was made in 1867, 
and cannot be amended without a two thirds 
vote of the Landtag, and the presence of Greiz. 

i pi i a • i (Area, 122 

three quarters ot the members. As in the sq.m. : P op., 

62 754.) 

other Eeuss, all the men of the princely fam- 
ily are named Henry ; the numbers, however, running 
from one to a hundred and then beginning again. 
The Prince carries on the administration not through 
ministers, but by the ancient method of a government 
board, whose members act together, and are not at the 
head of separate departments. 3 

The Landtag, whose term is six years, one half being 
renewed every three years, contains twelve members. 

1 The three-class system does not apply to the election of the commu 
nal councils, but half the members of those bodies must own land. 

2 Liebmann, Reuss dlterer Linie, in Marquardsen. 

3 His acts must, however, be countersigned. 



364 THE TWO MECKLENBURGS. 

Of these, three are appointed by the Prince, two are 
chosen directly by the great landowners, three are 
elected indirectly by secret ballot by all the tax-payers 
of the cities, and the remaining four are returned in 
the same way by the rural districts. The powers of 
this body are decidedly limited, for it has no initiative, 
but only a right to request legislation ; and in regard 
to the budget, which is voted for three years at a time, 
the estimates proposed by the government can be re- 
jected only by a two thirds vote, so that the crown has 
only to obtain the support of two members in addition 
to its own appointees in order to pass any budget it 
pleases. 1 

The duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklen- 
Meckien- burg-Strelitz have been placed at the end of 
Sehwerin. the Hst of monarchical states, because, unlike 
^m.' ; 5 pip 5 , the rest, their organization remains distinctly 

' feudal and unaffected by modern constitu- 

hurg- tional ideas. 2 They are subiect to different 

Strelitz. ii! i i . . . . 

(Area, i,i3i grand dukes, but their institutions are mter- 

sq. m. ; pop., ° 

97,978.) laced in such a way that it is impossible to 
describe them separately. It would, in fact, puzzle 
a political philosopher to say whether, before their 
nationality became merged in that of Germany, they 
were two nations or one; for although the treaty of 
1701 declares each Grand Duke independent and 
sovereign in his own territory, there is a common Land- 
tag, a common court of appeals, and several other com- 
mon institutions protected by the fundamental laws. 

1 Even if the budget is rejected, the crown can continue to collect the 
taxes for another year. 

2 Busing, in Marquardsen. 



THE GRAND DUKES AND THE LANDTAG. 365 

The constitution is not embodied in any single in- 
strument, but rests upon the " Union " of 1523, the 
" Reversales " of 1555, 1572, and 1621 ? and the com- 
pacts of 1755 and 1817, the most important of all these 
being the Vergleich of 1755. The organization created 
by these documents is in its main traits as follows : — 

The executive power in each duchy is exercised by 
the Grand Duke, except that the administration of a 
few matters is committed to joint officials acting in 
behalf of both states. For legislation, on the other 
hand, there is a common Landtag, which can be 
summoned to meet only by the Grand Duke of Meck- 
lenburg-Schwerin, but must be called together by him 
at least once a year. Either monarch, after giving 
notice to the other, may submit measures to it, and as 
a rule the two governments agree on the bills to be 
presented. 

The Landtag is strictly an assembly of estates, based 
on the tenure of land. These estates are the Hitter- 
schaft, or owners of knights' fees, all of whom, nearly 
eight hundred in number, have a right to sit, although 
few of them actually attend ; 1 and the Landschaft, or 
municipal authorities of the cities, which appear in the 
persons of deputies commissioned by the city magis- 

1 Only a little more than sixty of these belong to Strelitz, and the rest 
to Schwerin. The exceeding disparity in the numbers from the two 
duchies is largely due to the fact that the principality of Ratzeburg, 
which forms a considerable part of Strelitz, is not included in the terri- 
tory to which the constitution applies, and is not represented in the 
Landtag. The same thing is true of the cities of Wismar and Neustre- 
litz. The connection of Ratzeburg with Strelitz, which is more than a 
mere personal union under the same crown, is one of the many anomalies 
to be found in these duchies. 



366 THE TWO MECKLENBURGS. 

trates. 1 In several of the cities, however, the burgo- 
master is ex officio the deputy ; and as that officer is 
usually appointed by the crown, these cities have in 
reality no control over their representatives. 

The process of legislation is based upon the medi- 
seval idea that laws are made by the crown with the 
consent of the persons whose rights are directly 
affected ; and hence the laws are divided into three 
classes : first, those which concern exclusively the ducal 
officials, or apply only to the domains of the crown, — 
a district comprising about two thirds of the territory 
in each duchy. In regard to these, the power of the 
crown is absolute. Second, those which affect the 
rights or privileges of the estates or their members, 
including laws that extend the revenues of the crown 
beyond the regalia majora. For these the consent of 
the Landtag is required. 2 Third, those which do not 
directly affect the rights or privileges of the estates, 

1 Including the seaport Rostock, there are forty-eight of these cities, 
of which seven lie in Strelitz. 

2 Each new law is in effect a contract proposed by the crown and 
assented to by the Landtag. The communications between the govern- 
ment and the estates are entirely in writing as the ministers do not 
appear in the Landtag, the procedure being as follows : the crown sends 
a message proposing a measure to the Landtag, which thereupon votes a 
declaration or memorial containing, in fact, an answer, accepting, reject- 
ing, or modifying the measure. If the crown is satisfied, it enacts the 
law as amended. If not, it answers the memorial in a rescript; and this 
process is repeated until an agreement is reached, or it is evident that an 
accord is impossible. The debates seem to be conducted without the 
slightest idea of order, every one speaking whenever he pleases and as 
long as he likes, so that in times of excitement as many as twenty orators 
have been known to address the house at one time. For a humorous 
account of the procedure, see Bib. Univ. et Revue Suisse, May, 1895, pp. 
396-400. 



LEGISLATION AND FINANCE. 367 

and do not fall within the first category. About these 
the Landtag must be consulted, but its consent is not 
necessary. The principle that the consent of the 
persons directly interested is alone required for legis- 
lation is, indeed, carried farther than this; for if a 
measure affects only one estate or one district, or even, 
as it seems, one city, the consent of the representatives 
of that estate, district, or city is enough, — a survival 
in complete form of the political ideas of the thirteenth 
century. The estates sit as a single chamber, each 
Eitter and each city having one vote, and as a rule the 
majority decides; but in order to protect the cities 
from being swamped by the far more numerous Bitter, 
it is provided that either estate may demand the Itio in 
partes, that is, a separate vote by each estate. 1 

The financial system of the duchies is extremely 
complex, for the revenues are of three kinds, which 
are kept distinct and managed quite separately. The 
receipts from the regalia majora, and the taxes raised 
on the crown domains, forming decidedly the largest 
source of income, are entirely under the control of the 
crown in each duchy. Then there are certain funds 
and permanent taxes managed for both duchies in 
common by officials appointed by the Landtag. This 
is the smallest source of income, and the proceeds 
appear to be used to defray part of the interest on the 

1 There are Konvokationstage and Deputationstage; that is, assemblies of 
estates for a single duchy or district, whose functions extend to matters 
that do not concern the whole Landtag. They can be summoned by 
either of the Grand Dukes, but in fact this is not often done. The 
estates elect an Engere Ausschuss, which represents them when they are 
not in session, and has charge of certain funds. 



368 HAMBURG, BREMEN, AND LUBECK. 

public debt. Finally, the balance of expenses is covered 
by taxes voted by the common legislature, but adminis- 
tered in each duchy by a separate board appointed partly 
by the Grand Duke and partly by the joint Landtag. 

The political organization of the Mecklenburgs has 
a peculiar interest, because it is a survival of mediseval 
institutions which has retained its vitality to the pres- 
ent day. It is a fragment of the thirteenth century 
projected into the nineteenth. The absence of repre- 
sentative assemblies in these duchies has been a sore 
grievance to the German Liberals, who have more 
than once carried through the Eeichstag proposals to 
amend the imperial constitution so as to require every 
State to have a legislative chamber elected by the 
people. The Bundesrath, however, has always rejected 
the proposals. This might lead one to suppose that 
the objection to change came from the governments 
of the duchies ; but such is not the case, for the Grand 
Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin has on several occa- 
sions tried to establish a representative chamber, and 
in every case his efforts have been frustrated by the 
refusal of the Eitterschaft to surrender its privileges. 

The governments of the three Hanse cities have all 

gone through the same process of evolution, 

(Area,i 58 from their former patrician condition : and they 

sq. m. ; pop., *■ y ^ 

Bremen are now s0 mucn alike that it is enough to 
(Area,^99sq. describe the political organization of Ham- 
Lubtek! burg, and point out in the notes the chief 
s^fm.'- 1 pop., points of difference to be found in the other 
76 ' 485,) two. 1 The present constitution of Hamburg 

1 Wolffson, Hamburg ; Sievers, Bremen; and Klugmann, Lubeck, in 
Marquardsen. 



THE SENATE. 369 

was made in I860, and revised in 1879. 1 Amend- 
ments require a three quarters vote in each of the two 
political organs of the state, the Senate and the Bur- 
ger schaft? 

The executive power is vested in the Senate, which 
occupies, in fact, a position analogous to that of the 
monarch in the other German States, subject, however, 
to the important limitation that it cannot dissolve the 
Biirgerschaft. It appoints the officials, has the usual 
right of the crown to issue ordinances to complete the 
laws, appoints the delegate to the Bundesrath, and 
gives him his instructions. It chooses every year from 
its members a burgomaster, but this officer only presides 
over the body, and is in no sense the head of the ad- 
ministration. On the contrary, the executive work is 
divided among the senators, one or more of whom are 
placed at the head of each of the nine departments. 
The Senate consists of eighteen members, of whom 
nine must be learned in the law, and seven must have 
been merchants. 3 They are chosen for life, are paid, 
and are obliged to accept the office, but are permitted 
to resign after they have served six years, or have 
attained the age of seventy. 4 The method of election 
is peculiar, for when a vacancy occurs, the Senate 
chooses four of its members to serve on a nominating 

1 Those of Bremen and Liibeck were made in 1854 and 1851 respec- 
tively, and both were slightly modified in 1875. 

2 In Bremen an affirmative vote of a majority of all the members in 
each body is enough. 

3 In Bremen ten of the eighteen must be learned in the law, and five 
must be merchants, In Liibeck the Senate consists of fourteen members. 

4 In Bremen, service is not compulsory. 

VOL. I. 



370 HAMBURG, BREMEN, AND LUBECK. 

committee, and the Burgerschaft does the same. 
These eight men draw up a list of four candidates, 
from whom the Senate selects two, and one of the two 
is then elected senator by the Burgerschaft, — a pro- 
cedure which, as Wolffson points out, practically 
enables the Senate to control the election. 1 

The Burgerschaft is a representative assembly of one 
hundred and sixty members, elected in three categories 
by direct vote and secret ballot. The first category 
consists of eighty members, chosen in forty districts by 
all the citizens who pay a tax on an income of six 
hundred marks. The second contains forty members, 
chosen in twenty districts by the landowners; the 
third, forty members chosen at large by all men who 
are or have been judges, officials, or members of cham- 
bers of commerce or trade. 2 The service is unpaid, and 
as a rule compulsory. The term is six years, one half 
of the members being renewed every three years ; 3 but 
the sessions are not fixed by law, for the body meets 

1 In Bremen, on the other hand, the controlling power is in the hands 
of the Burgerschaft- for that body is divided by lot into five sections, each 
of which nominates three candidates, and chooses one elector. These 
five electors, together with an equal number chosen by the Senate, select 
three of the fifteen candidates, from whom the Burgerschaft elects the 
Senator. In Lubeck all the senators and an equal number of men 
chosen by the Burgerschaft meet to elect the new senator. 

2 The Burgerschaft in Bremen consists of one hundred and fifty mem- 
bers, of whom fourteen are elected by the university graduates, forty-two 
by the merchants, manufacturers, and tradesmen, twenty-two by the 
artisans and craftsmen, forty-four by the other inhabitants of the city, 
and twenty-eight by the residents of the suburbs, some of them on a 
property qualification. In Lubeck, the body contains one hundred and 
twenty members, elected by all the citizens in ten districts. 

8 In Lubeck one third of the members are renewed every two years. 



THE BURGERSCHAFT. 371 

whenever it sees fit, and except in the summer sits 
almost every week. 

All laws, treaties, and financial matters require the 
consent both o£ the Senate and the Biirgerschaft, 1 
and each body has the right of initiative. 2 The Biirger- 
schaft also takes an indirect part in the administration, 
for there are attached to most of the executive de- 
partments deputations or commissions, composed of 
senators and of unpaid members chosen for a term 
of years by the Biirgerschaft, and these bodies have 
powers that are partly executive and partly advisory. 3 
The Biirgerschaft elects, moreover, an Ausschuss, in- 
trusted with the duty of watching over the execution 
of the laws ; but owing to the frequency of the meet- 
ings of the representative assembly itself, this com- 
mittee does not appear to have much importance. 4 

In Hamburg the governments of the city and the 
state are now identical, 5 except that the suburban com- 
munes still retain a certain amount of local self-gov- 
ernment. Both Hamburg and Bremen had a right 

1 In case of disagreement, either body can demand a joint committee, 
which has an absolute power of decision, but this strange procedure has 
never been used. The Senate can appoint commissioners to attend the 
sittings of the Biirgerschaft, but rarely does so, although it is thought 
that a free use of the power might prevent needless waste of time. 

2 In Liibeck, at least, the Biirgerschaft makes little use of this right. 

3 Of Bremen, Dr. Sievers remarks that there is no hierarchical bu- 
reaucracy, but that the various deputations are prevented from pursuing 
inconsistent policies by close personal relations, and by referring all 
important matters to the Senate and Biirgerschaft. 

4 In Liibeck this body is much more important, for it considers all the 
measures to be submitted to the Biirgerschaft by the Senate, and chooses 
the members of various commissions. 

5 This is not quite true of Bremen, and still less of Liibeck. 



372 HAMBURG, BREMEN, AND LUBECK. 

under the constitution of Germany to remain free ports 
outside the customs union ; but, as we have already- 
seen, when treating of the Empire, both cities have 
surrendered this privilege, save as regards a strip of 
ground along the quays. 

Like some other German States, the three Hanse 
cities have combined for the better administration of 
justice. By a treaty, renewed for ten years at a time, 
there is a common court of appeal which now sits at 
Hamburg, the presidents being appointed by concurrent 
action of the three Senates, and the other judges by 
each State in proportion to the shares in which the 
expenses are borne. 

The political organization of Hamburg, with the 
carefully selected body of life senators at its head, 
produces a continuity of tradition and a watchful care 
for the future, which insures prudence, economy, and 
foresight. But, on the other hand, the fact that all 
three of the deputies to the Reichstag from the city 
are Social Democrats — a clear indication in Germany 
of political discontent among the working-classes — 
seems to show that the system does not satisfy a large 
section of the community. In short, the government 
of Hamburg has the same merits and defects that are 
found in the other great cities of the country. 

When the French provinces west of the Rhine were 

ceded to Germany in 1871, after the war with 

Lorraine.i France, they were placed by the force of cir- 

(Area, 5.600 . tip 

sq.m. ;P op., cunistances in an anomalous and unfortunate 

1,603,506.) . . . 

position. The violent objection of the mhab- 

1 Leoni, Elsass-Lothringen, in Marquardsen. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE. 373 

itants to the annexation, and their consequent hostility 
to the Empire, forbade any plan for creating a new 
State with the autonomy and the privileges of the other 
members of the Confederation. On the other hand, 
a proposal to incorporate the provinces with any exist- 
ing State would have aroused instant jealousy; nor could 
any State, except Prussia, have annexed them without se- 
rious danger to its own internal tranquillity. The only 
possible course, therefore, was to treat the country as a 
dependency of the Empire, under the direct control of 
the imperial authorities. With this object the act of 
June 9, 1871, gave the executive power to the Em- 
peror, reserving the legislative for the Bundesrath and 
the Eeichstag. In response, however, to a demand for 
self-government, an imperial decree of October, 1874, 
created a Landesausschuss, with advisory powers, 
and in 1877 a statute was passed providing that laws 
for Alsace-Lorraine might be enacted by the Emperor 
without the consent of the Reichstag, if the Bundes- 
rath and the Landesausschuss agreed upon them. 1 
Finally, on July 4, 1879, another statute enlarged the 
Landesausschuss, gave it a right to originate legisla- 
tion, and authorized the appointment of a Statthalter 
to exercise the powers previously confided to the im- 
perial Chancellor. At present, therefore, the executive 
power is vested in the Emperor, who acts through the 
Statthalter, while the laws are made by him with the 
consent of the Bundesrath and the Landesausschuss. 
They may, however, still be made at any time by the 

1 For the power of the Emperor to make ordinances, see the act of 
June 25, 1873. 



374 ALSACE-LORRAINE. 

Bundesrath and Reichstag, which are thus enabled to 
disregard local opinion entirely if they please. 1 

The Statthalter is appointed and removed at pleasure 
by the Emperor, to whom he is directly subordinate. 
He is, in fact, the minister for Alsace-Lorraine, and 
as such he countersigns the acts of the crown. He 
governs by means of a cabinet, composed of a secretary 
of state and four heads of departments; and, in accord- 
ance with the French traditions, he is assisted by a 
council of state with merely advisory powers. 

The Landesausschuss, which must be summoned 
every year, is composed of fifty-eight members, of 
whom thirty-four are chosen by the elected provincial 
councils of Upper Alsace, Lower Alsace, and Lorraine ; 
four by the municipal councils of each of the four 
largest cities; and the remaining twenty by electors 
chosen by the councils of the rural communes. Con- 
trary to the usual sensible practice in Europe, the 
members must be residents of the districts they repre- 
sent, and those who are chosen directly must also be 
members of the council by which they are elected. The 
deputies are chosen for three years, but they are not 
all elected at the same time except when the body is 
dissolved by the Emperor. 

In the local matters the old French system has been 
in the main preserved, all the executive officials being 
appointed by the government, and the local councils 

1 Any change in the fundamental laws or the statutes passed by the 
Reichstag must be made in this way ; when any other laws are so made 
they require the sanction of the Emperor, as a part of the ordinary legis- 
lation of the province. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE. 375 

being elected by universal suffrage. 1 In regard to the 
central officials, on the other hand, the German law 
has been introduced which protects them from arbitrary 
removal. 

The provinces participate to some extent in the 
government of the Empire, for they elect fifteen repre- 
sentatives to the Beichstag, and since 1879 the Statt- 
halter has been authorized to send delegates to the 
Bundesrath, but as envoys so appointed would be 
under the control of the Emperor, and hence for prac- 
tical purposes additional Prussian delegates, they have 
merely been given a right to speak without votes. 

The motives for annexing Alsace-Lorraine were 
chiefly military, but there was also no little talk about 
restoring the long-lost brothers to the German family. 
The brothers, however, although for the most part 
German by race and language, cried piteously at the 
thought of being united to the Fatherland, and the 
government has been obliged to use its utmost energies 
in trying to reconcile them to their lot. How far these 
efforts have succeeded it is difficult to say. The 
French writers declare that nothing has been accom- 
plished in changing the sentiments of the people, while 
the Germans insist that if the result has not been quite 
satisfactory, the progress has been very considerable. 
A recent English observer, who may be supposed to be 
impartial, is of opinion that at bottom the popular sen- 
timent has undergone little change, and attributes this 
to the fact that although the Germans have ruled the 

1 The French system of administrative justice has also been preserved 
with some modifications. 



376 THE GERMAN STATES. 

land well and kindly, they have shown towards the 
people a lack of confidence and sympathy, while the offi- 
cials, who are mostly Prussians, have been domineering, 
and used their arbitrary powers in a despotic spirit. 1 
Blum, on the other hand, in his recent history of the 
German Empire, 2 says that the mild government of the 
first Statthalter, General von Manteufel, was a failure, 
but that since 1885, the more severe policy of his suc- 
cessor, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst (the present 
Chancellor of the Empire), has borne better fruit. In 
favor of this view, it must be observed that candidates 
friendly to the Empire won in 1890 four, and in 1893 
five, out of the fifteen seats in the Reichstag, a result 
that is, however, perhaps due less to any direct effect 
on the natives than to the large emigration of French 
sympathizers, whose places have been taken by Ger- 
mans from the other side of the Rhine. 

This brief survey of the governments of the smaller 
States is enough to show the great vitality of the 
monarchical principle throughout Germany ; for al- 
though the representatives of the people exert every- 
where, except in Mecklenburg, a certain influence on 
public affairs, the guiding and controlling force is 
always vested in the Prince. Moreover, democracy 
does not appear to be gaining ground. During the 
last twenty years the German constitutions have under- 
gone few changes, and the diets have shown little 
inclination and still less ability to curtail the preroga- 
tives of the crown. One reason for this is, of course, 

1 Henry W. Wolff, West. Rev., Dec., 1890. 

2 Das Deutsche Reich zur Zeit BismarcJcs, pp. 637-57. 






VITALITY OF MONARCHY. 377 

the prevailing faith in the monarchical form of govern- 
ment. Another is the peculiar character of the Con- 
federation, which has deprived the States of most of 
their legislative power, but left their executive func- 
tions almost intact, and hence has diminished the 
authority of the diets far more than that of the princes. 
Still a third reason is to be found in the subdivision of 
parties, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 



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MBBBSBXi 



